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No* 8* 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
UNITED STATES ARMY. 


REPORTS 

FIRST BATTALION OF ENGINEERS 

AT THE 

MANEUVERS AT FORT RILEY, KANS., 

1908 . 


MAJOR SMITH S. LEACH, 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS, COMMANDING. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 
— 1904 .— 

















/ 



No* 8* 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
UNITED STATES ARMY. 


2 v 


REPORTS 



AT THE 



1903 . 


MAJOR SMITH S. LEACH, 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS, COMMANDING. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 

— 1904 .— 

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) 




















CONTENTS, 


PAGE. 

Reports of Major Leach _ l 

Capt. Flagler_ 19 

Capt. Deakyne_ 25 

Capt. Raymond___ 29 

Lieut. Stickle-,,.,_ 38 
































REPORTS OF MAJOR LEACH, CORPS OF ENGI¬ 
NEERS, COMMANDING THE BATTALION. 


Headquarters, 1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

November iy, IQOJ. 

The Adjutant General, 

Department of the Missouri, 

Omaha , Nebr. 


SIR: 


1. I have the honor to submit the following report of the partici¬ 
pation of the 1st Battalion of Engineers in the recent maneuvers at 
Fort Riley, Kansas. 

2. Pursuant to the provisions of par. 3, Department S. O. 178, 
c. s., the Battalion left this post at 8:30 A. M., September 23d, and 
marched to Fort Riley, arriving there at 1:00 P. M. October 2d. 
The trip was made in nine marches of approximately equal length. 
No march was made on Sunday, September 27th, the Battalion 
remaining in camp at Kilmer on that day. Five days’ rations were 
carried from the post, and five days’ were received by rail at Silver 
Lake. A tool wagon was taken with each company, and six wagons 
of the heavy train, three ponton, one trestle and two chess, accom- 
pained the Battalion. The full division of bridge train could not be 
taken on account of lack of sufficient animals. With the exception 
of one day, the weather was fine. The roads were in excellent con¬ 
dition for teams the entire distance. The march from Silver Lake to 
St. Mary was made in a rain, beginning with a drizzle in the morning 
and increasing in violence, the Battalion entering St. Mary in a down¬ 
pour. On this and subsequent days the roads were very heavy for foot 
troops, and the foot sections were put on the track of the Union Pacific 
R. R., accompained by an officer. The track was well ballasted so 



2 


that stepping the ties was not necessary, and inarching on the track 
was found to be easy on the men but hard on their shoes, as the 
ballast was composed of a burnt clay containing many hard and gritty 
particles which cut the shoes rapidly. 

3. A topographical officer was detailed for the march. The route 
followed was, with few slight variations, the one traversed by the 
Battalion last year. It was thought best not to attempt a new route 
this year in view of the great destruction of bridges and culverts caused 
by the summer floods. The work of the topographical officer was 
limited to checking, correcting and extending the map of last year. 
The data obtained will be incorporated in a new edition of that map 
as soon as time permits the work to be done. 

4. The total enlisted strength of the Battalion on September 
23d, the date of departure from the post, was 348, accounted for as 


follows: 

Present. 

Left at Fort Leavenworth: 

Sick in hospital,. 15 * 

In confinement,. 6 

Barrack guard,. 4 

Extra duty,. 11 

Special duty, . 6 

Total,. 42 

Leaving with the battalion,. 251 

Total present. 293 

Absent. 

Detached service West Point, Ky. 16 

Detached service Fort Riley, Kas. 13 

Detached service Fort Crook, Neb. 19 

On furlough, . 2* 

Absent without leave,. 1 

Other causes, . 4 


Total, . 55 


Total enlisted strength of the Battalion September 23d, 348 

Sixty-five public horses, 84 draft mules, and 21 pack mules accom¬ 
panied the Battalion. Seventeen horses and eight pack mules were 
with the detached section at Fort Crook. 





























































































































































































































3 


5. On arrival at Fort Riley, the Battalion went into camp on the 
site designated, where it remained until the close of the maneuvers. 

I he location of the site was slightly better than last year, the im¬ 
provement made possible by a change in the positions of the hydrants. 
I he police and sanitary conditions of the camp were satisfactory at 
all times. 

Lieut. H. W. Stickle with the mounted section of Company A 
and a company pack train reached Fort Riley from Fort Crook on the 
3d, and after reporting to the Commanding General of the post, 
joined the Battalion in camp. 

6. Saturday and Sunday, the 3d and 4th, of October, were 
devoted to making and improving camp. A strong wind was blow¬ 
ing on Friday when the Battalion arrived which prevented the proper 
alignment of tentage. This was corrected the next day, drains dug, 
frames for kitchen flies erected, and stone hauled from the quarry on 
the hill for paving the areas adjacant to the hydrants and kitchens. 

On Sunday afternoon, accompanied by Lieut. Stickle, commanding 
Company A, to which company the bridge train had been assigned 
for the trip, I made a reconnoissance of the river and selected two 
alternative sites for the bridge. One of these sites landed on the 
reservation on the Smoky Hill side, and the other did not. I ascer¬ 
tained definitely during the evening that the private land at the sec¬ 
ond site was under lease and available for landing the bridge, and as 
that site presented decidedly the best conditions, it was adopted. 
Monday morning the entire Battalion was turned out and the opera¬ 
tions of hauling the bridge material from the park near the siding to 
the bank of the river at the bridge location, the construction of 
approaches at the hither end of the bridge, and the marking and con¬ 
struction of roads from the maneuver camp to the bridge were simul¬ 
taneously prosecuted. Measurement of the river showed that it 
would be possible with the material at hand, consisting of that brought 
from Fort Leavenworth and the division of heavy train shipped from 
Washington Barracks, D. C., to lay two bridges at the then stage of 
the river with approaches so arranged that the bridges could be used 
on a rise up to three or four feet. As a reserve proposition, it was in¬ 
tended in case the river rose more than the amount named, to com¬ 
bine the two bridges in one, getting a length sufficient to cross the 
river at any stage short of a general overflow. 

6. The first bridge was laid on Tuesday the 6th. A gale of wind 
was blowing downstream, which made the work of placing the boats 


4 


and anchors difficult, and the carrying of material on to the bridge 
still more difficult. Chess had to be kept edgewise to the wind with 
great exactness. Two men who allowed the wind to catch the chess 
which they were carrying, were blown overboard. Under these con¬ 
ditions, the work was slow and was not finished until afternoon. 

As soon as a crossing could be effected, a company of the Battalion 
was put to work on the other shore laying out and constructing roads 
from the bridge to the beaten trail on Smoky Hill flat. 

The first bridge constructed and communication established 
with the other shore, the building of the second bridge was post¬ 
poned in the hope of receiving a car of the Washington shipment 
which had been lost and had not arrived. This car contained all of the 
small parts of the division, lashings, rack sticks, cables, etc. The 
car did not arrive, it may be remarked, until th,e last day of the 
maneuvres, and at my suggestion was returned to Washington Bar¬ 
racks with the seals unbroken. The second bridge was laid on Oc¬ 
tober 15, the lacking material being supplied in part by fabrication on 
the spot and in part by stripping the light division, which was parked 
in camp, and intended for use in the problems should a bridge train 
be called for. The second bridge was placed a short distance below 
the first, parallel to it, and connected to it by lines stretched between 
the corresponding boats. The upstream anchors were attached to 
the upper bridge, the downstream anchors to the lower bridge. The 
upper bridge was set apart for mounted organizations and wagons; the 
lower bridge for foot troops. Separate approaches were made and 
connected with separate roads leading from the maneuver camp to 
the bridge on one side and from the bridge to the Smoky Hill flat on 
the other side, so that it was possible to move two columns in the 
same direction, or in opposite directions from the camp to the flat 
without crossing or any other interference. These facilities for quick 
movement of troops were, as a rule, not utilized by the commanding 
officers. In a majority of cases, all the troops of a command ap¬ 
proached the bridge by a single road and left it in the same way. 

During the crossing and recrossing of the entire division for the 
review the two bridges were in simultaneous use by troops only 11 
minutes out of about two hours going and about the same porportion 
of time returning. If the second bridge had not been laid, there 
would have been no appreciable interference with the movement of 
troops as actually conducted. 

The bridges were in almost constant use during dayight hours from 




















the time they were laid until they were taken up. No restrictions 
were imposed upon their use beyond posting notices at each end of the 
bridge to the effect that all non-military persons crossed the bridge at 
their own risk. Hay wagons, milk w r agons, vegetable wagons, wood 
wagons, and an incessant stream of sightseers crossed and recrossed 
the bridge. Some statistics of the use of the bridges by troops, pre¬ 
pared by the commanding officer of the bridge company, are appended 
to this report. 

One important departure from established types of construction was 
made in laying the upper or wagon bridge. It was designed to meet 
difficulties encountered last year and consisted in a third or middle 
rail laid over the middle balk and lashed to it through the chess 
which were notched at necessary places to allow the lashings to pass 
through. This proved to be a most valuable addition, and is 
earnestly recommended for adoption as a part of standard construction 
of bridges for heavy traffic. Without this middle rail, the particular 
chess which is loaded at any given instant, is deflected downward 
carrying the balk with it. The chess on either side not loaded re¬ 
main practically straight, supported by the side balk. They not only 
take no share of the load, but also form an obstruction against which 
animals are very apt to stumble. With the middle rail, the edges of 
the chess are always in juxtaposition. When one is deflected, the 
adjacent ones are carried down with it, preventing them from getting 
out of register and also utilizing them to carry part of the load. 

On account of the excessive traffic on the wagon bridge, the floor was 
covered with hay to reduce the wear on the chess. This covering was 
found to possess other advantages in lessening the noise and especially 
in encouraging timid animals which seemed to feel that where they had 
hay to walk on, it was safe to go. 

The disposition of the bridges, the wagon bridge upstream and the 
foot bridge downstream, was adopted from force of circumstances and 
not from choice. It would probably be better, having in view the pos¬ 
sibility of accident in the two classes of traffic, to have the position 
of the bridges reversed. 

The provisional division, from the conditions in which it was 
organized, necessarily contained an abnormally large proportion of 
cavalry and artillery, and it would have been better in this case, and 
will probably be better in the general case, to have both bridges con¬ 
structed alike, so that all classes of traffic could be sent over either 
one at will. 


6 


v 

Cavalry and artillery habitually crossed the bridge without dis¬ 
mounting. Artillery, it may be remarked, is the easiest load which 
a ponton bridge has to carry. The deflections, it is true, are some¬ 
what more abrupt than those for cavalry or infantry, but the oscilla¬ 
tions, which are really the more serious strain on the bridge, are 
practically nothing. The hardest load on a bridge is cavalry, and the 
most troublesome load, to those engaged in its operation, is a pack 
train. I have observed that the oscillations of the bridge under 
cavalry mounted are not greatly more severe than those for cavalry dis¬ 
mounted, and are not so great but that they can be kept within 
reasonable limits by careful attention to the condition of the bridge. 
The frequent alternations of moisture and dryness made it imposssible 
to keep the balk lashings tight enough to give requisite lateral stiff¬ 
ness under mounted cavalry. The boats were therefore converted into 
a horizontal truss by two diagonal cables passing over the bows and 
sterns alternately and crossing under the middle of each bay. These 
could be set up by racksticks to any desired tension and gave very con¬ 
siderable increased stiffness to the bridge. 

Aside from oscillations, the strains on the bridge are, in my opin¬ 
ion, less under cavalry and artillery mounted than under the same 
arms dismounted and leading. The intervals are much better kept 
and the deflections of the bridge are much more regular. There is 
also the very important practical advantage that the rate of motion 
for these arms mounted is about 25 per cent more than the rate dis¬ 
mounted, and the time of crossing is reduced in proportion. As a 
result of my experience last year and this year, I am convinced that 
the traditional requirement that mounted organizations shall lead 
across a ponton bridge is unnecessary, if not undesirable. 

8. Besides the construction of the ponton bridges, other pieces 
of work were undertaken and entirely or mainly completed before the 
arrival of any other troops. Company B improved the main road in 
the vicinity of One Mile Crossing by some gravel fill and ditching. 
This company also collected materials and fabricated gabions, fas¬ 
cines, hurdles, etc., for use in the intrenchment problem. 

Company C constructed a pile bridge over Three Mile Creek, and 
reconstructed one and repaired the others of the beam bridges on One 
Mile Creek. This company also collected material and constructed 
two spar bridges one-fourth size, one single and one double lock, over 
a ravine between the Engineer camp and the Battalion hospital. 

Company D, in addition to preparing roads to and from the ponton 


bridges, repaired the existing bridges over the gullies and main chan¬ 
nel of One Mile Creek between the Division Headquarters and the 
main camp. 

During the maneuver period the Battalion, or parts of it, partici¬ 
pated in the problems as follows: 

In the afternoon of Friday, October 16th, Company D, Captain 
Raymond, marched to bivouac with the first brigade, and accom¬ 
panied that brigade during the execution of the problem on the fol¬ 
lowing day. The company was instructed to accompany a battery of 
artillery, assist in intrenching, and act as support. 

On Saturday, October 17th, Company B, Captain Deakyne, 
formed a part of the brown force in the problem of that day. This 
company also was assigned to duty with the Artillery. Lieut. 
Stuart, on duty with the company, was assigned as topographical 
officer for the brigade. 

On the afternoons of Tuesday and Wednesday, the 20th, and 21st, 
Captain Deakyne with his Company B, supervised the construction 
of intrenchments by infantry battalions, and on Friday, the 23d, Com¬ 
pany B, with a detail from A Company, completed the intrench¬ 
ments including the revetment of the lunette. On the afternoon of 
Saturday, the 24th, lectures and explanations relating to the intrench¬ 
ments were given to the officers of the National Guard by Captain 
Deakyne and Lieut. Stuart. 

On Thursday, the 22d, the entire Battalion particpated in prob¬ 
lem No. 5, deployment of division, under command of Captain Flag¬ 
ler, the Major commanding having been directed by the Command¬ 
ing General of the Division to accompany him as Engineer Officer 
on his staff. The report on this problem is appended. Late in the 
afternoon of the 22d, Company C, Captain Flagler, marched to Esker- 
son’s ranch and joined the force under General Barry in bivouac in 
that vicinity. The company particpated in problem No. 6 on the 
succeeding day. The company was assigned to reconnoitering the 
creek for suitable crossings, but at an early stage of the problem 
was put out of action by the capture of its train and the horses of its 
mounted section. On Friday, the 23d, Company D, Capatin Ray¬ 
mond, participated in this problem on the opposing side under com¬ 
mand of General Bell. The company was assigned to the extreme 
right of the line and directed to make a rapid reconnoissance to the 
front. 


8 


On Saturday, the 24th, the Battalion participated in the review 
division, being assigned to a position on the right of the line. 

On Monday, the 26th, the Battalion participated in attack and 
defense of position, problem No.7. The Battalion Commander was 
assigned to the left of the position, extending across the low ground 
between Reservoir Ridge and the Republican River. His report on 
this problem is appended. 

On the afternoon of Thursday, the 29th, the Battalion joined the 
force under command of Colonel Augur, went into bivouac on Re¬ 
publican Flat, and participated in the night march and morning 
attack of the succeeding day. The Battalion was assigned to a posi¬ 
tion in the center of the line with an infantry regiment on each flank. 
A copy of the report on this problem is appended. 

10. The construction of intrenchments, referred to above, involved 
the laying out and actual construction of a lunette for 200 men, lines 
of trench and echelon in four stages of construction, lying, kneeling, 
standing, and complete, and short lengths of Spanish and Boer trench. 
Except as indicated above, the labor was performed by details from 
the infantry regiments. The officer in command of the trenches was 
Lieut. Col. R. H. R. Loughborough, 6th Infantry. The details for 
working parties were made by battalions as follows: October 20th, 
afternoon, one battalion 2d Infantry, 126 men; one battalion 21st 
Infantry, 119 men; one battalion Texas provisional regiment, 148 
men; one battalion, 2d Infantry, Nebraska National Guard, 136 men; 
October 21st, afternoon, one battalion, 25th Infantry, 192 men; one 
battalion, 12th Infantry, 99 men; one battalion, 6th Infantry, 232 
men; one battalion, 2d Infantry, Kansas National Guard, 105 men. 

One battalion, 1st Infantry, Kansas National Guard, reported Octo¬ 
ber 21st, to late to commence work. 

The labor expended on the line by infantry troops was about 3,500 
hours for one man, or 437 eight hour days. The lunette was 
completed and Spanish and Boer trenches dug by Company B of the 
Engineer Battalion, assisted by 25 men from Company A. This 
force worked one day. 

11. The foot bridge was dismantled on the afternoon of Thurs¬ 
day, the 29th, and on Saturday, the 31st, the wagon bridge was dis¬ 
mantled, and hauling material to the railroad loading platform began. 
On Sunday, November 1st, the hauling was completed and loading 
began, the cars having been set on the siding about noon. The 
loading of bridge material was completed early on the morning of the 
















J* 




















9 


2d, and the company property and baggage to be sent by rail was loaded 
immediately thereafter, including the greater part of the tentage. The 
Battalion was placed in bivouac for the night. During the night four 
cars were dispatched to Washington, D. C., and a special train containing 
the Leavenworth equipment, with a train guard, was sent out. 

12. At 9:40 A. M. on the 3d the return march to Fort Leavenworth 
was begun. On account of several days’ rain the roads were in very bad 
condition, and the foot sections were put on the railroad track at once, 
and did not leave it except to make camp, until about four miles from 
Topeka. The mounted sections and baggage and pack trains made the 
first day’s march to Manhattan without very great difficulty. The road 
presented a hard, smooth bottom, covered by three to five inches of soft 
mud, which offered comparatively little obstruction to traction. On the 
second day’s march, Manhattan to Wamego, greater difficulties were en¬ 
countered as the roads were heavier, cutting through in places, and some 
very difficult hills were encountered. The mounted sections and baggage 
train reached camp at Wamego late in the afternoon. From three miles 
west of Wamego a report was sent forward to me that one mule of the 
bridge teams was down and the rest manifestly exhausted. Knowing the 
condition of the road ahead of them, I directed that they unhitch and 
remain where they were for the night. A mounted section was left with 
them as guard, and forage and rations were sent back from camp. 

The order of march adopted was to have the mounted sections follow 
the train closely, with orders, in case a wagon was seen to be in trouble, 
to ride forward, dismount and man the drag ropes. The policy was pur¬ 
sued from the beginning of sparing the mules any standstill pulls. They 
were reserved for the steady drag of the average road, and all pulls of un¬ 
usual difficulty were made mainly by the men. This arrangement was 
pursued throughout the trip, and but for it, in my opinion, the animals 
would not have lasted through. 

13. Next morning the bridge train started at 7 o’clock, and it re¬ 
quired three hours of very hard work to make the three miles to Wamego. 
The teams were rested until noon; dinner was served at 11 o’clock, and 
at 12 the march was resumed. Camp was made for the night in a field 
of mud north of Belvue, with an extremely difficult piece of road just 
ahead, which it was evident that the mules could not get through at the 
end of a day’s march. Next morning the men were required to carry 
their bedding out and deposit it in the worst parts of the road, and with 
this assistance and the teams fresh, this very heavy piece of road was 
passed without much trouble. The day’s march extended to Rossville, a 


10 


total distance of about 14 miles. The next day, a march of 17 miles was 
made from Rossville to about two and one-half miles north of the Reform 
School near North Topeka. The latter part of this march was very 
heavy and the mules came in nearly exhausted. The next day’s march 
was made to Meriden. I had hoped to get on as far as Ozwakie, which 
would have made up the lost time and put the Battalion on the schedule 
arranged before leaving Riley, but the condition of the animals on reach¬ 
ing Meriden was such as to determine me to go into camp there. 1 he 
next day Ozwakie was reached about 11 A. M., and from this point the 
condition of the roads began to rapidly improve. The march was con¬ 
tinued to a point about seven miles east of Ozwakie. "The next day’s 
march was to three miles west of Easton, and the next to Fort Leaven¬ 
worth, which was reached at 1:30 P. M., on the 11th, the day lost during 
the first part of the march having been made up. Men and animals came 
in in very good condition. 

14. There were very few cases of foot soreness on the march in either 
direction, and those that occurred were, in nearly every case, due to worn 
out or defective shoes. One bad case was that of a man whose shoes 
were too small although he had drawn the largest size issued by the 
Quartermaster’s Department. It would be very desirable, in my opinion, 
to have arrangements made by which men attending maneuvers who have 
to march in either or both directions, could draw footwear at Fort Riley. 
It is difficult to make adequate provision in advance because the wear on 
shoes is variable and uncertain. It is not always possible to tell, even by 
a close examination, whether a pair of shoes apparently in good condition 
with last through a march of 140 miles, or not, and whether they do or 
not depends quite as much on the condition of the road during the march 
as on the condition of the shoes at its beginning. A great many men of 
the Engineer Battalion were obliged to wear black shoes with the field 
uniform during a part of the maneuvers because their tan shoes in which 
they made the march were completely worn out. 

The following statistics on this subject are taken from the report of 
Capt. R. R. Raymond, Corps of Engineers, commanding Company D: 
’’Great care was taken before leaving Fort Leavenworth to see that all the 
men were provided with shoes in good condition.. Of the new shoes 
used 21 per cent failed before reaching Fort Riley and 87 per cent failed 
on or before the return march. Of the shoes that were not new but in 
good condition, 54 per cent failed on the way to Fort Riley, and 88 per 
cent failed before the return to Fort Leavenworth. These shoes cost 
$2.20 per pair. I am convinced that a shoe can be obtained for not more 


11 


than $5 per pair that will he much cheaper per mile than those issued, 
and will he more comfortable because worn longer after breaking in.” 

Captain Raymond also recommends that the shoes be provided with 
Hungarian cone-head nails on the soles to give a more secure footing on 
dry grass or rock, the former especially. He estimates that in rough 
country over grass burned by the sqn such shoes will increase the indur¬ 
ance of the men 25 per cent. 1 hare myself observed the effect of dry 
grass in this part of the country on the soles of shoes. It polishes them 
like glass and makes walking extremely difficult, as the shoes slip on the 
grass almost as they would on ice. Shoes so prepared would not be the 
most suitable for general use, but if they could be provided especially for 
field service, it would, in my opinion, be very desirable to do so. 

Capt. Raymond also noted the fact that the shoulder straps of khaki 
blouses were a source of great inconvenience by catching in passing 
through the brush. This I have also noticed, and I concur in Capt. 
Raymond’s recommendation that the straps be discarded. 

15. All officers on duty with the Battalion were present during the 
march and maneuvers, except Lieut. N. E. Bower, who was absent on 
detached service at West Point, Ky., until October 17th, and was on 
special duty as assistant to the Chief Umpire after that date; Lieut. W. G. 
Caples, who commanded the train guard from Fort Leavenworth to Fort 
Riley, and Lieut. C. H. Knight, who commanded the train guard from 
Fort Riley to Fort Leavenworth. 

In response to a request made by me to the Chief of Engineers for 
additional officers during the maneuvers, 1st Lieut. A. B. Putnam, Corps 
of Engineers, was temporarily attached to the Battalion, and assigned to 
duty with Company C. Lieut. Putnam served as topographical officer 
on the march over, and in command of the mounted section during the 
maneuvers. He was relieved on the 31st of October and returned to 
Fort Leavenworth by rail, and thence to his permanent station at Pitts¬ 
burg. 

16. One of the most significant lessons of the maneuvers of this year 
is the demonstration of the necessity for having officers and some, at least, 
of the non-commissioned officers provided with compasses which can be 
read without outside illumination. If watches with fluorescent dials, 
which could be read at night, can be obtained, their use would be a great 
convenience. 

Very respectfully, SMI 1 H S. LEACH, 

Major , Corps of Engineers , 
Commanding 1st Battalion of Engineers. 


12 


Headquarters, 1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 
Fort Riley Reservation, Fans., 


October 2J, IQOJ. 


The Adjutant General, 

Blue Division, 

Sir : 

I have the honor to submit the following statement of the movements 
of the 1st Battalion of Engineers in the problem of yesterday. 

The Battalion, less the foot sections of one company, and the mounted 
sections of two companies, was in position in column on the Ogden road, 
east of One Mile Creek at the appointed time. At 8:30 A. M., orders 
were received for the formation of a line of battle in which the Battalion 
was directed to accompany the Artillery and to assist in intrenching. 

Following the Signal Corps, the Battalion moved at once across the 
bridge and halted in the road at the top of the hill west of the bridge, to 
wait for the Artillery to come up. 

At this point verbal instructions were received from the Division Com¬ 
mander to follow the Artillery on a trail leading to the high ground east 
of One Mile Creek. The column was countermarched, overtook the 
Artillery, and found the place assigned to it in column. After perform¬ 
ing the work assigned to it, the Battalion took position under cover in 
rear of the Artillery position west of Morris Hill, and awaited instruc¬ 
tions. When the recall rocket was seen, the Battalion returned to camp. 

The foot sections of one company, not in attendance, were on duty at 
the ponton bridges. The two mounted sections not present with the 
Battalion, were with the advance guard. 

By order of the Division Commander, I accompanied him as Chief 
Engineer of the Division, and the command of the Battalion devolved 
upon Captain Flagler. Captain Flagler’s company was ordered into 
bivouac immediately upon its return from this exercise. He was notable 
to submit this report himself, from lack of time, but gave me the data 
from which it is made up. 


Very respectfully, 


SMITH S. FFACH, 


Major, Corps of Engineers, 
Commanding 1 st Battalion of Engineers. 






13 


STATISTICS OF THE USE OF BRIDGES AT FORT RILEY FROM 
OCTOBER 16TH TO OCTOBER 30TH. 

Foot Bridge. 

Twenty-five regiments of infantry, 2 companies of infantry, 3,222 foot¬ 
men (mostly civilians); 5 light wagons, 2 pack trains, and the mounts 
accompanying foot troops also crossed the bridge. 

Wagon Bridge. 

Twenty-three regiments of infantry, 44 companies of infantry, 121 
troops of cavalry, 32 batteries of artillery, 16 mounted sections of engi¬ 
neers, 6 dismounted sections, 1,727 individual horsemen, 751 footmen, 
206 one-horse vehicles, 703 two-horse vehicles, 386 four-mule wagons, 
73 six-mule wagons, 4 pack trains, 214 loads of hay, 1 automobile, 2 
Colts automatic R. F. guns. 


Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

4 

October 26 , IQOJ. 


The Adjutant General, 

Blue Forces, 


Sir : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations on 
the left of the position occupied in the problem of October 26th. I was 
assigned by the order of the Brigade Commander to the immediate com¬ 
mand of the left of the line, consisting of an artillery position for two 
guns at the extreme southern end of Reservoir Ridge and a line crossing 
the Republican bottom from the stone culvert to the river. 

The forces occupying this line consisted of the 1st Battalion of Engi¬ 
neers, less the foot sections of one company and a platoon of the 20th 
Battery, Field Artillery, commanded by Lieut. Clark. 

T he Battalion of Engineers left camp at 6:30 A. M., and at 7:10 was on 
the ground. Instructions were given to intrench a line about 100 feet 
from the edge of the timber extending from the foothills of Sherman 
Heights to the fence of the athletic field. Company C was placed on 
the right and Company D on the left of this line. 4'he extreme left, on the 
bank of the river, was held by Company D. A short piece of trench was con¬ 
structed between the fence and the river, about in prolongation of the line 
north of the field. The fence was assumed to be demolished. Two advanced 
positions w^ere prepared by taking advantage of natural cover with 
slight preparation. The left of the line on the river being advanced more 


14 


than the right, the latter resting near the pump house. The second posi¬ 
tion was between the advance and final lines, about 100 yards west of the 
athletic field. Safe avenues of retreat from each of the two front lines to 
the next one in rear were explored and prepared by some artificial addi¬ 
tions to the natural cover. The men were conducted over these lines to 
make sure that they understood where they lay and how to use them. A 
picket was sent across the highway bridge. A kneeling trench was con¬ 
structed on the main line, and cover for men lying down, and in part 
kneeling, was obtained on the forward lines mainly by digging and throw¬ 
ing the earth to the rear without raising parapets. T hese preparations 
were complete before 9:00 A. M. 

As soon as instructions for the foregoing work had been given, 1 pro¬ 
ceeded to the center and reported in person to the Brigade Commander. 
He instructed me to place Lieut. Clark’s platoon of Artillery, and I 
selected the position occupied by two guns with complete natural cover 
from all practicable Brown Artillery positions. I instructed Lieut. Clark 
to pay no attention to Artillery fire unless he could catch a battery chang¬ 
ing position and presenting a good target, but to fire on all bodies of In¬ 
fantry and Cavalry, mounted or dismounted, in sufficient numbers to 
make a reasonably good target. 

At 7:15 A. M. Lieut. Stuart with a mounted section and a pack mule 
containing a demolition outfit was sent forward to reconnoiter along 
Sherman Heights to and beyond the Governor Harvey road. Lieut. 
Stuart was instructed to send a non-commissioned officer, a mounted pri¬ 
vate and the pack mule direct to the Washington Bridge over the Repub¬ 
lican River, to prepare the bridge for demolition and to arrange to have 
the bridge destroyed on the approach of a Brown force, but not other¬ 
wise. Under these instructions the bridge was blown up at 10:10 A. M., 
a squadron of cavalry having been observed coming down the Governor 
Harvey trail. 

There was no firing on my front during the day, except on the extreme 
right where Cavalry repeatedly threatened and approached through the 
draw leading under the stone culvert. Part of a company was stationed 
on the west edge of the ravine commanding the trail through it and a 
troop of Cavalry operated similarly on the right bank with patrols up 
toward the head of the draw. 

About 10:30 1 received information that two troops of cavalry had 
crossed the Washington Bridge. This information subsequently proved 
to be incorrect and only the Umpire, and it is said, some Blue prisoners, 
crossed the bridge, where the two troops crossed by swimming. I may 


15 


note here, if true that prisoners were taken across the bridge, it was in 
my opinion an improper proceeding. A few minutes later the officer in 
command at the bridges notified me that Cavalry had been seen on the 
Junction City road. He was ordered to advance his outposts and sending 
of reinforcements to the bridge was begun. First, the mounted section 
of B Company was sent, then the mounted section of D, then a non¬ 
commissioned officer and ten men from the foot sections of D, then 
another detachment of the same size from the same company. Finally 
the Captain of B Company on the extreme left seeing nothing in his 
front and hearing heavy firing at the bridge, moved a part of his foot sec¬ 
tions without orders to reinforce the bridge. In all about 70 men were 
sent to reinforce the bridge guard in the course of 20 minutes. In addi¬ 
tion to the personnel of this defense the bridges had been interrupted to 
traffic by removing a small portion of the roadway on each. 

The guard on the ponton bridge was doubled at 6:30, and the officer 
in charge directed to patrol the woods at the south end of the bridge; 
stand off any Brown force that he was able to handle, and if a larger force 
appeared to hold it in check and take up the bridge. No Browns ap¬ 
proached the bridge from the south side of the river, but three men came 
up on the n-orth bank and claimed the capture of the officer in charge. 
A few seconds later they were surrounded by the bridge guard, them¬ 
selves captured, and the officer in charge of the bridge released. Later 
the bridge was attacked by a somewhat larger force. I have information 
that these men were cavalry troopers who crossed the bridge lying on the 
bottom of a trolley car. No other incident worthy of report occurred 
until the close of the exercise. 

Very respectfully, (Signed) SMI 1 H S. LLACH, 

Major , Corps of Engineers, 
Commanding 1 st Battalion of Engineers . 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Nans., 

October 28 , IQOJ. 

Colonel E. Z. Steever, 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Nans. 

Sir : 

I have the honor to submit the following, supplementary to my report 
on the exercise of October 26th, in compliance with your verbal request 
of this morning. 


16 


The three bridges on the left of the position and crossing the Republi¬ 
can River had all traffic over them interrupted by removal of a part of the 
roadway. The trolley bridge had rails and ties removed from the far end, 
and piled on the near bank. The railroad bridge had rails removed and 
thrown in the river, and ties removed and burned. T his was for a short 
length at the farther end of the bridge. The highway bridge had the 
flooring removed at the farther end and planks laid for men to cross in 
single file, to enable the pickets on the farther side of the river to return 
across the bridge when necessary. Men, tools, and all facilities for ac¬ 
complishing these results were at the bridge in ample time to complete 
the work by 7:30 A. M. 

Very respectfully, 


SMITH S. LEACH, 
Major , Corps of Engineers, 
Commanding 1st Battalion of Engineers. 


Headquarters, 1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 
Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

October 30 , igoj. 


The Adjutant, Blue Force, 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

Sir: 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of 
the 1st Battalion of Engineers in the affair of this morning. 

The Battalion left bivouac on the Republican Flat at 4:00 A. M., taking 
the position assigned to it in column in rear of the 21st Infantry. Owing 
to dai kness and the rapid rate of march the head of the column passed the 
place where it had been intended to leave the Harvey road, and marched 
to the junction of Estes road. The latter was taken for a short distance 
and formed the Battalion for action with one company in reserve and two 
companies in the line; each of the latter providing its own support. The 
space between the companies was filled by 10 mounted men. Ten 
mounted men patrolled also on the rightof the right company, and 10 on the 
left of the left company, in the attempt to secure touch with Infantry 
regiments on the right and left, respectively. Just as the column left the 
Harvey road, the sky clouded over obscuring all the stars. The direc¬ 
tion by compass which it was supposed would strike the south flank of 



17 


Forsyth mound was given the Company Commanders and the advance 
began. The two companies in the firing line advancing in line of squads 
with scouts in front. The advance was delayed by the darkness, and the 
failure to gain touch with organizations on either flank, and at daybreak 
the Battalion found itself behind a ridge with its right resting on Forsyth 
mound. A battery was found on the mound with an Infantry regiment 
deployed on its right. This regiment proved to be the 21st and the Bat¬ 
talion was moved by the right flank under cover of the ridge, to the posi¬ 
tion in line assigned to it on the right of the 21st. The 2d was found on 
our right and rear, the interval between the two being so small that the 
two companies on the firing line were brought together in line of skir¬ 
mishers, the interval between them being eliminated. When the advance 
began the Battalion moved forward directing on the right Battalion of the 
21st, gaining ground to the right and swinging to the left, to conform to 
the movements of* that regiment. A Brown outpost on the spur south¬ 
west of Wolf Canon was driven in, and the Battalion crossed the canon 
with the left near the spring and under fire from a ridge in its front. 
This ridge was gained, the force holding it falling back and the Battalion 
still turning to the left advanced to a position on the spur west of the 
saddle back facing slightly west of north, At this point the action ter¬ 
minated, When the Battalion was about half way up the northern slope„ 
of Wolf Canon, and just after the reserve had been put in the 
line, cease firing was sounded and the Battalion halted and remained 
in position for a few minutes, Meanwhile the right company 
which had gained the ridge was being fired on by the enemy 
and was returning the fire, Under these circumstances, without 
waiting for the signal to commence firing, the rest of the line 
was advanced on the ridge to the support of the engaged 
company. 

It was broad daylight when the Battalion first came under fire, but a 
light rain was falling and the crests of the ridges opposite were obscured 
by mists. During the early part of the action, the flash of 
the rifles could be seen. Toward the close of the action the men 
themselves could be made out at short ranges. Between these two 
periods was an interval when it was difficult to get any target; 
whatever. 

The heaviest part of the action appeared to be to our left, While in 
Wolf Canon the 21st Infantry moved by the left flank and we lost touch 
with them since we could not follow the movement on account of 
being engaged in front. The resistance on our part of the line was com- 


18 


paratively light and the Battalion advanced almost continuously through¬ 
out the action. At this writing no casualties have been reported. 

Very respectfully, 

SMITH S. LEACH, 

Major , Corps of Engineers , 
Commanding 1st Battalion of Engineers. 



19 


REPORT OF CAPT. FLAGLER, CORPS OF ENGI¬ 
NEERS, COMMANDING COMPANY C. 


Company C, 1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

November 77, IQOJ . 


The Adjutant, 

1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Leavenworth , Kans. 


SIR : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 
Company C, 1st Battalion of Engineers, during the recent maneuvers at 
Fort Riley, Kans. 

The company left its station at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., September 
23, 1903, and proceeded by marching with the Battalion to Fort Riley, 
arriving there October 2, 1903. 

Lieut. A. B. Putnam acted as Topographical Officer on the march and 
prepared a map en route. 

The composition of the company was as follows: 

Two officers, 47 enlisted men in foot sections, 17 enlisted men in 
mounted sections, 2 cooks, 4 teamsters, 2 packers. 

While at Fort Riley work performed and maneuvers participated in 
were as follows: 

Large details were furnished to assist Lieut. Stickle in laying two pon¬ 
ton bridges across the Kansas River. 

October 7th to 19th. The mounted section under Lieut. Putnam con¬ 
structed a single bay log bridge across One Mile Creek and repaired ap¬ 
proaches to other bridges across this creek previously built by the garrison. 
The mounted section under my direction constructed two spar bridges 
across gully to west of camp. These bridges were miniature, being one-fourth 
scale intended for illustration; one was single lock and one double lock; 
they afforded foot passage from the Engineer camp to its Field Hospital. 



20 


During this period Lieut. Caples with the foot sections constructed a 
pile trestle bridge across Three Mile Creek on the Ogden-Riley road. 

I quote his report description of the bridge. 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

October 28 , IQOJ. 

Capt. C. A. F. Flagler, 

Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., 

Sir : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the construction 
of a bridge over Three Mile Creek on this reservation. 

Project: To construct a pile trestle bridge of material that could be obtained 
in the vicinity of the work, the completed bridge to be of a permanent nature 
and capable of carrying all arms of the service and their trains. 

Construction: Work was commenced on October 6, 1903, with a 
detachment of troops from Company C, 1st Battalion of Engineers. 
The site for the bridge was selected just below the present ford on the 
Fort Riley-Ogden road. The length between abutments at this point 
was found to be 43 feet. It was decided to make the bridge consist of 
three trestles and two abutment sills. The height of the trestle above 
the mean low water of the creek to be 5.4 (five and four tenths) feet ex¬ 
clusive of the cap. It was decided to use piles of nine feet length and 
not smaller than six inches at the smaller end. When the piles were cut 
it was found that the smallest was about eight inches at its smallest end. 
Each trestle consisted of five such piles spaced three feet center to center 
and a cap covering the piles and pinned to them. The caps were of 
round timber about 12 inches in average thickness and grooved to fit the 
piles. A small sapling about four inches thick was split and the two parts 
spiked to the piles as cross bracing. The bearers between trestles con¬ 
sisted of round timbers about 12 to 14 inches in average thickness. They 
were left to project about three feet beyond each trestle. The floor con¬ 
sisted of round timbers 14 feet in length and not less than 0.2 of a foot in 
thickness at the small end and of split timber of the same length and not 
less that 0.4 of a foot in thickness at the small end before splitting, and of 
some shorter pieces of the same thickness. Three trestles were built. 
The spacing of the trestles was as follows: Beginning on the Fort Riley 
side of the stream, from sill to first trestle, seven feet; from first trestle to 
second trestle, 12 feet; from second trestle to third trestle, 12 feet; from 
third trestle to sill, 14 feet. In practice this span was found to be too 
long and earth and gravel were filled in under it so as to leave only 12 clear 



















21 


feet between Supports. 4 he crawl of the bridge was taken up by bury¬ 
ing at each end a sill of 14 inches in average thickness and pinning the 
roadway bearers to these. The crawl was further taken up by placing 
cross bracing between trestles two and three, making of them a braced 
cube. The caps were connected to the piles, the bearers to the caps and 
sills and the side rails to the caps and sills by wooden drift pins. These 
were made with a small wedge in the lower end and driven into place 
with a maul. At first it was attempted to fasten the side rails with wire, 
but it was found that the pins brought them into so much closer contact 
that they were first pinned and then wired. All flooring that was not 
brought into good contact by the side rails was spiked down. Spikes were 
however, only used where they were considered as absolutely necessary. 
1 he cracks in the floor were filled with brush and twigs, and the floor then 
covered with a thin layer of earth. The work was all done by hand. 
4 he piles were all driven with a maul. Those in the first trestle were 
driven by men standing on the shore and those in the second trestle by 
men standing in a wagon, as were those also in the third trestle. The 
shock of the wagons coming on and off the bridge on the flooring at the 
end was provided for by burying the sills and making the ends of the floor¬ 
ing of heavy, rough-squared timbers, brought a little below the natural 
service of the earth. In driving the piles for trestles No. 2 and 3 a layer 
of gravel two and one-half feet thick was encountered. This layer offered 
so much resistance that piles could not be driven into it without splitting. 
This layer was cut through and the piles driven until they would not sink 
more than half an inch under eight heavy blows of the maul. The holes 
were then filled in with the material excavated. The spacing of the piles 
was three feet. Rain for several days, the time occupied going to and 
from work, and the fact that all the timber had to be culled and all brush 
cleared up caused the work to go slowly. The bridge was completed 
October 17, 1903. A road was then cut to permit the easy access of 
wagons to the bridge. As soon as the bridge was completed it carried a 
battery of Artillery and a brigade of Cavalry without exhibiting any signs 
of weakness. Up to the date of this report, it has carried successfully 
every load which has been placed upon it. Drawing showing the plan, 
section and elevation of the bridge and photographs showing the manner 
of driving piles and the appearance of the completed structure are hereto 
appended. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

WM. G. CAPLES, 

2 d Lieut., Corps of Engineers. 


22 


Work on this bridge was much delayed by heavy cold rains. Draw¬ 
ings and photographs are omitted from this report. 

October 22d. The company in Battalion took part in a deployment 
of the Division. The Battalion in position was held in reserve in a draw 
a little west of Morris Hill, and in rear of Snow’s Battery; C Company, 
while the Battalion was in reserve, was instructed to intrench Snow’s Bat¬ 
tery. The entire company performed the work, digging three gun pits in 
about one hour. The work was performed with ordinary tools and with 
no attempt at concealment. Lieut. Caples with two enlisted men made 
a sketch of this deployment. 

October 22d and 23d. The company was attached to Gen. Barry’s 
Brown Force for maneuver to northeast of reservation. I quote from my 
report to Gen. Barry describing movement as follows: 

The company left its camp near the Artillery post at 4:30 P. M. 
* * * with one tool wagon, two advance guard bridge train wagons, 

took route, Packer’s Camp, Cemetery and Ogden and Keats road, as 
directed in written orders of October 22d (Headquarters Brown Division), 
and went into bivouac just north of Seven Mile Creek on above road at 
8:00 P. M. 

In accordance with instructions in Field Orders No. 1, I detailed 2d 
Lieut. W. G. Caples as Topographical Officer, to prepare map showing 
action on the 23d. This map is submitted herewith. 

October 23d. Left bivouac 6:15 A. M., marched by road to ford on 
Seven Mile Creek below Taylor’s, sent mounted section along north side 
of creek to find practicable crossings between Taylor’s ford and School- 
house No. 73. Report of these crossings received about 9:00 A. M. 
At 10:15 A. M. the entire company, under command of Lieut. A. B. 
Putnam, left Eskerson’s with the Artillery of the 6th and 19th Field Bat¬ 
teries, as directed by Field Orders No. 3, Headquarters Brown Division. 
The Artillery took up a trot and then a gallop, leaving the company be¬ 
hind. About 10:25 A. M. the company was fired upon from the hills to 
east of road, and the wagon train and mounted section ruled out of action 
by Major Zinn, LTmpire. 

The foot sections returned the fire and then fell back through the 
woods, crossed Seven Mile Creek about half a mile below Taylor’s Ford 
and rejoined the Artillery in position on a hill southeast of the Ford about 
11:30 A. M. About 11:45 A. M. the Artillery fell back at a gallop, the 
company at a double time. I took command of the company at this 
time. Two pieces halted in an open space in the creek bottom, and I 
formed the Company sheltered behind the bank on the creek between these 


23 


guns. A heavy fire was coming from the hills to the right and left front 
of the company. Soon the 2d Nebraska appeared at the stone fence on 
the east side of the open space in front of us. I fired at them for some 
time, until they left cover and charged across the open. They halted at 
150 yards, and Capt. Preston, Umpire, ruled the company out of action. 

October 24th. The company took part in review of all troops held on 
the Smoky Hill Flats. 

October 26th. The company in Battalion took part in the defense of 
a position. The Battalion was on the left of the position, extended across the 
Republican Flats, east and west through the race track. C Company 
extended from the Junction City road to the foot of the bluffs about 300 
yards south of the pumping station. The company constructed kneeling 
trenches on this line. One platoon as ordered by the Battalion Com¬ 
mander took an advanced position under my command just north of the 
pumping station. This platoon constructed two lying trenches, one on 
each side of the road, utilizing some 6-inch iron pipe found at the pump 
house for parapets. These parapets were completely concealed with dead 
grass. I placed scouts on the bluffs at my right. About 11:00 A. M. 
these scouts gave warning of the advance of Cavalry patrols of the enemy 
approaching my right flank. I immediately left the trenches and took up 
a position to the right rear, covering an opening in the bluffs on my right 
flank. In this position I exchanged several volleys with a Cavalry troop 
which attacked us dismounted. This troop withdrew and hearing firing 
in the rear, I fell back on the trenches, but found them deserted. Hear¬ 
ing firing on the hill above the right flank of my trenches, I climbed the 
hill with the platoon and found the Battalion Commander there with the 
remainder of the company. The problem ceased at this point. 

Lieut. Caples with the mounted section during the above movements 
assisted in the defense of a bridge across the Republican River on our left 
rear. This bridge was attacked by a Cavalry force which had forded the 
river above. The attack was repulsed. 

October 29th and 30th. The company in Battalion went into bivouac 
on the Republican Flats; the force was in blue under command of Col. 
Augur. At 10:30 P. M. orders were received for a night attack to be 
made the following morning on the Brown force, said to be encamped on 
the Saddle Back. The Battalion left bivouac at 4:00 A. M. and marched 
by the Governor Harvey road to the junction with the Estes road. From 
this position the Battalion moved to its position in the center of a line 
extending from Morris Hill to Forsyth Hill and facing northeast. C Com¬ 
pany was on the right of the Battalion and by instructions of the Battalion 


24 


Commander I patrolled with mounted men to my left keeping touch with 
B Company, Engineers, and to my right to keep touch with the 2d In¬ 
fantry, supposed to be there. I never found this regiment at any part of 
the maneuver and suppose it to have been lost. Some confusion as to 
direction arose in taking position, owing to heavy clouds and rain which 
obscured the stars, and to orders forbidding smoking and lighting matches 
which prevented use of compasses. I used the wind alone for direction, 
but it veered about 45° to the south from east causing a considerable 
error. However, at daybreak the company was very nearly ip its proper 
position. The advance began promptly at daybreak and continued to the 
east until we had crossed Wolf Canon. This advance was opposed on 
my front only by two troops of Brown Cavalry, which occupied each 
successive ridge and fired on us. I halted at each stand that they had 
made and fired by volley and at will, about 10 rounds, and resumed the 
advance, The Cavalry fell back at each advance. The close of the 
maneuver at 8:30 A. M. found the company in position on the right of the 
Battalion firing at a dismounted line of Cavalry at about 350 yards. 

The company left Fort Riley with the Battalion November 3d, and 
proceeded by marching to Fort Feavenworth, arriving November 11, 1903, 
Changes in the company during the maneuvers were as follows: 

2d Fieut. W. G, Caples, joined October 2d from detached duty, 

1st Lieut, A. B. Putnam, relieved October 31st. 

Six enlisted men joined from detached service. 

One enlisted man left sick at Fort Riley in Base Hospital. 

Very respectfully, 


C. A. F. FLAGLER, 

Capt. } Corps of Engineers , 

Commanding Company C, 1st Battalion of Engineers . 



REPORT OF CAPT. DEAKYNE, CORPS OF ENGI¬ 
NEERS, COMMANDING COMPANY B. 


Headquarters of Company B, 

1st Battalion of Engineers, U. S. Army, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

November 18 , IQOJ, 


The Adjutant, 

First Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 


Sir: 

I have the honor to make the following report of Company B, 1st Bat¬ 
talion of Engineers, from September 23 to November 11, 1903. 

September 23d to October 2d. March to Fort Riley; two officers and 
68 enlisted men. Left at Fort Leavenworth, one officer and eight enlisted 
men. At West Point, Ky., four enlisted men. On furlough, one en¬ 
listed man. 

October 3d and 4th. Ditched the company tents and dug sink. En¬ 
tire company. Inspection at 9:00 A. M., October 3d, 1903. 

October 5th. Engineer construction : 

Preparing approaches to ponton bridge, Lieut. Stickle, one non-com¬ 
missioned officer and 15 privates. Lieut. Caples, unloading ponton ma¬ 
terial, nine non-commissioned officers and 14 privates. 

October 6th. Work on approaches to bridge, eight non-commissioned 
officers and 29 privates. 

October 7th, A. M. Hasty intrenchments with small pick and shovel, 
two officers, and nine non-commissioned officers and 25 privates. 

P. M. Same as in the morning, two officers, eight non-commissioned 
officers and 15 privates. 

In ordinary soil a man can get appreciable concealment and some cover 
in six minutes, and fair cover in 15 minutes. 



26 


P. M. Collecting material for approach to ponton bridge, one non¬ 
commissioned officer and 10 privates. 

October 8th. Ditching road at One Mile Creek and placing gravel 
on same, two officers, 10 non-commissioned officers and 24 privates; using 
picks, shovels, one plow and three scrapers. 

October 9th, A. M. Eight non-commissioned officers and 28 privates, 
same as October 8th. 

P. M. Men worked cleaning up clothing and equipments. 

October 10th. Battalion inspection in the Field Order; two officers 
and 62 enlisted men. 

October 11th. Sunday. 

October 12th, 13th and 14th. Rain; no work. 

October 15th. Engineer construction : 

A. M. Two non-commissioned officers and 18 privates assisted in 
construction of ponton bridge. Two non-commissioned officers and six 
privates collecting material for fascines and gabions. 

P. M. Eight non-commissioned officers and 18 privates constructing 
fascines, gabions and hurdles. 

October 16th, A. M. Nine non-commissioned officers and 28 privates 
cutting material and making fascines, gabions and hurdles. 

P. M. Eight non-commissioned officers and 24 privates completed 
work commenced in A. M. 

October 17th. Company formed a part of the Brown force under 
Gen. Barry in Problem No. 2, formation of outposts. Strength, two 
officers and 49 enlisted men. Left camp 7:20 A. M., crossed river on 
ponton bridge and reached crest of Grant Ridge 8:45 A. M., where com¬ 
pany took position near Artillery to dig gun pits if required. (No gun 
pits were necessary). Attack was made by Blue force 1:25 P. M. Com¬ 
pany was posted on right of field battery to act as support and to guard 
against turning movement on right flank. Action lasted one hour. Re¬ 
turned to camp 3:30 P. M. 

October 18th. Sunday. 

October 19th. Selection of site for trenches and laying out lines for 
same on Smoky Hill Flat. Preparing material for revetment and collect¬ 
ing tools for the work. 

October 20th, P. M. Two officers and 11 non-commissioned officers 
on instruction of regular and state troops in construction of hasty intrench- 
ments. Had four Battalions as follows: 2d Infantry, 21st Infantry, 
Texas and Nebraska National Guard. 

October 21st. Continued work commenced October 20th, revetting 

















27 


parapet in lunette. Constructed Spanish and Boer trenches, two officers 
and 37 enlisted men. Had four Battalions at work: 6th Infantry, 12th 
Infantry, 25th Infantry, Kansas. 

October 22d. Deployment of entire Division. Company went as 
part of the Battalion. Left camp at 7:30 A. M., returned at 2:20 P. M. 
Company remained in reserve during the problem. Strength, two officers 
and 62 enlisted men. 

October 23d. Completing work on intrenchments, including revet¬ 
ment in lunette, two officers and 44 enlisted men. Wire entanglement 
constructed outside of lunette. 

October 24th. Review of entire Division. Left camp at 7:40 A. M., 
and returned at 11:45 A. M., two officers and 62 enlisted men. 

P. M. Lecture to state officers on intrenchments by the Company 
Commander. 

October 25th. Sunday. 

October 26th. Company formed part of the Battalion with Blue force 
on problem of "Attack and Defense of a Position.” Company occupied 
left flank of position, resting on Republican River. Mounted section 
was employed first in scouting and later on firing line. Foot section was 
posted at 600 yards firing point of rifle range. No direct attack was made 
on this part of position. An attack was made on left flank but was re¬ 
pulsed by mounted section of company and mounted sections of C and 
D Companies. Strength present, two officers and 55 enlisted men. 

October 27th. Field day; company took no part. 

October 28th. Attack and defense of a convoy. Light bridge train • 
participated, one sergeant, two privates (teamsters) Company B. 

October 29th. Left camp at 1:00 P. M. as part of the Battalion and 
marched to Republican Flats for bivouac, two officers and 56 enlisted 
men. 

October 30th. Left (bivouac) at 4:00 A. M. and proceeded north¬ 
ward and deployed for attack on Brown forces. Participated in the at¬ 
tack. Returned to camp at 9:30 A. M., two officers and 56 enlisted men. 

October 31st. Assisted in dismantling ponton bridge, two non-com¬ 
missioned officers and 17 privates. Company was mustered. 

November 1st. Loading ponton material, four non-commissioned 
officers and 20 privates. 

November 2d. Completed loading ponton material and company prop¬ 
erty, one non-commissioned officer and six privates. Company turned 
out 8:30 to 10:00 P. M., on account of fire in hay sheds. 

November 3d. Started on return to Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 9:40 A. M. 


28 


November 11th. Arrived at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., two officers 


and 71 enlisted men. 

Very respectfully, 

HERBERT DEAKYNE, 


Captain , Corps of Engineers, 
Commanding Company B , 1st Battalion of Engineers. 



29 


REPORTS OF CAPT. RAYMOND, CORPS OF ENGI¬ 
NEERS, COMMANDING COMPANY D. 


Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

November 1 8, IQOJ. 


The Adjutant, 

1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Leavenworth , Kans. 


SIR : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 
Company D, 1st Battalion of Engineers, during the recent maneuvers at 
Fort Riley, Kans. 

The company marched from Fort Leavenworth with the 1st Battalion 
of Engineers, under the command of Major S. S. Leach, Corps of Engi¬ 
neers, and arrived at Fort Riley October 2, 1903, going into camp at that 
post. 

From this date until October 9th, details were furnished for the con¬ 
struction of bridges. This work not being under my supervision, no re¬ 
port will be made here concerning it. The company was also engaged 
in laying out and marking with sign boards two roads leading to the two 
ponton bridges, and from these bridges to the Smoky Hill Flats. Two 
gutter bridges were built on these roads, brush was removed and about 
400 feet of road in loose sand was curduroyed with sun-flower stalks. 
None of this work comprised any important engineering features, but it 
is interesting to note that three methods were employed in placing the 
sun-flower stalks in position. At first the stalks were laid directly upon 
the surface of the sand, and were covered by sand shoveled in from the 
sides. This road lacked lateral support and tended to flow out into the 
ditches formed by borrowing the sand. These ditches also made it diffi¬ 
cult for wagons to turn out of the road when necessary. The plan was 



30 


then tried of making a shallow excavation the full width of the road, lay¬ 
ing the stalks transversely to form a layer about as thick as the depth of 
the cut, and backfilling the sand. This method is better than the first, 
but there is still a tendency to cut ditches, and the road is not uniformly 
filled with sand, the edges appearing to be filled more compactly than the 
center. The most satisfactory plan seemed to be to cut a ditch about 
eight inches deep for the full width of the road, casting the sand removed 
back upon the stalks last placed in position. When the cut had extended 
about six feet from the completed road, it was filled by a new batch of 
stalks, and these in their turn were covered by sand taken from a new 
length of road excavation. This road stood well the hard usage given it 
by Cavalry, Artillery and heavy loads of hay. It was later further im¬ 
proved by spreading over it a layer of loose hay. Thus by very simple 
means an almost impassable sand bar was turned into a decidedly practi¬ 
cal road over which heavy loads passed with ease. 

It is remarkable that sign boards, however plain and conspicuous, are 
not a sufficient guide for troops or wagon trains. The two roads men¬ 
tioned above were so laid out that both bridges could be used simultane¬ 
ously by foot and mounted columns without permitting these columns to 
cross and interfere with each other. No attention appeared to be paid to 
the signs, and the columns crossed to such an extent that the capacity of 
the two bridges was reduced to that of one. It is thought that sentinels 
should be posted at all cross roads or points where roads are near together 
to require passengers to follow the proper roads. 

On October 16-17, the company participated in the maneuvers of 
Problem 2, forming part of the Blue forces. A copy of this problem is 
enclosed herewith with a copy of my report to the Adjutant General of 
the First Brigade. 

October 22d. The company took part in the deployment of the Divi¬ 
sion, Problem 5, but was not detached from the Battalion for any purpose, 
and performed no service other than being present. 

October 23d. The company formed part of the Blue forces for Prob¬ 
lem 6. Copies of Field Orders No. 1, Headquarters Blue Division, and 
my report to the Adjutant General of the Blue Division, are submitted 
herewith. Attention is invited to the fact that the company, starting at 
the rear of the Infantry of the Division, at the end of the first six 
miles of the march, had caught up with the support of the advance guard, 
and then made a reconnoissance over extremely rough ground, covering 
the first 10 miles of this march in three hours, no allowance being made 
for halts or delays. The company was absent from camp from eight 


31 


o clock in the morning until four o’clock in the afternoon, and covered 
22 miles of country. Not a single man fell out or straggled. These facts 
are mentioned because one of the regiments of Infantry taking part in 
this problem has been credited with making the most difficult march of 
all during the maneuvers. Company D marched four miles farther than 
that regiment, and practically passed completely around it. 

October 24th. The company in the Battalion took part in the review 
of the entire Division. 

October 26th. The company acting with the Battalion, participated 
in the defense of a position, Problem 7, and constructed about 110 feet of 
kneeling trench and a few rifle pits. This line was not attacked and the 
mounted section, and later nearly all the company, was sent to assist in 
the defense of the bridges over the Republican River. 

October 29th. The company marched with the Battalion to the Re¬ 
publican Flats and bivouacked. Before daybreak of the following day, it 
took part in the night attack on the Brown forces. It performed no duty 
apart from the Battalion. 

From October 31st to November 2d. The company furnished details 
to assist in dismantling the ponton bridges and preparing material for ship¬ 
ment to Fort Leavenworth. 

November 3d. The company marched from Fort Riley with the Bat¬ 
talion and arrived at Fort Leavenworth November 11th. One sergeant, 
one corporal and eight privates returned to Fort Leavenworth by rail 
acting as a train guard. 

During the maneuvers the company consisted of one captain, one sec¬ 
ond lieutenant and 74 enlisted men. Seventeen enlisted men were 
mounted. 

The light bridge train, which is under the charge of the company, was 
used only as a supply division, and did not accompany the company on 
the road. No notes or recommendations regarding it can therefore be 
made. The personal equipment of the men was constantly studied, and 
it is believed that it should be improved. The work of the Engineer 
troops requires them to march to the front to make reconnoissances or to 
build or repair roads or bridges, and after the troops have passed, the 
Engineers must dismantle or destroy their work and then regain the head 
of the column. While they are equipped as Infantry this imposes a 
heavy strain upon them. It is suggested that light wagons capable of 
carrying most of their personal burdens, or even of carrying the men 
themselves, would enable them to meet this demand and retain their 
strength for the important Engineer work mentioned. 


32 


The loose shoulder straps should be discarded. They catch in the 
brush. Many were completely torn from the blouses. The greatest 
trouble during hard marching seems to be with the men’s feet. It is 
therefore very important that the shoes issued for field wear should be the 
very best obtainable. Great care was taken before leaving Fort Leaven¬ 
worth to see that all the men were provided with shoes in good condition. 
Of the new shoes used, 21 per cent failed before reaching Fort Riley, 
and 87 per cent failed on or before the return march. Of the shoes that 
were not new but in good condition, 54 per cent failed on the way to 
Fort Riley, and 88 per cent failed before the return to Fort Leavenworth. 
These shoes cost $2.20 per pair. I am convinced that a shoe can be ob¬ 
tained for not more than $5 per pair that will be much cheaper per mile 
than those issued, and will be more comfortable because worn longer 
after breaking in. The shoes should be provided with Hungarian cone- 
head nails on the soles to give a more secure footing on dry grass or rock. 
They also protect the soles and at the same time diminish the slipping 
and wear. In rough country, especially when the grass is burned by the 
sun, they will increase the endurance of the men fully 25 per cent. 

Officers and non-commissioned officers should be provided with com¬ 
passes with fluorescent dials which can be read in the dark without strik¬ 
ing matches. 

Sabers should be discarded. The first view of distant troops was gen¬ 
erally obtained by looking for flashes of light from saber blades. The 
sabers proved to be great encumbrances, were of no use, and after a few 
days in the field were not even ornamental. It is suggested that a hollow 
metal case for maps and drawings would be much more useful for Engi¬ 
neer officers could be made equally ornamental, and like the batons for¬ 
merly carried by officers of considerable rank, would be useful for signal¬ 
ing or pointing in the field. 

The spurs of the mounted men should also be discarded, although they 
might be permitted to be worn when necessary. They are rarely used, 
hand to hand fighting mounted being infrequent nowadays, and they are 
very inconvenient when dismounted in long grass, brush or mud. 

A great reduction in the bulk and weight of records may be made by 
means of a system of card files in place of large books. The records of 
the company displaced on the company wagon ammunition and supplies 
that in the field would be of much greater immediate value than the records. 

Very respectfully, your.obedient servant, 

R. R. RAYMOND, 

Captain, Corps of Engineers , Commanding Company D. 





































































































33 


2d problem. 

October 17th, Saturday. 

Outpost and patrolling for all regular troops. 

GENERAL IDEA. 

A Blue and Brown Division, each having a brigade, of all arms, as ad¬ 
vance guard, are approaching each other in the valley of Clarke’s and 
Humbolt Creeks. Each has received information that the enemy is in 
the front at no great distance, and the two advance guards have halted and 
established outposts from which more carefully to examine the country 
in front. 

SPECIAL SITUATION. 

Blue. 


A brigade, of all arms, forming the advance guard of a division advanc¬ 
ing to the north and east through Clarke’s Creek Valley, has received in¬ 
formation of the presence of hostile parties in front. The advance guard 
establishes an outpost and sends forward information patrols to ascertain 
conditions. 

The Blue force will leave at 3:00 P. M., October 16th, and bivouac 
on Smoky Hill Flat near the junction of Smoky Hill River and Hays 
Creek. It will leave bivouac the next morning in advance guard forma¬ 
tion and move by Clarke’s road to the proper point from which to estab¬ 
lish an outpost, with its left resting on Grant Ridge, near Kramer’s 
Ranch, and the right on Clarke’s Creek. The outpost will be established 
by 9:30 A. M., and information patrols, foot and mounted, will be sent to 
the front to examine the country to the north and east and between 
Clarke’s Creek and Grant Ridge. 

All patrols will return to the command by 12 M., when dinner will be 
eaten and the force will await further orders, which will be given through 

the Chief Umpire. 

Official : 


C. D. ROBERTS, 


Capt ., Aid. 

Copy respectfully furnished Company D, Engineers. 


Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley, Kans., 

October 17, IQOJ. 

The Adjutant General, 

First Brigade, Provisional Division. 

Sir : 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 


34 


Company D, 1st Battalion of Engineers, on October 16th and 17th, 1903, 
in connnection with the 2d problem. 

The company consisted of two officers and 54 enlisted men, of whom 
14 were mounted, two were on duty with the company pack train, and 
one was teamster. One private of the Hospital Corps was also assigned 
to the company for the occasion. 

The company in the field order, accompanied by its pack train loaded 
with the regular Engineer tool pouches and by one wagon loaded with 
tools, moved from the camp of the 1st Battalion of Engineers about 3:30 
P. M., October 16th, and took its place in the line of march immediately 
preceded by the Artillery, in order that assistance might be rendered that 
arm in case of bad roads or other difficulties. The roads had, however, 
been previously made passable, and no such assistance was needed. The 
night of the 16th was passed in bivouac on the bank of Hays Creek. 

Reveille on the 17th was at 5:30 A. M., and at daybreak the company 
resumed its march, again immediately preceding the Artillery, for the pur¬ 
pose named above. The roads were in passable condition, and the route 
after leaving the roads required no preparation for the passage of the Ar¬ 
tillery. During the deployment of the brigade, and in the absence of 
specific instructions, the company was kept in the vicinity of the Field 
Artillery in the belief that that arm might have need for its services. 
This indeed proved to be the case; for the 29th Battery was unable, with 
the tools in its possession, to intrench its guns in the time available, the 
ground being very stony and the Brown forces being seen advancing at 
not more than 3,000 yards. The entire company was therefore employed 
in constructing the necessary gun-pits. This work was successfully com¬ 
pleted except for the right gun where the ground was too stony for ex¬ 
cavation, and the gun was left upon the natural surface, a parapet being 
thrown up around it. The company was then assigned by General Grant 
as support for this battery in order to release the battalion of Infantry 
originally assigned to that duty, and took up its position behind the hill 
at the right flank of the battery, sending the tool wagon and all animals 
to cover in rear. T his position was maintained throughout the remainder 
of the engagement, until recall, when the company returned to camp via 
Clarke’s Creek Road and the Mormon Trail. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. R. RAYMOND, 

Capt., Corps of Engineers, Commanding Company D. 



35 


Headquarters Blue Division, 
Pawnee Flats, Fort Riley, Kans., 

October 22, IQOJ. 

I. A detachment of the enemy is reported to be in ORDERS 

the vicinity of Garrisons, Kans., and is said to consist of no. 1. 

all arms. 

. ORDER OF MARCH. 

II. \a) A reconnaissance in force toward Garrisons, 

i7 . M , , . I. Advance guard: 

N.ans., will he made tomorrow. A serious entangle- 6 ( .j l i n f antry . Lieut 

ment with the enemy is not desired, but a vigorous at- Col. R. H. R. 

tack will be made upon him wherever encountered, and Loughborough, 6 th 

will be pushed sufficiently far to drive in his outposts or Infantry, Com- 

advance detachments and fully develop his strength and man( Bng. 


position. 

(b) The Cavalry, operating under special instructions 

of the Division Commander, will, in case the enemy is U* Support: 55th 

encountered by the main column, push in to attack * owa anc * ^5th * n ~ 
, ; ... , fantry, 7th, 28th, 

vigorously, and must secure information even at the cost 20 th am} 29 ^ p^jj 

of a portion of its force. Batteries, in the 

III. (a) T he main body and advance guard will pro- order named, 
ceed from camp at 8:30 A. M., tomorrow, October 23d, 
and will follow the main road from Ogden to Garrisons, 
via Keats Postoffice (the road which passes Schoolhouse jjj Main Body- 
No. 73.) 3d Brigade less two 

(b) The Commanding Officers of the 4th Cavalry companies, 
and of the Engineer detachment will report to the Divi¬ 
sion Commander for special instructions. The follow¬ 
ing officers : IV. Rear Guard: 

Capt. R. R. Raymond, Engineer Corps; Capt. E. B. two companies of 
Winans, jr., 4th Cavalry; 1st Lieut. Guy V. Henry, 4th Brigade. 
Cavalry, are detailed as reconnaissance officers, and will 
likewise report to the Division Commander for special 


instructions. 

(c) The regimental field dressing stations accompanied 
by the necessary Hospital Corps detachments, will fol¬ 
low in rear of their respective commands. 

(d) The remainder of the medical department and 
equipment, ambulance companies, etc., together with 
the sick and convalescent, will be reported to the officer 
designated to take charge of the wagon train. This 
officer (to be designated later) will select a strong de- 


The detachments 
mentioned above 
will keep well closed 
up and follow each 
other at the mini¬ 
mum distances al¬ 
lowable by the ter¬ 
rain and cover. 


36 


Copies furnished 
Brigade, Regi¬ 
mental, Battalion, 
Squadron and Bat¬ 
tery Commanders. 


fensive position on the top of Sheridan Heights and will 
park the wagon and hospital trains and the tool train of 
the Engineers at a suitable place within the limits of 
this position, which will be placed in condition for de¬ 
fense by the construction of shelter trenches, obstacles, 
etc. All regimental bands, and such sick in quarters and 
convalescents as are able to do so, will report to the offi¬ 
cer designated to take charge of trains, to assist in the 
defense thereof. 

( e ) The Signal Corps will maintain communication 
between the train park and the rear of the command. 
It will also provide signal men with flags to communi¬ 
cate between the Division Commander and advance 
bodies. 

IV. The commander of the main body will detail 
two companies to follow the command as a rear guard. 
Should the command become engaged, these companies 
will be immediately sent one to the rear of and eche¬ 
loned on each flank, to guard against surprise. 

V. The Division Commander will be found with the 
support until the enemy is encountered and an engage¬ 
ment develops. Should an engagement take place, he 
will be found somewhere in the vicinity and in rear of 
the center of the line, on high ground if available. 
Those desiring to communicate with him after the en¬ 
gagement begins must look for his flag. 

By command of BRIGADIER GENERAL BELL : 

MICHAEL J. LENIHAN, 

Capt., 25 th Infantry , Adjutant General. 


Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley, Kans., 


The Adjutant General, 

Blue Division. 


October 2J, IQOJ. 


SIR: 

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of 
the dismounted sections of Company D, 1st Battalion of Engineers, in 
connection with Problem 6. 



Imftt*tnatiin obtained .—Prior to 11:00 o’clock, a Brown battery was in 
oosidon on the blurt just southeast of W eisman’s and Brown Cavalry, 
dismounted, was deployed on the ridge across the creek from Weisner’s. 
At 11:00 o’clock these forces withdrew toward the northwest, and no 
Brown troc ps remained east of the road running north from Schoolhouse 
No. 73. 

Details if reconnaissance .—In pursuance to Field Orders 1, Head- 
quarters Blue Division. October 22. 1903, the company Hess the mounted 
section) moved from camp at 8:30 A. M., and passed Three Mile Creek 
at 8:35 A. M. This start was timed to avoid waiting in line and to 
enable the company to make a rapid march to Ogden under cover of the 
point and hankers of the advance guard. The support of that body was 
passed at Ogden, and the company proceeded to destroy the two bridges 
just east of that place. This done, the shelter tents were readjusted upon 
the men so as to conceal as much as possible of the blue shirts, and the 
company moved in advance guard formation up the east bank of Seven 
Mile Creek, sending hankers over to the west bank and up the draws to 
the east. 

From a point about one-half mile south of Eemnitz’, the Cavalry and 
Artillery mentioned above were observed. In order to learn the extent 
of the Brown line to the eastward, the company moved to Kauer’s. 
From that point a patrol was pushed directly north until about one mile 
to the east of Eskerson’s. No Brown troops were found in this region. 
Heavy tiring was heard to the westward. The company was therefore 
moved from Kauer's toward the northwest; but before contact with the 
enemy was obtained, the recall was sounded, and the company returned 
to camp. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. R. RAYMOND, 
Captain , Corps of Engineers. 


38 


REPOETS OF 1ST. LIEUT. STICKLE, CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, COMMANDING COMPANY A. 


Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 


November 18 , IQOJ. 


The Adjutant, 

1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Sir : 

I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of 
Company A from the time of its arrival at Fort Riley, Kansas, Octo¬ 
ber 2d, 1903, till its departure for Fort Leavenworth, November 2d, 
1903, including its participation in the maneuvers at that place: 

O ctober 2d the company under the command of Lieut. Arthur Wil¬ 
liams, Corps of Engineers, except the mounted section, arrived at 
Fort Riley and made camp. 

October 3d the mounted section under my command arrived and 
joined the company having marched from Fort Crook, Nebraska, and 
made a map of the road en route. A copy of the report concerning 
this march, Appendix "A” accompanies this report. 

A reserve ponton division had been assigned to A Company and 
was under the immediate charge of a bridge section consisting of 
four non-commissioned officers and sixteen privates of the company. 

On October 5th a site for two ponton bridges, one wagon and one 
foot, across the Kansas River at Fort Riley was selected, about one 
mile south of Division Headquarters, the river flowing northeast 
at the site. The bridges were located so that the eastern approaches 
were on a sloping sand-bar; the western bank for the wagon bridge, 
steep, and 14 feet above the water; for the foot bridge, with a 
lesser grade, and 8 feet above the water. The site in a general 
way was selected by the Battalion Commander, and the exact loca¬ 
tion of the bridges chosen by myself. A graduated gage for deter- 





















39 


mining elevation of water was firmly set by Lieut. Williams, and 
remained in place, and readings taken and recorded three times daily 
until the bridges were dismantled. The north approaches to both 
bridges were cut down with pick and shovel by an average of 60 men 
from all the companies of the Battalion on October 5th and 6th. The 
grade was made one on thirteen and involved the removal of nearly 
500 cubic yards of earth. Two slip scrapers were used on October 6th 
and 7th and part of October 8th. 

The wagon bridge was constructed on October 6th by a detail of 10 
non-commissioned officers and 74 privates obtained from all the com¬ 
panies in the Battalion. This bridge was 286 feet 8 inches long. 

While constructing the bridge a strong cross wind was blowing, 
so that several chess carriers were blown overboard. All boats were 
anchored upstream and every other one downstream. One trestle and 
twelve pontons were used. In addition to the two side rails pre¬ 
scribed, a middle rail was placed over the middle balk, and lashed 
liked side rails to it. Two chess per bay were properly notched to 
make room for lashings. The effect was to materially stiffen the 
balk, but more important, to prevent the ordinarily relatively great 
differences of elevation of adjacent chess when animals crossed the 
bridge, and third to prevent the slipping of the chess at right angles to 
the bridge. It was not in the way for any traffic, the ends of rack 
sticks, where necessary, being lashed to the middle rail. 

The first method of constructing the abutment bay given in fig. 2, 
Plat XII, U. S. Bridge Equipage, was used, contact between balks 
and gunwales being provided or when necessary by wooden wedges 
driven in, and changed as necessary in case of rise and fall of pontons. 

On October 7th the water having risen seven feet the trestle at the 
east end of bridge, was replaced by a ponton and the trestle carried 
toward the shore, increasing the length of bridge to 307 feet 4 
inches. It remained this length until the bridge was dismantled. 

The bridge section’s sole duty during the month of October was 
to keep this bridge, and the foot bridge (constructed later) in order 
for the passage of troops and vehicles at all times. From the 
bridge section and the remainder of the dismounted section of the 
company, a guard was established October 15th and was continued 
throughout the month. A copy of Special Orders for guard and 
sentinels is appended (Appendix ?f B”). 

On October 7th the eastern approach to the bridge was improved by 
utilizing thirteen loads of rock, hauled from the Fort Riley quarry. 


40 


Some of this rock was used in making a low wall on the upstream 
side of this approach. The roadway was completed by scraping in 
gravel and coarse sand. The bridge without change was then practi¬ 
cable up to a three-foot rise. 

On October 15th with 28 men from A Company and details from the 
other companies to make a total of 84 non-commissioned officers and 
men, constructed a foot bridge about 125 feet below the wagon bridge. 
The bridge was constructed with extended intervals, all bays rein¬ 
forced. Ten boats and one trestle were used and the total length of 
bridge was 294 feet 8 inches. The western approach was readily 
made practicable for foot troops. Advance guard side rails had to be used 
and mostly advance guard chess, for this bridge. On October 19th the 
wagon bridge was covered with a layer of hay, mainly to protect the 
chess, this it did satisfactorily. It was necessary to replace it fre¬ 
quently as the continual traffic over this bridge rapidly pulverized it. 
The objection to the hay is that it makes it more difficult to observe 
promptly, cracked and broken chess, but it did excellent service and 
it is probable that without it a large number of the chess would have 
broken under traffic during the month. 

As mounted troops were allowed to cross mounted, and foot troops 
well closed up, considerable oscillation was observed in the bridges, 
especially the wagon bridge. 

On October 20th cables were passed along the wagon bridge under 
roadway from bow of one boat to stern of next and so on, the ends 
of cables being firmly attached to posts on the shores. The cables 
leading from the same end of a boat were in each case surrounded 
by a sling some six feet from point of attachment and cables rendered 
taut by turning a rack stick sufficiently and lashing it to one of the 
cables. In this way a sort of horizontal truss was formed. This 
lengthened the time of oscillation and reduced the extent of oscilla¬ 
tion and improved the working of the bridge under such loads as 
mounted troops and loaded pack mules. It it is not believed advisa¬ 
ble for cables, slings and rack sticks to be especially provided for 
stiffening in this way, as usually it takes too much time to put on for 
a very temporary bridge, cavalry may be required to dismount, and 
special precautions should be taken. Again for a bridge which is 
to be used for some time, cables, etc., may be obtained in exactly the 
same way as was done in this case, and be put on after the bridge 
has been used for some time. This method was suggested by Lieut. 
Williams. 


41 


On October 21st, the same method of stiffening was applied to the 
foot bridge. 

On October 22d, Lieut. Will iams with the mounted section took 
part in the problem for the day. 

On October 23d, six non-commissioned officers and seventeen pri¬ 
vates were directed to report to Captain Deakyne for duty in the con¬ 
struction of trenches. 

On October 24th, the entire division crossed the ponton bridges for 
review and returned. My report on that date is appended (Appendix 

"C”). 

On October 26th, in the problem of ”Attack and defense of posi¬ 
tion” Lieut. Williams with the mounted section accompanied the 
Battalion. The dismounted section of the company (except bridge 
section) were posted to protect the ponton bridges as part of the Blue 
force. My report of the operations of the dismounted section is ap¬ 
pended (Appendix "D”). 

October 27th, in the field sports of the division, Company A was 
limited to three entries. In the three entries the company represent¬ 
ing the Battalion won prizes as follows: 

1. Team under Corporal Fitton, pitching of conical wall tent, 
first prize. 

2. First class private Watson, equipment race, first prize. 

October 29th, the mounted section under Lieut. Williams, took part 

in the exercise as part of Battalion going into bivouac for the 
night returning at 9:00 A. M., October 30th. The foot bridge was 
dismantled and material piled in two hours and two minutes under 
my direction by six non-commissioned officers and nineteen privates 
of the company. 

On October 31st, the company with enough men from other com¬ 
panies to make 84 non-commissioned officers and men dismantled the 
wagon bridge and piled material in one hour and thirty-five minutes. 

October 30th and 31st, and November 1st, the bridge section hauled 
boats from water and loaded wagons as rapidly as wagons were made 
available. 

On November 1st, the company assisted in loading ponton material 
on train. 

On November 2d, the company broke camp and went into shelter 
tents, and on November 3d, at 9:40 A. M., the company left Fort 
Riley for Fort Leavenworth by marching with the Battalion. 


42 


Record of gage during the month of October. 


October 5, 1:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 5, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 5, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 6, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 6, 1:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 6, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 7, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 7, 1:30 P. M., 2.7 feet. 
October 7, 6:30 P. M., 2.5 feet. 
October 8, 7:30 A. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 8, 1:30 P. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 8, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 9, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 9, 1:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 9, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 10, 7:30 A. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 10, 1:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 10, 6:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 11, 7:30 A. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 11, 1:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 11, 6:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 12, 7:30 A. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 12, 1:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 
October 12, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 13, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 13, 1:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 13, 6:30 P. M., 2.0 feet. 
October 14, 7:30 A. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 14, 1:30 P. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 14, 6:30 P. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 15, 7:30 A. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 15, 1:30 P. M., 2.1 feet. 
October 15, 6:30 P. M., 2.2 feet. 
October 16, 7:30 A. M., 2.2 feet. 
October 16, 1:30 P. M., 2.2 feet. 
October 16, 6.30 P. M., 2.2 feet. 
October 17, 7:30 A. M., 2.2 feet. 
October 17, 1:30 P. M., 2.2 feet. 


October 17, 
October 18, 
October 18, 
October 18, 
October 19, 
October 19, 
October 19, 
October 20, 
October 20, 
October 20, 
October 21, 
October 21, 
October 21, 
October 22, 
October 22, 
October 22, 
October 23, 
October 23, 
October 23, 
October 24, 
October 24, 
October 24, 
October 25, 
October 25, 
October 25, 
October 26, 
October 26, 
October 26, 
October 27, 
October 27, 
October 27, 
October 28, 
October 28, 
October 28, 
October 29, 
October 29, 
October 29, 
October 30, 
October 30, 


6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.2 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.2 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.2 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.2 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

2.0 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

2.1 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet’ 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

6:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

7:30 

A. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 

1:30 

P. 

M., 

1.9 

feet. 


44 


October 30, 6:30 P. M., 1.9 feet. 

October 31, 7:30 A. M., 2.0 feet. 

Soundings every ten feet were taken at each bridge and recorded. 
The deepest water at the wagon bridge was 6 feet 4 % inches with 
the gage at 2 feet. 

With the exception of October 7th the two boats at the western end 
of the bridge were aground at all times, while with a less reading than 
2.0 feet three were aground. 

The deepest water at the foot bridge was 6 feet Y\ inches with the 
gage at 2.0 feet. 

One boat was aground at all times at the western end of the bridge 
while with a reading less than 2.0 feet, two were aground. 

The following is the record of the crossings of the bridges from 
October 16th to October 30th: 

Foot Bridge. 

Twenty-five regiments of infantry, 2 companies of infantry, 3,222 
footmen (mostly civilians), 5 light wagons, 2 pack trains, and the 
mounts accompanying foot troops also crossed the bridge. 

Wagon Bridge. 

Twenty-three regiments of infantry, 44 companies of infantry, 121 
troops of cavalry, 38 batteries of artillery, 16 mounted sections of 
engineers, 6 dismounted sections, 1,727 individual horsemen, 206 
one-horse vehicles, 751 footmen, 703 two-horse vehicles, 386 four- 
mule wagons, 73 six-mule wagons, 4 pack trains, 214 loads of hay, 
1 automobile, 2 Colts automatic R. F. guns. 

The mean surface velocity of the river at reading 1.9 was found to 
be 2.3 miles per hour. 

The bridge material consisted of one division complete (except for 
certain shortages) from Washington, D. C., the balance from the 1st 
Battalion of Engineers, Fort Leavenworth. It was all in very good 
condition, not one balk broke under the heaviest loads, and only eight 
chess were replaced in the bridges. No accident of any kind oc- 
cured on the bridges. 

The foot bridge reinforced as it was, could have been safely used 
if necessary for any ordinary army traffic. 

Remarks. 

It is recommended that enough balk be furnished with each divi¬ 
sion for putting a middle rail on all bridges built for passage of 
animals. 














45 


It is believed that the chess should be one-fourth inch thicker than 
at present. 


This recommendation concerning balk and chess is made, notwith¬ 
standing that it would probably require extra wagons for transporta¬ 
tion. 


A skiff should be furnished with each division to be manned during 
crossings and for use in making close inspection of balk, and for many 
other purposes. 

The work of Sergeant William McNally in charge of the bridge 
section was well and intelligently performed and his services are parti¬ 
cularly recommended. 

Lieut. N. E. Bower joined the company from detached service at 
West Point, Kentucky, on October 17th and was placed on special duty 
under the Chief Umpire on October 18th, and remained on special 
duty to include November 2d. 

Very respectfully, 


H. W. STICKLE, 

1st Lieut., Corps of Engineers. 




APPENDIX A. 


Camp William Cary Sanger, 
Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

October 2J, IQO 


The Adjutant General, 

Department of the Missouri, 

Omaha, Nebr. 

(Thro' Military Channels.) 

Sir : 

I have the honor to report the execution of par. 2, Special Orders 
No. 178, c. s. Headquarters, Department of the Missouri. 

The order was received September 14th. Preparations were at 
once made to provide my detachment with the necessary equipment 
and the Quartermaster, Fort Leavenworth, was requested to furnish 
transportation on September 16th. In order to properly care for 
the animals I secured a coach for the detachment on the same 
freight train with them. The baggage, engineer equipment, and 
animals were loaded on the afternoon of September 16th. The 
detachment consisted of the mounted section of Company A, 1st Bat¬ 
talion of Engineers, two packers from that company and the necessary 
mounts for section, two riding mules for packers, and six pack mules. 


46 


The train left Fort Leavenworth at 8:30 P. M., September 16th, over 
the Missouri Pacific R. R. and arrived at Fort Crook about 5:00 P.M., 
September 17th. 

Five hours were lost at Nebraska City, Neb., due to the fact that 
our engine while switching was derailed and the railroad company 
seemed unable to get it back on the track. The efforts of the com¬ 
pany being unproductive of results, and having been delayed from 
about 7:15 A. M., to 12:30 P. M., I wired the circumstances to the 
Chief Quartermaster of the Department, and an engine arrived and 
the train started within fifteen minutes. The animals were in box 
cars and there were no facilities for watering or feeding them. 

I reported immediately to the Commanding Officer, Fort Crook. 
The Quartermaster, Fort Crook, informed me that he had five 
wagons to be taken to Fort Riley, but that he had no teamsters and 
no authority to hire them. He also stated that he had no Quarter¬ 
master’s funds for the purchase of regular supplies, and the making of 
necessary repairs en route to Fort Riley. 

On September 18th, I proceeded to Omaha and reported to the Chief 
Quartermaster of the Department, who obtained authority and trans¬ 
ferred to me the necessary funds and telegraphed to the Quartermaster 
General U.S. Army, for authority to hire five teamsters. Rations 
and such forage as could be carried were obtained the same day. 

On September 19th, the authority was obtained, and efforts made to 
hire five teamsters. Three were secured, and on September 20th, the 
detachment started on its march to Fort Riley, two men of the mounted 
section being utilized as teamsters. One teamster was hired at 
Meadow, September 24th, and one at Firth, September 27th. 

Having been informed that no road bridge existed across the Platte 
below Fremont, some fifty miles out of my way, I telegraphed the 
Chief Quartermaster of the Department from Springfield, Neb., for 
transportation for my detachment from Meadow to South Bend, Neb., 
via the C. R. I. and Pacific R. R., such transportation to be used if 
necessary. 

Upon arriving at Meadow, September 21st, I found the road bridge 
out, and the river impossible to ford. At about 9:30 A. M., the agent 
at Meadow informed me that he had instructions to transport my 
detachment to South Bend, and before noon of the same date I had 
Information from the Chief Quartermaster of the Department to the 
same effect. 

The necessary cars were not then at hand and transportation was 


47 


not furnished until 12:15 P. M., September 24th, notwithstanding that 
every effort was made by me to get transportation, and I telegraphed 
daily to the Chief Quartermaster of the Department concerning it. 

The detachment was detrained at South Bend by 4:00 P. M., same 
date. 

Corporal Philgren was taken sick at Meadow and was sent by direc¬ 
tion of the Commanding General to the Hospital at Fort Crook, on 
September 23d. 

On September 25th the detachment started from South Bend, to Fort 
Riley arriving there without further delay about 2:00 P. M.,October 3d. 

I reported to the Commanding General, and, the 1st Battalion of 
Engineers having already arrived, I and my detachment joined that 
command. 

Fhe transportation escorted bv my detachment from Fort Crook 
was turned over to Captain Chauncey B. Baker, Quartermaster, U.S. 
Army. 

Fhe detachment and all animals arrived in excellent condition, the 
march from South Bend, Neb., to the Headquarters, Provisional 
Division, Fort Riley Reservation, a distance of 175.9 miles being 
marched in nine successive days or an average of 19.5 miles per day. 

The distance was determined by timing of horses checked by two 
odometers. The distance determined by timing from Fort Crook 
gate to the Headquarters, Provisional Division, Fort Riley Reserva¬ 
tion is 202.8 miles. The distance determined hy odometers is 200.63 
miles, being a difference of 2.17 miles for the entire distance. 

The odometers were on the front wheels of the same wagon, the 
wheels having the same measured circumference. Ordinarily the 
odometer checked well but when the road was rough, sandy, or 
muddy, considerable variation in the records of the two occured. 
The odometers were used as a check only, and it is believed that 
202.8 miles for the distance is very close to correct. 

About ten miles were lost covering distances east and west more than 
once. Such lost distances were short, and in such long distance it is 
impracticable to avoid all of them. 

It was intended to sketch two side roads the entire distance with 
occasional crossroads, and this was done whenever practicable. 
Three stopwatches only were to be obtained for my sketching details. 
These were supplemented by personal watches, but the usage given 
to all watches was hard and many personal watches and one stopwatch 
were soon out of order. It was considered impracticable to delay the 


48 


march till others could be obtained. The number of roads practicable 
near Fort Riley was more limited, and the side work was therefore 
necessarily diminished in amount. 

Sketches were compiled on a drawing board as soon as practicable 
after the detachment went into camp each evening. 

The work of the men of the detachment was faithful and their 
bearing excellent. 

Since arrival at Fort Riley the sketch has been reduced, traced, and 
blue prints made. This work has been necessarily delayed by parti¬ 
cipation in the maneuvers and for other reasons. 

A Road Report with two sets of blue prints, six per set, accom¬ 
panies this report. 

Very respectfully, 

H. W. STICKLE, 

1 st Lieut., Corps of Engineers. 

APPENDIX B. 

Company A, 1st Battalion of Engineers, 

Fort Riley, Kans., 
October 14 , 1903 . 

During the maneuvers or until otherwise ordered the following is 
directed for the bridge guard: 

The guard will consist of one non-commissioned officer and six (6) 
privates. It will be mounted daily at 6:00 P. M., and be on duty for 
twenty-four (24) hours. 

Two posts will be established. 

The post of No. 1 extends from the west end of the park, along 
the north side of the wagons to the north approach of the wagon 
bridge, south on the north approach to the wagon bridge, and the 
wagon bridge. 

No loose horses or cattle will be allowed on the bridge. 

Care will be taken to see that no team, or horse, be permitted to 
come upon the bridge for crossing while another is crossing in the 
opposite direction. All teams and animals will be required to cross 
at a walk. 

The post of No. 2 extends from the north approach of the wagon 
bridge east to north approach of foot bridge, and south on north 
approach to foot bridge, and foot bridge. No. 2 will allow no 
animals of any kind except mounts accompanying foot troops to cross 
the foot bridge. 


49 


Orders for both sentinels: 

The sentinels will allow no enlisted men or civilians to loiter on 
the bridge. They will watch carefully for drift or other danger to 
bridges, and report to the non-commissioned officer of the guard, 
when either bridge is in danger from any cause. 

Sentinels will render the customary salutes of sentinels. 

Sentinels will halt troops crossing the bridges if violent oscillations 
are observed, until the oscillations cease. 

A sentinel may leave his post to call the guard, and when directed 
by the non-commissioned officer of the guard, but not otherwise. 

The equipment of sentinels is the revolver, belt, and five rounds 
revolver ball catridges. 

Sentinels will keep a record of organizations, detachments, and 
individuals crossing the bridges, with times of crossing, as nearly as 
practicable. Memorandum books will be provided for this purpose. 

During the crossing of troops mounted or otherwise, the members 
of the guard will place themselves, under the supervision of the non¬ 
commissioned officer of the guard in the most suitable places to watch 
the bridge and render assistance in case of accident. Dismounted 
troops will be required to pass in column of twos at broken step. 

Cavalry should remain mounted and Artillery should cross with as 
little interval as possible. The guard will visit camp for its meals 
leaving one man in the guard tent in addition to the sentinel on post. 

The cables will be tightened when dry after a rain. 

When it is known that a body of troops are soon to cross the bridges 
the commander of the guard will notify at once the senior non¬ 
commissioned officer of the bridge section who will, if possible be 
present with his section at such crossings. Lashings, cables, chess, 
etc., will be carefully inspected daily, and after each crossing of 
troops and anything out of order will be at once repaired. 

The commander of the guard will keep careful watch of the tide 
gage, or see that it is done by a member of his guard. In case the 
reading should be 2 feet or more he will notify the senior non¬ 
commissioned officer of the bridge section who will at once turn out 
with his section. In case reading should be 3 feet or more the 
Company Commander will be notified. 

H. W. STICKLE, 

1 st Lieut., Corps of Engineers , 
Commanding Company. 


50 


APPENDIX C. 

Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

October 24 , IQOJ. 

The Adjutant, 

1st Battalion of Engineers. 

Sir : 

In accordance with verbal instructions from the Battalion Com¬ 
mander, I have the honor to report as follows concerning the crossing 
this date, of the Kansas River twice by the Provisional Division, on 
two ponton bridges, built by Company A, 1st Battalion of Engineers: 

1st crossing (from west to east.) 

1. Lower bridge. 

One brigade of Infantry crossed 7:50 A. M. to 8:01 A. M. 

2. Upper bridge. 

1st Battailon of Engineers crossed 7:53 A. M. to 7:56 A. M. 
Signal Corps Battalion crossed 7:56 A. M. to 7:57 A. M. 

Three Brigades of Infantry crossed 7:57 A. M. to 8:31 A. M. 
Divisional Artillery crossed 8:31 A. M. to 8:48 A. M. 

Cavalry Brigade crossed 8:48 A. M. to 9:15 A. M. 

Detachment of Field Hospital and ambulance companies crossed 
9:15 A. M. to 9:20 A. M. 

Wagon train, about 120 wagons crossed 9:20 A. M. to 9:56 A. M. 
Pack trains crossed 9:56 A. M. to 9:59 A. M. 

From 9:33 A. M. to 9:36 A. M., upper bridge was closed while a 
broken chess was replaced and side rail lashings were adjusted. 

Lower bridge used: 11 minutes. 

Upper bridge used: 2 hours, 3 minutes. 

2d crossing (from east to west.) 

1. Lower bridge in use for Infantry, 11:36 A. M. to 11:41 A. M. ; 
12:08 P. M. to 12:11 P. M.; and for pack trains, 1:00 P. M. to 
1:02 P. M.; 1:07 P. M. to 1:10 P. M. 

2. Upper bridge in use for Infantry, 11:27 A .M. to 11:37 A .M.; 
11:41 A. M. to 12:08 P .M. 

In use for Artillery, 12:08 P. M. to 12:24 P. M. 

In use for Cavalry, Hospital detachments and ambulance companies, 
12:24 P. M. to 12:54 P. M. 

In use for wagons and Division wagon train, 12:54 P. M. to 1*20 
P. M. 

No time was lost for repairing bridges during this crossing. 
















51 


Time lower bridge used: 13 minutes. 

Time upper bridge used: 1 hour 53 minutes. 

Considering the command in single column in both cases there was 
a gain in time in the second crossing over the first of eight minutes. 
No civilians were considered in this report. 

Infantry crossed upper bridge in colmn of twos. Cavalry cressed 
mounted in column of-twos. 

Infantry,Cavalry and Artillery in crossing were well closed up. Be¬ 
tween the first and second crossings, five cracked chess were replaced, 
new hay placed on upper bridge, and all cables and lashings adjusted. 

Counting both crossings between 7:53 A. M., and 1:20 P. M., 
about 25,000 crossed the bridges exclusive of animals, wagons, car¬ 
riages, and Artillery pieces and caissons. 

The capacity of the two bridges during this time is about 43,000 
troops, with the same percentage of various arms with equipment 
and baggage as took part in the review this date, or 4,000 per bridge 
per hour. 

Very respectfully, 

H. W. STICKLE, 

1 st Lieut ., Corps of Engineers. 

APPENDIX D. 

Camp William Cary Sanger, 

Fort Riley Reservation, Kans., 

October 26 , IQOJ. 

The Adjutant General, 

Blue Force. 

(Thro' Military Channels .) 

Sir : 

I have the honor to report as follows concerning the operations of 
the dismounted section of Company A, 1st Battalion of Engineers 
this date: 

The dismounted section consisted of a ponton bridge section of 
two non-commissioned officers and eleven privates, a bridge guard of 
one non-commissioned officer and six men, and a section used as in¬ 
fantry of four non-commissioned officers and ten privates. 

The bridge section was unarmed and kept the bridge in order, and 
acted as messengers and observers, reporting promptly during the at¬ 
tack on the bridge any movements of the enemy seen, numbers, etc. 

The ponton bridge guard had charge of the bridge crossings and 
assisted in guarding it against attacks. 


52 


The Infantry section was divided into three parts, one non-com¬ 
missioned officer and two privates were sent to the hill southeast of 
Whiskey Lake to observe and report if enemy were seen to the east 
or south, one non-commissioned officer and three privates were left 
in the trenches constructed on Smoky Hill Flats, and two non-com¬ 
missioned officers and five privates placed as a picket in the woods at 
the narrowest places between Whiskey Lake and the Kansas River, 
about 1000 yards below the bridges, guarding against approach of the 
enemy from the north. 

My instructions had been to guard the eastern approaches to the 
ponton bridges with the assurance that no attention was required on 
the Fort side, as it would be taken care of by other portions of the 
Blue force. 

In case of a strong force approaching on the eastern side, I had 
planned to delay them sufficiently to partially dismantle the bridges, 
the upper one constructively and the lower one actually. 

I remained near the bridge on the western bank, to take charge of 
this work if it became necessary. 

No attention was paid to an attack from this direction as above 
stated. 

I was surprised about 12:20 P. M., by Corporal Boehr, Brown force, 
and two privates of Troop D, 8th Cavalry, and about 12:40 P. M., 
Sergeant McNally, unarmed, and myself were captured by two of 
them, one of Corporal Boehr’s men having disappeared. In less than 
a minute three members of the bridge guard covered Corporal Boehr 
and his remaining man at less than five yards, and I considered the 
Sergeant and myself recaptured, or in reality the capture had not been 
completed. The Corporal and his man were captured and my 
outposts at once sent for. 

The first squad arrived about 12:50 P. M., and the others shortly 
after. 

The men were immediately placed in position behind the river 
bank and in the wagon cut, and about 12:55 P. M., a squad of from 
8 to 12, probably of Troop D, 8th Cavalry, of the Browns, opened 
fire on our position from about 400 yards above the bridges on the 
west bank. We were completely sheltered and their fire could have 
done us no harm. My detachment replied spiritedly and remained in 
position. 

Firing continued till 1:25 P. M., on both sides and the squad of 


53 


Browns approached to within about 150 yards from our position, 
coming in from our front under a strong fire. 

At 1:25 the Browns withdrew and at 1:35 P. M., seeing the troops 
returning, 1 marched the dismounted section to camp and dismissed it. 

Corporal Boehrwith his man undoubtedly had me at a disadvantage 
when I had but two armed men within a half mile, sentries on the 
bridge. He did not carry out the requirements of par. 22, Circular 
No. 1 of the Provisional Division, in making his capture. He stated 
that he had instructions to attach a sign to one of the bridges that it 
had been destroyed by a Brown force, and when I asked him how he 
had intended to destroy the bridges, he said he had a knife and might 
have gotten an axe if any were there,, and could have cut the cables, 
or required us to cut them. He claimed that the mere presence of 
his three men in the vicinity of the bridge constituted a constructive 
destruction of the bridges by his method. In the first place his method 
would not have destroyed the bridges, as both would still have been 
perfectly passable for any crossing, and in the second, two armed 
sentries were on the bridges, nine unarmed men of the bridge section 
at the upper bridge and some time would have been required to do 
even this with a knife, and axes not in his possession. His bearing 
throughout was excellent and soldierly, and he endeavored to carry 
out his orders as far as he understood instructions. I took care to allow 
him every opportunity to carry forward the advantages he had secured. 

It appears that constructive destruction is a privilege which might 
be easily abused. A sufficient force to overcome all opposition pre¬ 
sent, with materials required to destroy, and the knowledge necessary 
to use the materials in actual destruction, and the time necessary to 
actually do it, should be insisted upon. 

No Brown force developed east of the river. 

The fact that a Brown troop of Cavalry had crossed the river from 
Junction City on a street car, and an attack on my detachment was 
expected, was reported by wire to the Commander of the Blue force 
at about 12:45 P. M. 

No Umpire was in sight during the day. 

Very respectfully, 


H. W. STICKLE, 

1 st Lieut., Corps of Engineers. 





BY 


2d LIEUT. N. E. BOWER, 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 
— 1904 .— 





No. 9. 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
UNITED STATES ARMY. 


I 


REPORT 

UPON 


SURVEY OE MANEUVER GROUNDS 

AT 


WEST POINT, KY„ AUGUST, 1903. 

BY 

2d LIEUT. N. E. BOWER, 

CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 


engineer school of application, 

« 

WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, I). C., 

— 1904 .— 





























* 

















REPORT OF 2D LIEUT. N. E. BOWER, CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS. 


Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

January io , 1904 . 

Brig.-Gen. George L. Gillespie, 

Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, 

Wasbington , D. C. 

(Through Military Channels.) 

General: 

In compliance with instructions contained in your letter of the 19th 
ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report on that part of 
the work of the Engineer Detachment under my charge at West Point, 
Ky., pertaining to the preparation of the map for the maneuvers. 

On August 3d, 1903, in obedience to orders, I reported to Col. O. H. 
Ernst, Corps of Engineers, Engineer Officer, Department of the Lakes, 
at Chicago, Ill., for instructions. Col. Ernst’s written instructions defined 
the work which was to be done and prescribed the time before the expira¬ 
tion of which it must be done. He also specified the scale to which the 
map was to be drawn, the contour interval and other details. I was 
directed to report to him weekly the progress made. Mr. A. H. Grohman, 
C. E., junior engineer in the Chicago office was directed to report to me 
at West Point as draftsman. 

Previous to leaving Fort Leavenworth, a general idea of the work being 
had, a list of the surveying and drafting instruments which would prob¬ 
ably be required, was prepared and left with the Battalion Commander, 
in obedience to his instructions. A copy of this list was taken along to 
Chicago. Likewise a list of the enlisted men selected from the Battalion 
was prepared and left with the same authority in order that they might be 
prepared to start on their journey as soon as further word was received. 



2 


It was the wish of the Battalion Commander that as far as possible all 
instruments and supplies be furnished by the Engineer Officer of the De¬ 
partment in which the work was to be done; the remainder to be sup¬ 
plied by the Engineer Battalion. Such instruments as could be supplied 
by Col. Ernst were then deducted from the list and the Battalion Com¬ 
mander was at once requested to forward the remainder. 1 he proper 
steps were taken to have the detachment sent on promptly. Col. Ernst 
furnished all the maps and information he had succeeded in collecting 
through correspondence with various sources. I was introduced by letter 
to Dr. J. V. Prewitt, of West Point, Ky., who was requested to outline 
the territory and give other information I might desire. 

I reached West Point on the morning of August 4th. Mr. Grohman 
reported to me the following day from Chicago. As no instruments nor 
men could arrive for at least a couple of days this time was spent in going 
over the ground, planning the work and making arrangements for carrying 
it on rapidly when once the enlisted men arrived. 

As a result of Col. Ernst’s efforts to procure maps, little that was of 
practical value was gotten. The tract lay principally in Hardin County, 
the western portion only being in Meade County. No map of Hardin 
County had been made by the Geological Survey. Their map of Meade 
County was procured but was of little practical value owing to the small 
scale. Some elevation points were checked from it, however. A map 
of the State of Kentucky by Rand and McNally was at hand. A sketch 
map made by an engineer from the Illinois Central Railroad was procured 
and although it was very incomplete and crude (about 150 square miles 
having been gone over by one man in nine days) it was nevertheless of 
great value in planning the work. It illustrated the fact that a graphical 
illustration, however crude and incomplete, when made by an intelligent 
person gives greater satisfaction to succeeding map makers than informa¬ 
tion gleaned from farmers and other country people. A map of the right 
of way of the Illinois Central Railroad, which meanders through the tract 
from north to south, was procured. v 

The country embraced in the tract was found upon arrival, more diffi¬ 
cult of survey than anticipated. Much of the land was uncleared or only 
partially cleared. At this season of the year the leaves were on the trees 
and the underbrush in the woods and along the fences formed consider¬ 
able obstruction to vision and contour methods. The numerous orchards, 
worm fences, small fields and corn crops would materially delay progress. 
As the field work was to be completed in a month’s time it soon became 
evident that much time and thought would be required to so plan the 


3 


work that the desired results should be attained and all parts receive the 
proper degree of attention. 

As soon as the instruments arrived from Chicago and before the de¬ 
tachment arrived, two civilians were employed to prepare triangulation 
stations. One, a carpenter, was paid $3 per day ; his assistant getting 
$1.50 per day. Mr. Grohman and I then took the usual reported readings 
at the stations. The measurement of the base line was delayed till after 
the arrival of the detachment. 

In compliance with the following order: 

Special Orders, ) FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS., 

No. 161. i August 6th , iqoj. 

1. In accordance with telegraphic instructions from Headquarters De¬ 
partment of the Missouri, dated Omaha, Nebr., August 4th, 1903, the 
following men belonging to the 1st Battalion of Engineers will proceed 
to West Point, Ky.: 

Sergeant Robbins, Company C, in charge of detachment; Sergeant 
DeGraff, Company A; Sergeant Lowenheimer, Company A; Sergeant 
Crotty, Company D ; Sergeant Bealler, Company D ; Corporal Howry, 
Company A; Corporal Grissom, Company A; Corporal Layton, Com¬ 
pany C; Corporal Fluegel, Company D; Corporal Marron, Company D; 
Corporal Moffit, Company D; Private Baker, Company A; Private Wat¬ 
son, Company A; Private Pope, Company A; Private Howard, Com¬ 
pany B; Private Crary, Company B; Private Hosch, Company B; Pri¬ 
vate Moller, Company B; Private Fletcher, Company C; Private Rich¬ 
ardson, Company C; Private Smith, Company D; Private Hagen, Com¬ 
pany D; Private Grim, Company D. 

A mess outfit and the necessary tentage will be taken. 

The Subsistence Department will issue two day’s travel rations and 30 
day’s field rations for 23 men. 

The descriptive lists of these men will be forwarded to 2d Lieut. 
Nathaniel E. Bower, Engineer Corps, West Point, Ky. 

Upon arrival at West Point, Ky., Sergeant Robbins will report to 2d 
Lieut. Nathaniel E. Bower, Engineer Corps, for instructions. 

The Quartermaster’s Department will furnish the necessary transpor¬ 
tation. 

The travel enjoined is necessary for the public service. 

******* 

By order of LlEUT.-COL. WYGANT: 

JOHN H. BEACOM, 

Capt., 6th Infantry , Adjutant . 


4 


the detachment arrived at West Point on the evening of August 7th, 
The instruments, drafting supplies and rations were brought along as bag¬ 
gage and excess baggage. 

The following is a complete list of the instruments and supplies, and if 
if had been Supplemented with one fake, one pick mattax, one shovel and 
two lamps, it would have fulfilled all requirements. 4 he lamps were 
bought and the tools were borrowed at West Point. Material for six 
more stadia rods was purchased and they were painted in the field. 

DRAFTING INSTRUMENTS, ETC. 

Two field drawing boards; one steel ruler, 36-inch; two steel rulers, 24- 
inch; six bokWood triangular scales; five celluloid triangles, assorted sizes; 
one Celluloid triangle, large, 14-inch; one dozen drawing pencils, 
H H H H H H; one dozen drawing pencils, H H H H; 10 yards draw¬ 
ing paper, 36-inch; 10 yards drawing paper, 36-inch, mounted; five yards 
drawing paper, 56-inch, mounted; five yards tracing cloth; three bottles 
drawing ink, black; one bottle drawing ink, red; one bottle drawing ink, 
blue; six lead pencil rubber erasers; three ink rubber erasers; one sponge 
rubber eraser; one circular protractor, 8-inch; two semi-circular protrac¬ 
tors, 5-inch; three dozen thumb tacks; three dozen drawing pen; one 
dozen crow-quill pens; three crow-quill pen holders; three pen holders; 
one T square, 36-inch; one T square, 30-inch; one T square, 24-inch; 
three sets drawing instruments, in cases; one opisometer; one border pen; 
one steel eraser; two irregular curves; six stadia reduction charts; two 
paper protractors; 12 note books; one proportional dividers. 

SURVEYING INSTRUMENTS, ETC. 

Three engineer transits; two levels; three plane tables; four sketching 
Cases, cavalry; two 100-foot steel tapes; two level rods; 22 marking pins; 
six stadia rods (afterwards increased to 12); three hand saws; six hatchets; 
two axes; 10 pounds lOd nails; five pounds 20d nails; two pounds shingle 
nails; two pairs wire pliers; two stone cutters points; six machetes. 

One day was now required for arranging camp, adjusting instruments, 
making stadia rods, stakes, etc., and for giving the necessary preliminary 
instruction. Authority was gotten for the hire of one two-horse spring 
wagon and driver and four saddle horses and saddles. Only two were 
ever hired, however, for the reason that no horses could be found suitable 
for mounted sketching and as they were used for transportation purposes 
only, no more were found necessary. The horses all showed a tendency 
to enter fields or leave the main road and varied their gait, it depending 
upon the direction they were going. 


5 


RATES OF HIRE. 

One two-horse spring wagon and driver, $3 per day. 

Two saddle horses and saddles, at $1.50, $3 per day. 

It was arranged that the driver of the spring wagon take care of his 
own horses and the persons from whom the saddle horses were gotten 
arranged with him to take care of their horses also. This plan relieved 
the enlisted men of extra fatigue duty and seemed very satisfactory as 
horses and wagon were promptly reported for duty every morning. We 
were fortunate in having a faithful old driver who continued with us till 
the work was finished. It became necessary at a later stage of the work 
to hire another spring wagon to make extra or special trips. The cost of 
these trips was $1 each. The use of a heavy farm wagon in which it 
was thought several parties could be hauled was found very unsatisfactory, 
for although the box was filled with straw the men preferred to walk 
rather than ride over rough roads and hold the instruments; and perhaps 
better progress was made walking. Wood was purchased from farmers 
and could be gotten delivered at camp for $2 a cord at first. Later a 
higher price was paid. 

The first camp was located at Poplar Springs (near U C” on the map). 
From this as a central point it was intended to map all that part between 
camp and the Ohio River and as far to the east, west and south as ex¬ 
pedient. Only one small triangulation system was used. To have ex¬ 
tended this further than herein described would have required the erection 
of high towers and the measurement of difficult lines and consumed more 
time than allowed. A base line was laid out extending from a point near 
U C” to a point near Howard station—about one and one-third miles long, 
and measured three times. Other stations were : 

Two on Fort Hill, one north of Howard station near the river, and 
two on Pilchers Hill. All distances were computed and elevations of 
stations determined and this system when plotted was put on the plane 
table for further development. 

The transit-stadia method was used on the most difficult country, and 
the plane table method on that portion most favorable for its use. 

A transit party consisted of one transitman, sergeant; one recorder, cor¬ 
poral or private; one sketcher, corporal or private; two, three or four 
stadiamen, depending upon the skill of the transitman and the number of 
men available, privates. 

A plane table party consisted of one topographer, sergeant, corporal or 
private; one computer, corporal; two stadiamen, privates; one sketcher, 
corporal, when available. 


6 


The levelling party consisted of one instrument man, sergeant; one rod- 
man, private. 

The cook was left in camp and some days an assistant to the drafts¬ 
man, Mr. Grohman, usually a sergeant. All other men were used in the 
field. 

I, personally, assigned each party to its task in the morning and if pos¬ 
sible visited it at least once each day. The parties were started off gen¬ 
erally by seven o’clock, A. M.,and they would not return until five or six 
o’clock, P. M., or until they had completed their tasks. Lunch could 
have been taken along every day but it was not often done as the men 
preferred to buy a meal if it was not given them as was sometimes the 
case. To carry lunch in a haversack seemed to them a great burden, or 
at least seemed to interfere materially with their work. 

The method or plan of conducting the survey is described as follows: 

One or two parties were taken out in the spring wagon each morning 
and these would work towards camp. The remaining parties would, if 
it could be so arranged, start near camp and work outward and these 
parties would then be brought in that evening in the spring wagon. This 
seemed satisfactory for the men worked better when transportation was 
furnished, if only one way, and it was not practicable to have transporta¬ 
tion for all the parties both out and in. The spring wagon permanently 
attached was used during the middle of the day for hauling supplies—in 
one camp, water—and mail. 

Work was started the first day with one level, one plane table and one 
transit-stadia party. The extra men were sent with the two last parties 
to learn the methods, all of the future transit men keeping notes. I per¬ 
sonally instructed the plane table and level parties, and Mr. Grohman, 
who was soon to plot all notes, took out the transit party. If possible, 
natural boundaries were selected for the different tasks, otherwise roads 
and railroads, and sometimes the task was outlined on a prepared sheet for 
use on the plane table. The magnetic meridian established by one transit 
was used for all azimuth work. Later the true meridian was found sev¬ 
eral times by Polaris observations. Work was begun at the north end of 
the tract for it was here the maneuver camp was to be located and the 
territory was to be used continuously to the south for the maneuvers. 

On the first day the following start was made. The level party was 
taken to the Illinois Central Railroad bridge across Salt River at West 
Point. The west pier of this bridge has feet marked on it and numbered 
from the top of the pier to low water. The top of the cap stone of the 
pier is 65 feet above low water, our datum plane. It was ascertained 


7 


that a Geological Survey party had found the elevation of West Point to 
be 420 feet above sea level; but if any exact point was located, inquiry 
failed to reveal it. 1 he above datum plane was therefore selected. The 
level party started here and using Johnson’s method of keeping notes for 
differential levelling proceeded down the Louisville and Nashville turn¬ 
pike for a distance of eight miles, leaving bench marks at every cross 
road, and where they were far distant, intermediate ones. On the bench 
mark stakes was marked the number of the stake and the elevation above 
the datum plane. The same data was kept in both levellers books. Both 
levellers kept notes. This work required no more attention, except to 
examine and check notes which was done every night. This task took 
about four days and the party was then put on other work until more 
levelling was wanted, when the same party was used again. 

The plane table party was started at West Point and from the same 
bench mark as the levellers, the top of the pier. The table was oriented 
by the declinator, back sights not being taken, and all triangulation points 
used to check when visible. The usual text books method were then 
used. T he computer immediately calculated all elevations which were 
noted 1 in his book and were written at the plotted points by the topogra¬ 
pher for sketching in contours. When all the desired shots were plotted 
at one station a new station was established and then the topographer 
sketched in whatever contours he could before moving from this place. 
The plane table party would check up elevations at the bench marks left 
by the levellers and invariably worked on a circuit. This obviated the 
necessity of return levelling, except where a discrepancy was found and 
no better way of finding the error known. The sketcher equipped with 
a sketching case was sent out to get details, by the topographer. For in¬ 
stance, the plane table party went through the main streets of West Point 
only. The sketcher then made a map of the town and this was incorpo¬ 
rated that evening, when, as a rule, the work of that day was inked in, to 
prevent obliteration the following days. The first task assigned this party 
was all that territory under 100 feet elevation, bounded by the hills on the 
south and the Ohio River on the north. This was completed by this 
party in about seven days. I would personally visit the party and check 
up its elevations by observations on the triangulation stations whose eleva¬ 
tions were already known. During this work quite an important discov¬ 
ery was made and as the same idea is applicable to transit-stadia work it 
seems worth mentioning. One of the stadia men should be very intelli¬ 
gent and should understand contouring well. He should then be given 
the general direction of the next move and allowed to go out and select 


8 


and locate a new station while the other stadia-men are placing their rods 
for shots. The well located stations gave long courses and many shots, 
and saved many hours of time. Stakes with no marking on them were 
used for stations only. 

From Poplar Springs, the first camp site, the Louisville and Nashville 
turnpike runs south through a deep defile with precipitous sides for a dis¬ 
tance of over two and a half miles. The transit-stadia party started from 
a meridian laid out intersecting the aforementioned base line and proceeded 
south on the turnpike taking shots to the right and left. The needle was 
used only as a check on the azimuth and at once revealed any radical 
error. At the first opportunity it left the turnpike going to the right over 
the hill and completing the detour returned to camp on the road west of 
U C,” hundred of shots being taken to the right and left and front and rear 
of main stations and of sub-stations. Stakes were left at all stations and 
sub-stations marked with the initial letter of the transit man and with the 
number of the station as established by that transit man since the beginning 
of the survey. A start could now be made at any station of this course 
by any transit party and a new course or circuit made. By connecting 
up all bench mark stakes found, it is seen that the transit stadia party also 
checked up the levellers work. The sketcher remained almost constantly 
with the recorder and using the sketching case sketched every shot and 
station, woods, buildings, etc. None of these sketches were incorporated 
in the map but they were compared with the plotted notes and names and 
details not contained in the notes were taken from them. They were 
especially valuable in showing at all times just what territory was cov¬ 
ered and where new courses should be run. Occasionally the sketcher 
was sent out to sketch short roads, trails, etc. All transit-stadia work was 
done on circuits, each party closing on its own or on anothers stations. 
Each party was furnished two note books numbered one and two, used 
on alternate days, and containing the names of the transitman and re¬ 
corder. Notes were kept as prescribed in Johnson’s Theory and Prac¬ 
tise of Surveying, except that both the A and B vernier readings were 
recorded for each station for use in setting up at the next station and to 
avoid adding 180 degrees. This has advantages and seems preferable. 

The above described methods adopted for both classes of parties the 
first day were not changed during the survey. All parties checked their 
elevations by tying up on a turnpike bench mark and on every stake they 
came across. In the evening the transitman assisted by one or more of 
his own party reduced his distances and elevations and prepared his notes 
for the plotter. A stadia reduction chart was used to reduce all shots but 


9 


stadia tables were used for courses. If his notes failed to check suffi¬ 
ciently close the transitman was sent out to verify the course either afoot 
or mounted. T he sketchers put finishing work on their sketches in the 
evening and these were all retained and properly marked and numbered 
in a box in the drafting tent. After the fourth day the draftsman was 
kept busy every day. The plane table work was incorporated bodily by 
blacking the back of the sheet with lead and using a steel point to 
impress the lines on the large sheet. Principal points were picked through. 
1 he right of way map was reduced to proper scale and the railroad incor¬ 
porated. The number of plane table and transit parties varied. Some¬ 
times three plane table parties were used and one or two transit-stadia 
parties and vice versa. 

The work was done from three camp sites, one at “C” (Poplar 
Springs), one at cross roads 81, near Tip Top and the third near cross 
roads 42. Each camp site was located in elevation by the levelling party 
branching from the turnpike and leaving bench marks at all cross roads 
till camp was reached. The east and west boundaries were determined 
by locating as many points on them as convenient, accurately, and our 
best sketcher was then sent along them and his stream and river sketches 
were then fitted on. On the west boundary this sketcher waded the 
creek much of the way as the banks were precipitous wooded bluffs. On 
the east boundary he was compelled to walk between the high and low 
water lines on a steep bank on account of woods. 

The northwest corner of the tract is shut off from the east by a pre¬ 
cipitous wooded cliff 400 feet in elevation. It did not seem advisable to 
take a transit or plane table any great distance along the railroad, the only 
pass way as the road way is very steep and impracticable for instruments 
unless plenty of time is given. It was approached from the south as far 
as time would admit, with accurate instruments, and then the sketching 
case was used to complete this corner. Hachures are shown in that por¬ 
tion not penetrated by instruments other than the sketching case. 

The field work was completed September 3d. Approximately 48 square 
miles had been covered. Twenty-one full days of work were consumed, 
only one day being stormy. A day was lost each time in moving camp. 
Mr. Grohman left for Chicago shortly after, where the printing and de¬ 
tails were added to the map, and Col. Ernst attended to the matter of 
photo-lithographing. Prints were received at West Point, September 
16th, 1903. 

An arrangement of camp was adopted and continued throughout. We 
had 11 tents and two hospital tents. One hospital tent was used as a 


10 


drafting tent and was located at the head of the detachment street. An 
instrument tent was pitched at the corner of the drafting tent and one cor¬ 
poral assigned to the care of the instruments slept in it. An acting first 
sergeant was appointed and a sergeant in charge of the mess. No effort 
was made to compel the enlisted men to use boiled water, but the cook 
was directed to have it on hand for those that wanted it. One case of 
typhoid occurred just at the completion of the survey. Spring water was 
used almost exclusively. Sinks (two) were dug at every camp. 

It was requested of the Department Commander that commutation of 
rations be given. But this could not be done and 30 days rations and a 
Varney camp cooker were furnished instead. I now believe that this 
was the better plan. It kept the men together and near camp. Although 
farm houses were frequent it would have required considerable additional 
travel to go to them for meals. 

The prescribed allowance of fuel is entirely inadequate for a detach¬ 
ment of this size using the Varney camp cooker. To overcome the diffi¬ 
culty in a measure drift wood was collected when convenient to camp. 

Whatever credit has been given me for this work should be shared gen¬ 
erously with Mr. Grohman and the enlisted men. The amount of 
country covered in so short a time in a warmer climate than any of us 
were used to, during the hottest month of the year called for unusual 
effort. Every enlisted man did his best. Their conduct was excellent. 
All the work was done on private property and the orchards abounded in 
fruits, yet not one complaint came to me, 

COMMENTS ON THE MAP, ETC. 

1. A scale of yards should have been put on the map in addition to 
the scale of feet. 

2. Houses bearing the same name should have had some distinguish¬ 
ing letter or number. 

3. Five, ten and twenty foot contours were used by permission, de¬ 
pending upon the roughness or unevenness of the ground. As all were 
numbered they caused no complaint. 

4. The system of lettering the central thoroughfare and numbering 
the cross roads on its right with even numbers and those on the left with 
odd numbers, proved entirely satisfactory during the maneuvers. 

5. Farm boundary fences were not, as directed, put in on account of 
lack of time to locate the boundaries. 


11 

6. The map was first plotted on a scale of six inches to the mile and 
reduced in photographing. 

A copy of the map is appended hereto. 

Very respectfully, 


N. E. BOWER, 

2d Lieut ., Corps of Engineers, 





ANDREW 8 GRAHAM PHOTO UTHO WASHINGTON DC 























































































































































































































































































































































































4 


No. 10. 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
UNITED STATES ARMY. 



FOR THE USE OF 


STEEL PONTONS AND HALE-PONTONS 

FOR CAVALRY 

IN THE GERMAN ARMY. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 
— 1 <> 04 .— 







No. 10. 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
UNITED STATES ARMY. 


INSTRUCTIONS 


poll THE USE OF 


STEEL PONTONS AND HALE-PONTONS 

FOR CAVALRY 

IN THE GERMAN ARMY. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL. OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 

— 1904 .— 






NOTE. 

The accompanying report was furnished to the Second (Military In¬ 
formation) Division, General Staff, by Captain W. S. Biddle, 14th 
Infantry, Military Attache, Berlin, Germany. The translation was made 
by Major H. F. Hodges, Corps of Engineers. 


INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF STEEL PONTONS 
AND HALF-PONTONS FOR CAVALRY. 


1 his material is intended only for cavalry service and forms part of the 
equipment of each cavalry regiment. 

Each cavalry regiment has at its disposal four steel half-pontons with 
their regular appurtenances, all of which, for each set of two half-pontons, 
are loaded upon one ponton wagon of special construction. 

The equipment is as follows : 


For one 
wagon. 


For one 
regiment. 


2 Steel half-pontons, 118 kilograms 

3 Saddle pieces, 3.45 metres_ 

4 Flooring panels, 4m x lnt_ 

2 Sleepers_ 

3 Stanchions (for railing)_ 

1 Anchor_ 

6 Oars_ 

6 Oar locks_ 

4 Boathooks_ 

2 Anchor ropes_ 

8 Railing ropes_ 

4 Lashings _ 

6 Stakes__ 


4 

6 

8 

4 

b 

2 

12 

12 

8 

4 

16 

8 

12 


DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL. 

1. The Steel Half-Pontons. (Plates 1 and 2.) This is made from 
steel with a high percentage of nickel. The pointed end of the half¬ 
ponton is called the bow; the angle of the bow is called the stem. The 
end of the half-ponton opposite the bow is called the stern. 

The framework of the ponton consists of steel ribs upon which the 
skin plating is riveted. 

A strip of wood is worked around the upper and outer edge of the half¬ 
ponton to form the gunwale. 

There are holes in the gunwales to receive the oar locks, and others to 
receive the tenons of the saddles and the stanchions of the railings. 






















2 


On the inside of the bottom of the boat are placed two cavils, one 
near the bow and one near the stern, to which the anchor ropes may be 
fastened, after the assembling of the two half-pontons. 

The skin of the boat, which is of sheet steel, is protected on the out¬ 
side by three wooden battens worked lengthwise along the bottom, and 
on the inside by five wooden battens similarly placed along the frame. 
Besides these, two wales of wood are worked along the outside of the 
boat lengthwise as fenders, and serve also as supports for the other half of 
the boat when the two are loaded, one above the other, on the ponton 
wagon (see Plate 5). In addition, also for the purpose fast mentioned, 
there are five small braces worked between the gunwale and the waling 
strip on each side of the half-ponton, each* brace being provided with a 
hook, which helps in securing the half-ponton to the wagon, and in 
securing the flooring to the boat when the bridge is constructed. 

The two half boats are assembled by means of a hook and eye (Plate 
1) on the outside of the transom forming the stern of the half-ponton, 
and are secured also by lashings passed around the cavils in the bottom of 
the half boats. The parts can be assembled on land or in the water. 

2. The Saddle. (Plate 3). This is made of pine. The ends engage 
by hooking into seats prepared for them, one at the bow of the half¬ 
ponton, and the other in the inside of the gunwale of the stern transom 
(see Plate 1). 

1 he seats for the joists of the flooring panels are protected by sheet 
metal. The other holes in the upper surface of the sill are for the 
stanchions of the railing, different ones being used for the narrow foot¬ 
bridge and for the wide footbridge, both when built with whole pontons, 
and for the service bridge, as well as for the wide footbridge when built 
with half-pontons. 4 he sill is also used as an abutment sill for the 
larger bridges, being sunk a little in the ground and held in place by the 
stakes. 

3. The Flooring Panels. (Plate 3). These are made of' pine, each 
panel having three joists to which the wooden planks are secured. All 
these joists engage on the saddle, the outside ones by means of brackets 
and the middle one by a hook. In building a ferry-raft of whole or half¬ 
pontons, the joists are supported by the gunwales of the boats. 

T he iron stiap in the middle of each of the panels and the two holes at 
the end of the same are to engage the hooks of the sleepers (see Plate 4), 
used when the wider bridges are built. 

'Sic in the text. [ he plates indicate the hooks on alternate braces only. 


3 


4. The Sleepers. (Plate 4). The sleepers are made of pine reinforced 
with iron, and serve to support and clamp together the panels of flooring 
ing in the wide footbridge or the service bridge. Each sleeper has four 
hooks, with hand-nuts or thumb-screws at the lower end of the shank, 
allowing the hooks to be drawn tight by hand. The outside hooks have 
one branch, the two middle hooks two branches. The nuts or thumb¬ 
screws on the bottom are locked fast after drawing up, by rings arranged 
to pass over one of the arms and prevent the nut from working loose. 

5. The Stanchions. (Plate 4). These are made of ash, each with an 
iron shoe and tenon at the lower end, which fits into one of the holes in 
the saddle piece, or gunwale, according to whether a bridge or raft has 
been built. The stanchions project l m above the flooring. The upper 
extremity is provided with an iron cap and ring through which the hand 
line is placed and secured. 

6. The Anchor. This has two flukes and the usual stock. 

7. The Oars. These are of pine and 3 m long. 1'he blade is shod 
with iron and has rounded corners. 

8. The Oar Locks. These are of iron and of the usual type. 

9. The Boat Hooks (or Poles). These are of pine, round, 4.2 m long, 
5 cm thick in the middle. The lower end is blunt and shod with iron. 

10. The Stakes. The ropes or lines belonging to the equipment are 


as follows : 

Length. Diameter. 

Anchor rope_ 35.0 m 1.5 un 

Railing line- 6-5 m 1 c,n 

Lashings_ 2.5 111 0.8 cm 


11. The Stakes. These are of ash, 0.5 m long and 6 cm thick. 
They have iron points and are capped with iron. 

The manner of loading the ponton wagon is shown on Plate 5, here¬ 
with. The equipment loaded on one wagon is one-half of that carried 
with a regiment of cavalry. 

ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR ONE REGIMENT. 

Two Ponton wagons, Prussian model; 1 small shears, 1 shears for 
cutting sheet metal, riveting tools, 1 piece sheet steel, /i sq. m.; rivets, 
spare parts, iron; 1 tool chest, 1 box for rivets. 

DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHTS. 

Weight kg. 

118. 

20 . 


Steel half-ponton 

Saddle pieces, about 3.45 m long 







4 


Weight kg. 

Flooring panel, 4 m long, l m wide_ 90 to 95. 


Sleeper 

- 

45 to 50. 

Stanchion 


_ ... 2 to 2 / 2 . 

Anchor 


_ 25 to 30. 

Oar 


. . 4 to 5. 

Oar lock 


3 Y\ to /4. 

Boat hook _ 


_ .. to 4. 

Anchor rope 


_ _ 9 to 10. 

Hand line 


3 }4 to 4. 

Lashings _ 


_ _ 1 to 1 14. 

Stake 


_ >4. 

Ponton wagon 


... 1,580 to 1,600. 


The dimensions marked on the plates are in meters. 


\ 














Plan or Half Ponton. 


Plate: I 


io 
z 
u 
h 
h 
< 





Side: Elevation. 

alf-Ponton. 



















































































































































































































































































Plan 


Plate. 2 



\ 


Ponton, assembled from two halfpontons. 















































































































































































Pla n 


Plate3 





dE 


Z 

o 

h 

< 

> 

U 

J 

u 

ui 

G 

1 0 


O.ZI/r 


*Q.l6 


z ^ 

^ c\i 

< It 

J 
CL 


\ 


i 




Efe] 


u 

j 

a 

o 

< 

O') 



























































































Plate 4. 


Elevation . 


i o’ 

i«— 


1 . 


Cro5s Section a~b. 

-*| K-0.l?6cT 
iSl 

1a 

0.0 & 

a 

i 


! * o 0 ® 6 "o 6 °_ u!__ 2_°..i<?_L_°_?_5_O ° _9_°_ 0 _° . *1 .lllgj 




/ o 


5F 

I 


b. 


/ u 


1 


- 3 . /5 

Plan . 




'•> 


to -viSH- 

- 1\ 


ISE 


S 


EE 


SE 


Sleeper. 



<T) 


I 



Shoe 


o 06 


L 


nl: 


o.os 


i 

■'■N* 

O’ 


Stanchion . 














































Plate: 5. 


A . Limher chest with supplies for v/agon, etc. 

S. Bridge, materia! 

C Chest containing explosives, small supplies and 
repair Ait 


Side: Elevation. 




Four Flooring Panels 


3'5tANCMION,S, 

CTC. 


6 OAKS. 

A Coat Hooks 


LXPLC. 


6IVES 


Rear Elevation . 

£3_a-o 

Ha lp-Ponton . 
in a-o- 

Half-Pohton 


Small 

Bridge 1 

Supplies 

AND I 

Repair j§ 

FOR 

Kit. I 



Ponton Wagon Loaded. 






































































































































NUMBER 11. 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 

REPRINTS OF ESSAYS 
AND LECTURES ON 

COAST DEFENCE 


CONTENTS: 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS. Gold Medal* 
Essay by CAPT. C. G. VEREKER, R.A. ( Proceedings Royal 
Artillery Institution , April , May and June , IQOJ.) 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS. Silver Medal 
Essay by CAPT. C. S. S. CURTEIS, R.G.A. '( Proceedings Royal 
Artillery Institution , April May and June , IQOJ.) 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS. Highly Com¬ 
mended Essay by COL. P. SALTMARSHE, R.A. ( Proceedings 
Royal Artillery Institution , July , August and September , IQOJ.) 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS. Highly Com¬ 
mended Essay by CAPT. J. C. HANNA, R.G.A. ( Proceedings 
Royal Artillery Institution , July , August and September , IQOJ.) 

THE DEFENCE OF HARBOURS AGAINST TORPEDO- 
BOAT ATTACK. Lecture before Royal Artillery Institution 
by FRED T. J ANE, ESQ. ( Proceedings Royal Artillery Institution , 
January , IQ04.) 

COAST DEFENCE FROM AN IMPERIAL STANDPOINT. 
Lecture by COL. E. W. COTTER, h. p., R.E. ( Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution , May , IQ04.) 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 
— 1904 .— 



NUMBER 11, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


REPRINTS OF ESSAYS 
AND LECTURES ON 

COAST DEFENCE 



ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, P. C., 

— 1904 .— 






CONTENTS. 


Article. , Page. 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS, CAPT. 

C. G. Vereker, R.A_ 1 

General Observations_ 1 

Object of Coast Defences_ 1 

Form of raids to which ports are liable_ 3 

A. Fortresses at Home___ 6 

Defence against torpedo-boat raids_ 6 

B. Fortresses and coaling stations abroad_ 13 

C. Harbours of Refuge_ 19 

i 

Summary_ 20 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS, Capt. 

C. S. S. Curteis, R.G.A_ 22 

Introduction_ 22 

I. Construction_ 23 

II. Armament_ 28 

III. Organisation_ 29 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS, Col. P. 

Saltmarshe, R.A_ 38 

Introduction_ 38 

Meaning of raid_ 38 

Parti_ 41 

Construction and armament_ 41 

Q.F. Guns_42 

Siting and construction of Light Q.F. Batteries_ 43 

Field guns_ 46 

Booms and obstacles_ 46 

Part II_ 51 

Organisation_ 51 

Artillery_ 51 

Light Q.F. gun practice_ 54 






























VI 


Contents. 


Royal Engineers_ 55 

Infantry_ 55 

Training of the Infantry defence-- 56 

Co-operation of the different arms_ 57 

Co-operation with the Navy_ 58 

Regulations for the ingress and egress of friendly vessels__ 59 

The employment of booms and obstacles- 60 

Removal of buoys_ 61 

Removal of coal hulks, &c., from fire area- 61 

Employment of guard-boats_ 62 

Conclusion_ 65 

DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT RAIDS, CAPT. 

J. C. Hanna, R.G.A_ 67 

Chapter I_ 67 

Introduction and general remarks_ 67 

Chapter II_ 68 

Construction_ 68 

Chapter III_ 72 

Armament_ 72 

Chapter IV_ 77 

Organisation_ 77 

Conclusion_ 84 

THE DEFENCE OF HARBOURS AGAINST TORPEDO- 

BOAT ATTACK, Fred T. Jane, esq_ 85 

Discussion_ 96 

Reply- 103 

COAST DEFENCE FROM AN IMPERIAL STAND¬ 
POINT, Col. E. W. Cotter, h.p., R.E_ 105 
































[Rrprinted from the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, April, May and June, 1903.] 


Assuming the probability of raids by a Foreign Naval 
Power what are the best preparations to repel them so far as 
the construction, armament, and organisation of our Coast 
Defences are concerned ? 


BY 

CAPTAIN C. G. VEREKER, R. A. 

In Omnia Paratus .” 

u DUNCAN ” GOLD MEDAL ESSAY, 1903. 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 

Object of Coast Defences. 

Before we can discuss the construction, armament, and organisa¬ 
tion of Coast Defences, it is necessary to consider what is the object 
of the defences and what are the most probable kinds of raid to which 
they are exposed, and from these considerations we can obtain some 
guide as to the best form of defence to be employed in each case. 

The necessity for fortifying certain strategic points, and for pro¬ 
tecting dockyards, has long been recognised, but the importance of 
this means of defence has been greatly enhanced since the introduc¬ 
tion of steam for propelling ships, and especially during the past few 
years by the great increase in the speed of ships, which will enable 
them to reach and attack places, and to get away again, before the 
defending ships can obtain information of their intention or come to 
the rescue of the place attacked. 

In our Empire the necessity for adequate defence increases daily. 
Other nations, who a few years ago possessed no Navy to speak of, 
have been building ships and increasing their Naval Estimates year by 
year, and the time may not be far distant when we shall no longer be 
able to maintain the numerical superiority over any combination of 
probable enemies, which we have had since the days of Trafalgar; 




9 

w 




we must begin to realise that we may get the worst of it, at all events 
temporarily, and must be prepared accordingly. 

There are nevertheless a great number of people in this country 
who do not recognise the importance of, or even the necessity for, 
coast defences, and who go so far as to say that we could very well 
do without defences at all, that the Navy could prefectly well protect 
itself, and that the money spent on fortifications would be much 
better expended on building more ships. 

The true importance of fortification will probably never be really 
appreciated by the mass of our population until we are engaged in a 
maritime war. 

We, who are so dependent upon our Navy and our commerce, should 
of all nations be the one most ready to spend money liberally, on so 
strengthening our arsenals and protecting our coaling stations and har¬ 
bours, that in time of war they may be proof agai nst any possible attack. 

The past few years shows a very great improvement in this respect; 
the majority of our defences have been rebuilt and rearmed with the 
latest and most powerful ordnance, new harbours have been fortified 
for the protection of our commerce, and when all the works now in 
hand are completed, we should, given good training and organisation, 
be able to hold our own. 

Only a few years ago this was far from being the case; many of our 
coast forts were of an obsolete type and armed with obsolete guns, 
and would have been perfect death traps had they had to engage ships. 
Our guns could in some cases not range further than 5,000 yards, 
while the ships at that time had guns ranging to 10,000 or 12,000 
yards, and could have bombarded us with impunity. 

This state of affairs must never be allowed to come about again, 
but, in order to prevent its recurrence, we must keep pace with the 
times, and as armour and ordnance improves on ships, the coast de¬ 
fences must be rearmed and strengthened. 

The chief object of coast defences may be said to be the protection 
of our dockyards, which should be absolutely safe against attack in 
order that ships building and stores may not be destroyed and that our 
fleets may mobilise, rest, or refit, prior to or after an action, without 
the necessity of having to protect themselves. 

Perhaps equally important is the protection of stores, especially 
coal, at our various outlying coaling stations, as without coal a mod¬ 
ern fleet is impotent and the destruction of our reserves might place our 
cru lsers, or fleets, with depleted bunkers, at the mercy of an enemy’s ships. 


3 


A further important part played by coast defences is the assistance 
afforded in the protection of commerce. 

In the old days of sailing ships it was customary to form convoys, 
which, under the protection of a few frigates, were enabled to move 
from port to port with a fair amount of safety. But nowadays it is 
pretty well recognised that this system could not be carried out; the 
pace of the whole convoy would be determined by that of the slowest 
ships, its whereabouts would soon be discovered, and its attack and 
destrutcion by the enemy would be very probable as we could not 
spare a sufficient force of cruisers for its efficient protection. 

We may take it that it will be necessary for commercial vessels to 
look after themselves, and that the cruisers will be employed in 
patrolling the trade routes and in tracing or engaging any of the 
enemy’s whose whereabouts become known. 

Given trading steamers of fair speed, it should not be difficult for 
them to keep out of reach of an enemy’s ship during the daylight, 
and if chased, to give it the slip during dark, and our protected 
harbours and coaling stations all over the world will give them op¬ 
portunities of running in for protection or overhaul as required. 

They will run their greatest danger when nearing these islands, 
especially if passing through the channel at night, as they are then 
most exposed to attacks by an enemy’s torpedo-boats. Some naval 
authorities consider that no vessel should be within 200 miles of an 
enemy’s torpedo-boat station between sunset and sunrise. 

It is chiefly with a view to enabling ships to steam from port to 
port during the daytime, and to shelter during the night, that ’'har¬ 
bours of refuge” have been created at suitable distances apart along 
our coasts. 

Form of raid to which ports are liable. 

The class of attack to which each place is most exposed must vary 
according to its geographical position, its proximity to an enemy’s 
ports or torpedo-boat stations, and the probability of an enemy being 
in temporary command of distant seas. 

In the heading of this essay, we assume the probabitily of raids by 
a foreign naval power. Raid is, however, a somewhat general term 
and may be applied equally well to an attack by a few torpedo-boats 
or to a determined attempt at destruction by a fleet of battle-ships as¬ 
sisted by a strong land force. It is necessary therefore to enquire into 
the class of raid which is most likely to be employed by an enemy be¬ 
fore we can discuss the best means of meeting it. 


4 



Fortresses at L et us fi rs t take the case of our home fortresses. 

home. . . 

The most important of these are situated on or near 
the English Channel, and are paricularly open to an attack by torpedo- 
boats in the case of a war with our neighbours over the water. 

The distance from the nearest French torpedo-boat stations to 
Portsmouth is only about 80 miles, to Plymouth 110 miles, and to 
the Medway 70 miles. It is evident that a flotilla leaving their sta¬ 
tion after dark would be within easy striking distance of any of these 
points, and would have time to attack and get back to their station 
again before daylight, at all events during the winter months. 

Most people agree that torpedo-boat attacks are likely to take place 
during the earliest stages of a war, and even in some cases before war 
is officially declared. At this period it is probable that the reserve 
ships would be mobilising and squadrons collecting and preparing for 
sea, and the moral result of a successful raid would be very great. An 
energetic enemy would spare no trouble in carriyng it out and would 
not hesitate to sacrifice a few torpedo-boats when even one getting 
the defenses through might do incalculable harm to us. 

The torpedo-boats might be assisted by one or two larger vessels, 
either sent in to attempt to clear a passage for them through any ob¬ 
stacles placed in the channel, or employing gun fire in an attempt to 
extinguish the electric lights or take the defending batteries in flank. 
Small parties might also be landed for the destruction of lights or to 
assist in keeping down the fire of the Q.F. guns. 

Any raid of a more formidable nature than this, or any deliberate 
attack by battle-ships, is unlikely, for so long as we have a fleet in 
existence an enemy would not risk damaging his ships in an attack of 
fortifications, and even if we should lose command of home waters, 
it is scarcely conceivable that he would attack when he would be at 
liberty to blockade our ports, destroy our commerce and cut off our 
food supply with impun ity. 

From this it may be argued that there is therefore no need for an 
outlay of money on extensive fortifications which will probably never 
be attacked, and that it would be better expended on building more 
ships, which might ensure our keeping command of the sea; but those 
who take this view sometimes forget that our dockyards are only safe 
from attack so long as they are known to be well armed and defended, 
and that were this not so, an enemy who would hesitate to attack 
formidable works would very likely raid and destroy weak batteries 


5 


and the ships they ought to be protecting, should he succeed in elud¬ 
ing our fleet, even for a short while. 

We may then say that, though defence against torpedo-boats is im¬ 
perative, the effect of the further fortification of our dockyards is 
likely to be more moral than material. It is none the less important 
that they should be made absolutely impregnable in order that we may 
be prepared for any unforeseen contingencies. 

From the foregoing remarks, we can conclude that our home for¬ 
tresses are unlikely to be exposed to any form of raid except that by 
torpedo-boats. 

The case is however very diffferent at fortresses 

Fortresses and an d coaling stations abroad. Not only are thev liable 

coaling stations 

abroad. t0 torpedo-boat raids if within reach of an enemy’s 
port, but they are also open to much more deter¬ 
mined attacks both from the sea and from the land side. 

Our Navy is necessarily so scattered all over the world that we can 
not be certain that at some time or other we may not be in a minority 
in some quarter of the globe; our fleet may have to withdraw or may 
be beaten by superior forces, and for the time being, possibly some 
weeks or months, an enemy may be in undisputed temporary com¬ 
mand of that part of the sea. 

It is scarcely likely that such an opportunity would be missed of 
capturing or destroying our coal and stores, and a raiding attack 
would be organised, which might be of considerable strength and 
would tax the garrison to its utmost to defeat or keep off until relieved. 

The permanent capture and occupation of a place would scarcely be 
undertaken, so long as there was any probability of a relieving fleet 
from home being sent out. 

Our harbours of refuge at home are also liable to 
H arb ours^of j e,u ° e raids by an enemy whose object is the destruction of 

our commerce. 

In time of war they will be full of shipping, especially at night, 
and it is important that these should feel confidence in the defences 
protecting them. 

It is unlikely that an enemy’s battle-ships would be employed in 
attacking such ports, and they are also, for the most part, out of 
reach of a first-class torpedo-boat raid; but it is more than probable 
that an enemy’s cruisers would attempt to get at and destroy the ship¬ 
ping, or would send in their own second-class boats or pinnaces to run 
the gauntlet and do what mischief they could by night. 


6 


The different classes of coast defences and the form of raid to 
which each is most liable can be summarised as follows:— 

CI-ASS OF DEFENCES. 

# 

MOST i KOBABLE FORM OF RAID. 

A. Fortresses at home 

By tor edo-boats. 

( By torpedo-boats (if within reach of an enemy’s 

< ■ north 

1 By strong force, if command of sea temporarily lost. 

f By cruisers, or by torpedo-boats and pinnaces car- 
f ried by cruisers. 

B. Fortresses and coaling stations abroad 

C. Harbours of refuge at home_ 



As each port should be so armed and organised as to be best pre¬ 
pared to meet the most probable attack, it will be convenient to dis¬ 
cuss each separately and in the above order. 


A. FORTRESSES AT HOME. 

Defence against torpedo-boat raids. 

In order to divorce our thoughts from preconceived notions and 
existing works, it will be well, for the sake of discussion, to take an 
ideal case of a harbour with a narrow entrance to be defended against 
this class of attack, and to examine the various means of defence 
which might be available and the most suitable organisation. We 
may then be better able to see in what way existing works and 
schemes of defence might be improved. 

A boom or obstruction of some kind across the 

Booms. 

channel is essential if we are to be at all sure of pre¬ 
venting torpedo-boats getting through. 

No matter how good the gun defence and the lighting arrange¬ 
ments, if the boats only attack in sufficient numbers some are certain 
to get past, and if unimpeded, could run clear into the harbour. 

It scarcely comes into the subject of this essay to discuss the vari¬ 
ous forms of booms, but the ones now in use should, we should 
think, be quite good enough to achieve their purpose of at all events 
impeding or delaying torpedo-boats. 

The position of the boom necessarily affects the position of the 
guns and lights, and though it would usually be placed at the narrow¬ 
est part of the entrance, other considerations might make it necessary 
to put it elsewhere and to employ a longer boom, or narrow the 
channel by breakwaters or the erection of t 'dolphins,” permanently 
closing part of the shallower waters. 

The laying of the boom is now in the hands of the Navy. 












7 


The advantages of this arrangement are not very apparent. Every 
available sailor will probably be required on mobilisation, and dock¬ 
yard hands will have quite enough to keep them busy without having 
to do this work, especially when we remember that a number of men 
will have to remain on the spot to open the boom to let friendly ves¬ 
sels through, and to carry out any necessary repairs. 

It would be far better to have the whole operation of protecting a 
harbour placed in the hands of one authority, and the R.E. could do 
the laying out of the boom quite as efficiently as the Navy and would 
work under the orders of the Military Commander of the defences. 
Either the Submarine Miners could do this as part of their work, or 
the pontoon troops could be employed, as during naval operations it 
is to be presumed that they would have little work to do in the field 
in this country. 


Mines. 


M ines are not as a rule employed in defence 
against torpedo-boats,they have other and more import¬ 
ant work to do in acting as a deterrent to the attack of larger ships, and 
should not be fired on the chance of sinking such a small and fast mov¬ 
ing target as a torpedo-boat,thus leaving a blank in the mine field. But 
there is one contingency which we must keep in view and which may 
make the employment of mines in narrow waters very necessary in 
the near future, and that is the possibility of being attacked by sub¬ 
marine torpedo-boats. Such an attack could not be repelled by gun 
fire, a boom, unless specially constructed, would be of little use in 
preventing their entering a harbour, and mines may prove to be the 
best weapon of defence against them. 

The arrangement of the electric lights is one of the 
most important factors in a successful defence and one 
of the most difficult to decide upon. The present recoginsed method 
is to have an illuminated area in front of the boom, and advanced lights 
termed "sentry beams” and "search-lights” through which boats 
must pass before they can reach the narrower waters near the boom. 
All things considered, this appears the best arrangement, as timely 
warning of the approach of boats can be given, and they come under 
close range fire as soon as they enter the illuminated area. 

The scheme so often adopted of having lights and guns on both 
sides of the channel, is, however, not always satisfactory, though 
sometimes necessary owing to the breadth of the entrance. 

In the ideal case under consideraion, it would be better to keep 
all the lights as far as possible on one side, thus giving a complete 


Electric lights. 


Wire Jence 


8 


belt of light in front of the boom without any of the beams crossing 
each other. The most advanced of these beams should be able to 
light up the water close to the shore to prevent any chance of 
"creeping,” and if it were found that the lights would not illuminate 
the far shore sufficiently clearly, a beam might be placed as shown by 

TYPICAL DEFENCE 

against torpedo boat raid. 










9 

dotted lines in the accompaning sketch, to light up that side of the 
entrance. 

The beam nearest the boom shoud be capable of being turned upon 
it, to light it up in case of an attempt at destruction, but as a rule 
the boom should be left in darkness. 

By such an arrangement of the lights, besides doing away with 
crossing, we make it more difficult for an approaching boat to judge 
where the entrance to the harbour actually lies, facilitate the protect¬ 
ion of the lights against an attempt at destruction by small landing 
parties and enables the generating plant to be kept in one place. 

In the case of sentry beams, however, this will not often be feasi¬ 
ble, and we shall have to place lights on either side. As these are 
to enable timely warning to be given of the approach of boats, they 
should be placed as far out as possible. They should always be dupli¬ 
cated, in case of a break down, or of its being necessary to change 
carbons, and the spare lights used to search the water outside the 
sentry beams. 

All electric lights should be situated sufficiently close to the water 
to prevent there being much ''dead water.” Their protection 
against an enemy’s fire is now practically assured by the introduction 
of the "parabola ellipse” reflector, which enables them to be placed 
behind armour in which only a small aperture 3 feet high and 2/4 
to 8 inches wide, according to the angle of divergence, is necessary. 

The 12-pr. Q.F. is an excellent all round gun for 

Guns and works. . 

this class of defence' it is sufficiently powerful to 
sink a boat if it hits it and has a good rate of fire. 

It is however quite possible that an enemy would send in some 
larger or heavier vessel with the object of smashing the boom to clear 
the way for the torpedo-boats, and although submarine mines might 
succeed in stopping or sinking it, it is necessary to include in the 
defence, some heavier guns capable of dealing with such a case. A 
group of two 6" Mark VII. guns situated well away from the boom 
should answer the purpose. 

All the guns should be placed on one side of the entrance when 
possible. This would simplify the lighting arrangements as before 
explained, enable an effective scheme for the distribution of fire to be 
devised, facilitate the rapid transmission of warning or orders and the 
protection of the guns from a land attack, and do away with all 
chances of the bad moral effect which would result from shots from a 
batterv on one side of the channel ricochettin? into one on the other 


10 


side, a contingency which has now to be met by "stopping” the guns, 
thus limiting their effective arc of fire. 

Two is the greatest number of guns which can be efficiently looked 
after by one officer, who, besides having to direct his fire, must at¬ 
tend to the supply of ammunition and the replacement of casualties, 
&c.; all guns should therefore be arranged in groups of two, each 
group being perfectly self contained and independent of all others. 

These groups should be at least 50 to 100 yards apart to prevent 
confusion of orders and the effects of "blast” and "flash” on the lay¬ 
ing of other guns. 

The guns should be placed above and in front of the lights, with 
the exception of one group for the close defence of the boom. The 
best height above water at which they should be placed must, to a 
great extent, depend upon the conformation and nature of the coast 
line. The flatter the trajectory the better should be the chance of 
hitting at close range, and for this reason they should be placed 
as close to the water as possible; but, on the other hand, it is 
necessary for the efficient use of auto-sights, to have a certain amount 
of height and we can say that about 40 feet above the sea should be 
their normal position, which will give accuracy with auto-sights 
up to about 1,600 yards. 

The high siting of guns may sometimes give what is called "dead 
water,” upon which they cannot be depressed if the banks are steep 
and deep water comes close to the shore. In such a case it will be 
necessary to have one group close to the water’s edge for the special 
purpose of covering this "dead water” area and prevent "creeping” 
by torpedo-boats. 

As the batteries are not intended to withstand a heavy fire, they 
will not require any great amount of protection, and as they will be 
used chiefly at night, they should be of very simple construction. 

There should be no lifts from the magazines to the gun floor and 
steps should be avoided as much as possible. Ample recesses 
should be built around the emplacements to hold all the ammu¬ 
nition likely to be required in action. Special attention should be 
paid to the sleeping accommodation for the detachments, as if they 
do not get good rest during the day they cannot be alert and up to the 
strain of continuous night work. There should also be small shelters 
by each gun so that a few men may always be in readiness to open 
fire the moment the alarm is given. 


11 


All batteries should have a slight infantry parapet in rear and 
should be entirely surrounded by an unclimbable fence to prevent any 
chance of their being rushed. If commanded by high ground within 
about 1,800 yards which might be occupied by a landing party, they 
should have a parados or a high wooden palisade to screen the detach¬ 
ments from rifle bullets. They should also, if necessary, be made 
with a strong traverse on the sea flank, to protect them against en¬ 
filade fire by a ship assisting the torpedo-boats. This traverse would 
also, to a certain extent, prevent "blast” from interfering with other 
groups. 

. . . As a torpedo-boat raid is the one we must be best 

Organisation. 

prepared to meet, and as it may take place before mobil¬ 
isation has been completed, it is important that everything should be 
done in peace time to keep the defence ready for immediate action. 

The Royal Garrison Artillerymen available at home are only suffi¬ 
cient to man a small proportion of the various works to be defended 
in time of war; we depend in great part upon Militia and Volunteers, 
who on the likelihood of a declaration of war would be mobilised and 
allotted to their various ports, in accordance with the schemes of de¬ 
fence drawn up in peace time. But it is highly probable that before 
they were collected and settled down to their work that we would be 
attacked, and we therefore think that the defence against torpedo- 
boat raid, or, as it is sometimes called, the light Q.F. defence of a 
fortress, should be left entirely in the hands of the R.G.A. who are 
more highly trained and actually on the spot; the peace and war es¬ 
tablishments and manning details should be identical. 

To obtain absolute efficiency, the defence against torpedo-boats 
should be considered quite seperately in all general schemes of de¬ 
fence. All the light Q.F. guns and the electric lights should be 
controlled by one officer, who would organize the defence in peace 
time, train the men in their work, and command them in war. He 
should have under his orders at peace manning and on war mobilisa¬ 
tion not only the R.G.A. to work the guns and the R.E. to work the 
lights, but also any infantry told off for the special protection of 
lights and batteries and the men told off to lay and work the boom. 

This officer, whom we could call the Fire Commander for torpedo- 
boat defence, should of course belong to the R.G.A. 

Though nominally under the orders of the Fortress or Section 
Commander, he should be given an absolutely free hand and held per¬ 
sonally responsible for the preparation, training and organisation of 


12 


this part of the defence. This individual responsibility is absolutely 
necessary to ensure efficiency, and the principle has been recognised 
by the independence now given to G.G.C’s in charge of light Q.F. 
guns. 

In action, the Fire Commander would in no way control or inter¬ 
fere with the fire of the lighter guns though he might keep the direc¬ 
tion of the heavier quick-firers, previously mentioned as forming part 
of the defence, in his own hands. His main duty would be the ob¬ 
taining and transmitting of information to his batteries, and their 
protection against an attack from the land side. 

For the purposes of communication, he would be telephonically 
connected with the Fortress or Section Commander, with the port 
war signal stations and with his advanced look-out parties. 

The latter, in order to be able to give the earliest intimation of an 
attack, should be placed outside the sentry beams, and on sighting ap¬ 
proaching boats or seeing them in the beams, would at once give 
warning by ringing a bell, the circuit of which, passing through the 
Fire Commander’s post and the various batteries, would give the 
alarm to all simultaneously. 

The system of firing rockets by look-out parties is not advisable as 
it gives warning to the enemy that they have been sighted. 

In some cases, the Navy may have boats outside the defences, 
which may be able to communicate information, but the desirability 
of this is a vexed qusetion which we shall not discuss. 

The Fire Commander should also be in touch, through the Fort¬ 
ress or Section Commander, with the land front outposts and the 
look-outs at the various possible landing places. 

It is more than probable that small parties will land and attempt to 
destroy the lights or silence the guns in conjunction with the boat 
attack. The protection of landing places and the action of the in¬ 
fantry comes more under the general defence of the fortress, but, as 
in spite of all precautions a few men may creep through unobserved, 
the "torpedo-boat defence” must possess an independent organisation 
for its own protection at close quarters. Here again is an advantage 
of having all the guns and lights possible on one side. 

The batteries should be able to protect themselves by carbine or 
machine gun fire; the electric light emplacements and engine rooms, 
&c., should be surrounded by parapets and uncli nbable fences, and 
have a small guard of infantry, and possibly Maxim guns, if at all iso¬ 
lated; the boom should be protected by a small work or loopholed 


13 


wall at each end, the men in charge of the boom being reinforced, if 
necessary, by a few rifles (see diagram). 

It may be said that a great many of these precautions are quite un¬ 
necessary, but we maintain that the importance of these raids will be 
so great in a maritime war that an enemy will use every device possi¬ 
ble, fair or unfair, to ensure their success, and we cannot take too 
great a care of our guns and men or go into details too thoroughly. 

B. FORTRESSES AND COALING STATIONS ABROAD. 


Mines. 


These, if within range of a torpedo-boat raid, are as liable to this 
form of attack as our home fortresses, and the foregoing remarks as 
regards the preparation to meet it apply equally. 

But they also be prepared for a raid on a much larger scale, espe¬ 
cially the smaller and more distant and isolated coaling stations, and 
should be armed and organised accordingly. 

Mines and Brennan torpedoes are likely to play a 
very important part in the defence and in perventing 
ships coming into close range, but space does not allow a discussion 
of their merits as we are in this essay more particularly concerned with 
the artillery defence. 

These must of course be established for the pro¬ 
tection of all defended harbours at night, whether the 
harbour be exposed to a regular torpedo-boat raid or not, as an enemy 
may send in boats and pinnaces during dark to reconnoitre, to counter 
mine, or for other purposes. 


Electric lights. 


The general remarks on the placing of lights already made in A 
hold good, except that instead of having a lighted area in front of 
a boom, the inner lights would be arranged to light up the mine fields. 

The outer search-lights would have important work to do in pre¬ 
venting an enemy’s ship getting in close to the works unobserved, for, 
although it is agreed by most authorities that ships are unlikely to at¬ 
tack at night, it is nevertheless extremely probable that they will 
make use of the darkness to get in as near as possible, in order to 
open fire on the batteries at close range at dawn, instead of steaming 
in, in broad daylight, exposed for 8,000 yards or so to a far more ac¬ 
curate fire than any they can return. 

Existing lights would appear unequal to lighting up even large 
vessels at anything over 2,000 to 3,000 yards except under very favour¬ 
able conditions and it may, in some cases, be found advantageous to 


14 


send out vessels fitted with search-lights to assist the defenders in dis¬ 
covering the approach of ships. 

We do not require many guns in coast batteries, 
but what we have should be the very best and highest 
velocity ones available. Modern ships are very strongly armoured and 
unless we can penetrate their armour we cannot effectually cripple 
them, although by a rapid fire at the upper structures we may make 
them draw off. 

Quick-firing is very important, especially with the lighter guns 
which may have but a small and fast moving target exposed for a very 
short time, or may be opposed to the lighter guns of ships at close 
range, when speed in firing will be essential. 

With the heavier guns, a rapid rate of fire may also be necessary. 
It is the opinion of many naval officers that if ships engage forts, they 
will attempt to steam in at full speed to close range and then anchor, 
when the larger number of lighter guns they carry, and their better 
armour protection, may give them an advantage over the open shore 
batteries, which will be overwhelmed by a superior volume of rapid 
fire. 

It may therefore be imperative for batteries to try and stop ships 
before they can get to close range, and fire will have to be opened at 
about 10,000 yards and gradually increased in rapidity as the range 
shortens and accurate laying with auto-sights, with which presumably 
all modern guns will be fitted, becomes possible. 

To enable an accurate fire to be opened at these extreme ranges the 
guns must have a high initial velocity. 

The projectiles from the heaviest guns should be capable of pene¬ 
trating the belt armour of modern vessels at, at least, 2,000 yards, and 
those from medium guns should be able to pierce the armour of, and 
destroy, the secondary armament. 

The new 9 2" and 6" guns with which most of our defences are 
now being re-armed fulfil the conditions of rapidity and accuracy ad¬ 
mirably, provided they are properly handled and looked after, but it is 
questionable whether it will not be necessary, in the near future, to 
substitute heavier guns such as the 12" and 7*5" to enable coast de¬ 
fences to be equal to engaging modern battle-ships with success. 

The heavier guns, provided they can be made equally rapid loading, 
would, for shore batteries, appear to possess many advantages. 

The 4 1 " Q.F. fills no very defined position nowadays in coast de¬ 
fence, it is not powerful enough to penetrate the upper structures of 


15 


modern ships and is unnecessarily heavy for use against ship’s tops, 
See., or small vessels such as torpedo-boats, for which the 12-pr. is 
much better suited. The most useful employment of these would ap¬ 
pear to be as mobile guns firing shrapnel shell for the protection of 
landing places and the defence of positions. 

All R.M.L. guns are of course quite obsolete, and even the earlier 
pattern B.L. guns and those on disappearing mountings are too un¬ 
wieldy and slow to be of much value in an engagement and should be 
replaced. 

As there are great advantages in reducing the classes of guns used, 
as far as possible, the ideal normal armament of coast fortresses 
should consist of:— 

Heavy Q.F.’s (9’2" or 12"). 

Medium Q.F.’s (6 /r Mark VII. or 1'S"). 

Light Q.F.’s (12-pr.). 

(The term Q.F. for all guns is used advisedly, as though at present 
a quick-firing gun is generally understood to be one whose charge is 
contained in a metal case, the expression should be applied to all 
rapid loading guns on mountings which allow of the laying being 
carried out independently of the service of the gun). 

In addition to these it might, in some cases, be advisable to pro¬ 
vide accurate high angle fire guns of a B.L. type, when there are waters 
which, although not requiring defence by direct fire guns, might be 
occupied by ships with a view to enfilading the works or bombarding 
a place at long range. 

w The introduction of high velocity guns and high 

explosive shell on ships sealed the doom of the elabo¬ 
rate granite forts, tightly packed with muzzle loaders, which figured 
so prominently in our coast defences, and the tendency now is to keep 
to works of simple trace, made as inconspicuous as possible and armed 
with a few good guns. 

Owing to the long range now obtainable from guns, the batteries 
need no longer be kept close to the water’s edge, but can, if neces¬ 
sary, be withdrawn and placed on higher ground. 

The adoption of automatic sights has made it important that guns 
should be mounted as much above the sea as possible, and where no 
high ground is available, an artificial mound is raised, or the old 
forts are made use of as a substructure on the top of which modern 
ordnance can be placed. 


16 


Besides the greater accuracy in laying, range-finding, and observa¬ 
tion, obtainable from high sites, they possess every advantage for the 
heavier guns; these become less liable to be hit by an enemy’s projec¬ 
tiles, as ships cannot come in to very close range or their shell would 
pass over the batteries without doing damage, and at long range their 
fire is not likely to be very effective. 

At any but very close ranges, coast defences guns possess an enor¬ 
mous advantage over shipsowing to their firing from a stable platform. 

The latest works built afford, for the most part, good protection 
to the guns and detachments, but we still do not appear to recognise 
the importance of protecting the executive officers and the communi¬ 
cations. One sometimes sees the Battery Commander and his range¬ 
finders with practically no cover at all, telephone wires exposed, and 
dials in the open where they could not remain five minutes underfire. 

On board ship the executive officer is in an armoured conning 
tower, sometimes as strongly armoured as any part of the ship, his 
means of communication are close by him and the wires &c., are led 
away in armoured tubes. 

Are not these precautions equally necessary on shore? Although 
the B.C. and his staff are nowadays no longer so indispensable as 
heretofore, and the guns can, if necessary, be fought just as well with¬ 
out them at close range, the effective direction of fire in the prelimi¬ 
nary stages of an engagement still depends entirely upon them, and 
as long as they are found to be necessary they should be protected. 

We therefore think that the B.C.’s post should consist of an ar¬ 
moured emplacement or cupola placed in the most commanding position 
in rear of the centre of his guns, where he could see what was going on, 
observe his fire and pass his orders without delay. His D.R.F. in¬ 
struments should be close by him, as it is no longer necessary to place 
them on the flanks, owing to the introduction of smokeless powder; 
the instruments themselves should be of an "overhead” type, in 
order that they and the detachment working them may be safe. All 
telephones wires, speaking tubes, &c., should run direct into and 
from the B.C.’s post and when not buried at least a yard deep should 
be carried in steel pipes; all range indicator dials of the present clock 
faced pattern and "figures” should be relegated to the scrap heap and 
reliable electric range dials and order dials introduced, so that the 
whole of the communications may be under cover. 

Another point requiring consideration when constructing new 
works, is the nature of ground used on the outer slopes. This, if of 


17 


a crumbly nature, causes clouds of dust to obscure the view of the 
guns even at peace practice, and when thrown about by the bursting 
of an enemy’s high explosive shell, might make it quite impossible to 
carry-on direct fire at all; if shingly, it may make things somewhat un¬ 
comfortable for the gun numbers in action, though this would be the 
lesser of the two evils. A heavy soil well bound together by surface 
roots or grass would appear the most suitable for the purpose, but 
would rarely be available at foreign stations. 

The drill book recognises that at close range, owing to dust and 
smoke from the enemy’s bursting shell, it may be impossible to lay 
the guns over the sights, and to meet this eventuality, it has been found 
necessary to retain position-finders, placed some distance away from the 
batteries, so that the guns may be fought by Case III. from under cover. 
The cells for these instruments will require very careful screening, more 
so than is sometimes the case at present, in order that an enemy may be 
unable to ascertain their position even at a short distance, as other¬ 
wise he will no doubt do what he can to render them untenable. 

The ammunition supply to guns is a very important detail to attend 
to. It is pretty well recognised that it would, in these days of rapid 
fire, be inadvisable to attempt to supply guns in action direct from 
the magazines by lifts, but that all the ammunition likely to be re¬ 
quired will have to be previously brought up and placed handy in 
recesses near the guns. It is therefore necessary that these recesses 
should afford ample room for the storage of a plentiful supply, be 
easily get-at-able, and be well protected from an enemy’s fire. 

Batteries should be well defended on the land side, for whatever 
the action of the ships, there can be no doubt that if the destruc¬ 
tion or capture of the works is aimed at, landing parties will play a 
very prominent part, and their success or failure will probably decide 
the ultimate result of the raid. Every battery should be a self-con¬ 
tained fortress, if at all isolated, and its safety should not depend en¬ 
tirely upon the advanced infantry; it should have a good infantry 
parapet, be surrounded by unclimbable fences, entanglements, 
abattis, and other obstacles, have a clear field of fire, be defiladed by 
a parados or by traverses if the interior or the guns can be com¬ 
manded by high ground, and in fact be made as impregnable as mod¬ 
ern fortification can make it. 

The reduction of the number and types of guns 

Organisation. u$e( ^ anc j ^ introduction of auto-sights will very 

greatly affect the organisation for defence. 


18 


This must be as simple as possible and the main object kept in 
view must be decentralisation of responsibility and the encouragement 
of individual initiative. 

There must be one supreme head of the defences on both the sea 
and land fronts, but Section Commanders and Fire Commanders 
should be reduced to a minimum, and Battery and Gun Group Com¬ 
manders should be prepared to act upon their own responsibility with¬ 
out waiting for orders from higher authority, for, under modern con¬ 
ditions, there will be little time to spare between the sighting of an 
enemy and the opening of fire. All orders as to selection of targets 
and distribution of fire should be arranged in peace time and frequently 
rehearsed so that when the attack takes place each individual may 
understand exactly what is required of him and act without hesitation. 

In any case the higher commands must gradually become of less 
importance as ships approach the batteries, until, when these are 
within effective auto-sight range, we may expect to find each gun act¬ 
ing independently and correcting its own fire. It is absolutely im¬ 
possible for a B.C. or G.G.C. to make himself heard, or to pass 
orders, if three or four Q.F. guns are firing with any rapidity, and 
it is to be hoped that this may before long be recognised by our drill 
books, and that our men may be trained in the observation and cor¬ 
rection of fire of each gun by its gun captain and layer whenever auto¬ 
sights are used. This system has already been tried at practice and 
found to work very well; it will however, entail a much higher stand¬ 
ard of intelligence on the part of our N.C.O’s and men, more care 
in the selection of gunlayers, and a thorough knowledge of the guns 
and mounting in use. 

Every gun has its own peculiarities, and it is just as necessary for 
a detachment to know their gun as for a sportsman to know his, or an 
infantryman his rifle. As at stations abroad, the men required to 
work the guns are, or ought to be, always on the spot, it could be 
easily arranged to have a number of them told off to each gun and to 
get them to look upon it as their own particular weapon, much as 
is done on board ship; they should be responsible for keeping it clean 
and in working order, for mounting and dismounting it when neces¬ 
sary, and should always keep to it at drill and use it at practice and 
in action. 

If this were done, we feel sure that it would bring in a principle 
of personal emulation which could only be productive of increased 
efficiency, and we would not so often hear of guns missing fire or failing 


19 


to run up, and the thousand and one causes of delay and waste of 
time, for which, as often as not, it is difficult to find anyone re¬ 
sponsible. * 

In the same manner, the Specialists should have charge of their 
instruments and communications and should be capable of testing, 
adjusting, or repairing them. 

If organised on these lines, the higher ranks would then have their 
duties in peace and war clearly defined. 

The G.G.C. would be in charge of his group of guns and their 
ammunition supply, the B.C. of his battery, its instruments, com¬ 
munications, See., and the F.C. of his fire command; not on paper or 
occasionally when manning, but always, and absolutely, so long as 
serving in a station. 

The only true test of the organisation of defences is actual war, 
but much could be done if Garrison Artillery were occasionally 
given an opportunity of testing the efficiency of their preparations by 
being attacked by ships during mobilisations and manoeuvres. 

Anyone who has read the reports on the United States combined 
manoeuvres last year, cannot fail to have been impressed by the con¬ 
sensus of opinion as to the great benefit derived from them. 

It would be excellent training, not only for our coast defences, but 
for our Navy also, if the annual naval manoeuvres occasionally took 
the form of evading a small defending fleet and making a raid on 
some distant coaling station. We would even go further, and sug¬ 
gest that the expense entailed would be infinitesimal in comparison 
to the experience gained, if a division of the 1st Army Corps was 
embarked in transports and convoyed by a fleet for a combined attack 
by sea and land on one of our larger fortresses, say Malta. 

C. HARBOURS OF REFUGE. 

The defence of these calls for few further remarks. Most of what 
has already been said under A and B applies to some extent in this 
case. 

Although it will rarely be feasible or desirable to close the entrance 
with a boom, there must be a good proportion of light Q.F. guns in 

*The only objection to this arrangement would appear to be the difficulties in the 
way of carrying out service prize firing, but the rules for this could be amended to 
suit the new conditions; if not, prize firing as at present carried out should be abol¬ 
ished, for the moment it interferes with the efficient organisation of our defences it 
no longer fulfils the object for which it was introduced.— C.G.V . 



20 


the armament, and electric lights must be provided, in order to pre¬ 
vent raids by small boats during dark. 1 he defence might be greatly 
assisted by a line of anchored barges or pontoons carrying quick-firing 
guns, if the entrance is at all broad, an illuminated area being estab¬ 
lished just in front of these, but any form of floating defence should 
be avoided if possible as it is likely to interfere with the freedom of 
fire of the land guns. 

If larger vessels attack they will probably be cruisers or "com¬ 
merce destroyers,” and to meet these an armament of 6 /r guns should, 
as a rule, be good enough, with perhaps a few 9’2" guns to deal with 
a possible attack by armoured cruisers or battleships and keep them out 
of bombarding range of the shipping. 

These defences are not intended to stand a determined attack, 
which, as already explained, is an extremely remote contingency, and 
there is no necessity for overdoing their armament, but the few guns 
provided must be the very best. 

An attack by a landing party being extremely probable, as some 
harbours of refuge are somewhat isolated, and as a large force may 
not be available for their protection, the batteries, while made safe 
from a sudden rush by means of the usual parapet and unclimbable 
fence, must be further guarded by small infantry redoubts occupying 
any high ground within range of the rear of the batteries, and 
which might be occupied by the enemy with a view to keeping down 
the fire of the guns while the attack on the shipping in harbour is 
made. I he landing places should also be guarded by small redoubts, 
which might with advantage be provided with one or two 4’7" guns 
able to fire shrapnel shell at any boats attempting to land men. 

No elaborate organisation or chain of command is necessary, as, if 
attacked, there will be little doubt about what to do and how to do 
it,provided definite orders and instructions have been issued beforehand. 

The garrison should consist in great part of local Militia and Vol¬ 
unteers, who will take a personal interest in the defence of their port 
and homes, will know the coast and surrounding country, and can be 
trained in peace at the work they will carry out in war, so that on 
mobilisation there will be no delay, and the port will be placed in an 
efficient state of defence against raid before the declaration of war. 

SUMMARY. 

The chief points brought forward for consideration in this essay 
can be summarised as follows:— 


21 


The seperation of the defence against torpedo-boat raids from the 
general defence of fortresses. 

The removal of all old type guns and the retention of only three 
natures, Heavy, Medium and Light Q.F’s, in works. 

The introduction of greater independence both of batteries and of 
personnel and the encouragement of initiative. 

The recognition of the liability to attacks from the land side, and 
the organisation and preparation of works to meet them. 

We are getting good guns and good works; what we now require is 
good organisation and training, especially in the lower ranks, training 
in peace which will fit them for the work they will have to carry out 
in war, and make them able to depend upon themselves in the hour 
of need. 


22 

[Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, April, May and June, 1903.] 


Assuming the probability of raids by a Foreign Naval 
Power what are the best preparations to repel them so far as 
the construction, armament, and organisation of our Coast 
Defences are concerned? 

BY 

CAPTAIN C. S. S. CURTEIS, R.G.A. 


Ut Vivas Vigila. 

“DUNCAN” SILVER MEDAL ESSAY, 1903 . 


INTRODUCTION. 

Raid by a foreign power is generally accepted as meaning an attack 
by small vessels of very high speed, capable of inflicting damage out 
of all proportion to their value, on an imperial naval base, dockyard, 
or harbour. These vessels would be torpedo-boats or torpedo-boat 
destroyers, and would as a rule be escorted by a covering squadron of 
fast unarmoured cruisers, whose main armament would not consist of 

heavier guns than the equivalent of our 6" gun. This squadron 

» 

would endeavour, immediately the attack of the torpedo vessels had 
been discovered, to support that attack with the greatest vigour by 
pushing in as close as possible and engaging the batteries of the de¬ 
fence. 

Such an attack could hardly be contemplated in daylight, and we 
may assume that, except at night, it would not be attempted. For 
the rest, the main object of the raiding craft would be to get past 
the forts as quickly as possible, and effect their ultimate and only ob¬ 
ject, viz., the destruction of as much materiel as possible in the dock¬ 
yard or harbour, regardless of risk to themselves. These are the main 
features of raid which must be taken into account when considering 
what are the means and method of defence most suitable for repelling 




23 


such attacks. Countermining on the part of the enemy will not be 
discussed, as it does not affect the system of defence, beyond estab¬ 
lishing the principle that mine fields must be protected by guns. 

As far as possible the subject will be treated under the headings 
given, on broad lines which it should be possible to lay down without 
restricting in the least that modification which must be necessary 
with all systems, and more especially so with that under considera¬ 
tion, the efficiency of which depends so much on the correct apprecia¬ 
tion and employment of the natural advantages peculiar to each port 
to be defended. 


I. CONSTRUCTION. 


Under this heading will be considered all questions connected with 
the siting of works, mine fields, electric lights, and other components 
parts of the defence, and the relative importance of each will be dealt 
with, as affecting the ultimate efficiency of the whole as a completed 
line of defence aganist raid. 

The immense importance of the siting of the 

importance of origi- of defence and their adjuncts is obvious, bear- 

na! selection of sites. J 

ing in mind that, owing to the expense involved, 
mi stakes made at this point are permanent in their results, and will 
as a rule last until the armament mounted becomes obsolete. 

To evolve a sound system of defence against raid, 

mutually dependent it must be realised how, to a greater extent than in 
on each other for an y other case, the various means of defence are de- 
effect ‘ pendent for their effect upon each other; and how, 

to obtain the maximum effect from them, these means of defence 
must be so placed that their action may be concentrated at the most 
favorable point, and they may be worked under the most favourable 

conditions, for the defence. 

The elaboration of an efficient line of defence is 
lafMj^tkm o^those dependent on a complete mutual understanding be- 
responsibie for tween those officials who are in the first instance re- 
ongina! scheme. spons j^j e f Qr ^ s { t j n g an d construction of the 

works, armament, lights, and mine fields. 

If these most important questions are not, in the case of each sep- 
erate port, considered in the first instance in their order of relative 
importance, but decided piece-meal without sufficient collaboration 
between the departments responsible and the local military authori¬ 
ties, the defence can never be that most suited to the natural features 


24 


of the place, and all subsequent organisation and framing of schemes 
of defence must suffer, these being dependent entirely on the original 
distribution of the means provided for defence. 

No doubt there is not much difficulty on this point at home sta¬ 
tions, where all concerned are practically on the spot, but abroad the 
case is different. It is impossible to overrate the value of the opinion 
of military authorities on the spot. No amount of map and chart 
reading can make the opinion of individuals, sometimes thousands of 
miles away, equal in value to the opinion of those qualified by local 
knowledge to express it. There are sometimes of course questions 
involved which regimental and other officers at a station abroad are 
not aware of, but this fact cannot alter the soundness of the main 
principle, though it may modify it in particular cases. 

It would appear that the adoption of a method, such as that which 
follows, would almost prevent the possibility of guns being placed 
where they are not required, and ensure the attainment of a defence, 
equal to all requirements and most suited to local conditions, at the 
minimum cost. 


„ A1 _ . . The authorities having decided that it is necessarv 

for deciding on to defend a port—in this case against raid—should 
original scheme of call upon t h e local military authorities to submit a 

o etence. 

scheme, without limiting them in any way, for the 
defence of the port. 

When this has been done, the heads of the departments concerned 
at home could criticise to any extent, require reasons for certain dis¬ 
positions, limit the armament proposed if the demands were exces¬ 
sive, either from a financial or tactical point of view, and in fact 
make what observations the thought fit in order to ascertain whether 
the scheme suggested was sound; at the same time adhering to the 
principle that local recommendations should be appproved unless 
some very good reason to the contrary could be given. 

It is not intended to suggest that any existing control should be 
taken out of the hands of the heads of departments at home, but 
merely that, retaining that power in full, they should start at the 
right end by allowing any scheme for the defence of a port to be based 
originally on the opinion of those who are qualified to state, from 
intimate local knowledge, the number, nature and distribution of the 
guns required for the adequate defence of the place. 

The considerations governing the selection of sites for the various 
means of defence may now be dealt with in detail. 


25 






M ine fields should be protected and covered by 

Works of defence > r c t< , , 

and minefields. the ” re °* guns, hence they are in a measure 

dependent on there being suitable sites available for 
such guns within effective range of them. Conversely the siting of 
the guns must to some extent be governed by the question of the best 
sites for the mine fields. Where these sites are coincident, 
the best site for the mine field being immediately opposite, and 
within effective range of, the best sit-e for the guns, the line of de¬ 
fence can at once be decided on. Otherwise the best line obtainable, 
with due regard for the requirements of both, must be selected. In 
the absence of mine fields, the guns only need of course be con¬ 
sidered. 


i he requirements to be borne in mind in selecting sites for the 
guns are:— 

(a) That the water area should, if possible, be so naturally re¬ 
stricted by reefs, shoal water, or the opposite shore that torpedo ves¬ 
sels running past should be within effective range of the guns through¬ 
out their arc of fire. 

(b ) That there should be as large an arc of fire as possible. 

( c) That the site should have a command sufficient for the ac¬ 
curate use of auto-sights over the restricted water area, and if possi¬ 
ble slightly greater than that of the fixed beams. 

The siting of mine fields not being an artillery question, no more 
need be said than that they must necessarily be under observation from 
the shore, except in extreme cases, and the water area must be suffi¬ 
ciently restricted naturally, or made so artificially, if the channel be 
too wide. 


Fixed beams. 


On this question of the siting of guns and mine fields depends the 
position of the line or lines of defence. Other means of defence 
are of secondary importance in this consideration. 

The siting of the fixed beams depends on the sites 
selected for guns and mine fields, except in the pos¬ 
sible case mentioned later. They may exist for both, or for guns 
alone. Each pair of lights should, if possible, be rather on the inner 
side of the batteries for which it is intended, and on a slightly lower 
level, as previously stated, as objects in the beam are more plainly 
visible from above it. 

As regards the beams themselves, it cannot be too strongly urged that 
they should combine power with dispersion; the former is sometimes 


26 




sacrificed to the latter. Rather than sacrifice power the number of 
lights should be increased. The lights should he sufficient in num¬ 
ber or their power and dispersion increased sufficiently, to allow the 
whole channel within effective range of the guns to be fully illumi¬ 
nated. Otherwise the full fire effect is not obtained. This is merely 
a matter of calculation, and the nearer the channel, the greater the 
dispersion required. For instance, suppose a battery of 12-prs. with 
its mean line of fire at right angles to a channel 800 yards distant, 
and down the centre of a pair of fixed beams with the usual 60° dis¬ 
persion. A vessel on entering and leaving the beam will only be 900 
yards from the battery, which given light, could open fire with effect 
at 1,200 to 1,500 yards. 


As far as possible on the outer side of the defences 
Look-out posts and , , , , , , . .. . . 

sentry beams, should be a look-out post, in direct communication 

with all Q.F. batteries, and near it powerful sentry 
beams which should be solely employed in searching the approaches, 
with a view to giving as early an alarm as possible of any attack to 
the defence. 


After the attacking torpedo vessels had passed the look-out post, 
these beams would probably have to be used as an exceptional case 
to aid the fire of the heavy guns of the outer batteries in keeping the 
covering fleet at a distance. 


Brennan torpedo. 


h In almost all cases such guns will be mounted, and 

outer works. their role would be to keep the covering fleet at a 
distance and prevent them supporting the attack by 
fire on the Q.F. defences. 

The Brennan torpedo may be a most valuable aid, 
but it does not affect the general arrangement for the 
defence in any way. 

Everything possible in the way of artificial obstruc- 

Temporary con- . , ,, , , . , . 

struction. tions should be made with a view to narrowing the 
available waterway, delaying the enemy in the il¬ 
luminated areas and retarding his speed. 

Effect of natural Under the heading of construction must also be 

features on seiec- considered how the construction of an efficient line 

tion of line of defence. , , . 

or defence against such attacks is effected by natural 

features. 


Harbours and dockyards may be divided for tactical purposes into 
three classes:— 


27 


Harbours of this sort are most easily defended. 

Harbours with long , . 

approaches. Jjy approaches is meant some sort of limited water¬ 
way, either a channel within effective range of land, 
or at least a waterway commanded by, and wholly within effective 
range of, land on both sides. In most cases the approaches are nar¬ 
row throughout the greater part of their length, and in every case 
some narrow part adapted to the kind of defence under consideration 
can be found. 


In this case a line of defence would be sought for which would 
fulfil the conditions necessary for the combined operation of Q.F. 
guns and mine fields and be at the same time out of range, and out 
of view if possible, of the enemy’s covering squadron. Ample warn¬ 
ing would be possible owing to the distance between the line of de¬ 
fence and the look-out post at the outer end of the approaches. 


The advantage presented by such natural features is that the sys-. 
tern of defence against raid can be concentrated with all its energy on 
its legitimate work undisturbed by the fire of the enemy’s ships, as 
the fire from the light Q.F. gun usually carried by each torpedo vessel 
would not be of much account used at an unknown range, amid the 
glare of lights and for so short a time. 


In this case, harbours with approaches of one mile 

Harbours with or so are re f erre d to, when, though the possession 

short . 

approaches. of approaches is an advantage, the shortness of them 
causes the line of defence against raid to be almost 
at the entrance with the heavy batteries. In such cases but little 
choice of sites is usually possible, and the Q.F. batteries will be 
liable to long range fire unless the outer batteries are powerful enough 
to cause the covering squadron to withdraw out of range. The 
latter would however probably take great risks to get in close at the 
moment when the enemy’s raiding craft were making their attempt 
to rush the defences, and it is stated that the effect of a powerful 
search-light, directed from an enemy’s ship across the fixed beams and 
between the Q.F. batteries and the channel, is to render any vessel 
in the channel absolutely invisible to the defence. 


If this is so, the importance of having either the outer batteries 
sufficiently powerful to prevent it, or the Q.F. defence sited on the 
inner side of a bend in the channel, is very great. Such a manoeuvre 
on the enemy’s part could not fail, if successful, to result in complete 
or partial immunity for his raiding craft from both guns and mines. 


28 


But few cases of this sort exist, where there is 
H Approaches "° °P en water right up to the entrance to the harbour. 

In such cases, the guns of the defence are all of 
necessity under fire of a covering squadron. More guns are required, 
and in some cases the greater number of the batteries must be sited in 
rear of the entrance to the harbour and consequently of the line of 
defence against raid. Q.F. batteries would, therefore, be liable to a 
more or less heavy fire from the enemy’s ships and must be well pro¬ 
tected. Apart from these disadvantages, however, the concentration 
of the defence on one very narrow point, heavily mined, is obvious, 
and no attempt of an enemy to force such a passage could fail to be 
attended with heavy loss. 

The siting of fixed beams would in no case be 
Fixed beams as a ff ec t e d by natural features, but would entirely de- 

affected by natural 

features. pend on the position of batteries and mine fields, 
unless the assumption that an enemy’s covering ships 
could use their search-lights with the effect described above is correct. 
If so, the siting of fixed beams must have in some cases a most im¬ 
portant bearing on the question of siting batteries and mine fields, 
and the relative importance of these three elements of the defence 
in selecting the line of defence must be reversed. It would mean 
that, unless the shortness and straightness of the approaches prevented 
any other arrangement, the Q.F. batteries and mine fields should not 
in any case, however favourable the proposed site may otherwise be, 
be sited within view and effective range of an enemy’s ships meas¬ 
ured from the position which they could take up in the event of their 
being able to keep down the fire of the outer batteries. 

What is required is a position as far seawards as 
Siting of look- possible consistent with the possession of an arc of 

out post and sentry 

beams. view commanding all approaches to the channel. 

The outer sentry beams should be sufficiently numer¬ 
ous and so sited that all water, especially deep water under the land, 
may be completely swept by their light. In some cases it may be 
necessary to place one or two sentry beams in between the look-out 
post and the line of defence against raid, where the intervening dis¬ 
tance would otherwise enable raiding craft to lie unseen and await a 
favourable opportunity for attack, after having passed the outer beams. 

II. ARMAMENT. 

On the question of armament, there is not much to be said. We 
have guns, which are very good and up-to-date and a few remarks 


29 


Grouping. 


only are necessary as to the conditions which necessitate the use of 
certain natures of guns, and as to the grouping of them. 

For defence against raid, the best guns are without 
Ga doubt the 12-pr. Q.F. of 12 cwt. and the 4’7" Q.F. 

They are both very accurate and have a high rate of 
fire with auto-sights. The 12-pr. Q.F. is quite large enough for use 
against torpedo vessels, and if the guns it is proposed to mount are 
for use in case of raid only, then there is no need to go further than 
the 12-pr. Q.F. 

If, however, the guns are needed for use under other conditions as 
well, the best gun to mount is the4*7 // Q.F. 

No more than two guns of either nature should be 
grouped together in one work, except in exceptional 
cases, for the following reasons:— 

1. Mounted in pairs, their effective arcs of fire are greater than 
if three or four are mounted together. 

2. A pair of guns forms the most convenient tactical unit for 
this kind of defence. 

3. If any attempt be made in conjunction with raid to land a party 
and take these small works in the rear just before the rush is made, 
they mutually support and flank each other, and their seperation con¬ 
stitutes an element of safety inasmuch as the guns of the defence will 
not all be captured by a successful assault on one work, and the 
enemy must divide his attacking force. 

The most obvious exceptional cases are when there is only one 
available site, or the case of a harbour without approaches. 

One Maxim gun on a parapet mounting is supplied 
for each pair of 12-pr. Q.F. guns, but is equally 
necessary for 4*7" guns mounted for defence against raid, as all works 
of this sort must always be liable to attempts at temporary capture 
just prior to the dash of the enemy’s raiding craft. 

Ammunition. The equipment seems sufficient. 

III. ORGANISATION. 

It is proposed to discuss under this heading all arrangements for an 
efficient defence, excluding actual drill, which are subsequent to the 
erection of the completed works of defence. 

It is laid down that raid may be expected im¬ 
mediately, if not before war is declared,and very prob¬ 
ably before a state of war is known to exist. In this 
case, the force would consist of a flotilla of torpedo-boats or destroy- 


Machine guns. 


General remarks 
on raid. 


30 


Probable length of 
warning. 


Only certain 
ports liable. 


ers, alone, or accompanied by fast unarmoured cruisers, and the 
enemy’s chief object being to effect a surprise, there would be no 
hesitation or delay on his part in striking. 

The warning given by him of his intention to raid 
would be just that interval of time which he would 
take to traverse at full speed the distance between 
the point at which the sentry beams picked him up and the outer 
edge of the first fixed beam. This would be slightly increased in 
the event of the impending attack being discovered by any naval 
picket boats patrolling outside. Later on at any period of hostilities, 
raid might be attempted, and would undoubtedly form part of any or¬ 
ganised attack on a naval base by the enemy’s battle fleets, in the 
event of our own fleets being temporarily disabled or beaten. 

Only certain ports are considered liable to raid, 
dependent on their distance from a possible enemy’s 
nearest naval base, and the radius of action of the 
craft he would use for raiding. Those most liable are our naval bases 
and dockyards on the south coast of England, and those in the Medi¬ 
terranean. The former would be especially liable, and such attacks 
on them probably of frequent occurrence. Their distance from the 
bases of a possible enemy is so small that thick weather could be 
waited for, and used to advantage by him. The warning possible is 
so short, that nothing but unceasing vigilance and continual readiness 
on the part of those entrusted with this harassing work will ensure 
success for the defence. 

The grave difficulty of distinguishing between 
friend and foe also exists, which must add greatly to 
the responsibility of officers in charge of such bat¬ 
teries, on whose part the least hesitation in opening 
fire may be fatal. We are now trying to obtain a satisfactory and 
workable system for ensuring such distinction, but there is no doubt 
that any such system should be of the simplest nature, with no com¬ 
plicated code of signals changing day by day. 

With these few preliminary remarks on the difficulties to be sur¬ 
mounted, an attempt will be made to discuss existing methods, and if 
possible suggest improvements on them. 

It is obvious that the more warning that can be 
given of raid the better; therefore the further sea¬ 
wards the look-out post can be placed, consistent with the effective 
searching by the sentry beams of the water area over which the 


Difficulty of dis¬ 
tinguishing friend 
from foe. 


Look-out system. 


31 

enemy’s vessels must pass, the more probable is it that his attack, as 
a surprise, will fail. In some ports frequent attempts at raid are so 
probable that this post should be most carefully selected. In some 
cases it is placed near the supporting battery, the position of which is 
governed by the examination line. This point need not of necessity 
be the best available. Where it is not, a seperate look-out post 
should be established. It should be slightly in advance of the sentry 
beams, and have good command with no hidden water. The system 
would work immediately mobilzation was ordered. 

_ . If the look-out post were at the supporting battery 

Communications. % r ... 

the examining vessel would probably give first inti¬ 
mation of the boats being those of an enemy. We need not discuss 
here the method of signalling from the examining vessel. But if the 
look-out post was further seawards, the individual in charge would 
have to trust to his own judgement as to declaring boats hostile. 
The difficulty does not appear to be insurmountable, and some such 
system as the following is suggested. Let us take the case of the 
look-out post being further seawards than the supporting battery. If 
not, the system would not be materially altered. It is believed that 
an alarm bell, actuated from the look-out post, has been placed in 
each Q.F. battery in some fortresses. No better means of alarm 
could exist. As much warning as possible being necessary, it stands 
to reason that the alarm should be given immediately any vessels, 
which could possibly be the enemy’s torpedo craft, are sighted, the 
meaning of the alarm bell being simply ’’ Stand to the guns. ’ ’ It should 
also be put in all submarine mining test-rooms. This alarm could be 
followed by a seperate signal, such as a rocket or signal gun, on the 
craft being made out to be hostile. If this proved impossible from 
the look-out station, the examining vessel could be trusted to give 
this informatoin. A simple signal might easily be decided on, in 
the event of th^ alarm proving unnecessary. 

Some mention must be made of the entrance of 

Friendly vessels. 

friendly boats at night. At present all torpedo craft 
unless declared friendly are to be treated as hostile. The declaration 
of the boats as ’'friendly” is the difficulty. Undoubtedly all war ves¬ 
sels of our own entering at night would first make the examining 
vessel. Any system of making a friendly vessel fly a given signal in 
passing the defences is bad, as it might get into the enemy’s hands. 
In some ports he could deliberately wait outside sheltered from the 
sentry beams and see the signal of the day hoisted by a friendly vessel 


32 


on entering. If his boats made a dash past the examining vessel and 
then hoisted the signal whatever alarm the examining vessel gave, any 
officer in charge of a battery would hesitate about opening fire on a 
boat entering the beam with the friendly signal flying, as he might 
well think she was preceding hostile vessels. It seems clear therefore 
that what is required is a signal ashore, and not on the boat itself. 
A simple code of lamp signals on the flag staff of the supporting bat¬ 
tery could easily be arranged—any boat not signalled "friendly,” to 
be fired on. The question of friendly boats bound outwards is differ¬ 
ent. No boats bound outwards at night could be hostile, unless an 
enemy’s boat had passed the forts already, except in the case of a 
harbour with a double entrance, of which none, as far as is known, 
exist. It is a question therefore whether any signal in this case is 
needed at all, as friendly vessels would hardly pursue the enemy’s boats 
out of the harbour across the beam, while the latter were under fire from 
the shore. In fact all vessels passing out could well be treated as 
friendly, unless an enemy’s boat had passed in, when all outgoing 
craft would be treated as hostile until the enemy had gone out again 
or been destroyed. 


By some it has been advocated that the R.G.A. 

Electric lights, should have control of the sentry beams. Our exist¬ 
ing system is that sentry beams shall not, except 
under most exceptional circumstances, be used to aid artillery fire. 
If this system is sound—and it appears to be so, for, with sentry 
beams aiding artillery fire, small vessels might easily pass in unob¬ 
served altogether and raid, as a surprise, be made easy—we need not 
burden ourselves with the direction of these lights, for no knowledge 
perculiar to Gunners is required to work search-lights for look-out 
purposes only. 


Our present system of manning, viz., two reliefs, 

lighting o" d 0ne on ’ anc ^ one °^» duty, a look-out man, and the 

batteries. guns loaded, cannot, it is considered, well be im¬ 

proved upon. As regards fighting the batteries, the 
aim and object of any system should be to make a boat the target for 
a continuous rapid and well directed fire from the moment it enters 
the beam until the moment it leaves it. 

To obtain the best results from such a system, fire directions must 
be vested in the gun-layers, who must be trained to observe and cor¬ 
rect their own fire. The officer in charge should be responsible for 
fire discipline and control, viz., the efficient service of the guns and 


33 


the distribution of fire, retaining always in his hands the power of 
assuming fire direction as far as deflection is concerned, though with 
adequate training this should not be necessary at all. 

1 he efficient training of personnel is affected by 

Training of . . . . J 

personnel. many questions of organisation in time of peace, 
and some will be touched on which, though affect¬ 
ing the Regiment as a whole, yet have especial reference to the case 
under consideration. 


Regulars. 


Employed men. 


No sounder system can be found than that the offi¬ 
cer commanding a company, on its arrival at a stat- 
tion where it will be called upon to man guns for defence against 
raid on mobilization, be ordered to tell off and keep in constant train¬ 
ing, the number of Q.F. detachments required for the guns in time of 
war. These detachments should practice from their own guns at the 
annual prize firing. 

If the R.G.A. are to attain a higher standard of 
average efficiency, commanding officers must have 
their men. Attempts have been made in this direction, but the re¬ 
sults cannot be called satisfactory. The only remedy possible under 
existing conditions, which allow soldiers to hold extra-regimental 
employments, is the absolute enforcement of the principle, which 
under no circumstances permits the subordination of the military effi¬ 
ciency of the soldier as a fighting man, to the work connected with 
his employment. 

In the case of our home defences, Militia Artillery 
should carry out their training from guns which they 
may have to man on mobilization. Every facility 
should be afforded them, and as regards the case in point, they should 
be rendered familiar with every phase of attack possible, by con¬ 
stant drill, practice, and night manning with electric light in con¬ 
junction with the Navy. They are up for such a short time that no 
expense should be spared to make them efficient, and thoroughly 
familiar with all service conditions. As regards Volunteer Artillery, 
as much training as possible should be given during the very limited 
time at present available. 

Much has been done of late years to improve the 
gunnery of the R.G.A. and the great obstacle hitherto 
experienced, in the lack of ammunition for practice, has to a great 
extent been overcome by the introduction of the aiming rifle. This 
is of the greatest value for practice with Q.F. guns, for which otherwise 


Militia and 
Volunteers. 


Practice. 


34 


immense quantities of ammunition would be required to produce a 
high standard of efficiency. 

The use of the aiming rifle for practice is, however, confined too 
much to one period of the year, that immediately preceding prize 
firing, and this is owing to the fact that the annual allowance is still 
too small. The extra money needed to enable weekly practice to be 
carried out is very small, and should not be allowed to stand in the 
way. The raising of the annual allowance from ;£213 per company 


Officers’ 

duties. 


to ,£300 per company would be sufficient, and the compulsory ex¬ 
penditure of this extra money in weekly practice would go a very long 
way towards the maintenance throughout the year of the high stand¬ 
ard usually aimed at for the week or so of prize firing. Results 
should be regularly recorded and made a subject for report. 

The officers likely to be in charge of Q.F. batteries 
in time of war must necessarily be juniors, as seniors 
will be required elsewhere. Modern Q.F. guns are 
liable to be temporarily put out of action by some small derangement 
of the machinery, not necessarily actual damage. Officers in charge 
should be able to at once set anything of this sort to rights, and 
should be trained to do it in time of peace. 

The I.O.M. is a most necessary official, as are his artificers. But 
there is usually only one I.O.M. in a district, and perhaps one artificer of 
sorts in each work, sometimes, though a good man, not gifted with great 
intelligence and not immortal. It does not seem to be realised that in 
time of war the I.O.M’s time would be fully occupied by repair of 
damage, and that it is in the interests of the Service that the regi¬ 
mental officer should be qualified to attend to the working and adjust¬ 
ment of all fittings, and so free the former for the more important work 
which in emergency would fully occupy his time, and which he alone 
can be qualified to undertake. Yet in time of peace when anything 
goes wrong with the working of one of the intricate portions of the 
mechanism, how frequently is the officer, only too keen to try and set 
it right, told he must not touch that, but must send for the I.O.M. 
(or artificer) as the case may be. This is right if the officer is ig¬ 
norant and will only make matters worse, but he should and must, be 
able to do it, and he can be taught. As it is, he seldom learns. 

The physique of men is not considered sufficiently 
qualifications. when detailing them for Q.F. gun squads. Gunners 
should be given that work for which they are best 
suited physically. Q.F. gun drill requires men with a quick, active 


35 


physique, not necessarily big men, but hard, wiry men of middle 
weight, who can move quickly and can last. Fat and clumsy men 
are utterly out of place, yet they are often seen on these guns. Selec¬ 
tion of men of suitable physique has much to do with the mainten¬ 
ance of a high rate of fire. 

When gunners are first called upon to defeat an 

opcciaiists. 

enemy’s attempt at raid, with the alternative, in the 
event of failure, of perhaps millions of pounds worth of materiel lost 
to the nation, the all important man will be the gun-layer. He will 
be at his gun waiting, see a torpedo vessel enter the beam perhaps at 
over 20 knots an hour, and have to stop that boat while it is under 
his fire, perhaps for one or two minutes only, if that in some cases. 
What conditions can be more calculated to upset a man’s nerves, to 
in fact make him lay his gun less accurately than usual? Some men 
have a natural genius for gun laying, are always sure of themselves, 
have a marvellous control over elevating and traversing numbers, and 
always keep cool. We see it in the tests to which we put them in 
peace time, when they consistently lay a gun accurately *in about half 
the time the average layer takes. Yet we let these men go when 
their time is up. We make no more effort to retain them than any 
ordinary man. We apparently go on the principle that we can al¬ 
ways make such men. Yet, if we could keep them by making it 
worth their while to stay on in the Service, we should have men who 
would get the highest rate of fire possible, given good drill, and get a 
hit every round. The value of such men in war time is exactly the 
value of the damage saved to the nation, t and it is not exaggerating to 
say that there are such men, but they are comparatively few. The 
free board of a torpedo vessel is only about four feet, easy enough to 
hit in daylight, but given a dim, uncertain light and nerve breaking 
conditions, anyone, who knows how any error with an auto-sight is 
exaggerated, will fear for the result with the average gun-layer. It 
will be worth our while to pay these men the wages they would earn 
in civilu T > life to induce them to stay. 

' -r 

In some places it is possible to carry out practice 
at night, yet it is seldom if ever done. Night man¬ 
ning means as a rule every man in his place, drill, testing communi¬ 
cations, and blank rounds with a towed target, in fact everything ex¬ 
cept actual practice with visible results. The writer took part in 
night practice with Q.F. guns once, and at any rate realised from it 
the difficulties which obtained owing to altered conditions, and the 


36 


necessity for constant practice at it. A substitute for a towed target 
was obtained by the mooring of six targets at unknown ranges, which 
were lit up seperately by the lights for one minute at a time for the 
Q.F. guns, it never being known which target would be lit up next. 
This gave a very good approximation to the target we would have to 
deal with in case of raid, and one realised from it most fully how 
different are the conditons, how badly men lay under the altered cir¬ 
cumstances, and how difficult is the observation of fire. In some 
places, at any rate abroad, a little energy would enable such firing to 
be carried out regularly. In others, it would be worth the expense, 
especially at home, to erect a battery and search-light, for practice 
purposes only, on a suitable site, from which, with the precautions 
mentioned below, regular practice could take place. All that is re¬ 
quired is a week’s notice to the local authorities, and one or two 
picket boats at a safe distance, placed where outgoing or incoming 
vessels could be seen. A rocket from either of these boats would 
order "cease firing. ’ ’ 

The effect of a search-light, shone straight into a 
Protection for the b a nery at short range in the eyes of gun-layers and set- 

eyes of gun¬ 
layers and setters. ters, is to make them incapable of seeing anything for 

quite an appreciable period, and when time and accuracy 
are everything, nothing can conceivably be more important than some 
means to obviate it. Some sort of smoked glasses will do it, and also 
aid greatly in shielding the eyes of these men, on whom all depends, 
from the shower of dust raised by the discharge, which comes into 
the emplacement with a wind blowing into the battery. 

_ , More experiments as to service conditions, and 

Experiments. 

possible manoeuvres of an enemy, should be carried 
out in conjunction with the Navy. To mention only those points 
raised above, it could be ascertained exactly what effect a powerful 
search-light, directed across a fixed beam and between a battery and 
a target, has on the visibility of the latter. If it is found that it has 
the effect described, it has considerable bearing on the sit'jig of bat¬ 
teries and fixed beams, for such a manoeuvre on the part of an enemy 
being possible might mean a free passage for his raiding craft. Again 
try the effect of a search-light shone from near the target into a bat¬ 
tery at short range, and it is believed that the need for some sort of 
smoked glasses will be proved. 

In this essay, those details already laid down in 
our drill books, &c., as essential, and generally agreed 


Conclusion. 


37 


upon as such, have been avoided, or only mentioned as being neces¬ 
sary in attempting to lay down the general guiding principles for de¬ 
fence against raid under varying conditions, and the preparations 
necessary in time of peace. 

The conclusions come to may be summarised as follows:— 

1. The need for more care in the first instance in selecting the 
best lines of defence. 

2. I he necessity of making full use of the opinion of military 
experts on the spot, by making any scheme for defence, as regards 
armament and sites originate with them. 

3. That economy as regards light should not be considered a mat¬ 
ter of importance. 

4. That a simple look-out and signal system, in some cases apart 
from, and independent of, that connected with the examination 
anchorage and supporting battery, is necessary. 

5. That more attention should be paid to the physical qualifica¬ 
tions of men, in selecting them for work with Q.F. guns. 

6. That these men, once told off, should regularly be trained at, and 
fire their annual prize firing from the guns they would have to man 
on mobilization. 

7. That the auxiliary forces should have all the practice possible 
with the guns they are told off to on mobilization, and should be famil¬ 
iarised with every conceivable form of attack they would have to cope 
with in war time. 

8. That the annual allowance for practice should be increased, 
and a compulsory reservation of a fixed sum be made for periodical 
aiming-rifle practice throughout the year. 

9. That employments should in no case be allowed to interfere 
with the military efficiency of the soldier. 

10. That young officers should be thoroughly trained in what is 
apt to be considered I.O.M’s work only. 

11. T’^at gun-layers, who are really crack shots, should be offered 
sufficient inducement to retain them in the Service. 

12. That every effort should be made to enable night practice 
with electric light to be carried out, and practice batteries erected 
where necessary. 

13. That all questions arising at any time as to possible manoeu¬ 
vres on the part of an enemy, or as to possible improvements in our 
own system and appliances, should be at once made the subject of 
experiment. 


38 

[Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, July, August and September, 1903.1 


Assuming the probability of raids by a Foreign Naval 
Power what are the best preparations to repel them so far as 
the construction armament, and organisation of our Coast 
Defences are concerned? 

BY 

COLONEL P. SALTMARSHE, R.A. 


Unit ate Fortior." 
HIGHLY COMMENDED ESSAY. 


INTRODUCTION. 

Meaning of raid. 

"Raid” is an English word which at first sight seems perfectly 
easy to construe, but sit down and attempt to write 

Definition of the a c i ear definition of the term and difficulties are 

term. 

found to arise at once. 

Any sudden dash at our defences with the intention of inflicting 
damage followed by a rapid retirement seems to partake of the nature 
of a raiding attack, for example two hostile iron-clads approach a 
dockyard at night, bombard it heavily for an hour at daybreak, and 
then bolt; does this come within the category of raid? It might be 
argued both ways, fortunately the drill book^ comes to our rescue and 
calls it a ' 'desultory bombardment, ” so we are able to exclude it from 
discussion. 

Again seeking counsel from the same excellent authority, we find 
a raid defined as "a sudden attempt to penetrate the defences with a 
view to the destruction of shipping in the harbour or under construc¬ 
tion, docks, coal, or stores,” the limits of our inquiry are thus hap¬ 
pily narrowed. 

^“Garrison Artillery Drill,” 1899, Vol. I., p. 151.— P. S. 




39 


History helps us hut little in the consideration of 

Examples from ,. 

history. our subject, at any rate as far as sea raids are con¬ 
cerned. Torpedo-boat attacks are the successors of 
the "cutting out expeditions" of old, but as the latter were carried 
out under totally different conditions—the element of suprise alone 
being common to both—they are of little use for illustrative purposes. 

I he examples of successful torpedo-boat descents on vessels at 
anchor in inland waters, such as the destruction of the Blanco Encalada 
in Caldera Bay in 1891,'*' the sinking of a Turkish gun-boat in the 
Danube in 1878,* and the spirited dash of the Japanese flotilla at 
the Chinese war vessels in Wei-hai-Wei. harbour in 1894, when with 
a loss of two boats only out of fifteen, fourteen men killed and thirty- 
one wounded, four hostile vessels were sunk,t though they show what 
torpedo craft when well handled can effect, and though they empha¬ 
size the necessity of a well organised defence, teach us but few les¬ 
sons with regard to the same, for in no case did shore batteries assist 
the threatened vessels. 

At Santiago, the Americans never attempted to 

when raids are en ter the harbour. Though our coast defences are 

attempted. liable to raiding attacks at any time during hostilities, 

and naval manoeuvres have proved that torpedo craft 
can generally elude a blockading squadron at night,+ the following 
seem the occasions on which we may chiefly expect them:— 

1. Immediately after, or quite possibly even before the declaration 
of war.§ 

2. When, though we still have command of the sea, the enemy by 
clever strategy have drawn off our ships from the proximity of some 
important dockyard. 

3. When we have temporarily lost command of the sea. 

The first is perhaps the most likely, for if an 

Raids at the com- enem y me ant business he would probably declare war 

mencement of 

hostilities. as soon as or perhaps before we issued orders for 
mobilization, well knowing that it takes us a day or 
two to assemble our Militia and Volunteers whose services we so 
much depend on for manning our coast defences. 

*Major F. B. Elmslie, Duncan Gold Medal Prize Essay, R.A.I. “Proceedings,” 
Vol. XX., p. 348.— P.S. 

f“China—Japan War;” Vladimir, p. 281, et seq. — P.S. 

+ “Naval Manoeuvres, 1895;” R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIV,, p. 324.— P.S. 

\ For hostilities before declaration of war, see statistics by Colonel Maurice in 
1883; R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XX., p. 348.— P.S. 



40 


He would also know that booms and mines are not likely to be laid 
out until the last moment. 


Such raids would be carried out by torpedo-boats and destroyers, 
perhaps too in the future by submarine craft; it is not likely the enemy 
would care to risk, at this period at any rate, larger and more valuable 
vessels; one cruiser or fast steamer might perhaps accompany the 
lighter craft for the purpose of breaking the boom, unless the adver¬ 
sary could count on its not being in position.'^ 

Flotillas of torpedo-boats can be assembled without attracting much 
attention at foreign ports, the proximity of which to our southern 
dockyards enables a dash over and attack to be made during the hours 
of darkness, such flotillas would in all likelihood be well on their 
way before war was formally declared. 

im d t d Raids by small landing parties with the object of 

destroying our Brennan installations, electric lights, 
and Q.F. guns may be expected at the same time, especially if our 
opponents see the chance of bringing them off before the infantry de¬ 
fence, which consists for the most part of Militia and Volunteers, is 
properly organised. 


A raid when the enemy considers himself safe from 
Raids during the an immediate attack by our Navy would assume a 

temporary absence 

of the fleet. different character. 

In this case torpedo-boats might be accompanied by 
cruisers which would support the dash in of the lighter craft by a heavy 
fire on the Q.F. batteries and the electric lights of the defence,which in 
many cases they could do without entering the lighted area themselves. 

A raid when we have temporarily lost command of 

Raids when we have t h e sea wou ld again be made under quite different 

temporarily lost 

command of thesea. conditions, here the enemy is for the time being safe 

from our Navy, and if from the presence at the ob¬ 
jective dockyard of war vessels being refitted, or for other reasons, he 
considers it worth while, he may supplement the torpedo-boat attack 
by a bombardment of the fortress and docks; it is questionable per¬ 
haps whether such operations come within the scope of the present 
essay; though any sudden dash by torpedo-boats and other light craft 
through the inner defences, even if only an incident of the general 
attack, may be considered a raid. 


* “Some Naval Officers consider that a heavier vessel would always accompany the 
torpedo-boats.’’—“Value of torpedo-boats in warfare;’’ by Commander Bacon, 
R.N., “Brassey’s Naval Annual,’’ 1896, p. 156.— P.S. 



41 


Raidmg^attacks by Landings of a raiding nature are not unlikely to 

accompany the second and their phase of naval opera¬ 
tions just described. 

Such landing parties must be of considerably greater strength than 
those I have suggested may be expected during the 24 hours or so fol¬ 
lowing the declarations of war, for we shall have had time to mobil¬ 
ize our Militia and Volunteers by now, and the whole of the coast 
line in the proximity of our forts and batteries will be well patrolled 
and guarded; on the other hand the absence of our war vessels enables 
our opponent to transport over in safety a force which he hopes is 
strong enough to hold in check the infantry defence while batteries, 
search-lights, See., are being destroyed. 

Such attacks Mr. Jane tells us the French contemplate in the 
future even while our fleets are "in being," though from the discus¬ 
sions following his lectures, I gather that under the latter condition 
English naval officers hardly agree with him.* 

The above being the kind of raids to which our ports may be spe¬ 
cially subjected, we must now consider the best means of dealing 
with them. 

PART I. 


Construction and armament . 


Heavy 

ordnance. 


Heavy guns of a modern type may be sometimes 
used on the occasion of a raid, as for example, when 
a larger vessel attempts an entrance to break the 
boom, or the torpedo-boat rush is supported by fire from battle-ships 
or cruisers, but as they are unlikely to be located for this purpose 
only, they hardly come within the scope of the present discussion. 

Lieut. Colonel Elmslie, in his prize essay, recommended heavy 
guns loaded with shrapnel being fired in salvos at torpedo-boats, + but 
this was 12 years ago and so manyQ.F.’s have been placed in position 
since then that his suggestion need not seriously be discussed. 

To repel raids by sea therefore the following may 
be considered:— 

1. Q.F. guns. 

2. Heavy R.M.L. guns (special case.) 

3. Field pieces (under very exceptional circum¬ 
stances. ) 


Defensive equip¬ 
ment against 
sea raids. 


*R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIX., p. 28.— P.S. 

fR.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XX., pp. 356 and 363. Refer also to remarks by 
General Richardson, p. 30 .—P S. 



42 


4. 

5. 

6 . 
7. 


Booms and obstacles. 

Brennan torpedoes. 

Boat mines ( now under consideration.) 
Search-lights and other illuminants. 


/. 


The 6-pr. Q.F. gun. 


The 1 2-pr. Q.F. gun. 


Q.F. j^uns. 

Though the 4*7" Q.F. and even the 6"B.L. Mark 

4.7 inch and 6 inch yjj g uns would probably be fired at torpedo craft 
B.L. Mark VII. . 

guns. if their services were not required elsewhere at the 

time, and though they would be most useful in re¬ 
plying to heavier vessels supporting a raid or attempting to destroy 
the boom, it. is unlikely they would ever be placed in position with 
these ends only in view and they need hardly therefore be considered 
in connection with a raiding attack pure and simple. 

We have thus to deal only with light Q.F. armament. 

The 6-pr. Q.F. has some advantages over the 
12-pr. notably in rapidity of fire and easiness of 
shooting with the percussion lock, but the small size of its projectile 
renders it much less effective, and likely to be added to in the 
though existing guns may be left in position their numbers are not 
future. 

The 12-pr. Q.F. with automatic sights seems the 
ideal weapon for dealing with torpedo-boats and 

destroyers. 

The present pattern has, however, two defects in its equipment. 

{a) The unreliability of the electric firing gear. 

ment in the electric W 1 he inconvenient percussion lock. It must 

firing gear and per- not be forgotten that every time a gun fails to go off, 

cussion lock of the , . , , . . 

12 -pr. q.f. gun. not on ly are its services lost tor sixty seconds at least, 
a serious matter in a torpedo-boat attack at night, 
but it has a demoralizing effect on the layer. 

In 1901, the writer saw misfire after misfire occur, though instructors 
of gunnery and range-finding as well as other experts were present when 
the gear was tested before practice. Last year,owing to improved cables 
and a better insulation of the striker, they were much less frequent 
and several series were sometimes fired before one occured, but extra¬ 
ordinary precautions were taken, precautions which in war, especially 
at night, might hardly be possible. 

It is questionable therefore whether gear which requires such ex¬ 
ceptional care and attention is desirable, and whether, if it cannot 


43 


be greatly improved, it is not better to trust to percussion firing; un¬ 
fortunately the arrangements for the latter with the 12-pr. Q.F. are 
clumsy and inconvient, the layer having to pull the trigger behind 
his back; some method which will admit of its being pulled on one 
side as with the 6-pr. Q.F. should, if possible, be devised. 

Siting and construction of Light Q.F. Batteries. 

This must depend in a great measure on the configuration of the 
neighbouring coast line and the character and extent 
S '^batter!es!^ t ^ le b a y> creek,'or estuary in which the dockyard 
to be protected is situated. 

The ideal approach to a harbour from a defender’s point of view is 
by a long and narrow entrance protected by successive 
sites for ofp.gu^s. batteries which expose the raiders to a fire of some 

duration before they reach their objective. 

It would be interesting to give examples, but this can hardly be 
done without touching too closely on the defence schemes of individ¬ 
ual ports. 

Such favourable conditions are, however, not always met with. 

Torpedo-boats with light draught are not depend- 
Disadvantageous high tide on the main channels, and can 

usually get within comparatively near proximity to a 
harbour before they come under the search-light beams of the defence. 

This necessitates the Q.F. guns which have to deal with them 
being all sited in the immediate neighbourhood of the harbour mouth, 
an unfavourable condition of defence in many ways, for not only is 
the enemy under fire for a short time only, but guns and dockyards 
being close together, shells which miss one may easily take effect on 
the other. 

Consistent therefore with effective fire Q.F. batteries should not 

be too much crowded together. 

When sites for batteries are being considered, the 

Naval opinion to be -jf nava j authorities on the spot might be 
asked for locally. * r 

useful.* 

It is a mistake I think to place more than four guns together, the 

fewer the number in a battery the steadier will be the 

Number of guns f^ re anc J the better the observation, moreover if a 
in a battery. 

number are together, many may be out of action at 
the same time when echelonning is excessive. 

*See remarks by Lord Charles Beresford on the subject; “Nineteenth Century 
Magazine,” February, 1897, p. 181.— P.S. 



44 


Heights of batteries J n constructing a battery on the sea level, as so many 

in connection with . 

auto-sights. of ours are, it should never be forgotten that every 
foot of height is an advantage when automatic 

sights are used. 

The present pattern requires a minimum height of 20 feet;* many 
of our low coast batteries allow little if anything over this at high 
tide, the time of course when torpedo-boats would make their at¬ 
tempt; with 24 feet the extreme range for accurate firing is 1,100 
yards,! and with 30 feet 1,300 yards.! 

Emplacements should be so engineered that the guns are at least 25 
feet above the water at high tide, and if a few feet higher so much 
the better. 

In day firing from a low site, auto-sights do not seem to give any 
markedly better results than ordinary ones, in fact at competitive 
practice many B.C.’s if left to themselves prefer layers and setters, but 
at night the superiority of the former is beyond dispute. 

A weak point in the construction of our Q.F. bat- 

Frontal protec- , c , , 

tjon teries is their lack of frontal protection, but it is 

difficult to give it without narrowing the fire area, 
moreover at long ranges they afford but small and not very visible 
targets, and if an enemy once got in close the men would be driven 
off the guns in any case. 

As regards protection in rear, there is a grow- 

Protection in , i ti a rc /-' i 

rear. mg feeling among K.A. officers—witness General 

Maurice’s remarks after Mr. Jane’s lecture at Wool¬ 
wich!—that our works are often inadequately guarded on the land 
side. 

Q.F. batteries are frequently enclosed by an open iron fence only, 
affording the gunners no protection whatever from musketry fire in 
the rear. 

If the infantry defence is weak as it probably will be during the first 
24 hours or even 48 hours of hostilities, raids on our Q.F. guns and 
electric lights by small parties of determined men are to be expected. 
Such parties will naturally attack in rear, the gunners may have to 
defend themselves, and if protected by open fencing, only, will be shot 
down, and the guns put out of action or even blown up. 

* “Garrison Artillery Drill,” 1899; Vol. I., p. 142 g. — P S. 

t “Garrison Artillery Training,” (provisional), p. 78.— P.S. 

+ R. A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIX., p. 49 .-P.S. 


45 


The capture of,® an da An instance of a successful surprise at night is 

Neira in 1 810 by ^ 

a night surprise, afforded by the capture of Banda Neira, the seat of 
the Dutch Government in the Spice Islands by Cap¬ 
tain Cole, R.N., in 1810.* 

The latter landed, his men, less than 200 in number on a dark and 
squally night, took one battery in rear by a sudden dash, and rushed 
the citadel as it opened its gates to admit its own Governor, the other 
forts thereupon surrendered. 

The garrison consisted of 1,500 men, and there were 52 guns in 
position, so we have a striking example of what a few determined men 
can do. 


If not actually inside a fort, batteries should surely be protected in 
flank and rear by a loop-holed wall with strong gate, this will guard 
the gunners against surprise, and if the raiding party is, as it probably 
will be, a small one, enable them to hold their own. 


The above too is an argument in favour of the retention of the 
carbine by the R.G.A. 


Shelters in Q.F. 
Batteries. 


All Q.F. batteries should be provided with shel- 
tersf for one relief (see under "Organisation”) and 
one officer per group in very close proximity to the 


guns themselves. 

There is no reason whatever, if mobility is not a factor, why men 
should not enjoy shelter and comfort when not actually employed, and 
they will do their work all the better if such is provided, especially 
as the guns may have to be manned continuously for many months. 

A recent War Office letter suggests that reliefs on the guns should 
lie out under waterproof sheets, &c., but it is hoped that this may be 
reconsidered, as if the shelters themselves are within a few yards of 
the guns, a watchman on each seems all that is necessary. A gun 
layer’s hand and eye would be all the steadier if he has not been lying 
out in inclement weather. 

Very effective results on torpedo-boats at ranges up 
Heavy r.m.l. guns to g()0 yards are believed possible with heavy R.M.L. 

and special case. J 

guns firing special case.l 


* James’ “Naval History," Vol. V., p. 321. — P.S. 

tThe question of shelters is not quite a new one, Colonel Richardson advocated 
them in 1893; R.A.I. “Proceedings," Vol. XX., p. 26. It is only within the last 
year or so, however, that any action has been taken in the matter.— P.S. 

+ The 10'' R.M.L. case contains 50 steel balls, each 3 lb. 9 oz. in weight.— P.S. 


46 


It is unlikely that such weapons would ever be specially installed 
for this purpose, existing ones only when suitably located being made 
use of. 

The most suitable position is at the narrow en- 

th«°fhovr 9 trance of an harbour on inland waters, and the best 

for the above. 

way of employing them is to lay them on fixed 
points which the torpedo-boats are expected to pass over, and by posi¬ 
tion-finders or other suitable means to fire them by electricity from 
the top of the fort or other convenient post of observation. 

By keeping the guns loaded and moving men from one to the other 
the personnel can be reduced to a minimum. 

Experiments were made at Shoeburyness in 1895 

cales 1 aTshoebury. t0 test the results obtainable with these projectiles. 

A 9" R.M.L. gun was used, the case shot contain¬ 
ing 35 chilled iron balls of about 3 lb. each in weight. 

The results were not altogether satisfactory, as an average of only 
two balls per round penetrated a l / 2 n steel target 400 feet in area at 
400 yards, and only one per round a target of the same description but 
720 feet in area, at 600 yards. 

As these case have since been improved by the substitution of steel 
balls for iron ones, further trials are desirable. 

Care should be taken that the retention of obsolete guns for the 
above purpose is not used as an argument for reducing the modern 
gun armament, for the are probably of little or no use except for firing 
case. 

Field guns. 

Though the employment of other than coast defence artillery is 

hardly contemplated against torpedo-boats, occasions 
Possible employ- . . \ 

ment of field guns might arise when the field pieces belonging to the 
against torpedo- mova ble armament, or even the guns of a field bat- 

tery,if their services are not required elsewhere at 
the time, should be used, especially if the defence is weak in Q.F. 
equipment. 

Booms and obstacles. 


Booms. An exam pl e 0 f th e effective use of a boom is found 

in the operations at Wei-hai-Wei during the Chino-Japanese War. 

The Ch inese had placed across the mouth of the 
hai-wei. harbour a boom consisting of baulks of timber con¬ 
nected by wire hawsers, and held in position by 
chains and anchors. 


47 


Although this boom was unprotected by shore guns, the Japanese 
torpedo-boats three times—on 30th and 31st January and 3rd Febru¬ 
ary, 1895 failed to get through it, and it was only at the fourth at¬ 
tempt they succeeded.* 

The natural position at first sight for an obstacle 

Position and 0 f this kind is at the narrowest part of the entrance 
construction of 

a boom. to an harbour, but the tide is frequently to strong at 
such points to admit of its being placed easily and 
rapidly in position. 

If the channel is too wide for a single span, it is divided into sec¬ 
tions which are kept in position by anchored vessels or dolphins, and 
this method has the advantage of allowing the greater part of the 
boom to be laid out while one section is kept open for traffic; it is in 
fact questionable whether this plan should not always be adopted 
whenever practicable. 

The obvious necessity of training in peace time 

Necessity of laying t h 0 se responsible for laying out a boom in war time 

out booms In _ w 

peacetime. is not sufficiently recognised. Atone of our great 
dockyards, a boom which has been in existence for 
11 or 12 years has to the best of the writer’s knowledge never been 
put in position, the reason given being that traffic, which could easily 
be diverted for a day or two in another direction, would be interfered 
with. Practice in laying out this boom is all the more necessary as 
the tide at the harbour mouth is a very strong one. 

It is insisted on, and very properly insisted on, in 
the "Garrison Artillery DrilP’t that booms should be 
well protected by Q.F. guns which are required not 
only to deal with torpedo-boats attempting to enter 
the friendly channel, but also to destroy the swift launches the enemy 
may employ to break an entrance through the obstruction with 
dynamite. 

It is almost needless to observe that such guns must have a clear 
water area to fire over, and yet there are places—it would not do to 
give chapter and verse—where the neighbourhood of the boom is 
considered a nice quiet anchorage for coal hulks and such like craft 
which by masking gun fire and electric light would afford excellent 
cover to torpedo-boats and launches. See further under "Co-operation 
between Army and Navy” page 58. 


Protection of 
boom by Q. F. 
guns. 


* “China—Japan war;” Vladimir, p.276.— P.S. 

| “Garrison Artillery Drill,” 1899, Vol. I., p. 176. P.S. 



48 


Temporary 
booms and 
obstacles. 


shall ever take 
channel as the 


Brennan tor¬ 
pedoes. 


A temporary boom is easily constructed by anchor¬ 
ing vessels across the fair way and stretching chains 
and wire hawsers between them. It is unlikely we 
the desperate measure of sinking vessels across a 
egress from as well as the ingress to the harbour is 
thereby obstructed; the enemy are more likely to attempt this as 
the Americans did at Santiago; we may, however, narrow the 
channel, and thus make it easier to defend by these means, or we may, 
when two channels lead to a harbour or inland water, think it desira¬ 
ble to close one of them; the north channel leading to the western 
entrance to the Solent is a good example. 

The R.E. inform us that it has not yet been defi¬ 
nitely decided whether the Brennan is to be used 
against torpedo craft, it would probably depend on 
the number of torpedoes available; it would, however, be undoubtedly 
employed against any vessel of larger size attempting to pass with a 
view to breaking the boom. 

A Brennan installation, if not actually within the walls of a fort, 
should have adequate infantry protection, for its machinery being so very 
easily destroyed, it would naturally be one of the first objectives of a raid¬ 
ing party. 

These have been adopted by the Navy, and are, we 

Boat mines. . . 

are informed, under consideration by the R.E. The 
discussion after Mr. Jane’s lecture shows that there is a great difference 
of opinion as to the value of submarine mines in general,but if we admit 
their utility, these boat mines would seem a desirable adjunct to our 
defence against raids, especially if Q.F. guns and electric lights have 
suffered from the enemy’s fire; they are easily and rapidly put in posi¬ 
tion, at the same time they would undoubtedly complicate the ar¬ 
rangements for the safe navigation of friendly vessels. 

As it is hardly probable that raiding attacks will, 
except perhaps in foggy weather, be attempted other¬ 
wise than at night, it is necessary that the fire area of the Q.F. guns 
be illuminated as much as possible. 

The arrangements described in "Garrison Artillery Drill”* seem 
in most respects satisfactory, but many gunners think that the advanced 
or sentry beam, which should be a search-light and not fixed, ought 
to be under the control of the C.R.A., whose interest it is above all 
others to have the earliest information of the enemy’s movements, 

* “Garrison Artillery Drill,’’ 1899, Vol. I., p. 175. 


Electric lights. 



49 


and who should be able to manipulate the light in question in what 
he considers the best way to obtain it. 

Our general principle of course is to keep the fire 

Electric light . 

tactics. area continuously illuminated by all lights, but 
would it not be feasible, by aid of the shutters with 
which the lights are provided to adopt some sort of tactics by which 
the enemy would be worried and confused? 

For example:—"A” "B” and "C” "D” are four lights. "A” 
being the outside one, presuming the attacking boats must pass 
through the area illuminated by "A” "B,” would it be possible to 
shutter off "C” r 'D'’ until they are required? 

The enemy passing through "A” ,f B” would see dark water in 
front of him and might slow down, especially if any boats had been 
hit and holes required plugging, in any case fresh lights turned on 
him suddenly would bother his helmsmen. 


It would depend on local circumstances and the number of installa¬ 
tions whether these tactics could be carried out safely, but naval offi¬ 
cers say they would be exceedingly annoying, and much object to our 
trying them at peace manoeuvres. 


Vulnerability of 
electric lights. 


Electric lights are somewhat vulnerable both in 
front, and if they are not within the limits of a fort, 
also in rear. 


Buoys are not removed during war, hostile vessels can therefore 
pick one up at night and by aid of their charts will have the range to 
a yard, the lights themselves give an excellent line, and some of them 
at least are not unlikely to get knocked out by the enemy’s fire.* It 
is worthy of consideration whether they could not be at least partially 
protected by iron casemates or some arrangement of armour plates 
round the apparatus. 


As regards protection in rear, the arguments already used for enclos¬ 
ing Q.F. batteries by a fence which is not penetrable by musketry 
fire, apply quite as forcibly, to electric lights which are sure to be 
one of the objectives of a land raid. 

There seems no reason why batteries should not be 
supplied with auxiliary illuminants such as light 
balls, rockets, and light parachutes, if they can be 
fired by rockets, not only would they be useful if the electric light 


Auxiliary illumi¬ 
nants. 


* For corroboration refer Mr. Jane’s lecture, R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIX, 
p. 37. 



50 


was put out of action, but they might materially assist the defence 
in the event of an attack being made in the rear. 

Rockets too might be used for signalling and alarm purposes if 
other communications broke down. 


Raids by submarine torpedo-boats must ere long be 
'marine*era ft!" seriously considered; that the French think them 
feasible is evidenced by Captain Heilmaun’s report 
to the Minister of Marine on the results of trials with these craft last 
summer,* in which it is stated "that the submersible type can visit 
an enemy’s harbour and attack ships that have taken refuge therein." 

Such raids will indeed be difficult to meet as the boats will pass 
through or rather under the lighted area secure from the fire of our 
Q.F. guns, and the boom as constructed at present will be no obstacle. 

A net work of boat mines at different depths, and torpedo netting 
stronger than that used by the Navy seems the only means of dealing 
with them. 


Though Q.F. batteries at night are not under con- 

Communications. 

trol of any fire command, it is desirable they should 
be able to communicate readily with the F.C., for example heavy 
casualties in personnel or materiel may require replacing, moreover use¬ 
ful information as to the enemy’s movements, number of attacking 
boats, &c., can often be afforded an F.C. by an outlying battery. 

General O’Callaghan instances a case at manoeuvres in Malta in 
1901, where boats got through the defences simply because the F.C. 
had no means of communicating with some of his guns.t 

Telephones therefore from the F.C’s posts to all Q.F’s are desira¬ 
ble, though except for alarm, or imparting necessary information they 
should be sparingly used. 


New alarm 
circuits. 


A new alarm circuit has been recently proposed; 
this will connect the sentry beam installation with 
the F.C’s post and all Q.F. guns, and is so arranged 
that any of these can give the alarm to the others simultaneously, a 
gong in the shelter or other convenient place being sounded. 

Our defence against raids by land depends chiefly 
on the rifle, but there are one or two artillery ad¬ 
juncts which may be touched on. 


Raids by land. 


* “Journal of the Royal United Service Institution;’’ Naval notes Vol XLVI 
p. 1466. 

fR.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXVIII., p. 221.— P.S. 



51 


l 'g^jns n6 To re P e ^ suc ^ ra ids, especially if on a large scale, 

machine guns on light traveling carriages are useful, 
and should be held in charge in all sub-districts. Such guns are 
sometimes located on fixed mountings in the proximity of our bat¬ 
teries, but as the invaders would of course avoid them, their value is 
questionable. 

The guns of movable armament need perhaps 

Movable arma- , . . . , . , 

ment. hardly be discussed in connection with raids pure 

and simple, though if the latter were in force, their 

services might be utilized. 

If on the spot, they would of course be used against boat landings. 

A rapid firing field gun is the most suitable, though for many years 
to come we can only hope to get the weapons the mounted branch 
have discarded. 


PART II. 


Organisation. 

It is much easier to discuss organisation freely, than construction 
and armament. 

In the treatment of the latter we have often to deal 
with that awkward point un fait accompli , which must have some effect 
on the mind of the writer; the former, on the other hand, can be 
modified or altered by the stroke of a pen or at most the installation 
of a new telephone. 

Under organisation may be considered:— 

1. The personnel required for defence against raids, viz., Artillery, 
Engineers, and Infantry. 

2. Co-operation of the different arms. 

3. Co-operation with the Navy. 


Artillery 


Artillery 

organisation. 


We depend of course to a great extent on our Militia and Volun¬ 
teers for the manning of our coast defences, but it 
ought to be fully recognised that Q.F. armament 
must be in the hands of the regulars. 

A Q.F. layer, and if automatic sights are not used the setter also, 
has great responsibility, the former has absolute control over his 
weapon, he traverse it, lays it and fires it himself, and on his nerve, 
steadiness, and eye-sight depends the efficiency of the shooting. 


52 


The necessity Careful and continuous training and practice is 

of Q.F. detach¬ 
ments belonging necessary, and we could no more expect a Volunteer 

to the or Militiaman, with the limited chances at his dis- 

regulars. 

posal, to obtain the same results as a regular, than 
we could hope to see a sportsman who has a few days shooting in the 
year equal the feats of Lord de Grey. 

Q.F. guns too may be required the first night of hostilities, before 
the auxiliaries shake down and get accustomed to their weapons, pos¬ 
sibly before they arrive on the scene. 

Putting accurate and rapid shooting aside, the great difficulty al¬ 
ready alluded to of keeping the firing gear of these guns in order, as 
well as the great care required in the manipulation of the automatic 
sights renders it imperative that they should be in the hands of men 
who thoroughly understand them. 

Wherever therefore Q.F. guns are installed their manning details 
should be provided by the regulars, and if the latter are not forth¬ 
coming, much as mixed detachments are to be deprecated, the gun 
layers at least should be provided by them. 

Though a single relief with a fair reserve for 
casualties is considered sufficient for guns which 
need not be manned continuously, light Q.F. guns 
which during the hour of darkness must be ready to 
fire at a moment’s notice require the number actually necessary for 
their service to be always on the spot. Reliefs must, therefore, be 
arranged. 

The following seems a convenient system, it has been already 
adopted in one district and works well:— 

The manning allowance for light Q.F. guns* admits of some 16 
men being detailed for each; these 16 men are divided into four re¬ 
liefs of four men each, this number being sufficient to serve the gun 
efficiently if the ammunition is previoulsy placed in readiness. 

The first relief will always be on the gun or in a shelter in very 
close proximity, in any case a watchman will remain on each piece. 

If the barracks are within say a quarter of a mile, the second relief 
can sleep there, but in their clothes and boots; should their rooms be 
over that distance and there is no other convenient place, the shelters 
should be large enough for two reliefs. The third and fourth reliefs 
will sleep in barracks in the usual way. If the barracks are above, 


Distribution of 
reliefs for Q.F. 
guns. 


41 - 


War Office letter, 51 | Devonport | 8004 of 25 | 1 | 01 .—P S. 



53 


say a mile from the guns, hut or tent accommodations must be pro¬ 
vided nearer at hand, the former of course for choice. 

During the interval which elapses between the 
q.f. details during or( j ers f or mobi 1 ization and the arrival of Militia and 

the emergency 

period. Volunteer units, called in our defence schemes <r The 
emergency period,” the third and fourth, and even 
if necessary the second reliefs will be held in readiness to serve the 
most important of the heavy guns which the auxiliaries take over on 
arrival. 


Though in action the gun-layer must to a great 

Fire tactics of light , , f . , r , 

q.f. guns. extent be left to himself, some simple arrangement 
of distribution of fire seems neceessary; want of 
space prevents our entering into details, but any such scheme should 
be based on the principle that every effort ought to be made to sink 
the leading boats, for if they are destroyed or rendered unmanageable, 
not only will the passage of those in rear be obstructed but the moral 
effect may be considerable. 

There is one very serious defect in the present 

Defects of Artillery . . _ . n 

organisation with system of administration affecting the effective em- 

speciai reference payment of Q.F. guns. I allude to the arrange- 

to Q.F. guns. 

ments for providing foreign reliefs. 

It is of course necessary that our forces aboard be kept up to the 
full establishment, and as we cannot recruit at foreign 

Effect of the 

present system stations, this can only be done by drawing on units 
of foreign reliefs^ at home. It is not, however, quite recognised that, 

ourQ.F. gundefence while other branches of the army are unlikely to be 
during the winter em pl 0 y e d at the commencement of hostilities with 

a European power, and that they will therefore have 
time to fill the gaps in their ranks before having to fight, the services 
of the Garrison Artillery may be required simultaneously with the 
declaration of war; neither is the fact quite appreciated that the 
special training, which recent improvements in our materiel necessi¬ 
tate, cannot be imparted in a few days or even a few weeks. 

We know of two companies which during October and November 
last year lost practically the whole of their efficient gunners. They 
each manned on service eight Q.F. guns and were expected to keep 
up 32 layers apiece. When they had despatched their foreign reliefs, 
five layers in one and three in another were all that remained, and it 
need hardly be pointed out that after the officers’ servants, his 
D.R.F. specialists and Q.F. layers are the last men a Major will 


54 


part with, he will keep them by fair means, or foul if he can do so. 

This wholesale denudation simply means that had we been raided 
in September, the service of the Q.F. guns in question would have 
been as effective as two zealous and capable Majors could make it; 
had, on the other hand, the attack come off in December, it would 
have been quite a different pair of shoes. 

Of course the recruits which come in during the winter months 
are trained as rapidly as possible, but as the yearly practice is over, 
none of them will fire a shot until the following spring. 

It is unfortunate that all our reliefs must be carried out in these 
months instead of being spread out over the year; this renders us, as 
far as our home coast defences go especially vulnerable between 
November and March, a fact which hostile powers in the future are 
not unlikely to take advantage of. 

A proportion at least of foreign reliefs might be recruits who can 
learn their drill abroad as easily as they can at home. 

Another difficulty in our administration, and the 

Effect of the • 

system of carry- statement is made with all due respect, is the system 

ing out reliefs by by which foreign reliefs are arranged by groups in¬ 
groups instead of i r i 

by districts. Stead of districts. 

Under the present arrangement for example, a com¬ 
pany manning Q.F. guns in war, which Militia and Volunteers have 
little or no experience in handling, may have most of its men sent 
abroad, while another told off perhaps to armament which the auxil¬ 
iaries are accustomed to is almost untouched. 

This could not happen if the C.R.A. of the district selected the 
men for reliefs. 

The above points are worthy of serious consideration as they 

gravely affect the efficiency of our Q.F, defence against raiding 

attacks. 


Light Q.F. gun practice. 

It is perhaps hardly intended that details of drill and training 
should be discussed in the present essay, but we ven- 

Practice from , . , . 

light q.f. guns. ture t0 bring forward two points which might be 

improved on as far as Q.F. armament is concerned. 

The first is our competitive practice, now excellent in many re¬ 
spects as is the system under which this is at present carried out, it 
has this defect; the whole arrangement for classification is based on 
a broadside or nearly broadside target though the winding in gear on 


55 


# 


our launches enables us now in man} 7 places to give approaching shots 
at almost any angle, thereby making the shooting far more varied and 
"sporting.” Modifications in the practice regulations are desirable 
in this respect. 

The other point is carbine shooting, the value of 

Carbine shooting w hj c h as an adjunct or rather preliminary to practice 
as a training for 

q.f. practice, over sea ranges, with special reference to Q.F. train¬ 
ing, is hardly appreciated as much as it might be. 

Even the stereotyped musketry course, drawn up almost entirely 
from an infantry point of view, helps a company C.O. in the selection 
of men likely to become good layers, give him a freer hand in the 
distribution of the ammunition and he will do a great deal more 
towards making the land range a training ground for the sea one. 

For example, as rapidity as well as accuracy is a great factor with a 
Q.F. gun, he would probably apply the test of "hits per minute" to 
carbine practice, making certain selected shots fire as rapidly as they 
can at say the 200 yards target, and then choosing his layers from 
those who made the greatest number of hits in a given time inde¬ 
pendent of the quantity of ammunition expended. 


Royal Engineers. 

r.e. organisation. The difficulty the R.E. have in organising the 
personnel required for their lights is simply lack of men. 

We believe we are right in stating that at no 

Manning details s j n gf e important fortress at home have they sappers 
for the electric n 

lights insufficient, enough on the spot to provide even one relief it all 

lights are being manned simultaneously, as of course 
they will be in war, especially if any of their men are engaged with 
the submarine mines at the time. 

They depend largely on Militia and Volunteers and should be quietly 
reinforced by these auxiliaries before actual mobilization is ordered. 

Search-light tactics have been discussed under "Construction and 
Armament. 

Infantry. 


Duties of infantry Q n t h e Infantry, the Artillery and Engineers rely 
defence. , , . ,. , , 

for protection from raiding attacks in rear, and at¬ 
tempts to destroy their guns, Position Finding cells, and installations. 

Mr. Jane in his now well known lecture commented on the unpro¬ 
tected state of our coast defences on the land side, and hinted that we 
did not sufficiently recognise their vulnerability in this direction.* 


*R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIX., p. 40.— P.S. 



% 


56 


Sufficiency or Colonel Barron in the discussion which followed 
otherwise of . . . , . * , 

infantry de- tried to ease our minds on the subject, 1 but some or 

fence. us think: there is a great deal in what the lecturer 

urged. If what Colonel Barron intended to convey was that local 
authorities are doing their best with the means at their disposal, he 
no doubt is right, but are these means usually adequate? 

During the early days of hostilities at least we have some cause 
for anxiety. 

The secrets of course of our defence scheme cannot be discussed, 
but it is well known that our general principle is that all regular in¬ 
fantry units join the field army immediately orders for moblization 
are issued, the infantry defence of our coast fortresses being greatly 
left in the hands of auxiliaries. 

Now is it quite wise to withdraw all the regulars before the Mili¬ 
tia and Volounteers settle down in their place, get accustomed to the 
locale and learn somewhat of their duties? Is the necessity of at 
once assembling the whole of the field army so urgent that units sta¬ 
tioned at important naval bases cannot be left there for the first week 
or so of hostilities? 

It is during these first days few that the danger is most acute, as 
auxiliaries have only just arrived who are quite ignorant of the ground 
they have to defend,and who may have seldom if ever been practiced 
in night operations. 


Training of the infantry defence. 

A point which cannot be too strongly urged is that auxiliary units 

should go through their annual training at their 

training aux- moblization stations. We are well aware of the 

iiiary units at great difficulty there is in inducing some of them to 
their mobilization . , , . , , 

centres. willingly leave their own districts for their camps on 
account of social and recruiting exigencies, but 
these difficulties must be overcome. Both Artillery and Infantry 
Corps should train at their moblization posts at least every other 
year, and during the year in which they do not so train all officers 
should be brought to these places at the public expense, be shown 
over the ground both by day and night and have the position of the 
picquets and patrols carefully explained to them; they should all be 
in possession of maps of the locale, and should be encouraged to work 
out tactical problems based on landing attacks and raids therein. 


* Ibid. , p. 44. — P. S. 



57 


It is of course the rule that Artillery Militia do train once in every 
three years at the works they man on service, and Volunteer Artillery 
in many cases every year, but auxiliary infantry hardly ever, though 
it is nearly if not quite as important that they should do so as well. 
1 his is further discussed under ''Co-operation.” 

If an apology is needed for including in this essay, questions 
which at first sight appear to belong more to coast defence in general 
we would point out that it is during the first few nights of hostili¬ 
ties, when raiding attacks are more likely to take place, that lack of 
previous training will be chiefly felt. 


Co-operation of the different arms . 


fh°"?h erat '° n ° f "We (the gunners) suffer much from want of 
the three arms. 

co-operation with other branches of the service which 
does not tend to increase efficiency of defence.” 

1 he above are the remarks of the Inspector-General of R.G.A., 
in his first annual report. 

The i.g. r.g.a.'s The I.G. R.G.A. then comments on the disincli- 

first annual 

report. nation of the R.E. in many cases to give the R.A. 

the details of their mine fields or even to disclose to 
them their whereabouts. 

A recent decision however of the War Office* has put this matter 
on a better footing. 

As regards working together, there should not be, neither is there 
generally, any difficulty, but as we have already pointed out, the R.E. 
can seldom run the whole of their lights at once without extraneous 
help. 

The I.G. R.G.A. also alludes to the little training infantry get in 
coast defence work, and the Commander-in-Chief in forcible terms 
endorses his remarks on the necessity of improving matters in this 
respect. 


Though Artillery mobilizations partial or otherwise 

comb^ned^mobiii- are not infrequent occurrence we very rarely see 
zations and their the three arms requisite for the defence of a coast 
rare g ° hom? 1106 fortress brought together at home. During 13 years 

continuous Garrison Artillery service, the writer has 
never seen this done, and believes he is right in stating that at our 
most important naval base, the complete defences even on the sea¬ 
ward side have never been mobilized together. The reason has been 


*War Office letter Conf. D. 191. of 26 | 11 | 02.— P. S. 



58 


of course the difficulty in collecting at one time the different auxil¬ 
iary units alloted to the defence, especially the infantry ones which 
are almost wholly composed of Militia and Volunteers. 

Now the Commander of one section in this fortress has in war 
some thousands of auxiliary infantry under his command, these in¬ 
fantry are alloted chiefly for the purpose of defending some miles of 
coast line, and protecting Q.F. batteries, search-lights, water supply, 
&c., from sudden raids; now how can this Commander, an R.G.A. 
officer probably, or his staff hope to handle and dispose of such a body 
of men to the best advantage if they have no practice beforehand? 

If they are not trained on the spot in peace time, how can these 
Militia and Volunteers be expected to do good service in war? 

Those units of the personnel of a fortress whose 
services are most likely to be required at the com¬ 
mencement of hostilities, as for example, Q.F. de¬ 
tachments, electric light engineers, and the infantry 
detail necessary for their protection against raiding 
attacks, should be mobilized really every year if only for a few days. 

Big fortresses abroad like Gibraltar and Malta have permanent gar¬ 
risons of considerable strength which the General Officers Command¬ 
ing can mobilize on their own initiatives. 


Yearly mobiliza¬ 
tion of the units 
required for de¬ 
fence against 
early raids very 
necessary. 


Co-operation with the Navy . 

This was a point specially emphasized by the Hartington Commis- 

Co-operation with sion * Want of s P ace prevents quotations at length 
the Navy. Lord being made from their report, but attention may be 

Comm^ion drawn to para. 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12, where the want 

V/ O ill ill loolOili 


of a proper understanding between our Naval and 
Military forces is strongly commented on, and especially to para. 13 
where the then conditions of affairs is described as unsatisfactory and 
dangerous. Has it been bettered since? 


Lord George ^he po ^ c y of entrusting the defence of our harbours 
Hamilton's speech to the Army may be a wrong one,t but as long as it 

° n ln e i 893 > . ieCt ls * n ^ orce co-operation between the services is one 

of the most important features of satisfactory organi¬ 
sation. 

The Navy when not at sea looks to the Army, and especially to 
the Artillery branch, for protection. 


Royal commission to enquire into the Civil and Professional administration of 
the Naval and Military departments, dated July 10th, 1899.— P. S. 
f Speech of Lord George Hamilton, March 7th, 1893.— P. S. 



59 


On the Army devolve the duties of guarding the dockyards, har¬ 
bours, and anchorages whose security is so essential to the sister 
service. 

It follows therefore that there are many questions which must be 
settled by mutual agreement and co-operation. 

The most important of these are:— 

Questions for r 

co-operation 1. 1 he regulations for the ingress and egress of 

between the friendly vessels into and from defended ports during 
services. ... 

hostilities. 

2. The arrangements for laying down mines. 

3. The employment of booms and obstacles. 

4. Installation of electric lights. 

5. Removal of buoys. 

6. Removal of coal hulks and other anchored 
vessels off fire areas. 

7. Employment of guard-boats. 

8. Combined training. 


Regulations for the ingress and egress of friendly vessels. 

These generally speaking appertain more to the defence of the port 
as a whole than to mere raiding attacks. What 

Admittance of however we must discuss in the present essay is the 
friendly torpedo- 

boats at night. question of whether or no we are to allow friendly 
torpedo-boats into the harbour at night. 

The present ruling is that all vessels of this class are to be fired on 
during hostilities, and as it is impossible for our gunners to discrimi¬ 
nate between friends and foes after darkness sets in, this seems to be 
the only safe policy;* no satisfactory system of arranging for their 
entry into the harbour at night, at any rate unaccompanied by the 
escort of a larger vessel, seems possible. 

On the other hand one of the few things we gun- 

subject from ners learnt from the Naval Manoeuvres of 1901 was 
the 1901 that t h e Naval Commander-in-Chief is not unlikely to 

manoeuvres. 

insist on his scouts, who may have important and urgent 
information to deliver, being admitted at any time; such information 
too might be of the utmost importance to the officer in military com¬ 
mand, and some scheme must be devised for sending it in. Again 

* “Everything that cannot make itself unmistakedly known at night, should be 
ruthlessly sunk, for in these days of fast torpedo-boats there is no time for con¬ 
sideration.”—“Defence of a fortress;” by Col. Richardson, R.A.I. " Proceedings,” 
Vol. XX., pp. 26 and 31 —P.S. 


60 


partially disabled boats of our own may require immediate attention. 

During the manoeuvres in question the above mentioned rule was 
modified by a provision enabling torpedo craft to be admitted at night 
by local arrangement. 

Lieut. General Owen, the military umpire in chief, commenting 
on the above states:— 

"The exception made as to torpedo craft not being always fired at 
by night if local arrangements are made to the contrary opens the 
door dangerously at present. This point is the most difficult of all to 
deal with satisfactorily.”* 

We put forward the following suggestions with 

Suggestions as . , , 

to the admittance great diffidence as the, question is so much a naval 

of friendly one*_ 

(a) That a friendly torpedo-boat having news to 
communicate should deliver it to the Commander of the examining 
vessel, who would signal it in. 

The objection to this is that unless the message was signalled in 
cypher it would not remain confidential. 

(b) That any friendly torpedo-boat wishing to enter the harbour, 
should be closely escorted at very low speed by some dockyard tug or 
launch well known to the gunners, and showing some preconcerted 
signal. 

( c) That, where the configuration of the coast line admits, a 
small auxiliary harbour, in many cases a pier would suffice, should be 
constructed where a boat could land and deliver its message without 
running the gauntlet of the Q.F. guns. 

I his, so far as raids go, only refers to the possible 
use of boat mines which could only be put in posit¬ 
ion with the acquisecence of the Naval authorities. 

It is we believe a well known fact that the latter are not favourable 
to mines in general and the R.E. anticipate some difficulty in obtain¬ 
ing permission to use them during hostilities; some definite agreement 
on this point should be come to. 

The employment of booms and obstacles. 

It is very necessary there should be some clear understanding 
The use of between Naval and Military officers on this subject, 

booms and We seldom if ever see booms placed in position in 

ObSt3 01 0 5 , 

peace time, and a doubt arises in our minds whether 

t Report of the military umpire-in-chief for Naval manoeuvres of 1901, para. 
27. d .—P S. 


Laying out boat 
mines. 



61 


it is really intended to use them in war. As we install Q.F. guns 
and electric lights to defend them, a definite policy on this point 
should be arrived at. 

I he same remarks apply to the closing of part of a water-way or an 
auxiliary channel. 

This is a matter on which the Naval authorities 
The installation h ave to b e consulted, the glare of the lights frequently 

lights. interfering with the navigation of vessels. 

This difficulty is most acute at the actual entrance 
to a harbour where the Admiralty sometimes insist on having a con¬ 
siderable area of unlighted water. 

It is not quite understood why, if lights are provided with shutters, 
which are only opened when required, i.e. y when a raid is actually 
occuring, they should be objected to. 

Removal of buoys. 


Instances might occur when, in order to deceive the enemy as to 
ranges, it might be desirable to alter the position of 
buoys if this could be done without interfering with 
navigation; the Naval and Military authorities would 
have to agree on the question, and it ought to be carefully thought 
out in peace time. 


Possible removal 
of buoys. 


Removal of coal hulks , £sfr., from the fire areas. 


Removal of hulks '1'his has already been alluded to on page 47. 

off the fire T • . ' • . 

„ It is an important point. 

drGdS* 

The usual arrangement is that such craft will be 
taken away on the commencement of hostilities. This is not nearly 
definite enough, it will take some time to remove them, especially 
the coal hulks, and every tug and probably every man will be required 
elsewhere at the time. 

Their removal should be one of the preparations we make before 
actual mobilization and some clear understanding on the subject be¬ 
tween Naval and Military authorities should be arrived at.* 


*In support of many of the above remarks we venture to quote the following para¬ 
graph from the report of the Hartington Commission:— 

« There does not appear to us to exist sufficient provisions for the consideration by 
either service of the wants of the other, it seems to be assumed without adequate 
ground that each will in time of need be prepared to give the assistance, &c.”— 
Report of Lord Hartington’s Commission, 1889, para. 12 .—P S. 


62 


Employment of guard-boats. 


Combined 

training. 


Every officer in naval command at an important dockyard has in 
war time certain vessels, torpedo-boats for the most 
boats. part, allotted to him for patrolling purposes, borne 
idea of the sea area to be guarded by these boats, and 
their general duties should be known to the military commanders; his 
own tactic sare to a certain extent affected thereby. 

This, though discussed last, is perhaps the most 
important question of all. 

For some extraordinary reason the Navy at any 
rate in home waters, show a marked disinclination to join hands 
with us.* 

Lord Charles Beresford in the article referred to, 

want of co- Gen. Owen in his report on the Naval Manoeuvres 

operation between Q f 1901 5 Gen. Slade in his first Annual Report, Mr. 
the services as 

regards combined Jane in his well known lecture, and Colonel Barron, 
training. j n <jj scuss j on which followed all comment on 
the want of co-operation in this respect between the 
two services. I am convinced that every R.G.A. officer fully agrees 
with them. 


In spite of recent instructions, a naval officer rarely attends to wit¬ 
ness practice from our batteries, and though soldiers and sailors are 
ever the best of friends, the latter do not show any great anxietv for 
our company at their quarterly firings. 

What we most deeply deplore however is the unwillingness of the 
sister service to help us to test the effiicency of defences on which 
her ships when in harbour will have to rely so much for pro¬ 
tection. 

Army and Navy co-operate readily enough in all social questions, 
as the numerous service clubs in London, and recreation grounds at 
Portsmouth and elsewhere testify; at cricket, football, hockey, golf, 
or any other game we find no more eager opponents than the sailors, 
but if we challenge them to a professional contest we usually meet 
with a chilly response. 

* I am sorry to say that during my experience in the majority of cases that have 
come to my notice where the Army and Navy have not combined or rather where 
difficulties have been raised to their combining in certain operations, almost invari¬ 
ably the difficulties have been raised on the part of the Navy.”—Lord Charles 
Beresford in ” Nineteenth Century Magazine,” February, 1897, p. 181 .—P S. 



63 


Absence of Naval 1 hough attacks on the forts do sometimes take 

°coast°defences 1 P^ ace at Gibraltar and Malta, we cannot recall one 
at home. single instance of naval operations on a scale worth 
mentioning having been undertaken against any of 
our coast defences at home. 


About 12 years ago such operations were contemplated at Ports¬ 
mouth ; a fleet was to go to sea for a week and subject 
the fortress to a series of attacks of all kinds not the 
least of which would have been the raids by land and 
sea we have been considering; the greatest interest 
was taken by all concerned, but at the last moment 
the Admiralty withdrew their permission. 


Attack on Ports¬ 
mouth in 1890, 
forbidden by the 
Admiralty. 


Mark however the loss to us. At this time the positions for Q.F. 
guns and electric lights were being considered, and the defence 
scheme drawn up, what valuable information, information which 
might have seriously affected the installation of the former and the pre¬ 
paration of the latter, was lost when these .operations were given up. 

It is true that sections of our coast defences are 
Navat supposed sometimes . to take part in our Naval 

Manoeuvres, 

1901. Manoeuvres, but the schemes under which the latter 

are carried out never oblige a fleet either to attack 
our forts, or to take refuge behind their guns. During the operations 
of 1901 not a round was fired from the land at any but friendly vessels. 


Naval 

Manoeuvres, 

1890. 


In the Naval Manoeuvres of 1890, an hostile flotilla 
operating from the Channel Islands made a succes- 
ful attack on a fleet in Plymouth harbour, but the 
forts took no part in the operations!' 1 ' 


Wanted, an 
enemy! 


We gunners, or rather I should say coast defence garrisons, for En¬ 
gineers and Infantry are as much affected as Artil¬ 
lery, labor under the enormous disadvantage of rarely 
being able to obtain an opposing force. 

How dull and uninstructive it would be for our field troops if they 
always operated against an imaginary enemy, fancy manoeuvres at 
Aldershot and Salisbury carried out on such lines! Is it not equally 
uninteresting to us to hammer away day after day at our work with¬ 
out any opponent. 

Let us take an example from land manoeuvres to illustrate what we 
require. 


* Prize Essay, Major Elmslie; R.A.I. "Proceedings/’ Vol. XX., p. 349 ,—P.S. 



64 


The lessons we 
wish the Navy to 
teach us. 


The usual 
torpedo-boat at¬ 
tack in peace. 


An illustration In 1899 flying columns were being sent out a few 
from field m ji es f rom Aldershot for a week or ten days, during 

Aldershot. which time they were liable to attack at any hour by 

day or night. How Sir Evelyn Wood did harry 
those columns, and how often he caught one at least of them napping! 

Now we want to be put in a like position, we want harrying for a 
week or two by a naval Sir Evelyn Wood. 

We are anxious to find out if, under favourable 
circumstances, and given a fair chance of surprise, 
torpedo-boats can elude our lights and 12-prs., and 
quite as important a factor, whether landings can be 
effected and our batteries and emplacements raided in rear. How can 
Militia and Volunteer Infantry, guarding as they do a coast line of 
perhaps some miles in extent, be expected to deal effectively with a 
land raid in war, if they are never practiced in doing so in peace? 

The most we can ever induce Naval authorities to 
do in home waters is to run their torpedo-boats in at 
night for us to shoot at; these boats leave the har¬ 
bour before sunset and make an attack as a rule as 
soon as it is dark, we know their numbers, we know to an hour or two 
when we may expect them, we are all wide awake and alert, and the 
element of surprise is almost altogether wanting; the boats too come 
in generally at little over half speed; this perhaps cannot be avoided, 
it is too much to expect their Commanders who would be dashing 
and enterprising enough if attacking an hostile port, to take excep¬ 
tional risks when entering our own during peace, at the same time i 
the faster they go the better practice for both of us.* 

Land raids are never attempted on these occasions, though such opera¬ 
tions would be quite as useful to blue jackets and marines as to ourselves. 

We make humble attempts sometimes to organise 
Our own efforts t hem with our own resources, witness manoeuvres at 

to raid our 

defences. Malta in 1901,t but our launches are to slow, too 

few in number, and- their skippers as a rule too 

timid, to carry out anything very realistic. 

There might be a few accidents; but it is better to have accidents in peace time 
and give that experience which is almost certain to prevent them in war. These 
accidents in peace will give the personnel a useful lesson. The same accident in 
war may lose the action and the campaign.”—Lord Charles Beresford in” Nine¬ 
teenth Century Magazine,” February, 1897, p. 181.— P.S. 

t" How the gallant C.R. A. managed to annex four government launches for a 
week is a mystery to his comrades at home who are lucky if they can secure for any 
lengthened time the uninterrupted use of one!” R.A.I. ” Proceedings ” Vol 
XXVIII., p. 219.— P.S. 


65 


Operations by 
fleets against 
coast defences 
by the French 
and Americans. 


What we require are combined operations* based on schemes which 
will oblige the Navy to attack our forts, attempt to penetrate into 
our harbours, and raid our coast. 

Want of space prevents examples being suggested. 

The French are continually practising their fleet 
in attacking their ports, and Mr. Jane quotes an 
instance in their last manoeuvres where the personnel 
of a torpedo flotilla actually landed and cut the rail¬ 
way line!'' The feature of the American Naval 
Manoeuvres last year was an attack on the Long Island forts. + 

Why are we behind other nations in this respect? If the Admiralty 
and War Office cannot agree, the Cabinet should take the matter up. 

When Naval Manoeuvres do not take place or 
when they are held with the sole object of testing 
one fleet against another at sea without reference to 
our land defences, a torpedo flotilla with perhaps a 
couple of cruisers could help us a great deal, always 
provided that during the operations they keep at sea, or if they must 
come into port at night it is not the port they are threatening. 

Officers of the three arms concerned should invari¬ 
ably be on board an attacking fleet, those of the Ar¬ 
tillery and Engineers should have a place on raiding 
torpedo-boats, and those of the infantry should ac¬ 
company any landing parties. T he Navy should also have its repre¬ 
sentatives among our batteries and picquets. 

Full reports ought to be made by these officers, which reports 
should be issued to all concerned in both services. It is very desira¬ 
ble we should have our work criticised not only from a military but 
also from a naval standpoint. 

Conclusion . 


How torpedo- 
boat attack in 
peace ought 
to be carried 
out. 


Full reports by 
Naval and Mili¬ 
tary Officers 
necessary. 


Summary. To sum up, the points more particularly urged in 

this essay are:— 

1. As regards armament and construction. 

{a) More reliable electric firing gear and more convenient per¬ 
cussion lock for 12-pr. Q.F. gun. 

*There ought to be yearly combined operations of the Army and Navy at all 
"Naval bases under conditions similar to those which would obtain in war/ 7 Lord 
Charles Beresford in " Nineteenth Century Magazine," February, 1897, p, 180.— 

+R.A.I. w Proceedings," Vol. XXIX., p. 39.— P.S. 

+« Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XLVI., p. 1578.— P.S. 


\ 



66 


( b ) The desirability of siting Q.F. guns as high as possible 
with special reference to sea level batteries. 

(r) The necessity of giving Q.F. batteries rear protection. 

( d) Further experiments with the special case N fired from heavy 
R.M.L. guns. 

(e) Protection for electric lights. Further consideration of their 
tactical employment. 

(/) Improved communications. 

2. As regards organisation. 

(a) A modification of the present system of carrying out 
foreign reliefs in the Garrison Artillery, to ensure a sufficient number 
of layers and specialists being retained in the winter months for the 
efficient service of the Q.F. guns. 

(b ) A modification of the regulations for competitive practice 
to enable Q.F. guns being fired at approaching targets. Develop¬ 
ment of carbine practice. 

(c) The better training of the infantry allotted to our coast 
defences. 

( d ) More frequent mobilizations of the three arms together. 

( e ) A better understanding with the Navy as to the admittance 
at night of friendly torpedo-boats, booms, mines, electric lights, 
clearance of fire areas, &c. 

(/) The necessity of more thorough co-operation between the 
services in regard to combined manoeuvres. 

_ It may be considered that ''Co-operation with the 

Conclusion. t 

Navy” occupies too much space in this treatise, and 
that the subject perhaps has been unnecessarily drawn out; it is one 
however of such immense importance that no argument should be 
omitted which may tend to induce both services to recognise more 
fully the significance of the motto of their famous club. 


67 

I Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, July, August and September, 1903 .] 


Assuming the probability of raids by a Foreign Naval 
Power what are the best preparations to repel them so far as 
the construction, armament, and organisation of our Coast 
Defences are concerned? 

BY 

CAPTAIN J. C. HANNA, R.G.A. 


1 Statio Bene Fida Car inis. 
HIGHLY COMMENDED ESSAY. 


CHAPTER I. 

Introduction and general remarks. 

The nature and amount of armament, both primary and secondary, 
in our coast fortresses will of course depend on the strategical and 
tactical value of the place, and on the nature of attack to which it is 
most exposed from its geographical position. 

Our Defence Committee at Headquarters is responsible for select¬ 
ing the various harbours to be fortified as naval bases, or harbours of 
refuge for our mercantile marine, and for apportioning the armament 
to each individual port according to the value that port is expected to 
have in war; the detail of the armament and defences generally being 
of course further determined by the consideration of existing artificial 
or natural protections (such as breakwaters or shoals) and on the 
conformation of the coast line; i.e., if good sites are obtainable the 
number of guns may be fewer and yet adequate for the defence of 
the place. 

But as this essay is confined to the question of construction, arma¬ 
ment and organisation of our coast defences against raids , it will be 
necessary to seek a definition of the word raid and only deal in detail 
with that part of the armament, &c., which is primarily intended for 
use against such form of attack, assuming that the remainder of the 




68 


defences are all that they should he for the requirements of the 
locality. 

"Garrison Artillery Drill, 1899,” Vol. 1, page 151, classifies the 
various forms of attack to which our coast defences are liable, the 
fourth of these being "Raid,” and on the following page raid is de¬ 
fined as "a sudden attempt to penetrate the defences with a view to 
the destruction of shipping in the harbour, or under construction, 
docks, coals, or stores.” To this might be added "or an attempt to 
cut off outlying batteries, signal stations, or defence lights.” 

Briefly then raids may be classed under two headings:— 

(a) By sea. 

(b) By land. 

Of these, (a) will almost invariably be made by torpedo craft, and 
then either by night or in thick weather. It is very probable that 
such attacks may be made before formal declaration of war. 

The second heading (b), is a more difficult one to define or guard 
against. It may be of any strength, from (1) a single boat’s crew 
landed to destroy a signal station, cut a cable, See., to (2) a con¬ 
siderable force of infantry, with field guns, and howitzers, landed 
outside the water area covered by the heavy guns of the fixed defences, 
intended to attack the forts or what they cover from the land side. 
It is clear that (1) may be expected in any state of sea power and also 
before the formal declaration of war, but that (2) could not be 
launched against us till a state of war actually existed, and not even 
then unless the enemy had at any rate temporary command of the sea, 
for as long as we had any destroyers afloat, they would be on the spot 
quick enough to cut off the transports that landed such a force before 
they could embark the troops again and get clear. 

Let us then accept this definition as a basis to work on, and the 
general instructions on the following pages of the drill book just 
quoted, i.e., that torpedo-boat raid would be met by the fire of the light 
Q.F. guns of the defence, assisted by the electric lights; with per¬ 
haps boom defences and mine fields thrown in, and that a land raid 
would be met by the infantry garrison with the guns of the moveable 
armament. 

CHAPTER II. 


Construction. 

The first point naturally to consider is the ques- 


Fixed defences. 

Light Q. F. 

batteries. tion of site, and there are several points to be con¬ 
sidered in connection therewith. 


69 


It stands to reason that as torpedo-boat attack is chiefly feared by 
night, the water area covered by the guns must be illuminated—and 
therefore as the power of effective illumination is limited, that part 
of the harbour or approach thereto which can be effectively lit up 
must be selected for the light Q.F. defence. This will be the first 
and main consideration—then comes the consideration of height 
above sea level, if the limitations already mentioned afford any choice 
in the matter—with auto-sights it is a fairly safe principle to lay down 
that the higher the better, always provided that there is not a danger¬ 
ous area of "dead water’’ left, except perhaps for very short ranges— 
but there are very few T places where too great a height is obtainable. 
Next obtain as large an arc of fire as possible, for each gun, over the 
illuminated area. 

These considerations, with the all important one of the difference 
in cost between different sites, will fix the positions for the batteries. 

We now use concrete and not brick work or stone for all our forti¬ 
fications. A solid drum of concrete is laid down and the pedestal 
firmly bolted down to it. This requires to be very carefully levelled. 
The terreplein at the level of the top of the drum should be suffi¬ 
ciently large to allow of the detachment having plenty of room to 
work. The top of the apron should be as high above the gun floor 
level as is compatible with getting the full amount of depression re¬ 
quired. The front of the apron and the earth parapet or sand belt 
should slope down at a steeper angle than the extreme angle of de¬ 
pression required—for if not, when firing at very short ranges, the 
axis of the gun is nearly parallel to the slope of the parapet, and so 
little above it that the blast will cause such a cloud of dust &c., as to 
seriously impede the working of the gun. Providing sufficient height 
is obtainable to overcome the question of dead water in front, it is a 
mistake to raise the guns above the natural surface of the ground. 
Recesses must be provided, practically on the gun floor level, for a 
good supply of ammunition. Magazines should be as close to the 
guns as can be arranged. 

Shelters for a complete detachment for each gun must be provided 
as close as possible, and should be as nearly on the same level with 
the gun floor as practicable. The officer also must have his shelter. 
The shelters need not necessarily be bomb proof. Nobody would be 
in them during action, and if they are knocked away some form of 
cover can be improvised pending their repair. A recent W.O. letter 
suggested "uralite" as a material to use, and it would seem to have 


70 


several advantages. It is non-inflammable and does not splinter like 
wood. Moreover, being very thin, it offers practically no resistance 
and shells might go clean through it, leaving a clean hole, without 
bursting. The gun emplacements, magazines and shelters should be 
well lit by electric light. To ensure a quick turn out plenty of light 
is necesssary, and as long as the actual lights themselves are screened 
from the sea, the glow that they throw will be inappreciable when 
coming into the harbour in the glare of the fixed beams over the il¬ 
luminated area. It is poor economy to try and save the cost of fixing 
an extra "oyster light" or two, and when there are perhaps six or 
eight or a dozen 30,000 candle power beams running, the extra 
power required costs practically nil. 

A year or so ago there was an idea that some form of light lying 
down cover, actually on the gun floor, for three or four men was 
necessary in addition to the shelters, but it has been found so impos¬ 
sible to provide in all existing batteries, that the idea has been aban¬ 
doned, and in cases where it is essential that men must be standing 
to their guns all night they must just brave the weather in the open. 
But these conditions do not prevail everywhere. In many places it 
is possible to have a sentry beam some way in front of the illuminated 
area, and with a sharp lookout kept (from both ends of it, if feasi¬ 
ble) and a continuous alarm circuit from these lookouts ringing a 
loud bell in each Q.F. shelter, there will generally be sufficient time 
for detachments to be on the guns before the enemy’s boats enter the 
illuminated area. T he time it takes for a destroyer to cover the space 
between sentry beam and illuminated area, and the time it takes for 
the detachment to turn out, are easily calculated. One or two ob¬ 
servers must, however, under any circumstances be kept on the guns. 
If the sentry beam fails even for a moment, the detachment must turn 
out and stand to their guns, and with the least trace of fog no depend¬ 
ence can be placed on the sentry beam giving warning. But these 
considerations are too varying with the locality to enable any uni¬ 
versal hard and fast rules to be laid down. Let each district C.R.A. 
decide for himself what is necessary and the Inspector-General of 
Garrison Artillery can suggest or order any alterations he considers 
advisable. 

Security from 1 he next question of construction that presents 
reverse or itself is that of securing protection to the battery 

land attack. f rom an att ack on the land side. If the battery is 

sited inside one of the old pattern residential forts which we find in 


71 


many fortresses, no extra protection is needed as the already existing 
ditch is sufficient obstacle; or again, if it is sited right in the town, 
in inner waters, where it is or should be practically impossible to 
surprise it by land. But if we find it out in the open by itself some 
obstacle is essential. 

Ditches are very costly, and consequently we do not find them round 
our new works. And we appear to trust to the Government pattern 
fence, euphemistically called ''unclimbable” but in reality easily 
surmounted by any man of average activity. Moreover this fence is 
very difficult to fire through, especially if the line of fire is at all 
oblique to the line of rail. A good barbed wire entanglement, about 
5' high and 8 or 10 yards deep with electric lamps, similar to the or¬ 
dinary street lamp, at intervals, would prove a much more effectual 
protection. The lamps should not be kept alight, but only turned 
on by the sentries when they saw or heard anybody in the wire. Trip 
wires ringing an alarm bell could be placed just inside the outer edge 
of the entanglement to make certain of the alarm being given, but it 
is hardly conceivable that a single man, let alone a raiding party 
could get through a stiff harbed wire entanglement in the dark with¬ 
out giving vent to some pious ejaculation which would disturb the 
stilly night. A very few infantry with Magazine rifles should be 
suffitient for each work. 

These remarks will also apply to electric light emplacements as 
well as to outlying batteries. A small party landed to assist a tor¬ 
pedo-boat raid effect their purpose just as well by knocking out the 
lights as by knocking out the guns. This is on the assumption that 
a small landing party is attempting to surprise and rush the battery 
bv night. 

Any more elaborate attack in force would be met by the infantry of 
the defence with the movable armament. 


The construction of land forts pure and simple, 
is not now contemplated. Where such works exist 
they will no doubt be utilized, but their cost is quite 


Permanent 
land defences. 


incommensurate with their modern fighting value. 

Positions will of course be selected in peace time, for the infantry of 
the defence and for the moveable armament, covering all possible land¬ 
ing places in the neighbourhood of the fortresses, and all the main 
roads, railways and bridges leading into it; and these will naturally 
be strengthened by extensive use of the spade; alternative positions 
on an inner line would also be selected and entrenched. Possibly we 


72 


may get some modified form of the South African blockhouse line; 
but it is fairly certain that nothing (beyond selection of position) 
will be done before the ''emergency stage” at least, owing to expense. 
Moreover as these outlying land defences could not be required before 
the formal declaration of war, for their necessity implies a large land¬ 
ing, it would be sufficient to commence them during the "emergency 
stage,” for the normal infantry garrison of any of our home fortresses 
is sufficient to entrench these selected positions pretty effectually in 
a very few hours. 

CHAPTER III. 

Armament. 

Against raid Still working on the assumption that we are limit- 
by sea. irJ g t fi e definition of ”Raid” by sea to mean an attack 
by torpedo craft only, the best guns in our service that we can use 
for the defence are the 47" Q.F. and 12-pr. Q.F. 

We have discarded the 3-pr. and 6-pr. Q.F. as not having sufficient 
bursting charge to stop a destroyer, and many men now hold that even 
the 12-pr. Q.F. is full light, especially when the question of armour¬ 
ing destroyers is seriously contemplated. One admits that unless ex¬ 
ceptionally lucky, one or two 12-pr. shells will not stop a destroyer 
dead, but the generally accepted idea is that the garrison gunner of 
the present day can be pretty certain of sufficient 12-pr. hits on a de¬ 
stroyer to stop her, given a reasonable number of guns compared to 
the probable number of attacking boats. 

The 12-pr. has the following advantages over the 4'7 // Q.F. gun, 
mounting, emplacement and ammunition are considerably cheaper. 
The detachment is smaller, and ammunition much more easily 
handled. Its rate of fire compared with the 47" is : : 15 : 10, at 
least "Practice Seawards” says so. 

Per contra, in weight of metal thrown per gun per minute, the 47" 
has considerably the best of it, and the stopping power of its shell is more 
than double that of the 12-pr. 

According to our existing classification, however, the 47" is more 
often than otherwise not classed as an anti-torpedo craft gun ; in fact 
where 12-prs. are also provided it is generally not so classed, and it must 
be borne in mind that What’s in a name? ” won’t apply here, as the lack 
of the name anti-torpedo craft gun means that no second relief is pro¬ 
vided for it in the manning tables. 1 his varying classification seems 
hardly right. Let us call the 12-pr. our anti-torpedo craft gun, par ex¬ 
cellence, but in all cases where the objective is sufficiently important to 


73 


tempt a big attacking flotilla, say three divisions or eighteen boats, for the 
sake of certainty let us have some 4 7V' as a last resource; not the outer 
battery as we are prone to place them, but the inside battery of all; then 
if the outer batteries have justified their existence, the tremendous shell 
fire of the 4 1" should be able to absolutely annihilate any remaining boat 
or boats getting abreast of them. Some people will argue that this is 
waste of a long range powerful gun, but if we consider a torpedo-boat raid 
the most probable form of attack on our coast defences, and our own 
Navy are the foremost to tell us this, then let us ensure that our defences 
are as secure against that form of attack as we can make them, and not 
endeavour to effect a compromise between our heavy gun defences and 
anti-torpedo craft defences, resulting probably in neither being effi¬ 
cient. It seems much more waste of a battery of 4‘7’s" to site them 
where they may be able to open a long range fire against bigger ships, 
always supposing such an attack is ever made, and standing a good chance 
of getting knocked out before they have put in any useful work, than to 
have them in reserve, in inner waters, where the odds are heavily in 
favour of them saving the situation in the case of a torpedo-boat raid. 

Sjghts Unquestionably the auto-sight is the sight to use for 

anti-torpedo craft guns. It enables a more rapid rate 
of fire being maintained, but above all it does away with the heart¬ 
breaking efforts of G.G.C.s to identify rounds from their own groups, 
if two or three groups are firing simultaneously at the same target. 

Tide tables can be made out showing the rise or fall every half hour 
above mean tide level, and given the height and time of high water in the 
port each day (which can be found in the official blue book on tides sup¬ 
plied to each sub-district) the necessary correction at any hour of the day 
can be read off. The error of the day after some little practice can be 
fairly well estimated, even if one has not had trial shots in the day time 
at a fixed target, so that theoretically at any rate one ought to waste no 
time ranging. It is open to argument, however, if we have yet fully ap¬ 
preciated the limit of usefulness of the auto-sight. The “Garrison 
Artillery Drill, 1902," Vol. 2, gives /2 a minute as the probable angular 
error of the layer in his line of sight; this appears too small for practical 
purposes. Admitted that it is easy to work up this standard by day, 
when training layers at a fixed target in smooth water; it remains very 
doubtful if a layer suddenly roused from sleep will make equally good 
shooting at a 30 knot destroyer, which throws up a big wave even in the 
calmest of water, and while shells are bursting all around him. The de¬ 
ductions about suitable heights for the auto-sights are:—(1) Any height 


74 


h, at which an error of X minutes in the angle of depression of the line of 
sight for a range R, conveys'an error to the quadrant elevation of the gun 
within the permissible error to hit a 4 ft. vertical target, (4 ft. is taken as 
the drill book estimate of the freeboard of a torpedo-boat) from height (h ) 
and range ( R ) will be a suitable height. (X being the probable error of 
the layer and laid down in the drill book as /4.) 

(2.) And that the best shooting height is that at which the largest 
error can be made by the layer in the angle of depression of the line of 
sight at range R, compatible with keeping the resulting error in quadrant 
elevation within the limits of the permissible error to hit a 4 ft. vertical 
target from the height and range. 

If tables showing these heights were made out and published for each 
nature of gun at various ranges, it would be an excellentg uide to officers 
when selecting site for a battery. They may be known at the W.O., 
but it is certainly not a matter of common knowledge. There is more 
than one battery fitted with auto-sights in our coast defences at home 
which is sited too low for the auto-sight to be trusted, at the range that 
battery would generally be used in action. 

Now to consider the armament that would be used 

Moveable arma- a o- a j nst an enemy making a land raid. There have 

merit for 

general defence, been great changes recently in the approved moveable 

armament of our coast defences, the old 20-pr. and 
40-pr. R.B.L. guns that have been doing duty as “ moveable arma¬ 
ment" for years, have at last been superseded and their places taken 
chiefly by \'l" guns on travelling carriages, and 6" B.L. howitzers, and 
to some stations have also been allotted some 15-pr. B.L. field guns; 
machine guns of rifle caliber, either on parapet mountings or infantry field 
carriages, have for some time past been also included. 

The role of the moveable armament has not been properly realised till 
quite recently, and so we find that these old 20-pr. and 40-pr. R.B.L. 
guns were generally allotted places inside the various forts, and practically 
looked on as extra fixed armament. 

Of course that is not right. T he moveable armament should be pushed 
well out, to cover the feasible landing places in the neighbourhood of the 
fortress which are not under fire from the guns of the fixed armament, 
and to cover the various lines of approach from such landing places. If 
this argument holds good, then the 6" B.L. howitzer is a very useful 
weapon for covering an otherwise undefended cove or beach. If it can 
pick up the range of a transport which is lying in shore to land troops, it 
ought to make the situation very uncomfortable. It is preferable to a 


75 

£un for this purpose, as it can he withdrawn somewhat from the coast 
line, and is much more easily concealed. 

1 he 4 7" gun is not such a suitable weapon for defence against land 
raids. 1 here are not many positions round our coast fortresses where 
the land ranges are too great for held guns, and the high muzzle veloc¬ 
ity of the 4 7" rather militates against its usefulness with time shrapnel. 
Conditions are not the same as in South Africa, where the* travelling 
4*7" was first used. A raiding force will not sit down and entrench 
themselves and play at long range fighting. They haven’t got the time. 
If they delay, their line of retreat, i.e., their transports, may easily be cut 
off. They must attack vigorously if they find the defenders in position 
between them and their objective, and therefore long ranges can only be 
a matter of short duration. The 4'7" on its travelling carriage is very 
heavy and moves but slowly, and then only on good roads. If an attack 
is rapidly pressed home the 47" stands a much worse chance of retiring 
safely to a second position further back than an ordinary 15-pr. field gun 
would. Some pom-poms might be allowed for moveable armament. 
Admitted that their material effect was not great in the recent war, at 
least most R.A. officers tell us so, still their moral effect was very con¬ 
siderable, especially when they were first heard, and that moral effect 
would probably be repeated, as the Boers and our own Army are the only 
people who have yet have had to face pom-pom fire in action. More¬ 
over the pom-pom is very mobile, just what is wanted in the class of 
fighting we should encounter. 

The machine guns should chiefly he pushed out with the infantry of 
the defence, and only in rare cases should any be left actually confined 
to forts or batteries. Of course they save a certain number of infantry 
being locked up inside works, but nevertheless their sphere of usefulness 
would appear curtailed by being thus disposed. 

It must be thoroughly realised that the best time to catch a landing 
party is when they are actually landing, and that once we permit them to 
land and get within rifle range of our works, even by night, they are very 
likely to render the situation extremely uncomfortable for our gun de¬ 
tachments. We only want our wire entanglements, &c., as a last re¬ 
source, to prevent a rush by a small party who have evaded the picquets 
on the coast line; a passive defence inside the batteries is not the modern 
notion of guarding against a landing raid. 

The requirements of each fortress, as far as nature and number of 
pieces of moveable armament, want to be thoroughly gone into by the 
local authorities, and their recommendations should carry considerably 


76 


more weight than seems to he the case at present. Of course the first 
outcry against this would be u But then every General would at once 
ask for infinitely more guns and howitzers than the Treasury will sanc¬ 
tion money for.’" That, like many another argument requires proof. 
Doubtless in some places an increase would be asked for, but it is equally 
certain that in some other cases local opinion would tend to a reduction 
of the present approved armaments. 

Suppose the case was submitted to the G.O.C. like this : “It is pro¬ 
posed to spend ,£10,000 on moveable armament for this fortress. Each 
4'7 // gun costs £X, each 6" B.L. howitzer £Y, each 15-pr. B.L. field 
gun costs ,£Z, and so on with pom-poms, machine guns, Sz c.; what are 
your recommendations about number and nature of pieces, and how do 
you propose to utilize each individual gun, howitzer, Szc. ? ” 

After a G.O.C. has made out his recommendations on this sort of 
basis, his ideas can be criticised at Headquarters and alternatives suggested 
to him, giving the reasons for differing from his proposals. 

This does not seem, however, to have been the method adopted in 
drawing up our present allotment, and, though it may be treasonable to 
say so, it is not apparent to the average regimental officer on what prin¬ 
ciples the present allotment can have been arrived at. 

That, if one may be permitted to say so, is one of the grave defects in 

• _ * 

our present War Office methods. 

The regimental officer is kept too much in the dark over the principles 
that govern any change in coast defences or armament. Changes are 
made; the reasons are not always plain to see, and as no explanation is forth¬ 
coming, individuals are driven to build up their own theories on the subject. 

No wonder then that so many different ideas on the subject of coast 
defence prevail amongst our senior officers, and that our junior officers 
have so many confused notions, collected at each station they serve in, 
that it is only here and there one can find a Garrison Artillery officer 
who has a comprehensive grasp of his profession. 

Though perhaps not strictly “ Armament,” still the 
defence lights are such an integral part of our defences 
against torpedo-boat raid that some mention must be made of them. 

We want the best illuminated area that we can get, over which boats 
must pass to reach their objective, and our guns must be so sited as to 
take full advantage of this area. The lie of the coast line, and the limit 
of a 30° dispersed beam (the one most used by us) will fix this water 
area, and then we have to consider the number of beams we require for 
effective illumination. 


Defence lights. 


77 


Speaking generally, we have not got enough lights, nor have we a suf¬ 
ficient proportion of spare projectors. Our electric light trials are too 
often carried out under favourable weather conditions, and seldom do we 
get any trials sufficiently prolonged to test the average breakdowns that 
are bound to occur. 

Over the relative merits of steam engines and oil engines, only an 
expert can offer an opinion, and this unfortunately the R. G. A. officer 
is not. 

Submarine mines. Though not primarily intended for use against tor- 
Br^nnan torpedo, pedo-boat raids, there is little doubt that observation 
Submarine boats. m i nes would be exploded were torpedo-boats discovered 
crossing the mine field. It is possible though not likely, that the Brennan 
torpedo, if installed, would also get a run against a flotilla of destroyers, 
but its speed is not really sufficient, and its probable effect would be nil. 

Submarine boats may prove useful. It is impossible in their present 
state of development to foretell what they may do in the future. It 
certainly seems as if coast defence was their role , but their speed again 
would probably not render them very dangerous to the 30 knot destroyer. 

Until they get a reliable periscope at any rate, they are not likely to 
prove serious foes or reliable defenders ; but their moral effect is enormous 
(and even their detractors must admit this) so for this, if for no other 
reason, every defended port should have its complement of submarines. 

While on this heading, just a word about the hydro- 

Hydrophone. . . . 

phone. I his is a somewhat unknown and as yet im¬ 
perfectly developed instrument for recording sound waves produced by a 
vessel moving through the water. It has been found possible to detect a 
ship some two or three miles off by this instrument, but at present it is 
not particularly reliable. The details however are capable of improve¬ 
ment, and if a satisfactory instrument can be produced it ought to prove 
of the greatest practical value in giving warning of the approach of sub¬ 
marines, as well as for detecting a raiding flotilla of destroyers when 
a mile or two outside the sentry beam. It can be anchored at the en¬ 
trance to a harbour and connected with the shore by wires along which 
the indications would travel, or it can be towed astern by the examination 
steamer and information signalled in from there. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Organisation. 

This is certainly the most varied and difficult heading of the subject to 
discuss. It embraces both existing organisation in peace time, and the 


78 


Existing peace 
conditions. 


Alternative 

suggestion. 


various changes that take place during precautionary and emergency 
stages, as well as the final war organisation after mobilisation is completed. 

The u Army Corps System,” as it is usually termed, 
is not an ideal one by any means as far as coast defence 
is concerned. Decentralisation in coast defence cannot 
well be carried out, and all correspondence in connection therewith has 
to go to the War Office. T he number of offices en route entails great 
delay in all correspondence, and the want of local, and in some cases 
technical, knowledge on the part of the Headquarters Staff of the Army 
Corps makes their expressions of opinion carry little weight. The 
fault is not with the officers concerned. It is the fault of the 
system. 

A peace organisation that left the whole of our coast 
fortresses, with their entire personnel , outside the Army 
Corps scheme entirely should not be hard to devise. 
Each fortress should have its Fortress Commander in peace time with his 
staff (or perhaps a somewhat modified staff) the same as required in war 
time. On all points the Fortress Commander should correspond direct 
with the War Office, with no intermediate channels. The infantry gar¬ 
rison allotted should be the number of men considered necessary during 
the precautionary or emergency stages. The existing Garrison Regi¬ 
ments recently formed could probably be considerably increased, and 
these are the class of men who should form the infantry peace garrison. 
If more battalions of the Garrison Regiment could not be formed, then 
infantry battalions last home from foreign service should be allotted, and 
these should not form part of any Army Corps. Reliefs would be 
carried out as now provided for., viz., if say four battalions of the 1st 
Army Corps have to proceed abroad in the ordinary course of reliefs, 
their places are taken by four from the 2d Army Corps, these again 
filled from the 3d Army Corps, the four coast defence battalions that had 
been longest home would then join the latter Army Corps, and the four 
battalions that were relieved abroad would become coast defence bat¬ 
talions. 


By this plan the organisation of a coast fortress cannot become sud¬ 
denly dislocated by rumours of war, and not by actual war itself until at 
least three Army Corps have left the country. 

Wffiat would happen at this moment, were we threatened with a 
European War, would be that the existing infantry garrisons of all our 
coast fortresses in the south of England would be required by the 
f 1 oi tress Commander during the precautionary and emergency stages, 


79 


and probably be working under his orders at very high pressure, while 
the G.O.C. 2d Army Corps, to which these infantry units all belong, 
would be simultaneously endeavouring to equip and concentrate his com¬ 
mand ; in fact two men trying to command the same unit at the 
same time, and having definite and opposite views concerning its 
disposition. 

If the infantry garrisons of coast fortresses were constituted as suggested, 
there would be a good nucleus of officers and men with local knowledge, 
an enormously important factor, when Militia were embodied and joined 
their moblization stations. 

However, there is little probability that these suggestions will ever see 
the light of publicity, and still less that they will ever be seriously consid¬ 
ered by those in whose power it is to carry them out. Let us then turn 
to the more detailed points, which are after all unaffected by the question 
of whether units of the 2d Army Corps form the peace garrison of Ports¬ 
mouth or Plymouth, or whether they don’t. 


The defence scheme of a fortress contains, or should 
schemes contain, the whole system of organisation, both of per¬ 
sonnel , and materiel. Unfortunately it must be ad¬ 
mitted defence schemes are not kept up to date, nor do they go into 
sufficient detail in the case of units which are not quartered in the fortress 
in peace time. 

The "Instructions for preparation of defence schemes,” issued in June, 
1901, are admirable, but they do not seemed to be acted on as a rule. 
In most places, the duty of Secretary of the Defence Committee devolves 
on some Staff Officer who has already as much work as he can conven¬ 
iently perform, and there is no incentive to him to work hard at the 
defence scheme as well. The Local Defence Committee frequently 
exists in name only, and at times not even in name. Many important 
W.O. letters intimately connected with questions of general defence never 
find their way to the Secretary of the Defence Scheme at all, being dealt 
with by A.A.G., C.R.A., C.R.E., or other Staff Officer immediately con¬ 
cerned, and filed in the Central Registry eventually. 


It is suggested that the defence scheme for each fortress or defended 
port be kept absolutely separate from the rest of the defence scheme of 
the district in which it lies, and that there should be a secretary of 
each fortress defence scheme, who should invariably be an officer who 
serves on the staff of the Fortress Commander on mobilization; if 
possible, the man who in peace time is Staff officer to the man who be¬ 
comes Fortress Commander in war time. 


80 


The W.O. treat defence schemes as such secret documents that the 
individuals most concerned get such meagre extracts from them, as to 
render the scheme comparatively worthless. The general idea, and really 
the greater part of the detail, ought to be known by every officer in the 
fortress. It can be kept confidential enough, even if this was done. T his 
enormous secrecy, of what a foreigner probably knows in every detail, is 
responsible for cramping the intelligence and initiative of junior regi¬ 
mental officers. If some keen, or merely inquisitive, Subaltern begins to 
ask conundrums about general defence, he is somehow choked off, and 
given to understand that such things don’t concern him, and that he had 
better go and study his gun drill instead. What is the result? The aver¬ 
age Subaltern is quite content to accept the situation, and consequently 
remains in ignorance of the broad principles of coast defence, or of their 
application to the particular fortress where he is quartered, and his mind 
does not soar higher than considerations of whether No. 2 should handle 
a sponge with "right hand back under” or the reverse! Possibly this is a 
slight exaggeration, but it must be confessed it is not far wrong. Prob¬ 
ably this state of affairs is not fully realised by those in high places, but let 
the question be suddenly put to any young R.G.A. Subaltern "What is 
your place on mobilization?” and in nine cases ont of ten he won’t be able 
to give a definite answer. He may know what fort he goes to, its long 
odds he doesn’t know what group. 

Go a little further and ask him if he happens to be orderly officer some 
afternoon, and in the absence of any senior officer in barracks, he opens a 
telegram saying " Precautionary stage exists,” or words to that effect, 
what steps would he take, its very long odds that the boy would be hope¬ 
lessly at sea and his probable answer would be "send for the Sergeant- 
Major.” This state of "Organisation” is hopeless. Every company 
officer must know every detail connected with the allotment of his unit 
on the commencement of the precautionary stage, and should be constantly 
questioned on every point connected therewith. He may find himself in 
a detached work, away from his Major and the rest of his company. He 
should know accurately how and where every man of his gun detach¬ 
ments is to be quartered, where they draw their rations from, where their 
water supply is, through what channels he gets his orders or information; 
in short he should be able to parade and move off with his own group 
details without a single further word of explanation or instruction. And 
the great advantage of this suggestion is that it can be fully carried out 
without costing the taxpayei a halfpenny! M^ould that all improvements 
could be effected as cheaply. 


81 


E qu , p p mg° f To enable all anti-torpedo-boat batteries to be sud- 
shelters. denly manned, if required, with the minimum amount 
of confusion, it is suggested that every shelter in light 
Q. F. batteries should be fully equipped in peace time with all that 
men would require for immediate occupation, such as blankets, 
watch-coats and oilskins for the look-out men, cooking utensils, See. 
Hammocks are now provided and kept in these shelters, but noth¬ 
ing is more unsuitable. They are not by any means easy to get out of 
quickly, and the time it would take for the entire group detail to turn out 
would be, at a moderate computation, three times what they would take 
if they were on the floor, on bed boards, or in the ordinary barrack bed¬ 
steads. It is urged in their defence that hammocks take up much less 

space. This is open to argument. T he ordinary Q.F. shelter is de¬ 
signed to give each occupant about 300 cubic feet of air space, or half 
barrack synopsis. As they are generally fairly low, say 7*6" or 8", this 
would work out about 40 square feet of floor per man, leaving ample 
room to fit in beds or bed boards for the full number of occupants. 

There have been great strides made in the last few 
years in the way of establishing war signal stations 
along the coast, which forward information about pass¬ 
ing vessels to various places ; speaking generally to the 
Head Naval Intelligence Office of the group, to the 
war signal stations each side of themselves, and in some cases to a speci¬ 
fied military officer as well. The detail is all shown in a '‘secret” blue 
book on the Distribution of Intelligence issued by the Admiralty. These 
war signal stations are found entirely by the Royal Navy. There is one 
grave defect, however, in the system, and yet it would not be difficult to 
remedy. T hese signal stations are not all connected by special tele¬ 
graph or telephone wires, and in some places a message has to be taken 
a mile or two away to the nearest village post office and transmitted by 
ordinary G.P.O. wire to its several destinations. This is inexcusable. 
If intelligence is to be of any value, it is essential that it should be dis¬ 
tributed quickly. 

As an instance of this, the following is what actually occurred several 
times during the Naval Manoeuvres of 1901 at one of our home coast 
fortresses. A little bundle of telegrams would be delivered to the For¬ 
tress Commander from the local Post Office, at say, 8 p.m., and on being 
opened would be found to come from three war signal stations (one as 
far as 40 miles away) giving information about passing ships, in some 
cases four hours after the ship in question had passed the examination line. 


Sources of 
information and 
communica¬ 
tions. 


82 


Marconi. The value of wireless telegraphy to coast defence can¬ 

not be exaggerated. Nearly all our port war signal stations are fitted with 
Marconi appliances, but the system might be even further extended,and have 
every war signal station thus equipped—of course it would cost money to 
install and keep up the personnel, but on the day that a naval war broke out we 
would be only too thankful to find the system working all around our shores. 

The internal telephonic communications at the pres- 
_ ent day in our coast fortresses have been very carefully 
considered, and in the main leave nothing to be de¬ 
sired. The only suggested improvement is one which exists in certain 
places, but which has not been universally installed, viz., a continuous alarm 
circuit ringing up all Light Q.F. batteries simultaneously, and emanating 
from the look-out post or posts established at the sentry beam or elsewhere. 
It is not essential to have a telephone instrument on this line, in fact it is 
better not to have. All that is required is a heavy electric bell in each 
battery, and when it is heard, the gun detachments know they must stand by. 

The typewriting telegraph mentioned in Captain Spender’s article in 
R.A.I. “Proceedings,” Vol. XXIX, No. 7, 8, and 9, sounds very satis¬ 
factory, and if it is all that he claims for it, the sooner the system is intro¬ 
duced the better. Telephones are apt to go wrong, at least R.A. 
command lines do very frequently, and the other system seems preferable. 
Why some order dials are not introduced'into our fortresses, goodness 
only knows. Not the old pattern that we experimented with ten years 
ago, but those made by Barr and Stroud. Sufficient orders could prob¬ 
ably be marked on them to cover all contingencies during action, just the 
time when orders must go quickly, and when telephones are sure to fail us. 

The examination service perhaps hardly comes into 
the question of raids, and yet it would be advisable to 
make some reference to it. The existing regulations 
are somewhat cumbrous, and yet it is hard to say how they can be modi¬ 
fied. Except that by employment of picquet and patrol boats, working 
some little distance further out than the actual examination steamer, we 
ought to be able to determine in most cases whether a vessel is hostile or 
not, before she is at such close quarters as the actual examination line. 

Training of Perhaps no point of our existing organisation is so 
Militia and voiun- weak as this one. It all results from the fact alreadv 

t©©r Artillery, * 

with the guns of expressed that the role of movable armament has not 
loveable been properly understood, and that the materiel sup- 
plied, until quite recently, has been of such an anti¬ 
quated nature, that it would have taken a keener soldier than has yet been 


Examination 

service. 


the m< 
armament. 


83 


found to attempt a serious training with it. It must be remembered that 
in none of our home coast fortresses are men of the R.G.A. told off for 
moveable armament, simply because there are none available. The 
R.G.A. are allotted first to the light Q.F. guns of the fixed defences, and 
if there are any men left after this, to the most important of the primary 
armament. 

Consequently moveable armament always has been and probably al¬ 
ways will be in the hands of the Auxiliary Artillery, be they Militia or 
Volunteers. For the proper training of such Corps as are thus allotted, it 
stands to reason that an Adjutant and permanent staff, who are familiar 
with the uses of Artillery in the field, are essential. 

This does not imply that these officers and N.C.O.’s should have be¬ 
longed necessarily to Siege Train Companies of the R.G.A. That is one 
of the points frequently missed by even gunner officers. A battery of 
Heavy Artillery with 47" guns or 5" or 6" howitzers is not the same as 
a Siege Train Company. The error crept in in South Africa, by sending 
out a Siege Train Company (No. 15, Western it was then), with 47" 
guns. A Siege Train Company is a unit intended as its name implies, 
for taking part in the attack of a land fortress, and its training does not 
necessarily cover the principlesof employmentof Heavy Artillery in thefield. 

Probably officers and N.C O.’s of the R.F.A. after they had learnt the 
actual drill of the heavier gun and howitzer would be more suitable than 
the R.G.A. officer or N.C.O. Land ranges are not always available at 
our coast fortresses, and it may be necessary to train a unit at some place 
like Lydd, or wherever it is decided to establish the Lydd of the future. 

A thorough knowledge of the country in the vicinity of the fortress is 
essential for all ranks, and especially of the positions selected in the de¬ 
fence scheme to be occupied in the event of attacks from various points 
in the neighbourhood. 

A certain amount of practice over sea ranges should be carried out by 
howitzers from the actual positions that they would occupy covering 
possible landing places. 

If found practicable, all Infantry Militia Regiments 

Infantry Militia. . . , . .... 

should also train frequently at their mobilization station. 
There may be greater difficulties about this than a gunner officer can 
anticipate, but at any rate it should not be hard to get the C.O., his 
second in command, Adjutant and Quartermaster, with a good propor¬ 
tion of Captains of Companies, to attend every year at their mobilization 
stations for a few days, and given every opportunity of making them¬ 
selves thoroughly acquainted with all local conditions. 


84 


Conclusion. 

In conclusion, one must make one or two general remarks, about the 
Artillery personnel. We want more companies of R.G.A. at home. 
There are at the present moment 37 companies of R.G.A. at home and 
68 abroad. 

By the present system of finding drafts for foreign companies entirely 
from home companies, each of the latter has to feed about two foreign 
companies. Consequently, a company of R.G.A. at home is largely 
composed of recruits, and as men are trained they have to be drafted 
abroad. While this state of affairs exist, we can never be efficient at 
home. There is sufficient outcry already about the linked battalion sys¬ 
tem in the infantry. What would it be if each home battalion were 
asked to feed two battalions abroad, and not one? 

Of course it is urged that we have ample Militia and Volunteer Artil¬ 
lery to complete our home garrisons on mobilization. So we have in 
point of numbers, but their training is wholly inadequate. 

The nation is either ignorant of, or else deliberately shutting its eyes to 
this very vital question. Doubtless it is again a question £ s. d., but 
when it comes to be a matter of fighting for our national existence in a 
European war, the statesman who has cramped our R.G.A. personnel will 
have a grave responsibility on his shoulders. 

We have heard a good deal of debate on the Army generally, in the 
last few weeks, but never a word on the subject of coast defence. Why ? 
Because nobody seems to know anything about it, or to realize its national 
importance. 

Let us hope somebody will be found with knowledge enough and 
weight enough to voice its cause, before we see a foreign fleet off Spit- 
head or up the Hamoaze. If not, there will be a worse day for England 
than she has yet seen. 

It won't take an impossible number of men, it won’t take such an 
enormous sum of money, but it will require a first-class organiser, with a 
thorough grasp of all our requirements, and all our existing shortcomings, 
to bring our coast defences to that state of perfection which will be found 
to be essential, in case of war with a first-class naval power. 


85 


[Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, January, 1904.1 


The Defence of Harbours 
against Torpedo-boat attack. 

BY 

FRED T. JANE, ESQ. 

(A Lecture delivered at the Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, Thursday, 12th 

November, 1903.) 

MAJOR-GENERAL F. G. SLADE, C.B., R.A., 

Inspector-General of Royal Garrison Artillery, in the Chair. 


The CHAIRMAN: —Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure it is quite 
unnecessary for me to introduce to you the lecturer this evening. 
Several of us have had the pleasure of sitting under his spell, and I 
am sure all of us are familiar with his book which has been a very 
great help to the defenders of our coasts, and I will now ask him to 
favour us with his lecture. 

The LECTURER: —Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, in ven¬ 
turing to address you upon this subject of defence against torpedo 
craft, I would desire at the outset to call your attention to the gen¬ 
eral obscurity that exists on the question. By this I mean not only 
the absence of data, but the absence of any, what I may call, ''sealed 
pattern plan of defence. 

I do not see how we could have one as things are, for we have very 
little to go on. The most that we can go on in the way of facts we 
may take from the Chi no-Japanese War, which even if its results 
could be accepted as conclusive then, may be nullified now by the 
subsequent advent of the destroyer. However, let us first review the 
Chi no-Japanese operations at Wei-hai-Wei. 

There were altogether four attacks upon Wei-hai-Wei, and the de¬ 
fence consisted of three 1" or 1}4" iron steel hawsers with wooden 



86 


floats every ten yards and a boom of this sort was placed at each en¬ 
trance, but both booms had openings in them. The eastern entrance 
had two openings, there being one torpedo-boat one inshore protected 
by the forts that fell into the hands of the Japanese, and a larger one 
in the centre for big ships which was protected by mines, which the 
Japanese attempted to destroy, but only partially succeeded in doing. 
The forts guarding this entrance were already in the hands of the 
Japanese, and therefore from the gunners’ point of view Wei-hai- 
Wei can hardly be regarded as any criterion whatever. 

The points of interest about the attack worth noting are, that in 
the first attack of all, which was made on the 1st of February, when 
the Japanese boats came in they were sighted by the forts held by 
Japanese soldiers and fired at under the impression that they were 
Chinese boats. The boats then retreated untouched. 

The second attack, which was made on the 2d of February, was 
again a failure, as the Chinese sighted the boats as they were coming 
into harbour. They again retired at once. 

Then for the third attempt the scheme of attack w'as varied. A 
feint was made on one entrance by six boats, and the eastern entrance 
was attacked by twelve boats. It was an intensely cold night, there 
was no moon, it was about 3 o’clock in the morning. The Japanese 
lost two boats and one or two were very much damaged. Only one 
was hit by a 3-pr. The forts did nothing. In fact the Chinese forts, 
so far as could be ascertained, did not see the boats until they were 
more or less amongst the big ships. 

On the 4th, there was another attack, which was a complete sur¬ 
prise, in which they lost tw r o boats from ship fire. So that practically 
we have really very little to go on, so far as torpedo-boat operations 
in a time of war are concerned. 

All we may deduce I think from the Chino-Japanese affair is that 
the rule with the boats seems to have been, if once sighted and fired 
on, to retire at once and leave everything to the chance of getting in 
unseen on another occasion. 

Of course if this is to be the rule, defence will be a very easy thing, 
because a sharp look-out and a gun or two will be all that will be 
required. But we have to bear in mind the sort of attack, or what 
is likely to be the attack on us, may not be on similar lines to that 
which the Chinese met. I do not think we can assume that it would 
be the same. The Japanese were short of torpedo-boats and they 
could not afford to throw away what they had. Now-a-days torpedo- 


87 


boats have increased very rapidly and destroyers have multiplied ex¬ 
ceedingly, and I think we should take it for granted that if any attack 
is made, it will be pushed home as long as a single boat is left. 
Therefore the problem with regard to defence is to account for every 
single boat that attacks. Say, for instance, that twelve boats attack, 
it will not be much good accounting for eleven if one gets through. 

There might be attacks made upon us the first night of a war 
when the enemy would hope to find things unarranged for, and later 
on when attack was unsuspected because of long immunity. It is of 
course extremely improbable that we should have a blockaded fleet, 
but we should very likely have one or two injured ships. Attack 
is pretty sure to be pressed home as torpedo-boats are so much more 
plentiful now and a few can easily be spent on an off chance. 

The first question in relation to defence it seems to me is to find 
out what has got to be defended, whether the boats are coming with 
a view to securing any odd ship, damaged or otherwise, that may be 
in a harbour or whether their intention is to try to block up the docks 
and dock entrances by getting inside and torpedoing these. The 
latter perhaps is what we might be most in fear of and must expect to 
see attempted. 

Then if we take the various defence systems, every system seems 
to have its advantages and disadvantages. If we take the favorite sys¬ 
tem, No. 1 gun firing at No. 1 boat, No. 2 gun firing at No. 2 boat 
and so on, that in theory may be a very excellent system, but the de¬ 
fect of it is that in practice, No. 1 boat becomes No. 3 perhaps at 
one moment and No. 2 at another, and there is always the danger 
that No. 1 gun may be firing at No. 2 boat, and No. 2 gun at it also, 
leaving one boat neglected, and a practice of rushing based on the 
chances given by this system exists, and, if one of a dozen gets through, 
untold mischief may be done. 

There is also of course the question of what is to happen if more 
boats than guns should be used. 

Then take the zone system. There success depends upon doing a 
great deal with comparatively small armaments. If the boats, know¬ 
ing that the zone system is going to be employed, come in in bunches, 
then again there seems to be a very good chance of one boat managing 
to crawl through. If the boats would each enter each zone singly, their 
fates would be certain; but we cannot depend on that happening. 
Obviously the gun that has only one boat to fire at and the gun that 
has a dozen in its zone are very differently situated. Still, I incline 


88 


to fancy that the zone system is better than any other. But whatever 
system of defence is adopted, there is always grave danger in a lack 
of definite co-operation between the Army and the Navy, and I think 
there can be no doubt that if the two forces fail to act in concert, it 
would tend to help and assist any attacking boats more than anything 
else. 

As things are at present, we may assume, I think, that the shore 
defence would be entirely in the hands of the Army, but the Navy 
will, by having ships in the harbour, also be conducting some defence 
of its own. 

This defence will perhaps include picket boats and if the attacking 
boats realize, as they very likely will do, that there is a picket boat 
defence, they may manage to take advantage of it, and either our 
picket boats may get destroyed under the impression that they are a 
hostile craft or the hostile craft may slip through as picket boats; but 
the subject of picket boat defence I shall allude to later on. 

Next to gun fire, perhaps, search-lights form the most important 
part in all defence operations. The value of search-lights is I think 
a very debatable point. From my own experience on board torpedo- 
boats and destroyers rushing harbours, I think there is a great deal to 
be said both for and against the search-light. Of course for rushing 
in in peace time you are not firing any shotted guns, and therefore 
you cannot have any data to go on, as to how easy or difficult it may 
be for a destroyer coming in to fire at a search-light and perhaps pick 
it out, and then in the sudden gloom get in easily. 

Some experiments in Germany seem to have shown that it is not a 
difficult thing to hit the search-light. My own impression of search¬ 
lights is that when you are three or four miles out, they do not show 
you up, but they do show the way in, and show it tremendously 
clearly. This is perhaps more true of fixed beams than of searching 
ones; the difficulty to the attack comes in where the searching beam 
gets full on the boat, inasmuch as then the boat can see next to noth¬ 
ing, and when the light goes away or is evaded there is a sort of com¬ 
plete blindness; I think that the value of the search-light for defence 
is perhaps to flash it on to the eyes of the boat’s crew and then off 
again. Its use thus should lead very often to the boat going ashore 
or running into other boats from the temporary blindness that the 
flash has caused. 

The search-lights no doubt light the way in to some extent, so 
much so perhaps that the real value of them to defence is only the 


confusing effect they have on the attack. If the boats does evade the 
search ray it seems to me that it is not very likely to be picked up 
again, whereas if a deliberate flash system be adopted, there will be 
no need to bother about picking up. I am not sure that a good deal 
could not be done by a mechanically operated light. Exact experi¬ 
ments can hardly be carried out because of the danger involved in a 
really practical demonstration; but I may mention one walk in life 
in w T hich a somewhat similar system is carried out tolerably scientifi¬ 
cally and methodically. The ordinary policeman is often an adept in 
taking advantage of the impotence to which an assailant can be re¬ 
duced by judiciously alternated light and darkness. I certainly think 
that something valuable might be evolved by regarding the search¬ 
light as a weapon rather than as a substitute for daylight—its usual 
use. 

In harbour attack I notice a boat has great difficulty in evading the 
search beams at all, but at sea I have certainly noticed that the boats 
manage to evade the beams very well, and I think that in war time a 
boat coming into harbour and trying to manoeuvre in order to evade 
the light would be manoeuvring differently to what it is in peace 
time; when the officers in command of the attacking boats do not care 
to run any unnecessary risk which is not warranted. But in war time 
where the question of retreat and attack comes in, I think a boat 
dodging about might possibly get out of the range of the searching 
beams and not be picked up again. In that case the searching beams 
would be to your disadvantage; but the great point altogether about 
the search-lights is that it seems very little thought has been devoted 
to the question of fighting search-lights with return lights. It was 
tried the other dav at Portland when destroyers slipped in, and as 
soon as they were sighted switched their lighs on to the forts and 
opened a heavy rifle fire on the men at the guns, and it is an inter¬ 
esting question as to what would happen in war time. This more or 
less unexpected rifle fire, coupled with the glare of the attack’s search¬ 
lights, must have a very disorganizing effect on the defence for sev¬ 
eral minutes, say, for long enough to allow a certain proportion of 
the boats to slip through unhurt or nearly so. 

The question that requires an answer is, how that sort of thing is 
to be met? Everything depends as I said before upon the point— 
which is of more importance than anything else—that nothing must 
be allowed to get through. How to stop the boat getting through 
therefore becomes a doubly important problem. It is not so much that 


90 


♦ 


the boat has to be sunk, but it has got to be stopped from doing any 
mischief before it goes under. 

Supposing a modern destroyer was hit by one 12-pr. shell, it is ex¬ 
tremely improbable that that 12-pr. shell would sink her. 

Then we will say that a foreign destroyer is attacking Portsmouth; 
supposing she gets up' by Clarence Pier and she gets a 12-pr. shell 
into her, will that boat stop there or will she drift right on up har¬ 
bour where she could ease off her torpedoes before she settled down 
for good. 

That is why I think the Maxims might be an extremely useful ad¬ 
junct to the defence, both alongside the 12-prs. in the batteries and 
also where they are never put at all, that is at the entrance to the 
docks; so that supposing the boat is coming up, a Maxim fire can be 
directed on her sufficient to kill anybody at the tubes. The danger 
from the boat lies entirely with the men at her torpedo tubes, and to 
destroy the personnel in that case would be as good as destroying the 
boat. 

Then the question with regard to booms is a very vexed one indeed. 
I believe the theory in the Navy is that the Navy can always jump 
the most ideal of booms; but in British harbours at any rate we can¬ 
not have those, for we must have ways for getting in fairly quickly 
and ways for getting out fairly quickly. This means entrances, and 
supposing these entrances to be only opened to let ships in or out, 
there is always the chance of an attack being made about that time. 

We may assume that, supposing an attack to be made at all, one 
will very likely be made immediately war is declared or possibly a 
little before. The scouts which in the ordinary way might be lying 
off a harbour may not be out then, or they may be evaded. The 
theory animating the boats, certainly the one that animates the 
French torpedo flotillas, is that if they can only make their attack 
sufficiently early in the war they will come in at the time when every¬ 
thing is not quite ready—when perhaps the men are not all told off 
to their stations, and that they will get their chance to look in then, 
but quite as likely attacks might be expected several days after the war 
had commenced, when the first vigilance of the defenders had begun 
to slacken, especially in the early hours of the morning. 

Supposing the booms to be an adjunct with a mine-field, the Chinese 
at Wei-hai-Wei had some mines, and it was reported on one occasion 
that some of these were exploded as the boats were passing, but the 
Japanese say that no damage whatever was sustained by them, and 


91 





they rather had a theory that the mine would probably not hurt such 
a little thing as a boat rushing in. But whatever kind of mine is 
adopted, it may be taken for granted, I suppose, that the enemy will 
try and countermine, and if they countermine then it appears to me 
that there will be very great danger of the defence’s attention being 
distracted by this countermining and possibly a certain amount of fir¬ 
ing in that direction will be carried on by the enemy to secure a 
chance to make a second attack from some other point and so slip in. 

I herefore perhaps the question might be gone into more than it is 
, as to whether mines are or are not to be regarded as part of a harbour de¬ 
fence against torpedo craft, and, if so, whether a special kind of mine 
might not be served out to harbours intended solely to meet torpedo- 
boat attack. On the whole I fancy that the danger of distraction 
that countermining operations may afford, will render the mine de¬ 
fence a curse rather than a blessing to the defenders. 

The submarine boat presents as grave a danger perhaps as any other 
form of attack. We are just beginning now to worry ourselves about 
submarine boat attack, and the question is how is it to be met? It 
w r ill presumably have to be met by booms with nets below the surface 
in conjunction with a series of mines, but it is a very difficult prob¬ 
lem. The gun is no good against submarines. The boat cannot very 
well be shot from the shore by any existing gun. The odds against 
hitting it are tremendous, even if it be awash; if it is coming in sub¬ 
merged, it is about a million to one that the periscope will not be 
hit; and even were it hit, the boat would still exist. It can still pop 
up and then disappear again. The first question that arises with 
regards to the best defence of a harbour against submarines is that it 
will probably need an exceedingly good and skilful commander to take 
a torpedo-boat up any harbour that we have. A thorough knowledge 
of the tides would hardly be his, the knowledge of the currents would 
not be his, and although he might possibly be able to do it in peace 
time, in war time, in the case of a submarine attacking a strange 
harbour under fire, we may, I think, rest assured that the probability 
is that it would get flurried. We might also be able to secure a boom 
with torpedo nets down below in which the boat would get caught 
up. But unless there is a certain amount of flurry and risk to the 
boat, I do not see what is to prevent the boat being armed with appli¬ 
ances to cut through the boom. 

Or we might let the boat go cheerfully up inside the harbour and 
deal with it there. That would necessitate the employment of picket 



92 


boats with spar torpedoes,but the spar attack against submarines does not 
seem to be altogether so successful as newspaper accounts make out. 
The submarines seem to be rather a difficult thing to stop in that way. 

This question of submarine attack stands to be the problem of the 
future. What is to be done? Whatever device is thought of, any¬ 
body who has to do with submarines will waive it aside and say, 
tf Oh, but submarines will get in.” But even if we refuse to admit 
that to-day, although the submarine of to-day may be a defective 
weapon, the submarine of the early future will possibly be something 
very different indeed, and I do not see what we are going to do with 
the means for defence available at present. 

I think this is a problem that will probably have to be left to the 
Navy to solve—this defence against submarine boats coming in. But 
as they would be more likely to attack the harbours with fleets in 
them than not, they would come under the Navy’s province as things 
are at present. 

That brings us back again to the old problem of divided control. 
My own theory is that the ideal arrangement would be that harbours 
should be absolutely defended by the Army or by the Navy, by one 
and not by the other, and in view of the fact that the Navy out at sea 
will be put to a tremendous strain in guarding against torpedo attack, 
the strain for instance of steaming full speed, and possibly the strain 
of battle, it appears to me to be exceedingly necessary that the Army 
should be able to guarantee absolute peace to it when coming into 
port. But the Army certainly is not likely to be able to guarantee 
that absolute peace if the Navy is carrying out one scheme on the 
water and the Army carrying out another ashore. If everything is 
left to the soldiers in regard to defence, then booms, mines and so on 
are much less likely to be sources of, I will not say disagreement, but 
of misunderstanding than as things are now. 

I bel ieve it is generally understood that if we go to war, there is 
likely to be a good deal of misunderstanding about mine fields, and I 
think that if the water inside a port or a harbour instead of belong¬ 
ing to the Navy belongs to the Army, we should be better able to 
guard against troubles of that sort. The alternative would be, sup¬ 
posing this Army control to be objected to, to have a certain number 
of harbours like Portland in which the defence was entirely left to 
the ships inside it, and bases like Portsmouth which would not have 
fleets lying in them, but docks and things of that sort to be defended, 
should be left entirely to the Army to control and defend. 


93 


This would of course necessitate to a greater degree even than at pres¬ 
ent the study of each individual harbour, a knowledge of all its currents, 
its tides and shoals, all of which is best picked up by boating. I believe 
that there is a very good knowledge of most of our harbours on the 
part of many of the officers of the Garrison gunners which they have 
acquired by boating and they seem to be thoroughly acquainted with 
every shoal. In case of attack by hostile torpedo craft this knowledge 
should be invaluable to them, because they would know better then 
where to expect attack and be better prepared to meet it. 

The second point would be to learn thoroughly the draughts of all 
probable enemies. Of course where there are we will say a hundred 
boats all drawing under 10 feet of water, it is not very much satis¬ 
faction to know that if twelve boats are attacked they are some of the 
hundred. But there are always a certain number of largish boats 
which cannot attack certain harbours. If all the draughts were known 
and studied, then the attacking force would be known or guessed at 
before it was properly seen and the defence could be conducted more 
satisfactorily. 

Then I think it would be very necessary to study carefully what 
damage the enemy can do inside a harbour and guard against it. Say 
for instance what damage could an enemy do inside Portsmouth? 
He might run in perhaps at the western entrance or he might run in 
at the eastern, but supposing him to succeed in evading the guns 
there, and to get inside and come up the channel into the harbour 
where there is a very nasty twist, any hits in the steering gear of any 
boats coming up there would be extremely useful to the defence; but 
we might have another sort of harbour where the hitting of the steer¬ 
ing gear would not be of any use whatever. Then supposing them to 
pass the Blockhouse at Portsmouth and to get inside the narrow part, 
what is to be done to them there, and who is to look after them if 
they do get there? 

I have not heard myself who is to look after a foreign boat which 
does get inside Portsmouth harbour, whether it is to be left to the 
ships that may or may not happen to be lying there, or whether guns 
would be specially told off for the purpose. But certainly I do not 
think, from what foreign officers with whom I have conversed upon 
the subject say, that we have provided all the defence we might for a 
boat that does manage to get past and so get loose in the harbour. 
The boat would not reckon on coming out again, it would have done 
its work five minutes after it had got inside. The question is what 


94 


is to be done with that boat when it is inside? The principal object 
of the defence when attack is being made, and when the boats are 
coming in, will be I take it, not so much to sink the boat as to stop 
her doing mischief. Sinking her of course is the surest way of deal¬ 
ing with her, but owing to the difficulty of sinking her at once it 
may be advisable to have a supplementary defence, and that is the 
reason I suggested the Maxims and Nordenfeldts. Suppose a new 
sort of Nordenfeldt, set up on end, and firing across a zone. If a boat 
were coming, say, with in a range it may be of 50 or 100 or 150 yards, and 
the Nordenfeldt were put the wrong way up as it were, one barrel 
would hit at 50 yards, one at 100 and the other at 150; and I think 
that if a gun of that sort were invented it would be rather an ideal 
weapon for the defence of harbours, and if several of these guns were 
placed at intervals which would make zones of fire through which every 
boat would be compelled to pass, a great advantage to the defence must be 
effected. The guns on beyond would then be able to deal with any¬ 
thing that got through the zone of this fire, but the zone of fire from 
Nordenfeldt bullets and Maxim’s on a destroyer or torpedo-boat, would 
be a very serious thing indeed. Supposing a Nordenfeldt bullet to 
get inside the engine room, it would do as much harm as a 12-pr. 
A 12-pr. of course would blow things about a great deal more but the 
boat would still have her way on her. 

Now supposing her, instead of that one 12-pr. to be hit by ten or 
twenty Nordenfeldt bullets distributed about in various parts, of 
course we may ask ourselves which is going to do the more harm. 
We know she will ultimately sink from the effect of the 12-pr. hit, 
but what will she do before she sinks? Supposing one or two bullets 
to get into the engines, the question is whether the total result of 
those or the accumulation of those may not be much more serious 
against the boat than the one put from the larger piece? 

The new British cruisers appear to be armed on an idea not alto¬ 
gether different to this. As I understand the latest cruisers are not to 
he fitted with the 12-pr. but with a larger number of 3-prs. on the prin¬ 
ciple of getting more hits with less individual damage for isolated shots. 

I think this matter of naval ingenuity should always be very care¬ 
fully studied. Naval men are remarkably ingenious, and although 
the torpedo attacks we get, occuring as they do in time of peace, do 
not show it to the full, yet I think in time of war we should fully 
realize the great advantage that would accrue from a study of this 
very important branch of the subject of defence. 


95 


T he case that 1 quoted of an attack on Portland where the boats 
stole up and when they were sighted, switched on their search-lights 
and then opened a heavy fire—that is the sort of thing that should be 
very much thought out I think, and we should ask ourselves what 
other little devices are there of that sort that boats might employ? 

I think we might find our ideal defence if the gunners were all sent 
out in the torpedo-boats and destroyers and the naval men were put 
in the forts. The gunners out in the boats would know all the weak 
points of the forts and the boats would be manoeuvred to come in in 
the best way against the forts, and that would furnish valuable data 
afterwards to know r from what point the greatest danger might be 
expected, whereas the method in which the naval men conducted 
operations against the boats would possibly give a few valuable 
wrinkles that had not been thought of before. Naval men would 
naturally best understand what would be likely to damage boats very 
considerably. 

I do not think that this kind of thing is likely to come about, but 
there have been steps in that direction, which I think everbyody 
should be extremely glad to see. Lately Garrison gunners have been 
out in torpedo-boats watching the attack, and from all I hear I 
think that seeing the thing from the other point of view has been 
of very great assistance indeed to those who will have to defend our 
harbours in war time. Being in a boat slipping in, and realizing the 
joy of slipping in which exists in the torpedo-boat, should enable the 
gunner to realize very fully indeed not only the ease or difficulty, as 
the case might be, of the slipping in; but the meaning of what a 
single boat out of a dozen slipping past would be. 

It might be well to add that a combined attack is a thing that 
might very possibly happen; that is to say an attack we will say of 
12 torpedo-boats or destroyers, supported by one or two cruisers, seiz¬ 
ing a favorable moment. We will assume, for the sake of argument, 
that a British fleet is in the channel and that it goes in chase of a 
foreign fleet, and we will assume that this British and foreign fleet 
are in touch, the cruisers of either side operating together, cruising 
and scouting together, that is the time at which one or two cruisers 
attached to the hostile fleet might be detached in order to make a 
rush on a place like Portsmouth, where if the channel could be 
blocked up or the docks destroyed, incalculable mischief would 
result. If the torpedo attack were supported by cruisers, (of course we 
could not be sure that it would be—we may hope it would not be 


96 


but we cannot fail to recognize that such a thing is possible)and the 
cruisers came in and opened a heavy fire, under cover of which the 
boats could rush in, I think we should have an ideal attack from the 
attacking point of view. It is one which will be more dangerous 
than anything else, this attack of ships coming in unexpectedly with 
the object of creating a diversion, sending shells higgledy-piggledy 
about and round the forts, and then under the cover of the smoke and 
confusion torpedo-boats rushing in all of a heap, in the hope that 
one boat will get through, never mind what becomes of the rest. 
That, I think, is the form of attack that we must especially prepare 
for. In it there will always be danger; while any other form of at¬ 
tack will probably be doomed to failure. (Applause.) 

DISCUSSION. 

The CHAIRMAN:—I will now ask Admiral May if he will open 
the discussion with any remarks he may wish to make upon the lec¬ 
ture. 

Rear-Admiral H. J. MAY, C.B.:—General Slade, ladies and gentle¬ 
men. The point which, as a naval officer, I consider most worthy of 
discussion, is the general condition of an attack by torpedo-boats on 
a ship or ships in harbour. 

We consider that when an attack is made on a ship or squadron at 
sea the odds are fairly balanced with regard to the chance of the boats 
succeeding, but immediately the ship gets into harbour the pendulum 
swings very greatly against the boats. First it is not easy to find a 
ship in harbour, she may get away into some corner where it is very 
difficult to see her, again she can get her nets out, she can have the 
shelter of a boom, and finally there are the garrison gunners on shore 
who will attack the boats as they come in. So that I do not think 
that the ordinary above-water boat is such a dangerous opponent to 
a ship in a fortified harbour as many people imagine, nor do I quite 
agree with what has been said on the question with reference to the 
dock gate. The dock gate is a very small thing, and it is a very easy 
matter to rig a raft or small boom with nets across the dock gate, 
when an attacking boat would find it a very difficult thing to get 
even its money’s worth for the torpedoes fired out of an attempt made 
against a cassion thus protected. But conditions are changing; we 
have heard a little about submarine boats to-night, and we shall hear 
more in the future. Of one thing I am sure, that the above-water 
boat, with her big engines and her great vulnerability to guns, is not 


at all the best boat to use for the purpose of conducting an attack 
upon a ship at anchor where speed is not of great moment. The low 
speed of the submarine class of boat, which handicaps her at sea, is 
quite sufficient for carrying out an attack in harbour. But the sub¬ 
marine cannot be dealt with by guns from the shore. She must be 
met afloat, and that seems to me to be the pressing problem that has 
to be solved at the present time. 

A year or two ago it was true that owing to the deadly fire of Q.F. 
guns it was quite unnecessary to have any guard boats afloat. But 
that day is gone, and under present day conditions with which our 
gunners have to deal, the defence will have to be much more afloat 
than it has been, and consequently there will have to be better co¬ 
operation between the Navy and the Army. 

We have many instances in history of combined operations being 
carried on just on the edge of the shore. Those operations were 
usually successful when the Navy and the Army worked together 
harmoniously, but otherwise there was confusion and failure. When 
boats are used it is essential that the garrison gunners should be 
familiar with the officers in the boats and that the naval officers 
should frequently go ashore to the batteries. There must also be 
complete harmony between the commanding officers, and then things 
will go well. It may be that changes in organisation are desirable 
to promote the working in unison of the two services, but what we 
have got to see to at the present time is, when we are fighting together 
on the edge of the water, some being on shore and some afloat, that 
whatever we call ourselves, being all the King’s officers, we must 
work together harmoniously. 

With regard to the question of the guns on shore for opposing 
boats. The 12-pr. does not altogether commend itself to me as the 
most satisfactory defence weapon. A gun is wanted that will quickly 
stop a boat, and for this purpose a high explosive shell is the best pro¬ 
jectile. But the 12-pr. cannot fire lyddite. An ordinary powder 
shell hitting a boat high up, passing through the funnel or upper 
works will do no harm at all. But a lyddite shell detonating on 
funnel or venilator, will stop the boat. The cruisers mentioned by 
Mr. Jane have 6-inch guns as well as 3-prs. and it is the former gun 
that is most deadly. The 47" gun is a very good gun, and though 
such guns are big and expensive, there is much in their favour, 
especially when combined with 3-prs. or Maxims for attacking the 
exposed officers and men on deck. As long as people in the torpedo 


craft know they are going to be fired at by good sized shell, they will 
very wisely keep as high up as possible clear of anything that will 
make splinters. Those men can all be knocked out by a Maxim. 
The only drawback that I know of about the Maxim is that the 
Maixm makes a tremendous glare at nights; it gives one continuous 
glare of flashes; so that I think the ideal gun is the smallest gun that 
can fire a high explosive shell, supplemented by something in the 
Maxim way that will put a lot of bullets on to the deck of a craft in 
a very short time. And finally there is the counter attack to be con¬ 
sidered. 

I can hardly conceive that if you have a considerable naval force in 
harbour, they will tamely remain on the defensive doing nothing. 
All history tells us that what the enemy fear most when they ap¬ 
proach a British harbour is not the excellent guns on shore and the 
excellent gunners behind them, but the counter attack and pursuit on 
the water, which makes it very difficult for them to get home again, 
and we should undoubtedly, where there are ships in harbour, have 
a certain number of destroyers or similar craft not only to deal with 
submarines, but also to prevent the enemy’s boats from getting back 
to their ports. And I am sure the gunners will realize that whatever 
the designation of the defenders, and whatever their uniform and 
whether they work afloat or on shore, it is above all things necessary 
that they work together. (Applause.) 

Colonel H. BARRON, R.A.:—General Slade, ladies and gentle¬ 
men, might I first as a garrison gunner thank Mr. Jane for his kind¬ 
ness in coming here and lecturing to us as he has done this evening. 
Last year when he lectured on the defence of our fortresses he gave 
us the greatest possible encouragement, and told us that we were very 
likely to be attacked and that our chance would come. Admiral May 
I think seems to take the contrary view, that we as Garrison gunners 
are of little use as we should never be attacked. 

Mr. Jane has mentioned the subject of the co-operation of the 
Army and Navy and I am sure nobody more heartily wishes for it than 
I do. And he also mentioned picket boats and other boats which 
might be employed about our harbours to protect us. I can only say 
that I sincerely wish naval officers would work more thoroughly with 
the soldiers than, according to my experience, they do at present. I 
was present at the torpedo-boat manoeuvres at Milford Haven this 
year. We got continual warnings from the look-outs at the sentry 
beams of the approach of apparently hostile torpedo-boats. These 


99 


latter proved in nearly every case to be our own friendly boats which 
were either returning to harbour or waiting about the entrance to 
watch for the approach of an enemy. The gunners were never in¬ 
formed of the intention to use these boats in assisting the defence 
and the result was that friendly boats were occasionally fired at. 1 
have constantly in these manoeuvres seen friendly torpedo-boats fired 
at, but in every case the gunners on shore were not to blame. 

Th en Mr. Jane has mentioned the subject of the distribution of 
fire, that is to say, what arrangements should be made to insure that 
no hostile craft escapes being fired on. It is to all garrison gunners 
a verv difficult problem. It has been talked about I am sure in every 
coast fortress, the people on the spot have discussed it and they have 
devised what they consider the best system. I think it must depend 
entirely upon local considerations; you cannot lay down any hard and 
fast rules upon the subject. The only thing you can do is to impress 
upon everybody the importance of it. 

Then Mr. Jane talked about the lights and the question of attack¬ 
ing our lights. I must say I think myself that we have not gone 
sufficiently into the question of shuttering our lights, that is to say, 
putting out some of our lights until they are really required. 

It need not be necessary to expose some of our lights till the actual 
torpedo-boat attack was imminent. We must, however, be certain of 
an efficient system of warning from outside of the imminence of the 
attack or the defence might be caught napping. 

I maintain that we cannot efficiently protect our harbours from tor¬ 
pedo-boat attack unless the Navy will help us with boats for scouting. 
Three years ago I was at Plymouth during naval attacks by destroy¬ 
ers. I went out one night with Captain Hamilton, who was in 
charge of the flotilla, and just outside our lights there was a destroyer 
at anchor without lights waiting to run in when the mist, which was 
very probable, came on in the early morning. The gunners are tied to 
their guns, they cannot go out in boats and reconnoitre, and I think 
it is highly important that they should have some means of com¬ 
munication with outside to show if anything is waiting to come in. 

As regards the question of the 12-pr. gun for defence against torpedo- 
boats. Some few years ago at Shoeburyness I was mentioning to a dis¬ 
tinguished Admiral the number of hits per gun per minute we hoped 
to get on a torpedo-boat. His answer was "Why talk of the number, 
one in the right place would be sufficient." The engine room space 
is, I believe, something like rV of the length, and one 12-pr. shell 


100 


should be sufficient, not necessarily to sink the ship but to stop it. 
Of course we have other ways of stopping it, either by driving it on 
mud, or by the destruction of the personnel. 

I think it is a pity that the majority of the old heavy muzzle loading 
guns, which used to be at the entrance of comparatively narrow 
channels, have been removed. 

Their value with heavy case shot against torpedo-boats has been 
conclusively proved in practice recently carried out at Sheerness. 
All officers who witnessed the practice were of opinion that no boat 
could have lived in the hail of bullets. 

Then Mr. Jane mentioned the subject of the Army having full 
control. I am sure we shall be delighted as soldiers to take full con¬ 
trol and do everything. I fear, however, that his suggestion that 
gunners should take out the torpedo-boats and the sailors take the shore 
defences in our next manoeuvres, might be an expensive one, result¬ 
ing in the expenditure of some of the boats. 

A great deal, however, is being done and valuable information 
obtained by the presence of Artillery officers on torpedo-boats when 
an attack takes place. 

The CHAIRMAN: —Ladies and gentlemen, as nobody else seems 
inclined to add any further remarks to the discussion and it is getting 
late, I think I may sum up with a few remarks of my own. 

I should like in the first place to ask Mr. Jane if the harbour 
entrances which were attacked at Wei-hai-Wei were defended by 
electric lights? 

Mr. JANE: —They are supposed to have been lit from lights from 
the fleet, but they were probably defective lights. 

The CHAIRMAN: —Because of course that would make a very 
great deal of difference to the facilities of entry by the torpedo-boats. 

Mr. JANE: —I cannot say for certain how they were lit, but there 
were no fixed beams certainly. It was always spoken of as being 
quite dark as they came in. 

The CHAIRMAN: —Then with regard to picket boats; we are told 
that in war time the land defence will receive no assistance whatever 
from the Navy as regards scouting, and I think that the occasion 
which Colonel Barron alluded to just now, when friendly boats 
scouted outside Milford Haven, was strongly in opposition to all 
custom and to what would really occur in warfare. The question of 
the examination service has never been touched upon, either by the 
Lecturer or during the discussion, but such a possibility as that of a 


101 


friendly boat coming in, in the way described by Colonel Barron would 
be almost an impossibility if the examination service had been carried 
out correctly. 

Much has been said about disguising tordepo-boats, but I am of 
opinion that this will not be resorted to in time of war. To dis¬ 
guise a boat by adding masts, yards, extra funnels, higher bulwarks, 
&c., would seriously interfere with her navigation and action, and 
just at the time that the highest speed and greatest invisibility is 
required, the boat would find herself hampered by these additions. 
In the course of my inspections, I have seen some very curious dis¬ 
guises, and one was in the case of a destroyer. They put an extra 
funnel in her, repainted the hull, and lit her steaming lights, and then 
towed an old smack towards the harbour, with the result that directly 
she got to the examination line the whole thing was discovered, and 
the ruse failed. 

Another was in the case of a torpedo-boat disguised as a yacht. 
The weather was very calm, there was no wind whatever, but at one 
moment she was at a bearing of about 280°, and in two or three 
minutes after she was at about 250°, and any gunner would know 
that that boat could not possibly have sailed that distance in so very 
short a time. I do not think any disguise which hampers a boat’s 
action will ever be adopted in time of war. 

With regard to the question of Maxims in quick firing batteries, 
I think they are necessary in Q.F. batteries, and also at dock en¬ 
trances. Mr. Jane mentioned the possibility of a destroyer throwing 
her own light on the defender, and I think that is a very important 
matter. I saw an instance of that very thing last year, and drew at¬ 
tention to the possibility of its occurring in war, asking that the 
question might be considered. The destroyer came in very fast 
indeed and immediately she was lit up she opened fire with all her 
guns and turned her search-lights on the batteries. The effect was 
curious. It dazzled all the men in the batteries, and certainly inter¬ 
fered with the laying, but I think the lights showed her up to such 
an extent that she must have been sunk. However, what struck me 
most, was, that she appeared to draw the fire of all the batteries just 
for the moment, and as there was another boat behind her, which 
had no lights, the latter certainly had a very good chance of getting in. 

As regards an attack by torpedo-boats on dock gates, it must be 
remembered that the outer gates, as a rule, .are not those leading 
directly into the dock itself, but into a chamber, or outer dock, the 

/ 


102 


water level of which, is the same as that of the harbour; so that 
when a submarine or torpedo-boat has forced the outer gate, he still 
must negotiate the inner one, which is his real objective, and to do 
this in the face of a few machine guns and infantry rifles, and im¬ 
peded by the debris of the outer gates, will be a hazardous, if not 
impossible undertaking. Speed or immersion will not assist him. 

I quite agree with what Colonel Barron said about the distribution 
of fire. I consider it a matter of the very greatest importance, and 
one that should be very carefully studied. No hard and fast rules can 
be laid down, and every fortress should have a special scheme, worked 
out with regard to the local conditions, viz., the configuration of 
the coast line, the position and breadth of navigable channels, rise 
and fall of tide, shoals and banks, position of other guns of the de¬ 
fence, illuminated areas, arcs of search-lights, See. 

With regard to what has been said about the co-operation between 
the two services, I think it is a matter that is receiving the consid¬ 
eration of every one, and I notice that of late years it has much in¬ 
creased, especially abroad, where the officers of the two services are so 
much more thrown together socially. When commanding the Artil¬ 
lery at Gibraltar, the Admiral always appointed an officer, generally 
a Gunnery Lieutenant, to be attached to my staff during combined 
operations. He lived with me, and made notes of both the action 
taken by the defenders, as well as what the enemy did from a de¬ 
fender’s point of view. This was of great assistance to me in draw¬ 
ing up the results of the operations, and was what you may call satis¬ 
factory co-operation. I recommend that this should be done oftener. 
(Applause.) 

With regard to search-lights, I quite agree with what fell from 
Colonel Barron, that you cannot douse the lights that are absolutely 
at the entrances to ports, but there are harbours where there exists a 
second line of lights, and I think that that second line of lights in 
the rear of the others, ought to be kept doused until the alarm is given. 
A point which has not been touched on is the possibility of the elec¬ 
tric light emplacements being destroyed by gun fire, and the necessity 
for their better protection. This is a serious question, as it is quite 
possible for a cruisers, supporting a torpedo-boat attack, to lay out 
on a flank, and concentrate her fire on an electric light emplacement, 
whose light is not directed on her. 

I do not think there is anything more I can add. I have only to 
thank Mr. Jane very much for the lecture he has been kind enough to 


103 


give us, and I would be very much obliged if he would be good 
enough now to favour us with any remarks he may have to make upon 
the discussion that has just taken place. 

REPLY. 

Mr. JANE: —General Slade, lad ies and gentlemen, it being late, I 
must keep my remarks within as short a compass as possible. With 
regard to the question of dock gates which was referred to by Ad¬ 
miral May, I think, although the damage that might be done may be 
very little, the point is that there seems to be no scheme in existence 
for defending them at the present moment. The ships may be lying 
in harbour, but it is certainly not the duty of the ships in harbour, 
as things are now, to look after the entrance to the dockyard, and 
there are no forts there to do it, and that is why I am suggesting in 
particular the defence of dock gates, so as to take away all chances of 
mischief in that direction as far as possible. 

I think we may say that torpedo defence is looked at by the Navy 
as an entirely naval matter and by the Army as an Army matter—that 
is to say, that torpedo-boats from the naval officers’ point of view 
come in simply with the object of trying to smash a ship, but I think 
we might realize the fact that there are lots of things they might do 
in the way of mischief. For instance, there is the moral mis¬ 
chief, and the moral mischief they might do, looking at the matter 
entirely from a torpedo point of view is this:—Inside Portsmouth 
harbour there are ships and coal hulks and other things which they 
might destroy, and the moral effect of this would be very great. 
Indeed, I fancy that if the boats got inside and did nothing at all, the 
fact that they had been in would be a moral victory of value to them. 

Then with regard to the question of divided control, that is a mat¬ 
ter which I feel very strongly upon and have written a good deal 
about. It appears to me that we may make as pleasant compromises 
as we like and we may possibly devise some means by which the two 
services might act generally in unison, but there is no guarantee that 
they would do so, and although we may hope and say that they should 
be quite agreed with regard to the line of defence, the question of 
defence is such a very vague subject and a subject upon which so 
many opinions exist, that it is quite likely the two arms would hold 
diametrically opposite opinions. If they do what is going to happen 
to the defence? We rather ignore this and leave it to luck. We 
simply say we hope it will be all right, but I do not think we can be 


104 


sure of securing that unison to which I have just referred. As long 
as we have got a system that part of the defence has got to be looked 
after by one arm and part has got to be looked after by the other arm, 
each having different ideals, we run grave danger. I am still of opin¬ 
ion that the proper role of the Garrison gunner is not the mere 
''privilege of rendering the Navy such assistance as he may be able to 
supply.” I cannot but feel that that is a very wrong view. We have 
to think of facts as they are to-day—it is no good bothering about how 
the thing worked in the Nelson period. In the next war, ships com¬ 
ing into harbour will come with crews dead beat, and they will 
come to rest these crews. I think, therefore, that the entire defence 
of the harbour should be left to the military; if the matter be left un¬ 
decided till war is on us, a muddle is the best that we can expect. 
I can see nothing in divided control except assistance to the enemy. 

Then upon the question of the 12-pr. and the single hit, except 
in the case of hitting a boat, I am afraid I must disagree with Colonel 
Barron on the ground that I do not think anybody in the Navy would 
believe it. A great deal of study has been given to the question of 
how much hitting boats can stand, and I found that all of those 
whom I have ever consulted upon the subject are strongly of opinion 
that it is absolutely impossible to sink a boat right away with any¬ 
thing less than a 6-inch. Their contention is that if a boat is coming 
in at the rate of 30 knots her way will carry her on, and that is what 
they base the thing upon. The average torpedo man is of course in 
danger of being unduly enthusiastic about his craft. Still, I fancy it 
will be safer for gunners to think boats more difficult to sink than 
they actually may be than to hold the opposite opinion, and so under¬ 
estimate the attack. 

The question with regard to Maxims which was raised by General 
Slade, I have already referred to before. About the dockyard gates 
and the protection of all things inside the harbours, and the thinking 
out of all these matters. I think the main question is:—What will 
he the effect of the attack; what will the enemy be going for; what 
mischief can he do if he gets inside? 1 o apply this to every base 
and then to guard in the case of every individual harbour against the 
particular attack that threatens it most. (Applause.) 

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I will now ask you to 
allow me to close the meeting with a vote of thanks to Mr. Jane for 
his very interesting lecture. (Cheers.) 


105 


I Reprinted from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, May, 1904 .] 


Coast Defence from 
an Imperial Standpoint. 

BY 

COLONEL E. W. COTTER, h. p., R.E. 

Wednesday, 17th February, 1904. 

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HUGH MacCALMONT, K.C.B., 

in the Chair. 


In a lecture limited in duration to one hour it would be impossible 
to treat the subject of Coast Defence in detail; I therefore confine 
myself first to a general outline of the principles on which, in my 
opinion, coast defence should be based, and follow with an illustra¬ 
tion of the application of those principles. 

A statesman has recently told us that he could never get an answer 
to the question: "What is the object of the British Army?" At last 
we seem to be agreed that to answer the question correctly it is nec¬ 
essary to study our whole Imperial position. Only when we have 
done that can we arrive at a sound decision as to the size and con¬ 
stitution, not merely of our Army, but of all the Services connected 
with national defence. 

I asked myself, "What is the object of coast defence, what should 
be its nature, and what its extent?" and I came to the conclusion that, 
like the rest of the Services connected with national defence, it 
should be treated on the broadest lines, because its object, nature and 
extent will depend on the relative power of our Navy, and the objects 
for which that Navy exists. 

My argument is as follows:— 

1. It is of vital importance to us to have command of the sea, in 
order to keep open our Imperial communications and protect our 
seaborne trade. If we fail in that we fail in all, and coast de¬ 
fence would be worthless. 


to 



106 


2. As we must keep command of the sea, we do not require coast 
defence to protect us from invasion by a large Army; the utmost 
that we need fear is raiding by small forces, which can most 
cheaply be met by placing small mobile garrisons near such points 
as are of sufficient importance to tempt a raid. 

3. In order to keep command of the sea, it is necessary to secure 
permanently throughout a war those harbours whence our Navy 
draws its ships, its men, and its stores, and, in order to give 
freedom to our seaborne trade, it is necessary to secure our princi¬ 
pal commercial ports. 

4. If we relied on our sea-going fleets to secure permanently the 
safety of our naval bases and our chief commercial ports, it would 
be necessary to have, within striking distance of each such 
place, a fleet equal to the whole fleet of the enemy in being at 
each period of a war—a wholly impossible idea. 

5. It is possible to secure the harbours by defences placed on or 
based,on the land, without inordinate expense. 

The first four points I consider truisms which require merely to be 
stated; the last point, however, requires to be supported. 

The truth of the point depends on two main reasons. First: In 
order to secure our harbours by land defences, it is not necessary to 
have anything like the power which would be required if we relied 
solely on a fleet, because the land defences need only have sufficient 
power to ensure that an enemy will suffer more loss in getting posses¬ 
sion of the harbour than we will suffer by losing possession. The 
strength of the coast defence of a country like ours, which has to 
retain command of the sea, does not depend on the strength of its 
weakest defended port; it is sufficient to defend each port relatively 
to its importance. As far as I know, this theorem, on which all our 
coast defences should be based, has never before been publicly formu¬ 
lated; but common-sense has brought about nearly the required result, 
for we have never fortified unimportant places as heavily as places of 
more importance. None the less, I think it is of manifest advantage 
that the principle and the reason for it should be enunciated. The 
theorem does not apply to defence by a fleet, because the very exist¬ 
ence of that fleet would induce a superior inimical fleet to attack and 
destroy it, after which the port, if not otherwise defended, would be 
at the enemy’s mercy. 

The second reason in favour of the altogether greater economy of 
coast defence as compared with defence by a fleet is the fact that not 


I 


only do we require less power, but that this lesser power can be ob¬ 
tained on land at far less expenditure in men and money. 

Apart from the axiomatic reasons that on the land you have not to 
build expensive vessels to float your works, there is a reason which 
requires argument in support. 

Within its arc of fire, one gun on land was always superior to one 
gun on a ship, owing to its stable platform, and the fact that such 
platform could not be sunk. I make the reservation contained in the 
words, "within its arc of fire," because the ship, being mobile, could 
sometimes place itself outside the arc of fire of the guns of the de¬ 
fence and yet bring its broadside to bear on them; but this advantage 
usually existed when short lines of defence were dealt with; against 
long lines it should have been rarely possible. 

The often expressed view that in smooth-bore days, ships were 
superior to shore batteries arose from forgetting that success was 
almost invariably due to superiority in number of guns. People 
knew, but did not realise that even two-deckers had an average of 
about 70 guns apiece, so that, counting even but one side, three sail 
of the line had a broadside of over 100 guns. Did anyone ever hear 
of a line of batteries, having 100 guns on the water front, being re¬ 
duced by three ships; or of any important case where the relative 
number of guns available were in similar proportions? 

In those days ships had greatly concentrated gun power, which, 
when they could lie close to a low battery, enabled them to overwhelm 
the defence by sweeping the parapets or pouring projectiles through 
the embrasures; but this concentration of power could have been 
given to the shore batteries quite easily. It was not often given, 
because open earthworks were so much cheaper. 

Whenever it was possible to defend navigable waters by placing guns 
at a high level, then the land gun entirely dominated the gun on the 
ship. As the ship had to lie off at least as far as to enable its own 
guns to hit the battery, it was no longer possible for it to sweep clear 
even open earthworks. Hits on the ramparts inflicted little or no dam¬ 
age; to effect anything a gun or an individual man had to be hit 
directly, not an easy thing at some distance with inaccurate smooth¬ 
bore guns fired from an unstable platform; while the land gun had 
still a target it could not miss, for every hit on the ship was effective. 
A consequence of these facts was that, at high levels, it was no longer 
necessary to shelter land guns by placing them behind the parapets and 
making them fire through embrasures; but they could be placed 


108 


en barbette , thus largely increasing their arcs of fire, and rendering it 
rarely possible for a ship to take up a position whence it could hit 
the battery without being hit back. In the well-known case of the 
naval attack on Sebastopol, the Wasp and Telegraph batteries, which 
were 115 feet above water, beat off with their ten guns of which they 
lost but one, two of our ships, mounting altogether 140 guns, say 70 
on the broadside, and then caused the abandonment of the whole 
attack. 

The introduction of rifling increased the advantage of the land gun, 
because fighting could commence at longer ranges, because the in¬ 
creased length of effective range enabled a channel to be defended 
from a larger choice of positions, and because the increased accuracy 
of the gun could be more fully taken advantage of from a stable plat¬ 
form. All these advantages increased as the range and accuracy of 
rifled guns increased after their first introduction. 

The invention of automatic sights, which require a stable platform, 
has once more favoured the land gun, where high positions are avail¬ 
able. The principle of the automatic sight can be illustrated 
by Fig. 1. 


. 1 . 


Assume a gun at A and a target at B, then the line A B is the line 
of sight. If you know the height of A above water and know the 
depression of the line of sight, you know the range. If, then, you 
can arrange that as the sights move vertically the gun will move simul¬ 
taneously in such a way as always to have the elevation above the line 
of sight corresponding to the range, then the gun layer has but to 
bring his sights to bear and, without estimating the range, or wait¬ 
ing to have the range passed to him, or, in either case, having to alter 
his sights to suit the range, his gun has the proper elevation. 

The principle was, of course, always known, the difficulty was to 
apply it, for it demanded not merely seperate sighting gear for each 
pattern gun, but for each pattern at every different height above 
water. It also demanded almost perfect mechanism in the mount¬ 
ings, and almost perfect accuracy in the laying of the platform. But 

















109 


when quick-firing mountings and rapid loading arrangements were in¬ 
vented, the advantage of having some quick method of aiming became 
strongly apparent, and, owing to the development of mechanical 
engineering, the problem was solved, in large measure by Sir George 
Clarke, whose name now looms so largely before the public. 

Such is the theory of automatic sighting; how about the practice? 
I am not a gunnery expert; but I have seen practice with both the old 
and the new sights, and can say that when I first saw practice with 
the latter 1 was literally astonished. With sufficient height relatively 
to the range, I thought the efficiency of the firing was at least doubled. 

Theoretically, of course, automatic sighting is accurate from any 
height above the water; but, like all things made by man, it is in 
practice liable to error. When the angle of depression of the line of 
sight is very small then a small error in sighting will cause a large 
error in range, and as a result, fire with the ordinary sights, though 
slower, might be more effective; hence the necessity for height if the 
advantages of the sights are to be properly utilised. I am not prepared 
to lay down law—I leave that to some gunnery expert—but as an 
indication to those present who would like to have some idea of the 
matter I can state that from a height of 60 feet with medium guns 
good practice can be made with automatic sights up to a range of a 
mile and a half. From a height of 240 feet the range might be about 
three miles. Realise then the advantage of being able to follow the 
ship through your sighting telescope always having the range, and 
always ready to fire when the gun is loaded, and you will have a good 
idea of the position. 

From the foregoing series of arguments, I submit that I may thus 
sum up my case so far as it has gone. That coast defence with us 
must be wholly subsidiary to naval requirements, using the word 
"naval” to cover both our war and mercantile marine; that coast 
defence resolves itself in our case to harbour defence; that though we 
must have command of the sea we cannot rely on having that command 
everywhere at the same time throughout a war without intolerable 
expense, and that hence some cheaper form of securing our naval bases 
and our principal commerical harbours than defence by fleets is nec¬ 
essary; and, finally, that this coast defence can be provided without 
extravagance by land works because at each harbour it is only necessary 
to provide defensive power proportionate to the importance of that 
harbour and because such power as is required can be provided on 
land incomparably cheaper than on the water. 


110 


Having stated the principles on which I think our coast defences 
should be based, I will give an illustration of the method in which 
they might be carried out in an imaginary case, indicating how at 
almost every step our two great Imperial interests, naval supremacy 
and freedom of commerce, should guide our arrangements. 

Let us consider the case of an imaginary harbour .with two en¬ 
trances, to illustrate an important point. See sketch, p. 114. 

It can be readily understood that a simple way of defending a 
harbour is to block it altogether against entrance, as the Russians 
did at Sebastopol; but that if we have to afford free ingress and egress 
to our friends and deny them to our foes, the problem requires more 
complicated and more expensive arrangements. 

With us, harbour defence must be entirely subsidiary to the inter¬ 
ests of our war and mercantile marine, and hence we cannot adopt 
the cheap passive defence except where a harbour has two entrances, 
when possibly it might be admissible to adopt that form at one 
entrance. If this be done it should be no secret; the fact should be 
publicly announced. 

In the case we are considering, I assume that one entrance may be 
closed to both friend and foe. As the navigation of the western en¬ 
trance is easier than that of the eastern, I choose it as the one to be 
kept open, thus sacrificing the purely defensive view to the require¬ 
ments of our own ships. A nation with a weaker Navy and less 
dependence on its seaborne trade might very well reverse the procedure. 
At the western entrance every step taken must be subsidiary to the 
necessity for affording reasonably free passage to our own ships. 

I assume that the harbour has importance on the whole equal to 
that of Plvmouth, which has an important dockyard on its shores. 

The accompanying sketch will enable those who are not experts 
to realise what I mean when I use the term "combined arc of fire.” 



The figure represents a ground plan of a battery. From a centre on 
the right front there are two lines drawn, making an angle of 140° 
between them, and a similar pair of lines on the left front. These 
lines represent the limits of the arcs of fire of guns pivoting on each 





Ill 


centre respectively. I he inner lines cross in the centre, making 
again an angle of 140°. Now, the outer area beyond the crossing 
enclosed between these two lines is within the combined arc of fire, 
that is to say, that, as in Q.F. batteries, the gun on the right may 
not fire within 20° of the direction of the one on the left and vice 
versa , only the area I have just defined is under the fire of both guns. 

It is not considered admissible to place Q.F. guns closer than 40 
feet apart. My own opinion is that the distance should not, except 
for strong reasons, be less than 50 feet, on account of the effect of 
noise and blasts from a gun fired so nearly in one’s direction as 20°, 
because, though small, they are rapid-firing guns. With medium 
guns the distance apart is 100 feet, and with heavy guns 150 feet, and 
as both heavy and medium guns may not fire within 30° of the direc¬ 
tion of an adjoining gun, the combined arcs of fire are reduced to 120°. 

I have described these arrangements in some detail because I would 
like to add an opinion to the effect that though the distances suffice 
when a detachment has only one gun other than its own in the same 
group, they do not suffice when there is a gun hammering away at 
each side. I would like to see all guns in groups of two, and, when 
there is more than one group on the same terreplein and on the same 
general front, I would give spaces between groups at least 50 per cent 
greater than the interval between the guns of each group. 

To return now to my harbour, I will deal mainly with the western 
entrance, which, as it has to be kept open, is the more important. 

The line A II indicates the ordinary course of navigation taken by 
ships entering the harbour. In our case it would be wrong to alter 
or interfere with freedom of navigation along that line; it should be 
kept well clear of obstruction and no defence light so powerful as to 
dazzle the eyes of pilots should be allowed to shine too directly 
along it. 

The necessity for giving freedom of navigation* to our own ships 
raises the question of distinguishing friend from foe. It is a very 
difficult question. 

Some years ago, during naval manoeuvres, I commanded at a de¬ 
fended harbour, my main duty being to try a method of meeting the 
difficulty. The method was found too complicated, and has been 
abandoned. Though I may not even now describe the method tried, 
I should like to say something about what took place. 

On two occasions the defence gunners fired on ships belonging to 
our own side, and a special correspondent of the Times wrote a series 


112 


of diatribes against the military on the strength of a signal which 
had been communicated to him. I wrote shortly in reply to the 
effect that as the instructions governing the entrance into defended 
harbours in time of war were strictly confidential, the correspondent 
could not know what he was writing about. I did not then add, 
what I now can, as the system has been abandoned, that the corres¬ 
pondent’s ignorance was so complete that the answer to his diatribes 
was contained in the very signal which he took as the foundation 
for them. 

The correspondent’s letter started off a host of self-constituted author¬ 
ities. One original person said that no matter who was to blame it 
would be little satisfaction to the nation if it lost two of its own 
ships in time of war. Good heavens, what on earth were we doing 
but trying a method of preventing that, and how could we try the 
method if we did not rigidly adhere to its instructions? Did the 
man really think that our gunners are to recognise all our own ships even 
in the dark, and pass them whether they comply with the regulations 
or not? Please understand that I am not saying who failed. That 
is not necessary in this case, for the writer said it did not matter who 
was to blame. 

Another individual of the same class took up the text. I must 
mention one of his charges, as it is instructive. In the course of 
pointing out that our methods of coast defence in some ways were 
foolish, inasmuch as they were more injurious than advantageous, he 
said that it was our practice to disregard the necessities of our own 
ships and sometimes threw powerful search-lights in the eyes of navi¬ 
gators so that they could not see. Such may have been done in 
making trials; but so little truth is there in the charge that I need 
only answer that, for upwards of seven years at least, no defence light 
has been permanently installed without the Board of Trade being first 
informed of the position of the light and the direction in which 
it is intended to shine, and permission obtained for erection. 

Lieut. Colonel Maude, lecturing recently at Aldershot, condemned 
the scurrility with which the officers of our Regular Army were at¬ 
tacked by many special correspondents during the recent war. Though 
it is often the privilege of "Our Own’’ to be wise after the event, 
how very wrong he often is even when he has that privilege. Their 
very profession induces among gentlemen of the Press an effort at 
omniscience, with the consequent tendencies to dogmatic judgement 
on matters of opinion,and pretence at knowledge when they don’t know. 


113 


1 have said that the system tried was abandoned. I do not know 
what the present system is; all I know is that it is something very 
unlike the one tried by me. But I must give a general idea of what, 
in mv opinion, must be included in any system in order to show 
how it governs the whole scheme of defence against large ships. 

Near the mouth of every defended harbour there would be a war 
signal station. So far from trying to keep its position secret, I would 
during peace publicly announce the position in which it would be 
placed. I he duty of this signal station would be to communicate 
wi th every ship approaching the harbour. Everything secret in the 
way of communication would be here carried out. If the replies of 
the ship were satisfactory, it would be given permission to keep on 
its course; if not, the batteries would be informed so as to fire at or 
to warn off the ship. It follows that batteries should be placed so 
as to command as far as possible the whole area within the purview 
of the signal station. Merely to give satisfactory answers to the sig¬ 
nal station ought not to give complete entrance; it should only allow 
vessels to enter an area wherein they can he boarded and examined. 
As the weather would often prevent this being done in the open sea, 
the examination area must be fairly sheltered. The inner limit of 
this area, which should, in my view, be made publicly known for 
every defended port during peace should be a line with a definite 
bearing from some point which is marked on all charts. Ships crossing 
the line without authorisation would be fired on. Manifestly, to 
guard against a ruse, strong defences should exist to cover some area 
behind this line.* 

Whatever the system adopted, I can say with absolute conviction 
that all the arrangements governing the entrance to defended ports in 
time of war should be in charge of the Royal Navy. The Army 
should have nothing to do with them, except when informed by the 
Navy to fire at an inimical or warn off a doubtful ship. One great 
point is that the regulations should be so clear and so well known 
that friendly vessels can make no mistake. 

Now, as to the application of this system to the harbour we are 
considering. I place the signal station on Signal Point, which I 
prefer to Marconi Hill, which is often enveloped in mist; besides we 
want the closest inspection. As to the examination area, mere 
inspection of the plan indicates that the narrow part between West 

*It must not be thought that this forms a complete scheme, it is only a portion of 
a scheme; there would necessarily be many other regulations. 


114 


Flat and East Hill is capable of strong defence, while outside it is a 
fairly well sheltered area. I therefore assume that the Navy would 
be asked to fixed a well-defined line across the channel, a little dis¬ 
tance below the narrows, so as to give time to the defence, and yet 
not so far down as to unduly limit the area in which the examination 
will take place. 

IMAGINARY HARBOUR. 



The point I have now reached is a good one for discussing the ques¬ 
tion of a mine-field. Whether a mine-field is to be placed or not is purely 
a naval question. If not provided, the gun defence must be stronger. 
In this case I assume that it will be provided, and naturally place it 
across the narrow part. Again you may ask—Will our own ships run 
risks? Practically none. I am divulging no secret when I say that no 
nation dreams of using mines which explode on mere contact; if they 
did, there would be many cases of the sapper being hoist with his own 
petard. Contact mines are more dangerous to friend than foe—the 























115 


latter may not come near them, the former would have a ticklish job 
in laying and removing them. All mines are fired by an act either 
as deliberate or nearly as deliberate as firing a gun. But as there are 
objections in our case to a continuous mine-field. The main ones 
are that our own ships passing in and out would damage the mines and 
their connections, while the cables might entangle the screws of 
passing vessels. For these and other minor reasons we should have 
a friendly passage through the mine-field along the ordinary course of 
navigation. The width of that passage should be fixed by the Navy 
and the Board of Trade, but I can conceive no case when it would 
be necessary to make it more than 300 yards wide. In the case in 
point, its sides might be 150 yards at either side of the line A B, in 
which case, as the channel at the narrows is about 1,200 yards wide, 
three-fourths of it would be absolutely barred to big ships, and only 
be passable to torpedo-boats if they were prepared to sacrifice, not 
merely the leaders, but a second and possibly a third line as well, a 
loss that would probably act as a strong deterrent. 

But as regards torpedo-boats, we want to be ' 'sure” ; probable safety is 
not sufficient. We may not interfere with the friendly channel,but surely 
we can anchor booms behind the two mine-fields,along the line between 
the north corners of East Hill and West Flat. As the channel is 1,200 
yards across, and the friendly channel 300 yards wide, this would mean 
two booms, one about 5^)0 yards, and the other about 400 yards long. 
Such booms would so back up the mine-field that we could say with 
absolute certainty that no torpedo-boats could get in except through the 
friendly channel. The booms would have an incidental advantage, be¬ 
cause they would force bargees and such like truculent navigators to keep 
clear of the mine-field, which they might otherwise damage in passing. 

I read the other day a review of an American book on Coast 
Defence, from which I gathered that the author proposed to place a 
mine-field out to sea in front of the entrance. This seems to me an 
extravagant proposal in any case, but also an inefficient one, for in 
such a position the mines would be exceptionally liable to damage, 
and there would be great difficulty in repair. At any rate, such a 
proposal is utterly unsuitable to our conditions. 

I have now prepared the way for a description of the gun defence. 
This divides itself into anti-torpedo-boat defence, to which I barely 
allude to-day, and defence against large ships. 

Defence against large ships is divisible into three, though all three 
overlap:— 


116 


1. The outer defence. 

2. Defence of the channel. 

3. Defence of inner waters. 

The object of the outer defence is to keep the enemy well off the 
port and cover the area overlooked by the signal station. The sketch 
sufficiently indicates the area covered by the guns, which have their 
full arcs of 120° to the open sea, and which can all be brought to 
bear on ships making the entrance, while the right-hand guns of each 
battery can follow an enemy for varying distances up the channel. 
The two outer batteries have each two heavy guns; the inner one two 
medium guns. It will be noticed that the point called ''The Nose” 
defilades the batteries from any position whence they might be at¬ 
tacked without all the guns being able to reply; that is to say, all 
the area from which the batteries can be seen is within the com¬ 
bined arc of fire. The sites are high. 

To defend the channel from the mouth inwards I naturally select 
the narrows. As the outer edge of the plateau called West Flat 
makes an angle of nearly 30° with the direction of Signal Point, it 
can be arranged for all the guns to cover the channel right round 
from Signal Point as far as the combined arc of 120° will permit. 
Included in this arc are the whole of the narrows, so that the weak 
point—the friendly channel—is under a powerful fire. Though the 
height of the guns is only 60 feet, it is enough to allow the use of 
automatic sights at all ranges inside the entrance; in fact, just where 
they would be most useful. As Signal Point is not high enough to 
hide the batteries from the sea, it is advisable to throw back the line 
a bit so as to give fire over the point,but I would not do that at the sac¬ 
rifice of a single portion of the fire over the friendly channel; espe¬ 
cially as ships trying to enfilade the batteries from a position w T hence 
their fire could not be returned by all the guns they were firing at 
would, at any rate, be under fire of the right-hand gun of the right 
battery, besides the fire of the guns on Shoal Heights. I think three 
batteries of two medium guns each will suffice for this site. It can 
be seen that all the guns include in their total arc of fire an arc of 
about 50° to the open sea, which enables them to strengthen the 
outer defence. 

Though East Hill is not so suitable for a line of batteries defending 
the entrance, one can place on it batteries with different fronts. My 
design is a battery of two heavy guns with an arc of fire that covers 
the deeper part of the entrance and the open sea beyond, through an 


117 


arc of 25 , and continues to the right till it includes the friendly 
channel underneath. I arm this battery with heavy guns, so as fully 
to take advantage of the height of the hill. Further in I place on the 
same hill a battery of two medium guns which, while including the 
fiiendly channel within their arc of fire, cover with the rest of 
it an area inwards and not outwards. T. his brings me to third sec¬ 
tion of the gun defence, namely, that of inner waters. 

I know that high naval and military authorities are opposed to this 
class of defence, but I know that equally high authorities of both 
Services are in favour of it. It is a question which should be 
thoroughly examined and settled. Its object cannot be defence 
against large battle-ships or cruisers, for no admiral would be mad 
enough to send ships costing a million of money, and taking from 
two to three years to build, to rush a channel defended by mines and 
heavy guns, knowing that after they have got in they have to get out 
again, if they are not to be lost to him. This class of defence can¬ 
not be meant against torpedo-boats for, as they would invariably 
attack at night, they could not be seen, for who would think of light¬ 
ing up w T aters in which his own ships were at anchor? I have sought 
for an object, and think it can only be that, prior to declaration of 
war, an enemy might open the ball by sending ships of little value to 
destroy peaceful shipping lying in the harbour, and to blow up dock 
gates and do as much such-like damage as possible till they are sunk. 

To resist this class of warfare perhaps medium guns would suffice. 
In the case in point the battery on East Hill, which assists in defend¬ 
ing the friendly channel, might cover, as shown, the reach inwards. 
On Queen’s Hill two more guns with an all-round fire could be 
placed. The combined arc outwards includes raking the narrows,while 
the inward arc covers the anchorage and the waters off the dockyard. 

A better way of meeting a raid made by large ships before declara¬ 
tion of war is to prevent the enemy from getting in by taking the 
necessary steps when war seems imminent. Supposing the Navy 
were not prepared to prevent such a raid at all harbours, and that the 
one under consideration required to be protected by the land service, 

I would recommend that the whole or part of the regulations govern¬ 
ing entrance should be introduced in good time, and then rely on 
dirigible torpedoes. A dirigible torpedo will certainly sink a ship 
attempting to rush a channel, unless the navigable portion be over a 
mile from the torpedo installation. Now, supposing that the mine¬ 
field has not yet been laid, and that the artillery garrison has not yet 


been brought up to war strength, still, if the torpedo installation be 
ready, and be large enough to allow, say, three torpedoes to be fired in 
succession, I think such a raid would fail. 

I have said that gun defence of inner waters cannot be intended to 
destroy torpedo-boats. If a raid by a number of these little craft were 
made before we were ready with our full anti-torpedo-boat defence, 
I don’t see how to stop it; at any rate, it cannot be done by the land 
service. In my opinion, dirigible torpedoes are of little value against 
a mosquito fleet; to use them thus would be like firing cannon balls 
against a line of skirmishers. The lesson seems to be: "Get ready 
Jo meet a torpedo-boat attack immediately war seems probable." 

Looking at such a defence as I have described, you will observe 
that consideration of our own naval requirements has been my guide 
throughout. 

"What!" it may be said, "you consider eighteen heavy and med¬ 
ium guns sufficient to defend such a harbour with an importance 
equal to Plymouth?" My answer is Yes, in combination with a 
mine-field covering three-fourths of the narrows and a dirigible tor¬ 
pedo installation capable of firing three torpedoes in rapid succession. 
Recollect that I have hitherto been dealing with an attack by a fleet, 
not with a raid by torpedo-boats, for such require separate treatment. 
I bel ieve such a defence as I have indicated, if it did not beat off an 
attack a outrance by a large fleet, would inflict such damage on it be¬ 
fore succumbing that all the damage the victors could inflict inside 
would not repay them. Realise that the victors cannot land to any 
extent, for riflemen could shoot down the landing parties, and every 
defended harbour will have an infantry garrison. The main damage 
the ships could do would have to be done by torpedoes and by shell 
fire. It dare not do much of that sort of thing, else it would be at 
the mercy of the first battle-ships of ours with full magazines that 
arrived on the scene. I say that no attack by a fleet alone is likely 
to be made on such a port under any circumstances; and to expect it, 
when the enemy can only have temporarily command of the sea at this 
point, is to give him credit for folly—folly which we should be glad 
for him to commit. 

Then whv defend it so strongly? Because I may be w r rong, and 
the expense involved is not great, and, moreover, it may be consid- 
eied desirable to dispense with the mine-field at one time or other. 
One should not be too cocksure. Many high military authorities 
thought one army corps with the Indian division and such troops as 


119 


were in South Africa in October, 1899, would suffice to conquer the 
Boer Republics. 1 confess I thought so, too. Well, we lived to see 
the equivalent of six army corps carrying on the war for many months. 

Should it be thought that more should be done, I would put a bat¬ 
tery of heavy guns on South Cliff, where shown, which could join in 
the defence of the western entrance, and prevent a ship circling off 
the eastern in the manner indicated by the dotted lines. 

Time prevents me from dealing with the question of torpedo-boat 
raids, but the details of such would not materially help to illustrate 
the matter looked at from an Imperial standpoint. I desire, however, 
to indicate a few general points. 

The defence lights which should steadily illuminate the outer area 
should emanate from East Hill. If they were placed on West Flat 
the one that looked due south would shine directly along the line A 
B, which would interfere with the free navigation of the entrance. 

Another point, and one of vast importance, is this: I have laid stress on 
the enormous cost of modern men-of-war , and the time it takes to replace a 
lost one , and indicated how little likely an admiral would be to waste them 
against land works. For precisely the same reason how necessary it is to 
protect these valuable machines from being destroyed by a mosquito fleet. 
What a prize for torpedo-boats if a raid by, say, twenty or thirty of them, 
managed to sink three or four battle-ships; what matter if all the boats 
were lost, it would still be a victory. 

Just as I think that we overdo our defence by heavy guns, so I think we 
are apt to underdo defence against torpedo-boat raids. While I think few 
will support me in thinking such a defence against large vessels as that I 
have indicated would suffice if the harbour were as important a commer¬ 
cial port and naval base as Plymouth, I believe that the anti-torpedo-boat 
defence which I would recommend would be scouted as altogether overdone .* 

When I settled that the eastern entrance was to be blocked, but 
little of importance from a national standpoint was left to say con¬ 
cerning it. Suffice it to say that I would cover about half the basin 
with mines from the narrows at M O southwards, that across MO I 
would place an exceptionally strong boom, and to prevent armoured 
boats from coming in to destroy the obstructions I would have four 
medium guns. For night work I would have simply one search-light 
placed at T, where it would be defiladed from the open. As it would 

* These two paragraphs were written and handed in to the Editor, R.U.S.I. 
Journal, before the news of the outbreak of war arrived. Since then no word has 

been altered. 


120 


not have to carry far I would give it a 30° splay, so that it could light 
up a considerable area at the same time. Against a torpedo-boat 
raid, if such madness were attempted, I would assist the heavier 
guns with four quick-firing guns. I would place the medium batteries 
to the left of the light, so as to cover any position whence the light 
could be hit, with the quick-firing guns to the right of the light. 

In case it were considered desirable to make arrangements, while 
denying entrance to all vessels, to allow egress to our own torpedo- 
boats, the matter would scarcely be altered, for the consequent pas¬ 
sage through the mine-field need only be thirty yards wide, and, it 
commencing at a movable portion of the boom near O, and directed 
in a S.W. course on leading lights inside P, there would be but little 
loss in defensive power. Even if egress for large ships were required 
and, in consequence, a wider and more direct friendly channel be¬ 
came necessary, the only changes I would make would be to light up 
the whole basin and double the number of Q.F. guns. The defence 
would be assisted by a battery placed on South Cliff, before referred 
to, for it would prevent a ship from circling off the entrance and 
making practice by firing at the boom and the mine-field, while avoid¬ 
ing the guns of the defence. 

In the early part of this paper I said that it is only necessary to 
defend a harbour relatively to its importance. Suppose my imaginary 
harbour, instead of having the almost constant value of Plymouth, 
were to be a mere coaling station for the fleet, then how different its 
value, according as a fleet is anchored inside or not. In such a case, 
what value should be put on the harbour when deciding on the 
strength of the land defence? 

Here again the question of defence against large vessels and 
against a mosquito'fleet must be kept separate. 

As regards defence against large vessels, I would merely rank the 
port at the largest non-effective value that it is likely to have inside, 
including under the head of non-effective not merely colliers, store- 
ships, and merchantmen, but also an allowance for ships of war tem¬ 
porarily out of action. I would add nothing on account of effective 
fighting ships, because, just as they add to the value of what is in¬ 
side, they also add to the defensive power. 

Against torpedo-boat raids the matter is altogether different. If 
the harbour be within striking distance by torpedo-boats of any 
foreign port, then, if the harbour be likely to have a fleet anchored 
inside for any considerable period, the anti-torpedo-boat defence 

I 


121 


should be nearly as strong as if the harbour had the importance of 
Plymouth, because in neither case should torpedo-boats be allowed to 
get in. I say nearly as strong, because a fleet while inside could lay 
down a minefield and a boom, or add these defences to such smaller 
mine-field as maybe considered sufficient for the ordinary case of the 
harbour. Here again it is a question for the Royal Navy to settle: 
How much extra will they be prepared to do in such a case, and, con¬ 
sequently, how much shall be done by the military? Please note 
carefully that in saying "nearly as strong,” I only include mines and 
booms, for in both contrasted cases the number of defence lights and 
the number of Q.F. guns should be precisely the same. 

In concluding my paper, I would ask whether the time has not come 
for handing Coast Defence over to the Royal Navy. As it is entirely sub¬ 
sidiary to naval considerations, why bring in division of responsibility, 
especially as such division is most acute at the very place where there 
is most difficulty, viz., at the entrance? Such a proposal does not 
mean abolition of our Fortress Artillery or Fortress Engineers, it 
merely means that those bodies would be included with the Corps of 
Royal Marines. In every large fortress the whole defence on the sea 
front would be in charge of the Navy, that on the land side of the 
Army, the duty of the governor of the fortress being to make them 
perform their separate duties for the common end. Such a division 
of duties and separation of responsibility seems to be simpler and 
more logical than a system which involves joint responsibility, first, 
for every question connected with the principles on which the de¬ 
fence should be based, where naval considerations alone should be 
paramount; and, secondly, joint responsibility at the very place where 
mistakes are most likely to occur. 

Admiral F. ARDEN CLOSE: —Permit me to thank the lecturer for 
the information he has given us. If there is a fault to find in the 
lecture, I would say it is rather more scientific than practical, for 
this reason: Submarine mines are unreliable, and are useless against 
disguised gunboats. We have recently had an instance of self- 
destruction, by a ship being blown up in the face of the enemy while 
trying to lay mines at Port Arthur. 1 hoped that as a Royal Engineer 
was to give us a lecture on coast defence, we should hear what was 
ready for the defence of the coast. The meeting may remember 
that in years gone by schemes were proposed by foreign officers for 
the invasion of this country, and at the head of that list always ap¬ 
peared the Bristol Channel. I made it my business to look after 


122 


those defences, and found that they consisted of two fortified islands 
called Flatholmes and Steepholmes, with a battery called Brean Down 
to correspond with it on the mainland. The guns were old and al¬ 
most useless, and there were no gunners or garrison; nothing ready 
for immediate defence. The mayor and people of Bristol petitioned 
the Government that the coast defences of the Bristol Channel should 
be reorganised. We have now a gun-boat, Naval Volunteers, and six 
new batteries. That leads up to a question I wish to put to the lec¬ 
turer: Do you, in constructing these maritime forts, seek the advice 
of naval officers? I do not mean the naval officer stationed at the 
War Office; but whether a naval officer goes down to these maritime 
forts, and sees that they are constructed not only theoretically but 
practically? Without the assistance of a naval officer no maritime 
fort can be as serviceable as it should be. The other question I 
wish to ask is: Are our maritime forts ready? Because if they are 
not ready, what is the use of them? as war will come upon us like 
a ffash of lighting. Again, take the Thames—another weak point in 
our defences. As I stood on the banks of the river at Tilbury and 
saw the enormous number of merchant-ships ffying by on the flood 
tide, I asked myself: How are we going to stop this? Any one of 
these ships might have a charge of dynamite on board; anyone might 
be a gun-boat in disguise. I wrote a letter to the Globe , and the 
Editor was pleased to put a heading: "London bombarded; London 
in flames!” Two powerful forts have since been built between Til¬ 
bury and Sheerness. London is now safe from general attack; but if 
Germany was to declare war on Monday morning, they could have a 
couple of disguised gun-boats up in the middle of London by the next 
night. These maritime forts have no means of knowing the differ¬ 
ence between a friend and a foe under false colours, and when it 
comes to disguising gun-boats to make them look like a merchant- 
ship and and under false colours, they would not be interfered with 
at all. I say that London will never be safe until we always have a 
couple of gun-boats stationed there, because at the present moment if 
gun-boats got up past Tilbury to London, there is nothing to meet 
them but a police-boat; there is no knowing what havoc the gun-boats 
might do. They might blow up the bridges, destroy the Houses of 
Parliament and the docks and shipping; also Woolwich Arsenal and 
the magazines at Purfleet. Londoners do not understand that London 
is no longer an inland town, and is as much exposed to attack in these 
days of steam power as Hull, Liverpool, or Glasgow. London is 


123 


under military protection, and as it is impossible for them to perfect 
that protection without the assistance of the Navy, I submit they 
should ask for that assistance now, not waiting for the outbreak of war. 

Colonel R. F. JOHNSON, C.M.G., R.A.:—I happen to have been 
the Artillery officer in charge of the Severn defences for two years, 
and I am happy to say that while I was there there was no insubordi¬ 
nation nor drunkenness, and the forts were perfectly readv for action. 
I cannot say that it would have been much good to man them, be¬ 
cause at that time the guns had not been replaced by new ones; but 
with regard to manning them, we had a most excellent and very strong 
corps of Volunteer Artillery in Cardiff, within half-an-hour of the 
nearest fort, and within two hours of the farthest fort. The men 
were perfectly trained with all the guns that were in those forts. The 
lecturer has given us an example of the application of what he con¬ 
siders are the principles of coast defence. My practical experience 
makes me afraid of principles when they are applied to such matters. 
It was principles that led to several of our home ports being fortified 
on a scale calaculated for a total of garrisons amounting to 67,000 
men. The principles that have led to the conclusion that the heavy 
land defences of some of these forts are not necessary, have caused 
those of others, whose conditions are entirely different, to receive in¬ 
sufficient attention. The adoption of principles in placing guns has 
in some instances prevented the best use of the available sites. I 
know a work in which the changes in the conditions attaching to 
ships has made it desirable to alter the direction of the "combined 
arc of fire." When I discussed this with an Engineer officer I was 
told it could not be done, because the site did not admit of its being 
so, and of retaining the regulation distance between the guns. We did 
not want the arc of fire to be near the guns. Where we wanted a 
combined arc of fire was a considerable distance off, so that the blast 
need not have been taken into account. The principle, which in 
itself is perfectly correct, that high sites enable better practice at tar¬ 
gets from cheaper works, has prevented the use of low ones, which 
from their proximity to the channels that must be used by ships would 
enable us to make use of the greatest power of our guns, if they were 
armoured and protected in the way those on the ships are, which is 
our only chance of denying the passage to a determined assailant. I 
entirely agree with the lecturer when he says that a harbour with an 
importance equal to Plymouth may be sufficiently defended by 18 
heavy and medium guns; but whether Plymouth could be defended by 


124 


that number is quite another matter. If the guns were of sufficient 
power, properly placed, and sufficiently protected, even a smaller 
number might suffice. And it is especially necessary to limit your 
armament and fortifications nowadays, because it is more important 
than ever that they should be just as ready in every way, including 
their garrisons, for action as the ships that they have to fight. The 
only principles that I can accept with regard to coast defences are that 
they shall be strictly confined to places where the Navy thinks them 
necessary, and that their extent and cost shall bs as small as the local 
conditions, strategical and tactical, admit. I am sure that there 
might be a great saving made in the annual cost of our sea fortresses, 
though possibly a considerable capital expenditure might be necessary 
to enable this to be done. Whether you should defend the entrance 
or the inner waters of a harbour depends on the strategical conditions, 
on what damage to that which you are defending is worth to the 
enemy, and on what he can afford to pay. Can anyone cite an in¬ 
stance of batteries stopping completely the passage of a channel? If 
such an instance can be given, it is certainly the exception that proves 
the rule, and the chances of armoured ships getting through are now 
better than they have ever been. Suppose Port Arthur contained the 
only Russian dock in the far East; suppose that the Japanese Fleet had 
either a ship or two to spare, or was too weak to meet the Russian 
Fleet in battle; then, if the Rusisan Fleet was elsewhere, would it 
not in either case be worth while for the Japanese, whether in de¬ 
cided superiority or decided inferiority, to risk the loss of a ship or 
two, if the absence of inner defences gave them the chance of destroy¬ 
ing the dock? It seems to me somewhat lost sight of, that in de¬ 
fending channels by guns, and more so by mines, there is, in not a few 
localities, a danger of blocking with the sunken ships the channels it 
must be your object to keep open. I am entirely opposed to the pro¬ 
posal to hand over coast defence to the Royal Navy. The proposal is 
tempting to a Garrison Artilleryman, for in the work of defence the 
Navy must have more interest than the Field Army. We should get 
more money for the adjuncts necessary to develop the full powers of 
our amament; we might get rid of the principles of fortification, but 
the corps would suffer a deadly injury in having its chances of active 
service reduced to almost nothing, and the disadvantages to the Navy 
would be out of all proportion to any possible gain. All naval ener¬ 
gies should be directed to offensive action; and, with our Constitu¬ 
tion, it is necessary that the Naval Estimates shall not be burdened 


125 


with any expenditure not required for that offensive action. A Coast 
Defence Corps, entrusted with both the designing and fighting of the 
defences both seaward and landward, maintained on separate esti¬ 
mates, and at some places largely composed of partially-paid local 
troops, might perhaps be an improvement on our present organisation; 
but that is a large matter on which I should be sorry to be asked to 
give a decided opinion, for though the idea meets some views 
worthy of consideration, it has the great objection of locking up large 
numbers of men and officers, and in such a way as to lower their 
moral and zeal. 

Lieut. Colonel F. G. COTTER, R.M.L.I.:—It is only with refer¬ 
ence to the last paragraph of the lecture that I rise on this occasion, 
because on such a highly technical lecture that we have just heard it 
would be absurd for me to make any comments on the details. There 
was one matter wth reference to the defensive arrangements that struck 
me—and always strikes me—as a weak point, and that is the defence 
lights. It appears to me to be essentially a very vulnerable point, 
especially at night time, when of course their location is at once seen, 
and would be the object of raiding parties landed on various parts of 
the coast, and also open to attack from quick-firing guns carried by de¬ 
stroyers. I have heard it said that you cannot aim a gun at an electric 
search-light; but that is not my experience. I say that you can aim 
a gun at an electric search-light,and probably hit it,too. If the search¬ 
lights in the harbours like Plymouth or on the Thames were destroyed 
at night, what is to prevent torpedo-boats coming up the very next 
night? That is all I wish to say with reference to defence. The 
only other matter I desire to refer to is the last paragraph in the 
lecture, namely, the proposition to hand over the fortress defence to 
the Navy. The author mentioned the Royal Marines as being the 
soldier body of the Navy, suggested that the Fortress Artillery and 
Engineers should be, I suppose, amalgamated with the Royal Marines. 
We know that this subject has been brought up in this theatre on 
various other occasions, notably by Sir John Colomb, and we know 
perfectly well that the Admiralty have always set their face against it. 
I presume the reason that the Admiralty has always done so is lest the 
efficiency of the men-of-war should suffer through not having the men 
constantly on board, because, of course, it would mean increasing 
the Marine Corps to probably about five times its present strength. 
Another thing is that the Admiralty have recently reorganised the 
system of entering officers into the Navy. The officers are now 


126 


entered so that they may be practically interchangeable vvtih all three 
branches. We have no experience of that as yet, but we know per¬ 
fectly well that the system has already been commenced at Osborne 
in the Isle of Wight. The result is that the future naval officer will 
have quite enough to learn. He will have to learn his seamanship 

4 

up to a limited extent, I suppose, but certainly to a certain extent; 
he will have to learn his naval gunnery and his torpedo work; and he 
will now have to learn marine engineering and military work, as the 
present marine officers do, in addition to wffiich he is apparently to 
have piled on him the work of the defence of sea fortresses, so that it 
would result in the naval officer of the future being rather over¬ 
burdened with work, and he would become a sort of Jack-of-all-trades. 
Then, with regard to the Marines, we know that the Admiralty 
consider them a very valuable body of men on board ship. Some 
people think that Marines are of no use on board ship. My exper¬ 
ience is that on asking naval officers whether they would like twenty 
additional men attached to their vessel, and whether they would have 
them seamen or storkers or Marines, I have nearly always been told 
that they would rather have twenty additional Marines, which shows 
that the Marines on board ship are thought very highly of by the naval 
officers. The Marine, of course, would lose his value very consider¬ 
ably if he only spent one year in ten at sea, because I see the lecturer 
proposes to man all the sea fronts of all fortresses with Marines,or, as 
he says, men from the Navy. But he does not tell us who is to 
command these fortresses, whether they are to be naval officers or 
military officers. In one part of his paper he suggests that the sea 
fronts shall be defended by the Navy or Marines, and the land fronts 
by the Army; but that is also a divided responsibility. We therefore 
do not know who is to command the fortresses. It may be a naval 
officer. If so, he would also apparently have command of the land 
forces on the land side. 

Admiral the Hon. Sir EDMUND R. FREMANTLE, G.C.B., 
C.M.G., (Rear-Admiral of the United Kingdom):—I have not read 
the lecture, and consequently I do not feel entirely competent to 
criticise it in every way. I shall, therefore, confine my remarks 
chiefly to the question of principles, and also to some things which I 
think show the way in which we ought not to defend our ports. I 
take exception to the fourth principle laid down by the lecturer, that 
if we relied on our sea-going fleets to secure permanently the safety 
of our naval bases and our chief commercial ports, it would be necessary 


127 


to have, within striking distance of each such place, a fleet equal to 
the whole fleet of the enemy in being at each period of a war—a wholly 
impossible idea.” I venture to think that is a false idea of strategy. 
I admit that we did not fortify Wei-Hai-Wei on that principle. We 
say that if we were to fortify Wei-Hai-Wei we should have to fortify 
it against the attack of a fleet, possibly a Russian fleet from Port 
Arthur, and, therefore, as we do not propose to put up extensive forti¬ 
fications there, we do not put up any at all. I do not think that is 
the right principle of strategy. If there is a Russian fleet in Port 
Arthur we ought to be able to mask that fleet; we ought to keep it in 
hand, which the Japanese are doing at present. On the same princi¬ 
ple I think this one laid down by the lecturer is wrong. If there is 
an enemy’s fleet somewhere at Cherbourg, and we have got a suffici¬ 
ent fleet, we should be more or less watching that fleet. Even 
supposing our fleet was away for a little time, and the French fleet 
could manage to slip out, would it be a wise thing for that French 
fleet to come to Plymouth, to do a certain amount of damage, but in 
returning to be knocked about as well, possibly to lose the whole of 
their fleet? After all, if they lose the whole of their fleet it does not 
very much matter if we have lost the dockyard, as they certainly 
would lose their fleet, because our more powerful fleet would inter¬ 
cept it. But nobody does do that sort of thing. In the books that we 
read sometimes—we have not seen so many of them lately—called 
The Coming War, and so on, you generally see that the fleets fight 
in a sort of Kilkenny cat fashion. I well recollect one that I read 
some years ago, in which the Russian fleet was supposed to go up the 
Tyne and do a certain amount of damage there, losing ship after ship, 
and, eventually, fortunately for us, the whole Russian fleet was de¬ 
stroyed. That is the sort of thing which is absolutely and entirely 
unreal; it is not the sort of thing which takes place in real warfare, 
and consequently it argues a great want of sense of proportion to 
propose that it will be done. I have only one other remark to make, 
and that is on the subject of whether defences are proper to the cir¬ 
cumstances of a particular port or country. I should like to refer par¬ 
ticularly to some defences near Plymouth on the west side, where a 
system for high-angle fire, which was very much in vogue about ten 
years ago, was adopted. When I was in command at Plymouth, I 
recollect going round with the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley), 
Sir Redvers Buller, and others, to see all these defences—chiefly high- 
angle fire batteries, which were supposed to be very important, and 


128 


to embrace the latest improvements. I was asked: "What do you 
think of them?” I said: "I have no opinion as to their firing, be¬ 
cause I have only seen the guns fired once or twice, when they did 
not make as accurate shooting as I am told they did on other occa¬ 
sions; but if they made the most accurate shooting in the world they 
are absolutely useless. The best thing you can do is to blow them 
up.” I do not know what has become of them now; but they were 
absolutely useless, because the assumption was that some Power—not 
a Power that I know anything about—had the entire command of the 
sea, but had no land forces. It would not think of landing an army 
in the Yealm or in the Thames, or anywhere else, because it had no 
army. That was the assumption. But it had any amount of mortar- 
boats and a large fleet; and the assumption was that it would lie some¬ 
where in Whitsand Bay and would shell over the heights into the 
dockyard, with the chance, after throwing a very large number of 
shells, as we did at Sveabourg, that they would do a certain amount 
of damage to the dockyard. That is an assupmtion which, strategi¬ 
cally, is entirely wrong. And that is not the only instance I know 
of, because a Zalinsky gun was put up near Pembroke to prevent an 
enemy’s fleet lying outside and throwing shells from Bristol Channel 
over the heights into Pembroke Dockyard. I will only quote those 
instances of the way not to do it. What we do want, I venture to 
think, is a certain amount of direct defence, mine-fields, quick-firing 
guns to protect them and a certain proportion of heavy guns to prevent 
the enemy coming directly into the port. Those guns would be pro¬ 
portionate to the position of this country,which is supposed to be, and,I 
hope, still is, the greatest sea Power in the world; and she would natu¬ 
rally be supposed to have command of the seas; and if she had not 
command of the seas we know perfectly well that no amount of de- 
ences will enable her to retain her place among the nations. 

Colonel F. A. BOWLES, R.A.:—There are one or two questions I 
should like to ask the lecturer, which, perhaps, he will answer 
afterwards. In his lecture, Colonel Cotter states that "I am di¬ 
vulging no secret when I say that no nation dreams of using mines 
which explode on mere contact.” I am only asking for information, 
but I have an idea that wnen the electro-contact mine, as it is called, 
is put in working order, it does go off on contact. The lecturer 
rather conveyed the idea that the firing of a contact mine was just as 
deliberate an action as the firing of a gun; but I think I am right in 
saying that as soon as the mines are put in a dangerous condition the 


129 


ship does the rest. I think we may safely say that some nations 
dream of using them, and we know that one nation lately—if the 
accounts in the newspapers are correct—has certainly suffered from 
using contact mines. With reference to the boom at the western en¬ 
trance, I understood the lecturer to say he proposed to put two 
booms across what he called 'The Narrows,’’ i. e., 1,200 yards, leav¬ 
ing a friendly passage of 300 yards between them. I am not an expert 
in reference to booms, but I hardly think a boom 450 yards long would 
be manageable; and unless stone piers were built out to a very con¬ 
siderable distance, I think no boom could possibly be fixed in the 
western entrance. Even the eastern entrance, I think, is a little too 
wide to erect a boom. I believe it is an understood thing now that 
booms will not be very often used, probably for the reason that there 
are very few T places which are suitable for them. I think at both the 
western and the eastern entrances booms would be rather unwieldly 
things to work. Supposing a boom at the eastern entrance was placed 
in the position which the lecturer suggested, I think we must raise 
the question as to the position of the electric light, because the whole 
of the boom would be in the full light of its beam, and I think it is 
not an accepted principle that the boom itself, if you have an illumi¬ 
nated area in front of it, should invariably be in darkness. I think it 
would be useful if the lecturer would say something in reply in regard 
to that point. I should like to be allowed to say a few words in regard 
to some of the remarks that have been made since the lecture. With 
reference to the heavy and medium gun defence, I think all our coast 
defences now are founded on the principle that England must have 
command of the sea. The lecturer in his lecture asks, why have 
heavy and medium guns. I think the simplest answer is: In order 
that we may never have to use them. What I mean by that is that I 
think our heavy and medium gun defence is more a preventative 
than a form of defence that is ever likely to be of any great practical 
value, because as long as we have command of the sea no serious attack 
on any of our well-fortified ports could ever be successfully attempted by 
any country. With reference to anti-torpedo-boat defence, I endorse 
what little has been said by the lecturer. I cannot help thinking that 
every possible occasion should be taken advantage of to impress on 
anybody who has to deal with our defences the vast importance of a 
thoroughly organised and good anti-torpedo-boat defence. We have 
had no practical experience until very lately of the rapidity with 
which these attacks will be made. We have always said in our text- 


130 


books that torpedo attacks will be made probably before war is 
declared and that has certainly been justified by recent events. What 
we want is a very strong anti-torpedo-boat defence. The lecturer has 
also said a good deal about another subject which is still in a rather 
embryo state, i. e., the very great difficulty of distinguishing friend 
from foe. The lecturer pointed out what he considered would be a 
good system. 

Colonel E. W. COTTER:—I beg your pardon; it was a general 
outline. 

Colonel F. A. BOWLES: —Probably a great many of the audience 
know that wffiat the lecturer considers an outline of a good system is 
practically a fair description of what acually was tried at the recent 
naval manoeuvres. It has manv faults; but no system, in my opinion, 
that has been tried yet, can be looked upon as a pefectly successful 
system. It is almost impossible—I should say it is quite impossible— 
for anybody, even a naval expert, to be able to tell at night the differ¬ 
ence betwen his own torpedo-boats and the enemy’s torpedo-boats 
when an attack takes place, no matter what the rule may be. Sup¬ 
posing the rule is that friendly torpedo-boats, if they are moving 
about, are to advertise their presence in every possible way by show¬ 
ing all their lights and sounding their sirens, I have always main¬ 
tained that it would be very easy for the enemy (who would know 
more about our arrangements than a great many of us know ourselves) 
to do the same, and, as far as we can judge from what we have read 
in the newspapers that is what the Japanese did do; they showed all 
their lights; they came in as though they were friendly torpedo-boats, 
and by that ruse they got quite near to the Russian ships before the 
Russian ships knew it—if they ever did know it—until the torpedoes 
had actually taken effect. It is difficult to know how much to believe 
of what one reads in the papers; but if we do believe what we have 
lately read, we know .that the Russians have not only sunk their own 
torpedo-boats because they were thought to be Japanese boats, but they 
have also allowed their own ironclads to be torpedoed bv the Japanese 
because the Japanese torpedo-boats were thought to be Russian boats. 
If both those accounts are true, it only enforces still more the abso¬ 
lute necessity of our having some system of knowing without any 
doubt at all whether a torpedo-boat moving about at night is an 
enemy's boat or not; and that really is the crux of the whole thing. 
I think with our present system of defence of guns and lights, pro¬ 
vided they are properly arranged to begin with,which is most important. 


that we are in a more advanced state than Some of thoSe who 
have spoken since the lecture are aware of* I think we should make 
a very good attempt at keeping torpedo-boats out, if we krteW for cer¬ 
tain that they were the enemy’s torpedo-boats. It SeemS to me that 
the only possible rule which will meet with any Success is that HO 
friendly small boats are to move about at all during the hours of dark¬ 
ness, otherwise it gives the gunner absolutely no chance at all. A 
young subaltern of the Garrison Artillery, in command of two guns, 
cannot take the responsibility upon himself of firing on boats unless 
he is perfectly certain that they are the enemy’s boats, while if he 
hesitates half a moment he is lost; he will never have the chance 
again. Torpedo-boats, once they are seen in the illuminated area, 
do not give you a very long time to fire at them, and if you are not 
ready to begin on the instant the boat is visible over the sights or 
through the telescopes of your guns, you get no chance. Therefore 
I say it is absolutely necessary to lay down the rule that no friendly 
torpedo-boats are to move about at night within any waters that are 
defended by guns. I should like to be allowed to make one or two 
remarks about high-angle firing, because some remarks have been made 
which rather tended to show that it would be just as well to blow up 
high-angle batteries altogether. I am rather an advocate for high- 
angle firing. I know that experiments were tried at Plymouth some 
years ago, and I believe it was because of those experiments that high- 
angle guns were condemned by a very large portion of the military 
world; but I am not of that opinion myself. I am certain that high- 
angle firing guns can be worked up to very fair accuracy, quite suffi¬ 
cient accuracy, I think, to make them extremely useful in certain 
waters. Of course, they are not applicable to many places, but 
there are certain places where I think they would be most useful; 
anyhow, they would have the effect ot keeping the enemy’s ships on 
the move. I am open to correction by naval officers, but I have heard 
it said that a naval officer funks high-angle fire more than anything. 
If it does hit, it hits him in a place where he has not much protec¬ 
tion—the unarmoured decks, and I have always heard that it is a form 
of defence that the Navy will not run the risk of encountering. I 
just mentioned that because I am rather keen about high-angle firing, 
and I think it is a pity that it should be condemned without more 
experiments being carried out. 

Admiral the Hon. Sir E. R. FREMANTLE: —I should like to say 
that I believe it is a fact that the Admiralty’s arrangements are, on 


132 


the whole, quite complete (whether they are sufficient is another 
question) with regard to the closing of ports, and also with regard to 
distinguishing our own vessels from those of foreign Powers. Those 
arrangements were practically completed before I left Plymouth five 
years ago. 

Colonel E. W. COTTER, in reply, said:—It is very different thing 
to read a paper and have to speak extempore; but somehow I gather 
from the tenor of what has been said that although there has been a 
good deal of criticism, there is no disagreement with my general con¬ 
clusions, except in regard to the one about handing the defences over 
to the Navy. That subject I left to itself, apart entirely from the 
rest of my lecture. I only raised that point because the result of my 
study has brought before me the fact that at every stage, no matter 
where, I was always confronted with the query: "What would the 
Navy want in the matter?" I was asked a direct question by one 
speaker: "Were the Navy ever asked?" All I know is this, that I 
always asked the Navy whenever I came across any naval officer.' 1 ' I 
know that the same idea that was condemned by one of the speakers 
about a ship lying outside the fire of the batteries and bombarding the 
dockyard from the open sea, caused a long discussion at one place 
where I was, and it was raised in the first instance by a naval officer. 
It was not the foolish military officer that raised the question on that 
occasion, and, as General MacCalmont knows, I did not believe it 
was a practical point. I say this because remarks were made suggest - 
ing that we do not do these things reasonably. I appeal to you 
whether I have not tried throughout my lecture to give a reason for 
every step I took. Throughout the whole of the paper I have put my 
own branch of the profession last, because I felt that naval considera¬ 
tions in regard to coast fortresses must be entirely paramount. Ad¬ 
miral Close said we are not ready. Why! I said that I see no 
defence unless we are ready. We must be ready. If there be, as I 
said in some part of my lecture, a chance of torpedo-boats doing de¬ 
struction in a harbour before the declaration of war, the only thing 
for us to do is to get ready when war is imminent, and be ready when 

* 1 expressed myself very badly here. After lecturing for an hour on a theme, the 
text of which was that naval considerations should be paramount, I was naturally 
startled at being asked by Admiral Fremantle if I ever consulted a naval officer. 
Answers crowded into my mind, but I could not at the moment put them into 
words. Suffice it to give but one. A naval officer was consulted about every bat¬ 
tery built under me during my tenure of command as C.R.E. He was consulted 
before they were commenced, and he visited them during progress.—E.C. 



133 


negotiations are broken off. I think it was Colonel Johnson who 
said he would prefer to have batteries on a low site. I disagree 
with him altogether. I have not the least doubt in my own mind 
about it; but he is entitled to his own opinions. It would be a 
reversion to the old argument. I would infinitely rather have one gun 
in the open with 120° arc of fire than three or four guns with 
30° arc of fire, boxed up in a casemate where they are nut so ready 
to fire. 

Colonel R. F. JOHNSON :—I was not talking about casemates. I 
said in certain cases batteries which have an all-round fire would be 
better at low site than a larger battery, because you get shorter range, 
and therefore much greater penetration. 

Colonel E. W. COTTER: —Of course, if to get height you have to 
go a long way off, then the advantage of your height would disappear. 
If my drawing were put on a scale you would find that the slope of 
the hills* is 10°, so that the guns never lose more than about 100 or 
200 yards range. Somebody said that the Navy should be confined to 
offensive operations. There is something to be said for that. Per¬ 
sonally I think they should be confined thus:—Everything in which 
naval considerations are paramount should be done by the Navy. If 
it is offensive it should be done; if it is defensive it should be done; 
but that of course is a naval question. The question was raised about 
the anchoring of a boom. I do not see why a boom should not be 
anchored across the water where I showed. Of course, no boom 
would be 1,200 yards long; there would be two booms in the main 
channel, one at either side of the friendly passage. With regard to 
the torpedo-boats at night, I always understood that every torpedo-boat 
which attempted to enter a defended port at night would be fired at. 
There is one thing I should like to add before concluding. I have 
said that we are apt to overdo our defence by heavy guns, and apt to 
underdo our defence against torpedo-boat attack. In connection with 
that I may have been misunderstood. The officers who have been 
recently responsible for our coast defence have shown great insight and 
wonderful courage in the way in which they have placed but one gun 
where two or three guns were placed before; and with regard to what 
they have done against torpedo-boat attack, I can see no improvement 
possible. As to the style of the defence adopted, the only question is 
that I think we have not thoroughly realised how very necessary it is 

*/. e.y the hills on which the heavy batteries were placed.—E.C. 



134 


to go a great deal further on the same lines. I am very much obliged 
to you, Sir, for taking the Chair, and to you, gentlemen, who have 
discussed the paper.* 

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General Sir Hugh MacCalmont, 
K.C.B.) :—We have listened to a very instructive lecture and a very 
interesting discussion, though I do not mean to say that the discus¬ 
sion was not instructive too; as far as I am concerned, it was very in¬ 
structive. It occurred to me that the main point of the lecture is 
point No. 5:—"It is possible to secure harbours by defences placed on 
or based on the land without inordinate expense." I remember the 
case of Belfast Loch, where I lived some years ago. The place was 
absolutely undefended. It comprised a narrow channel leading up to 
a great manufacturing town and great ship-yards, which were practi¬ 
cally at the mercy of any cruiser which thought it worth while to 
work round and do some damage. The Navv cannot command every 
port; it cannot be everywhere, and it would be quite worth the while 
of any cruiser to make a raid on a place like Belfast. I wrote many 
letters in th e papers at the time I lived there to call attention to the 
great risks involved. Within the last three or four years the place has 
been adequately defended, and, as Colonel Cotter has pointed out, at 
quite a comparatively trifling expense to that of making the Navy re¬ 
sponsible for everything of the kind. It appears to me to be a matter 
entirely of economy. There is one question I should like to ask the 
lecturer. Colonel Cotter said that these contact mines were entirely 
out of date. We were given to understand that no nation would use 
contact mines. But we read in the papers the other day that the 
Russians blew up one of their ships through it touching a contact 
mine. 

Colonel E. W. Cotter:—I f I may answer at once, I would say 
we do not know enough of what has occurred; we cannot rely exactly 

* Addendum .—I gather from the discussion that I diinot make myself clear in the 
last paragraph of my lecture. I wish I had said: “Placed under the Admiralty” 
instead of “ handed over to the Royal Navy.” I never intended that sea-going naval 
officers should come ashore and command land batteries, nor did that follow from 
the text. Again, when I said that the present Fortress Artillery and Fortress En¬ 
gineers would be included with the Corps of the Royal Marines, I did not mean 
complete amalgamation, for of course the two existing Corps of Marines are not 
amalgamated. I meant that the Coast Defence Corps should bear the same relation 
to the Admiralty as do the two existing Marine Corps; but it does not neces¬ 
sarily follow that the new body would be sea-going, and therefore it does not neces¬ 
sarily follow that the R.M.A. and R.M.L.I. would get one whit less sea experience 
than they do at present.—E.C. 



135 


on what we read in the papers. But I think Admiral Fremantle said 
the other day in the papers that no nation would dream of using purely 
contact mines. You must, in addition to the contact, have another 
act, a very deliberate act. Of course, when that deliberate act is 
taken, then if you knock against the mines you blow yourself up. 
Whether the Russian arrangements were very bad or not, as I am not 
a naval officer, I do not say; but I cannot understand them. They 
may have in this respect done one thing by mistake, viz.: performed 
the deliberate act, so that when the contact occurred the ship was 
blown up. However, we cannot tell that until we know more about 
the details. But I do not believe they have used purely contact mines. 

The CHAIRMAN: —Then I should like to say that one of the 
speakers inferred that the advice of naval officers was not taken in 
regard to these land defences. I know of one case in point in which 
nearly all the work was done on the initiative of an admiral, though 
I cannot, of course, mention either the man or the place. At any 
rate, l know in one most important case that it was entirely on the 
admiral’s initiative certain steps were taken; and I remember his 
making the remark to me: "If you put guns of such and such caliber 
in a certain place no battle-ship will ever come near it." And the 
admiral’s view was acted upon. I do not think there is anything else 
I need say, except that I am not altogether prepared to agree with 
Colonel Cotter’s proposal to hand over the coast defence to the Navy. 
I am one of those people who think that everyone ought to be allowed 
to do his own business, and that all the land business ought to be 
done by the land forces. If it is a question of signalling, then the 
land forces, the Garrison Artillery, and so on, should be thoroughly 
educated for the interchange of all signalling with the Navy. There 
is a tendency for everybody to try'to do everybody else’s work. For 
instance, in the cavalry there are three men to one horse. Before you 
provide the three horses for the three men you proceed to mount the 
infantry. That is our way of doing business; it is a sort of Jack-of- 
all-trades plan, which I am quite certain is not conductive to efficiency. 

I desire, on your behalf to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Colonel 
Cotter for his very able and instructive lecture. 















NUMBER 12, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


NOTES ON 

INTRENCHING TOOLS 


EXTRACTS FROM “AN ESSAY 
ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 
OF FIELD FORTIFICATION,” 


By 

S. PIARRON DE MONDESIR, 


Chef de hataillon du genie brevet 'e. 


'Translated by FIRST LIEUTENANT G. B. PILLSBURY, Corps of Engineers. 





& 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 

— 1904 .— 


•T-Sfc C 


« 






4 


















. 





























■ 
















. 










NUMBER 12, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


NOTES ON 

INTRENCHING TOOLS 


EXTRACTS FROM “AN ESSAY 
ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 
OF FIELD FORTIFICATION,” 


By 

S. PIARRON DE MONDESIR, 


Chef de bataillon du genie brevete. 


Translated by FIRST LIEUTENANT G. B. PILLSBURY, Corps of Engineers. 


ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, I). C., 
— 1104 .— 


NOTE. 


In this essay Major Mondesir advances the theory that it will be 
impossible for the defence to occupy the military crest of the ridge 
chosen as the line of defence, on account of its exposure to the artil¬ 
lery preparation for the infantry attack. He accordingly advocates 
the occupation of the military crest by small advanced parties, which 
he calls fighting outposts ( avant-postes de combat.) The firing line is 
to intrench behind the crest of the ridge. The reserve, comprising 
one half the available forces, is to be concealed from the enemy, but 
not intrenched. The artillery of the defence is to refuse the artillery 
duel, but, after inflicting as much damage as possible on the first of 
the attacking batteries brought up, is to be posted in such positions 
that, while concealed from the enemy, it can nevertheless sweep with 
a flanking fire the slopes over which he is to advance. 

As soon as the attack reaches the military crest of the position, it 
necessarily loses the support of its artillery. It is then to be subjected 
to the artillery and machine gun fire of the defence, together with 
the infantry fire from the intrenched firing line; and finally, at the 
proper moment, the reserve of the defence is to make a counter 
attack. 

Whatever the opinions held on the system of tactics above outlined, 
the following extracts, relating to intrenching tools, are of interest 
as showing the present tendencies in the French army on this subject. 



i 


* 


Extracts from “An Essay on the Tactical 
Employment of Field Fortification,” 

By S. PIARRON DE MONDESIR, 

Chef de bataillon du genie brevete. 

[Revue du Genie, May, 1904 ] 

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'r* •'y* «'('» «y» /f* 

INFANTRY INTRENCHING TOOLS. 

Admitting that the conditions of the infantry attack require the at¬ 
tacking forces to maintain their position on the conquered crests, 
under the artillery fire of the defence, the question of individual cover 
for the infantryman becomes more urgent than it was thirty years ago 
at Plevna. The present equipment of a company of infantry is en¬ 
tirely insufficient, since, of the 200 to 250 men who may have to cover 
themselves during the course of the attack, twelve only are furnished 
with an intrenching tool. These are just enough to dig cooking 
trenches, and ditches around tents. 

On the defensive, the company w r agon can be drawn on. It fur¬ 
nishes 30 intrenching tools, not even enough for a single section, if 
all are at work. Nevertheless, if we admit that a portion of the section 
are to be employed on the earthworks, while the rest are preparing 
the material for covering the trenches, we see that the company 
wagon corresponds, as far as intrenching tools go, to the section. 

Let us suppose a battalion ordered to intrench a point of support. 
Dispostions are made as follows: 

One platoon as fighting outposts (with all the portable intrench¬ 
ing tools of the battalion.) 




2 


One company on the firing line (with the tools in all four com¬ 
pany wagons.) 

One platoon as support (shelters to be constructed finally at a dis¬ 
tance of 100 yards from the flanks, slightly in rear, or concealed 
by the terrain.) 

Two companies in reserve (concealed.) 

We see that the tools are sufficient, but that they are obtained at 
the price of disorganizing the system of equipment. 

But all this applies merely to defensive operations. Now it is the 
offensive that should be given the first consideration. 

We should be able to give every second man an intrenching spade 
(even if it be the present model, which is easily broken) without in¬ 
creasing the burden of the infantry soldier on the march. This tool 
would be carried on the company wagons, in place of the present re¬ 
serve tools. 100 intrenching spades, without cases, with a strap to 
attach to the waist belt, would weigh 75 kg. [165 lbs.] We would 
discard 16 round shovels, 2 square shovels, 12 picks; a total weight of 
75.5 kg. [167 lbs.] 

It should be noted that with the modern development of the com¬ 
bat, the troops on the firing line are quickly exhausted, and that the 
same individuals do not take part in the action from beginning to 
end. Each element engaged that has progressed so far that it must 
intrench, has soon played its part, and the action must be carried for¬ 
ward by a new element. Accordingly the troops who have delivered 
the decisive attack are not those who will carry on the pursuit, or, if 
the attack has been checked, the renewal of the attack. 

It results that the extra weight of the intrenching tool secured to 
the belt, distributed the moment the marching formation is changed 
to the formation for attack, is carried but a short time. For the as- 
sult, if necessary, they will throw away their intrenching tools. 
They may, indeed, throwaway their knapsacks! 

To this proposition, we add that of giving each squad four sand 
bags, or the company wagon thirty sand bags. 

TOOLS FOR THE ENGINEERS. 

In addition to the assistance of their hands, the engineers give the 
infantry the aid of their tools. Here again the distribution of the 
equipment, and even the tools themselves, are out of date. They are 
not in accord with the present tactical needs of the field of battle. 
I hey are more suited to seige work, in which case many other 


3 


sources of supply are available (local supply, supply from the Corps 
engineer train.) 

Two divisions are absolutely necessary. 

1st division—One light wagon, two horse, per section. The section 
of engineers is the most convenient unit to unite with the infantry 
units in charge of the preparation of a point of support. (All theo¬ 
retical studies and the experience in the non-commissioned officers 
schools shows this.) This wagon would carry only intrenching tools 
—of the light engineer model, and not the heavy reserve tools—tools 
for demolitions, and a small supply of melinite petards. Total, 4 
wagons, 8 horses. 

2d division—A wagon of the present model, 4 horse, with a lighter 
load (special engineer tools and the remainder of the melinite.) 

This question naturally requires close study, but we maintain the 
tactical necessity for the principle of two divisions. An engineer 
company would see its usefulness doubled. 

It should be remarked that when a element of engineers is joined 
to a force of infantry in the organization of a point of support, the 
greater part of the work (especially the trenches) would be carried on 
by the infantry but that there is at the same time work to be done of 
a character requiring the technical skill of the engineer (woods, vil¬ 
lages, shelters, communications.) The relation between the quantity 
—the importance in point of time if you wish—of this kind of work, 
and the quantity of work given to the infantry, corresponds very often, 
in the concrete cases that we have studied on the ground, with the 
relation between the effective force of a section of engineers and of 
a battalion of infantry. 

stz vl/ »L» •jL# vL^ 

'T* *T* 'T‘ 


APPENDEX II. 


ENGINEER TOOLS. 

Engineers soldiers are all furnished with portable tools; the com¬ 
pany engineer wagons and 9 heavy wagons of the Corps engineer train 
carry heavy model reserve tools, which would generally be handled by 
infantry auxiliaries. 

The earthwork tools (shovels and picks) of this model are handled 
with difficulty by men not skilled in earthwork. Again, the tactical 
situation, or the state of the ground, does not always permit the wagon 
to be brought to the spot where the tools are needed; the men are 
then obliged to carry the tools for a considerable distance, together 
with their guns and knapsacks. This is very troublesome and un¬ 
practical. 

Finally, are these earthwork tools well suited to the end for which 
they are employed? They usually serve only for the construction of 
shelter trenches, of a profile analogous to the simple trench—that is 
to say, requiring about two hours work per running meter for an 
unskilled laborer. 

Under these conditions, portable tools, like those carried by the 
engineers, would generally be sufficient for such work; being lighter, 
they could be carried attached to the waist belt, and with equal loads, 
more could be carried in the wagons. 

It is of great advantage to increase the number of tools at the front. 
From this point of view, it would be of advantage to give each sec¬ 
tion of engineers a light wagon, carrying as many tools as the regu¬ 
lar engineer wagon, the tools being lighter. These light wagons 
would be drawn by two horses. The heavy advance engineer wagons 
would be done away with. This would result in an economy in teams. 

This disposition would give more elasticity to the employment of 
the company; the section, which is the true unit of work, would be- 


5 


come independent, having always its tool wagon at its disposition. 

As the number of tools with the advance would be thus increased 
without increasing the means of transportation, the supplies carried 
by the heavy wagons of the reserve train could be decreased somewhat. 
A number of heavy wagons loaded with heavy tools would be retained, 
for more important earthwork, such as the construction of approaches 
to military bridges. 

To sum up, up to the present time our tools have been arranged for 
seige operations and not for field operations. 

It is not a question of making a sweeping change in existing ar¬ 
rangements; the considerations above set forth are intended merely to 
indicate the direction in which the evolution of the equipment 
should progress, by applying the proper means to the desired end. 

A. DERANCOURT. 

Chef de bataillon du genie brevet 'e . 


APPENDEX III. 

INFANTRY INTRENCHING TOOLS. 

The portable tools of the infantry comprise spades, picks, mattocks 
and axes. 

There are but 8 spades in each infantry company. Now the light 
spade is a tool for the offensive; it is the only one that enables the 
foot soldier to decrease his exposure in all the phases of the combat, 
when stationary, either by covering himself against artillery or in¬ 
fantry fire, or by firing behind slight cover, that he will improve with 
his spade. 

The fight may last many hours (Saint Privat.) It is therefore 
necessary that the soldier should be able to intrench himself, and it 
would be rational to furnish each man with a light spade. 

If we could have a light spade for every two men, as in Germany, 
it would still be a great improvement. 

As, to-day, we are seeking every means to lighten the burden of the 
foot soldier, these light tools could be carried on the company wagon. 
A hundred spades would replace the 36 heavy tools that are now 
carried in this wagon. 

When an engagement appeared probable, the tools from the wagon 
would be distributed to the men, just as cartridges are now distributed. 
This tool would be hung from the belt, so as to be always at hand. 

A. DERANCOURT, 

Chef de bataillon du genie brevet 'e. 


NUMBER 13, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 

Remarks on SEARCH-LIGHT 
PROJECTORS FOR COAST 
DEFENSE SERVICE 

By 

FIRST LIEUTENANT A. E. WALDRON, 

Corps of Engineers, 
and 

Mr. JOHN L. HALL, 

of General Electric Co. 



ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, I). C., 
— 1904 — 













NUMBER 13, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


‘Remarks on SEARCH-LIGHT 
PROJECTORS FOR COAST 
DEFENSE SERVICE 


By 

FIRST LIEUTENANT A. E. WALDRON, 


Corps of Engineers, 
and 


Mr. JOHN L. HALL 


of General Electric Co. 



ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, I). C., 

— 1904 — 















A 60-INCH PROJECTOR AND CONTROLLER 












SEARCH-LIGHT PROJECTORS 
FOR COAST DEFENSE SERVICE. 


The use of search-lights in modern warfare is an absolute necessity, 
no seacoast fortification being complete without them. Their value 
as an aid to seacoast batteries in repelling night attacks depends upon 
the number, size, location, and control of the search-lights and the 
reliability of the power supply. Inefficiency in any of these points is 
sure to be felt; and an energetic enemy is sure to notice and take ad¬ 
vantage of them. It is of interest to note each subject in turn and 
its influence upon the general efficiency of the search-light system, as 
by this means some features that are detrimental to the system may 
be eliminated and others altered to improve it. 

Local conditions, as in all other engineering projects, are the con¬ 
trolling features. This makes it impossible to adopt hard and fast 
rules, but the average conditions admit of a few general remarks which 
are, without very great-changes, applicable to all. 

Search-lights have been classified, according to the duties to which 
they are assigned, as searching, illuminating and blinding lights. 
The combined Army and Navy maneuvers have shown conclusively 
that blinding lights, while they cause considerable trouble with the 
merchant marine, are not real obstacle to warships. This leaves for 
consideration searching and illuminating lights. All lights of each 
distinct and seperate fire command should be under the control of one 
man, who should have complete control of them. The lights should 
be divided into searching and illuminating lights, and each should 
confine itself to the duties assigned to it; or, in other words, no 
search-light in either class should attempt the duties of the other, 
unless accident compels a reassignment of the lights, which should be 
in accordance with a prearranged plan. 

Aside from the regular duties an important feature of any system of 
defense is the protection of the home fleet. The opening events in 



2 


the present war between Russia and Japan have shown the desirability 
of an efficient search-light system. The present automobile torpedoes 
with an initial speed of 30 knots have a range of from 800 to 1,000 
yards, but as it is quite probable that in the near future a torpedo 
having an initial speed of 40 knots and a range of from 1,200 to 1,500 
yards will be designed. It is, therefore, important that the search¬ 
light system be able to pick up and illuminate torpedo-boats moving 
into an attack, in sufficient time to repulse them before they have 
attained the range given above. 

NUMBER OF LIGHTS. 

The number of distinct and seperate targets that can be subjected 
to an overwhelming fire at one time, determines the number of illumi¬ 
nating lights. In some cases this would be one for each fire com¬ 
mand, in others one for each gun, but the more general solution will 
be one for each battery. Under the head of illuminating lights some 
would place such lights as the FIRE COMMANDER’S and DIS¬ 
TRICT COMMANDER’S. If such lights are used they should be 
in a class by themselves, but with an efficient system of searching; 
especially as when there are boats out patrolling the offing they cause 
more trouble than good, and their use is not warranted. 

If mine-fields are located in exposed places it may be necessary to 
keep them illuminated; but on the other hand if a certain spot is 
kept illuminated, a mine-field will be suspected and avoided, or a 
submarine boat may countermine this lighted area. For these reasons, 
it is believed to be a better policy to depend upon the searching lights 
to expose any tampering with the mines. Should it be considered 
necessary to illuminate these places more lights will be required than 
outlined above 

The number of searching lights is more difficult to determine 
and much thought must be given the subject to obtain the best 
results. The information available will be the extent and depth 
of the water area, location of the channels, the outline of the 
coast and the location of the batteries. To thoroughly search all 
avenues of approach and avoid the intersection of beams, with the 
fewest lights, is the problem to be solved. Experience has shown 
that one beam intersecting another masks objects beyond the inter¬ 
section, even if they are actually in one or the other beam; or to 
express it otherwise, it is quite difficult to see through a beam of light 
from a projector. It will be found best to assign to each searching 


3 


light a fixed sector, the limits of which are determined preferably by 
natural land marks; and no search-light should be allowed to encroach 
on the sector assigned to another. For the same reason it is wise to 
keep all illuminating lights occulted until wanted for the use assigned 
to them. For if beams are permitted to intersect, a number of tor¬ 
pedo-boats or the fleet itself, might steam in close, masked by the 
interfering beams, and bv taking advantage of a temporarily unillumi¬ 
nated area of water make a dash for the harbor. The extent of the 
water area and the angular distance covered by each sector will deter¬ 
mine the number of searching lights. 

As ships in war time will be painted a color which will render 
them as inconspicuous as possible, they will be able to steam in much 
closer without being discovered, and a sharp eye and strong illumi¬ 
nation will be required in order that they may be picked up in suffi¬ 
cient time. A fleet making an attempt to close in on the batteries 
or run into the harbor will take advantage of the time required for 
each search-light to search from one limit of its sector to the other. 
This time must be kept as small as possible, while, on the other hand 
it has been found by actual trial that an angular velocity in azimuth 
of 360 degrees arc, in 15 minutes of time, has given the best results of 
for searching. Higher speeds do not afford sufficient time for a 
critical examination of the illuminated area. This movement 
corresponds to one degree of arc in 2.5 seconds, and to deter¬ 
mine the time of one complete cycle, allowance must be made 
for the return to the starting point, which will make 5 seconds per 
degree of arc. Furthermore, as the beam will undoubtedly be stopped 
to examine objects which are not at first fully recognised, a further 
increase must be made for this, and an equal time is assumed. This 
added to the 5 seconds, makes the time 10 seconds per degree of sec¬ 
tor, which is a conservative estimate; in a majority of cases the 
time will be considerably more than ten seconds. 

A torpedo-boat steaming at 30 knots an hour moves in one second 
approximately 50 feet, and while the beam is swinging through one 
degree of sector will move about 500 feet. It will be seen that if but 
few lights are used, the sector assigned to each increases; and assuming 
a sector of 90 degrees,during the time of swinging from one limit to the 
other and return, such a torpedo boat would be able to steam a distance 
of 15,000 yards. So that by reason of thick weather and partial invisi¬ 
bility due to color, it might be ableto steam close enough, without being 
observed, to deliver torpedoes of maximum range with high chance of 


4 


success. It would be a simple matter for the enemy to create a di¬ 
version, by keeping one or two torpedo-boats steaming about attract¬ 
ing the attention of the searching lights, thus increasing the oppor¬ 
tunity for the attacking boats to steam in. To avoid such a possi¬ 
bility, it is desirable to divide the water area into a number of sectors 
as small as possible, and assign to each a searching light. A sector 
of 20 degrees will not be too small to assign to one light. This 
sounds extravagant, but it would mean only nine searching lights 
when conditions were very unfavorable; that is, with deep water in 
all directions and 180 degrees of arc to cover. The configuration of 
the coast, the location of the channels, and shallow water, will in 
most cases considerably reduce the number of searching lights re¬ 
quired. 

SIZE OF LIGHTS. 

For efficient use of range finding instruments, it is necessary to il¬ 
luminate the objective as strongly as possible at comparatively long 
ranges; this means large illuminating lights. But before a target can 
be turned over to an illuminating light, it must be picked up and 
identified by a searching light, at a distance as near the maximum 
range as possible; and, also, as it is more difficult to see an object when 
temporarily illuminated by a swinging beam, than after it has been in 
the beam for a short time, or after the eye has had time to adapt it¬ 
self to the new conditions, searching lights must be as large as, if not 
larger than, illuminating lights. Therefore, projectors of a maximum 
illuminating power should be selected, and it is probable that the 60" 
size will be most suitable,although, in rare locations, such as restricted 
channels, the 36" size might be used. 

LOCATION OF LIGHTS. 

The location of the lights with reference to the observing station 
affects the visibility of objects at the working range: an observer 
near a search-light is unable to see the objects illuminated as clearly as 
one some distance to one side of the beam. Therefore, all searching 
and illuminating lights should be placed well to one side of the con¬ 
trolling or observing station. This location has been tried repeatedly 
and search-lights installed in this way have given better results than 
those located near the observer. The question of high and low sites, 
within reasonable limits, is not important and may be satisfac¬ 
torily settled by selecting a location of such height that the beam 
will be approximately tangent to the water at the working range; as, 



PROJECTOR WITH SHUTTER CLOSED 
























PROJECTOR WITH SHUTTER OPEN. 








by this means, a greater area of water is illuminated. Other points 
for and against a certain location, such as concealment, distance from 
power supply, etc., can best be decided by local conditions. 

CONTROL OF LIGHTS. • 

For efficient service, it is necessary that the control of the light be in 
the hands of an observer,and as the principle observer ought to be at least 
1,000 feet from the light, this means electrical control at this or 
greater distances. The system should be such as to avoid the neces¬ 
sity of handling the motor current in the controller and controller 
cable, as this will avoid excessive drop of potential in the latter which 
would effect the speed and power of the training motors. As mentioned 
before, velocities in azimuth ranging from 360° of arc in 15 minutes 
of time, to a maximum speed of 360° of arc in one minute of time, 
should be provided; the higher speed for rapidly shifting the 
beam from one object to another at need. This requires at least 
two speeds, one but Ts of the other. The controlling system should 
take care of this. It is impossible to get this range of speed by motor 
regulation, and reliable means other than this must be provided. It 
is also advisable to have all the movements—not only the different 
speeds in azimuth, but the training of the beam in a vertical plane, as 
well as in a horizontal plane—controlled from one lever or handle at 
the controlling station; simplicity in this respect limiting the chance 
of error in training, and saving much confusion. 

A device that has never been provided for coast defense search-lights 
might be used to advantage, namely, a shutter which will occult the 
beam when necessary, the shutter mechanism being operated from 
the controlling station. Without this, to occult the light it is neces¬ 
sary to open the lamp circuit, and as the lamp burns badly when first 
started, during the formation of the crater, the addition of the shutter 
would be an advantage: the lamp being allowed to burn continuously, 
but the beam being shown only when required. The expense of burn¬ 
ing carbons, when the projector is not in use is too small an amount to 
be considered. The power, however, is somewhat of an item, but 
even this need not be considered when reliability is compared with 
cost. A shutter without electrical attachments is shown herewith. It 
would be an easy matter to equip this shutter with anelectrical device 
which could be operated from the controlling station; that is from a 
point 1,000 to 3,000 feet from the projector. 


6 


The system of control of projectors, lately installed, is illustrated in 
the diagram. This has successfully controlled lights from a point over 
3,000 feet from the projector and can be extended to further 
points if necessary. In later shop tests 16,000 feet of cable has been 
used with success. This system takes care of all the points noted, 
except the shutter, which could be operated by a separate switch added 
to the controller. 

The heavy lines represent the lamp connections or those carrying 
the heavy current for the arc, the medium lines the connections of the 
training motors, and the light lines those of the magnetic clutch system 
and the control of the electro-magnetic switches or relay system. 
It will be noted that each motor has three electro-magnetic switches 
which determine the direction and speed of rotation. Two of 
these contol the direction of rotation; the third when operated 
in connection with either of the others, short circuits a resist¬ 
ance in series with the motor armature, increasing the speed of 
rotation. The gearing in the horizontal system, not shown in the 
diagram, has two ratios of reduction between the motor and the pro¬ 
jector’s turntable, giving two speeds, one of which is 15 times as fast 
as the other. Each gear train is controlled by the action of an electro¬ 
magnetic clutch, which in turn is operated by an electro-magnetic 
switch. 

In cases where it is desirable to equip the old style 30" or 36" project¬ 
ors with long distance control,a relay switch case can be obtained which 
can be placed near the light, the old cable being attached to the case con¬ 
taining the relay switches and the new controlling cable being carried as 
far as desired. This would not give the two speeds having the ratio of 
15 to 1, but simply the old control, extended to 16,000 feet if necessary. 

POWER SUPPLY. 

The use of search-lights under conditions found in the service ren¬ 
ders the distribution of power to obtain reliability, good regulation, 
and low cost of installation and maintenance, a matter for serious 
consideration. 

During the past two Army and Navy maneuvers, the writers have be¬ 
come convinced that in the majority of cases, on account of the higher 
illumination, the 60-inch projector will be the most serviceable. And 
for this reason the relative costs, as given later in this article, are 
based on the distribution of power to 60-inch projectors taking 
200 amperes as their normal current. Search-lights in use are 
installed at widely separate points, stretching into a long line— 


so? 

































































































































































































































. 



































































































































































































































l 


in one instance eleven miles. And these search-lights, as now 
installed, are in nearly every case remote from the generating station, 
making it necessary to furnish current to them through excessively 
long feeders, or to install a separate small generating plant for each 
light. I he latter have generally been steam driven, and on account 
of concealment these small isolated plants have been located to the 
rear from 1,000 to 3,000 feet. 

The search-lights require direct current for the arc, as alternating 
current is not as efficient or suitable; and while alternating current 
motors might be used for training, as the training motors require less 
than two per cent of the energy necessary for the arc, a direct cur¬ 
rent generator is used to supply the power for both the arc and the 
motors. 

In order that the lamp mechanism may properly function, it is 
necessary to have a resistance in series with the arc; and it is recom¬ 
mended that the voltage of the generator be 110-125 volts, the arc re¬ 
quiring 65 volts and using 110-volt generator, these being 45 volts drop, 
with normal current, in the feeder cables and resistance of rheostat. It is 
advisable that the drop in the feeder cables be kept as small as possible, 
as the regulation at the terminals of the feeders or at the search-light 
depends largely on this. If no training motors were used it would 
be possible to dispense with the use of a rheostat, using a feeder cable 
that would give the necessary drop in voltage between the generator and 
the search-light. But in electricallv controlled projectors, using 
motors for training the projector, it will not be possible to do this, 
for the reason that as the current varies in the arc, the terminal poten¬ 
tial would also vary, and, with motors wound for 65 volts when the 
lamp was burning, would be subjected to a pressure of say 110 volts 
when the lamp was not burning, which is 70 per cent more than what 
they were designated for,and which,of course,would not be good treat¬ 
ment. With a generator of higher voltage the difference would be much 
greater. This would not only have an injurious effect upon the motors, 
but would influence their speed so that the speeds of training would vary 
between wide limits. It is, therefore, necessary to distribute energy to 
the projectors with the minimum drop in the feeder cables,reducing the 
voltage for the lamp bv means of a rheostat,and maintaining the voltage 
at the training motors as nearly constant as possible. Again, on ac¬ 
count of the distance of the point of control from the search-light, 
i. e., length of controller cable, it is necessary to have the maximum 
generator voltage at the projector, in order that the resistance of the 


8 


controller cable may not interfere with the proper working of the con¬ 
trolling system; otherwise the cross section of the conductors in the 
controller cable, and, therefore, the size of the cable, will have to be 
materially increased. 

It is possible to distribute energy by either direct or alternating cur¬ 
rents. By direct current,power maybe distributed by several methods: 
by the two-wire low tension system; by the three-wire system and by 
by the use of 500 volts system with motor generating sets. The two- 
wire system is, at present, largely in use, yet it has but few advantages. 
On account of the long length of the feeder cable through which the 
current has to be transmitted, either an excessive amount of copper is 
necessitated or an extreme drop in the cable. The main advantage of 
this system is that it is more widely known,having been in use for some 
years, and enlisted men are more familiar with it than with any other. 
It is, however, no simpler than the other methods to be described later. 

Where two search-lights are located sufficiently close together to 
enable one generating station to supply the power, these two projec¬ 
tors may be run on the three-wire system, using either two 110 or 125 
volt generators in series, with a neutral brought back from the inter¬ 
mediate point, or a 220 or 250 volt generator with a derived neutral. 
This system will reduce the amount of copper that is usually neces¬ 
sary for two search-lights, as three wires may be used in place of 
four. All three cables should have the same cross section, for, in case 
only one light is running the neutral will have as much current to carrv 
as any other wire,but when both are in operation, the neutral will carry 
only the balancing current. In practice, however, it is seldom that 
two projectors are located close enough to take advantage of this, 
and for this reason, in the comparison of costs, the system is not 
considered. 

Re’ative to the 500 volt system, using motor generating sets, this 
has no advantage over the alternating current system, but on 
the contrary has not the flexibility, simplicity nor reliability of the 
alternating current system of distribution. A possible use of the 
500-volt direct current system, where the radius of distribution 
is not too great, would be to equip cars, running on suitably 
located tracks, and self-propelled by motors, with a search-light and 
motor generating set for supplying proper voltage to the projector and 
controller, both the motor of the generating set and the self-propelling 
motor taking their power from the trolley. The advisability of having 
portable projectors, or of mountingthem in permanent emplacements, 



PROJECTOR LAMP AND MECHANISM. 





9 


is not discussed, other than to state that the latter method permits the 
use of a much more satisfactory and reliable system of power supply. 

With the use of alternating current as a means of distributing energy, 
it is,of course,understood that some translating device must be provided 
at the terminals of the different feeders,in order that direct current may 
be supplied to the projectors, the alternating current being used only as a 
means of distributing the necessary energy. For this purpose alter¬ 
nating current is remarkably flexible and efficient. By reference to 
the curves of estimated costs it will be seen that, in spite of the fact 
that a motor generating set is necessary, the actual cost of installation 
is less than by any of the direct current systems of power distribution. 
Moreover,by this method, in nearly every case, one generating station 
can supply the power for all projectors in the district, rendering the use 
of small and inefficient isolated plants unnecessary, and doing away with 
the annoyance of distributing coal,oil,etc.,to these troublesome steam 
plants. The efficiency of this method is much higher, as with 
all projectors run from a single station the generating units may be 
larger, the efficiency of generation much higher, and the cost of main¬ 
tenance less. In such a station, it will be necessary to install alter¬ 
nating current generators with direct current exciters, and it is possi¬ 
ble for one generator to supply energy to all the search-lights; but 
as a matter of precaution, it might be well to have a reserve set to 
throw in, in case of accident to the generator in operation. The 
alternating current will be generated at a potential of from 1,000 to 
3,000 volts. Should it become necessary to transmit power to very re¬ 
mote points,the voltage may be stepped up by means of transformers for 
transmission over such lines at a higher voltage, reducing the copper 
cost and the line losses. 

Although not recommended as standard design, in existing direct 
current stations a steam driven three-phase alternating current genera¬ 
tor may be installed, or a motor generating set may be provided, 
taking direct current from the station bus bars, and driving a three- 
phase alternating current generator to supply power to the feeders. 
But it is a better plan to install a complete alternating current cen¬ 
tral station, of sufficient capacity to furnish all the power required 
within the radius of distribution; using alternating current motors 
wherever possible, and direct current only where it is absolutely 
necessary; such as for control of gun carriages and at the search¬ 
lights. At each search-light will be installed a three-phase alter¬ 
nating current motor-generating set, with the necessary transformer 


10 


for stepping down the voltage. The efficiency of the motor generating 
set, including the transformers, will be approximately 75 per cent. 
If belted sets are used, the efficiency will be somewhat less; but the 
cost of the sets will also be less. The direct connected set, however, 
aside from its increased efficiency, is recommended on account of the 
smaller space occupied, and also for the reason that it is self-contained in 
every respect. The costs of distribution by alternating current system, 
as plotted in the curves, include not only the cost of the cable, but 
that of the motor generating set as well; in order to compare its cost 
with that of the cable alone as used with the low tension direct current 
system. The cost of the generator is not included, as some method, 
in either system, must be used to generate the necessary energy. It 
would be a very simple problem to supply power to a number of 
search-lights distributed along a line of defense as much as eleven or 
more miles long, by locating the power station sufficiently back to the 
rear for protection, and distributing power in both directions to the 
various projectors. And if necessary the voltage of the more distant 
lines may be stepped up by transformers thereby saving copper with 
the same per cent line loss as in the shorter lines. 

This power station could supply the energy for all batteries, for the 
post lighting,and for the search-lights as well. Some might argue that 
it is dangerous to generate all the energy in one station: But if the 
station is properly located, the danger of its falling into the hands of 
the enemy,or of a projectile demolishing it, is extremely small. Should 
the reliability of this method be questioned, reference is made to the 
numerous commercial plants now in successful operation. The 
reason that commercial plants are successful is that competent 
men are in control; and this should be true of military plants 
as well. The central station and all electrical apparatus connected 
therewith should be in the hands of a commissioned officer, who should 
be held strictly responsible for the condition and efficient operation 
of the station, as well as for the pecuniary value of the property under 
his charge. 

It should be noted that this alternating current apparatus,properly de¬ 
signed and installed, is remarkably simple in operation. The induc¬ 
tion motor used in the motor generating sets for the projectors, is the 
simplest form of motor possible, having neither commutator nor 
brushes,and requiring the connection of onlythree wires to the starting 
device. This starting device is similar to starting rheostats of direct 
current motors,operating by reducing the starting voltage. For stepping 




11 

up the voltage, and the reverse, the transformer is the simplest device 
possible,and operates at an extremely high efficiency. It consists of two 
coils on an iron core, with no moving parts whatever; it is difficult 
to see how such apparatus could get out of order with ordinary care. 

To explain the curves: 

Curve No. 1 shows the relative cost of the different systems of 
transmitting energy from the generator to the projector. 

Curve No. 2 shows the number of pounds of copper necessary for 
different distances of transmission, based on the 110-volt two-wire sys¬ 
tem with a loss of 10 per cent. 

Curve No. 3 is the same as Curve No. 2, but based on 3,000-volt 
alternating current system, three phase, with 10 per cent loss. 

In Curve No. 1: A is the cost of lead covered cable,110-volt two-wire 
system, 10 per cent loss; B is the same as A, only allowing for 20 per 
cent loss,C and D are the same as A and B,respectively,using wire with 
weather-proof insulation on a pole line construction. The cost of 
the poles, however, is not included. Also, in Curve No. 1 E and F 
are caste for alternating current of 2,000 and 3,000 volts respectively, 
with 10 per cent loss, using three-conductor lead covered cable. 
These curves also include the cost of a motor generating set necessary 
to change the alternating current into direct current at the projector. 
G and H, also in Curve No. 1, are the same as E and F respec¬ 
tively, but using wire with weather-proof insulation on a pole line 
construction, the price of the poles (six dollars a pole) included, and 
the poles spaced 100 feet apart. All line losses are in per cent of 
the delivered power, and alternating current lines have the wires sepa¬ 
rated eighteen inches, a frequency of 60 cycles, and 80 percent power 
factor. With three conductor cables, the loss would be only that due 


to resistance. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































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NUMBER 14, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


EARLY DAYS OF THE 
ENGINEER SCHOOL 
OF APPLICATION 

BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL 

HENRY L. ABBOT 

Colonel , U. S. Army , Retired 



ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 
WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 
—1904.— 














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NUMBER 14, 

OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 

ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

UNITED STATES ARMY. 


EARLY DAYS 

OF THE ENGINEER SCHOOL 
OF APPLICATION 






BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY 11 ABBOT, 


Colonel , U. S. Army , Retired. 



engineer school of application, 

WASHINGTON BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, P. C., 

— 1904 .— 














































CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Engineer troops in the U. S. Army_ 1 

Disposition of the Battalion after the Civil War_ 2 

Inauguration of the Engineer School of Application_ 4 

The Essayons Club_ 8 

Meteorology in connection with Hypsometry___ 10 

Military reconnaissances and surveys_ 10 

Field Astronomy__’ 11 

Tidal and current measurements_ 14 

Military Photography_ 15 

The Engineer Depot_ 15 

The submarine mining service_ 17 

Special researches at Willets Point_ 23 

Military peace record of the Battalion_ 26 

End of tentative development_ 30 



















Ill ustrations. 


General Henry L. Abbot_ Frontispiece. 

Facing page. 

Commanding officers’ quarters_ 2 

Officers’ mess_ 4 

Officers’ quarters_ 6 

Mine explosion__ 7 

Barracks- _ 8 

Field astronomical observatory_ 11 

Photographic laboratory_ _ 12 

Mule decapitated with dynamite_ 14 

Submarine mine explosion_ 16 

Granite casemated battery_ 17 

Double submarine explosion_ 18 

Destruction of the Olive Branch __ 20 

Submarine mine explosion_ _ 24 

Explosion under ice_ 28 

T orpedo laboratory_ 34 

Bachelor officers’ quarters and barracks- 38 

Chapel_ — 40 

















































































■ 














' 






EARLY DAYS OF THE ENGINEER 
SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, 

By 

BREVET BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY L. ABBOT, 
Colonel , U. S. Army , Retired. 


The intimate connection which has always existed between the 
Engineer School of Application and the Engineer troops, renders a 
brief outline of the successive organizations of the latter important to 
an understanding of the former. Indeed to Company A under Lieut. 
Duane much credit is due for valuable technical researches, before 
the Civil War had demonstrated the necessity of a special School for 
this among other purposes. 

ENGINEER TROOPS IN THE U. S. ARMY. 

Subsequent to the Act of March 16, 1802, fixing the military peace 
establishment of the United States, there were no engineer troops in 
service, other than the Company of Bombardiers attached for a short 
time to the Military Academy, until Company A was raised by Act 
of May 15, 1846, to meet the exigencies of the War with Mexico. 
After its close the Company was stationed at West Point, except 
when it accompanied the expedition to Utah, although several detach¬ 
ments served in the West on duty with other troops in the fifties. At 
West Point the Company assisted in the instruction of the cadets in 
practical military engineering, but its most important duty was ex¬ 
perimenting with different patterns of bridge trains to take the place 
of the rubber pontons which had proved to be ill adapted to the needs 
of the service. These investigations were conducted chiefly by Lieut. 
Duane, and when the Civil War occurred the results proved to be of 
immense value. 

At the outbreak of that war Congress authorized, by Act of August 
3, 1861, three more companies of engineeer troops, and by Act of 



2 


August 6, 1861, one company of topographical engineer troops, the 
engineer service at that date being divided between these two Corps. 
After their consolidation, by Act of March 3, 1863, four of these 
companies served as a Battalion attached directly to the Headquarters 
of the Army of the Potomac, performing gallant and distinguished 
service from Yorktown to Appomattox. Company E was recruited at 
Detroit in 1865. The Battalion organization was first formally 
recognized by Congress by Act of July 28, 1866. 

The original organization of Company A called for 100 enlisted 
men. This number, and that of each of the new companies, was es¬ 
tablished at 150 men by the Acts authorizing the latter. In conse¬ 
quence of the reduction of the army after the war, the number allowed 
to be recruited for the Battalion was fixed in December, 1870, at 354 
men; on July 1, 1871, at 301 men; on June 3, 1873, at 350 men; and 
on May 9, 1877, at 200 men. On August 5, 1884, the number was 
increased to 450 men. The first reduction occasioned the breaking 
up of the Posts at Yerba Buena Island and Jefferson Barracks, the re¬ 
duction of Company D to a skeleton organization, and the transfer 
of Company E to West Point. 

DISPOSITION OF THE BATTALION 
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR. 

When the Army of the Potomac was mustered out of service at the 
close of the war it became a question what disposition should be made 
ot the Battalion. West Point it was foreseen would soon cease to 
be exclusively an Engineer Post, and moreover there were no build¬ 
ings there available for so many men, and for the storage of the im¬ 
mense accumulations of engineeer materials in Virginia that were 
worthy of preservation. At Willets Point the temporary buildings of 
the Grant General Hospital would afford immediate accommodation, 
and it was decided to create there an independent engineer post under 
the direct control of the Chief of Engineers; to send Company A back 
to West Point; to send Companies B, C and D to Willets Point; and 
to send Company E to Jefferson Barracks, where were to be stored the 
accumulations of Engineer property remaining after the discharge of 
the Western Armies. Subsequently, under General Humphreys’ ad¬ 
ministration, Company D was transferred to California in August,1867, 
for such military duty as might be required by the Commanding Gen¬ 
eral, taking station first at Fort Point and later at Yerba Buena Island; 
and Company A was transferred from West Point to Willets Point, 








3 


arriving on September 3, 1867, being replaced by a small detachment 
from the Battalion; the instruction of the companies at the three En¬ 
gineer Posts was to be prescribed by the Battalion Commander, even 
the Post returns being forwarded through him; he also acted as Super¬ 
intendent of the Engineer Recruiting Service, officers of the Corps 
on other duty at several cities having charge of the enlistments. 
Such were the general conditions under which the Engineer School 
of Application originated. It really was divided between three Posts, 
prior to the abandonment of Yerba Buena Island and Jefferson Bar¬ 
racks in 1871. 

When the Army of the Potomac was mustered out of service in the 
summer of 1865, General Duane who had been its Chief Engineer 
reported for duty to General Delafield, then Chief of Engineers. 
The latter asked what service would be agreeable to him, remarking 
that he was one of the first officers of the Corps.to return to duty after 
distinguished service throughout the entire war in his legitimate arm 
of service. General Duane replied that he should like to command 
the Battalion of Engineers. General Delafield acceded, and he was 
ordered to take charge of the construction of the fortifications at Wil- 
lets Point, and to command the new Engineer Post. Companies B 
and D were sent there to receive and store the engineer property, to 
be joined later by Company C which remained at Washington to col¬ 
lect and ship the stores. This work was in progress when in the 
autumn of 1865 my volunteer regiment was mustered out of service 
and I reported for duty to General Delafield. He assigned me to the 
charge of the construction of the fortifications at Fort Schuyler, and 
to the command of the Battalion of Engineers, then under that of the 
senior Captain, Brevet Colonel Harwood. I reminded him of Gen¬ 
eral Duane’s request; but he said the latter’s health had suffered, and 
although he was in command of the Post I would be held responsible 
for the Battalion. Before I could assume command, I was not sorry 
to he ordered to report to General Humphreys for temporary duty on 
the Mississippi River, and it was only on June 1, 1866, that I finally 
took station at Willets Point. 

Having long entertained the highest respect and esteem for General 
Duane, and feeling that our verbal instructions might cause mis¬ 
understandings as to our relative functions I had a frank explanation 
with him on reporting. He fully met the difficulty by at once issuing 
a Post order defining our relations as those existing between the Super¬ 
intendent and Commandant at West Point; and from that time until 


4 


the date when he was relieved from duty at Willets Point, in October 
1868,we cooperated most cordially in endeavoring to make the service 
with troops profitable alike to the young officers who, it was understood, 
would be given a tour of duty at Willets Point immediately on leaving 
the Military Academy, and to the older officers who would find the com¬ 
parative leisure useful for such professional reading as had been sug¬ 
gested by their experience in other fields of duty. It would be unjust 
to General Duane to fail to recognize the benefit I derived from his 
good advice in the effort, without special authority or supplies of any 
kind, to relieve the officers from the tedium of routine garrison life, 
which after the excitement of active field service could hardly fail to 
become irksome. 

INAUGURATION OF THE 
ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION. 

In October, 1866, General Humphreys having recently succeeded 
to the command of the Corps made his first inspection of the Post. 
He asked many questions, and was evidently impressed with the im¬ 
portance not only of replacing the temporary buildings, already giving 
signs of deterioration, with structures better suited to the climate, 
but also of developing some well considered plan by which the new 
Post might be made to serve as a School of Application for officers 
and men alike, and thus contribute to the efficiency of the Corps of 
Engineers. The locality was well suited for the practical instruction 
of the troops in works of siege including land mining, in military 
bridge exercises, and in military reconnaissances of the surrounding 
country to serve as a basis for the study of defensive lines. The ques¬ 
tion for the officers was more complex, and should be developed with a 
view to meet the actual needs of young officers resulting from the fact 
that while admirably trained at West Point in the theoretical rudi¬ 
ments of their profession, and in many of the practical details of the 
military duties of all arms of service, they had still much to learn 
about the use and care of delicate surveying, astronomical and other 
instruments in constant use by the Corps of Engineers. Before the 
war this needful practice had often been given by early assignment to 
duty on the Survey of the Lakes, or on explorations for a Pacific Rail¬ 
road, or for the demarkation of our International or State boundaries; 
but now that the first two or three years after graduation would be 
largely devoted to service with troops it was desirable to afford ample 
opportunities to master these details, without a knowledge of which 

















5 


the officer was certain to find himself in respect to the civil employees 
of the Corps in the mortifying position of a young Infantry or Artil¬ 
lery officer attempting to instruct old sergeants without himself un¬ 
derstanding the weapon. Many of the older officers had not for¬ 
gotten such experiences in the days before the war, when there had 
been no facilities for acquiring these rudiments before actual work 
began. As to a post-graduate course of technical reading, it would 
in General Humphreys’ view be inexpedient to resume at once the 
studies and recitations which for four years had occupied so much of 
the time at West Point. The young graduate should be made to feel 
that his school-boy days were over, and that he was now responsible 
for the use of the time available for reading. He had learned how to 
study and should be allowed to apply this knowledge in the identical 
manner which the duties of the Corps would exact during all the rest 
of his life. Any one worthy of his commission would soon begin the 
work, and the examinations for promotion would weed out sluggards. 
In a word, Willets Point should be a School of Application and not 
an under-graduate affair. Furthermore, as soon as means could be 
obtained, it should be made the special laboratory of the Corps where 
with the assistance of officers and enlisted men any investigations re¬ 
quiring experimental research should be conducted. Such an estab¬ 
lishment had always been needed. 

Such was the general plan which occupied the mind of General 
Humphreys and to which my local experience suggested no modifica¬ 
tion or improvement. I did, however, suggest the question whether, 
as some of the work that officers would be called upon to perform lay 
beyond the usual requirements at military posts, it might not be well 
to have some such official recognition by the War Department as had 
been given in the case of the Artillery School. He said he thought 
not, at least for the present. The plan would be tentative at best, 
and such official recognition might involve conditions that would re¬ 
quire troublesome modifications later. The command of the Battal¬ 
ion carried with it the requisite authority for what was proposed, and 
in case of any question I could depend on his support. It seemed bet¬ 
ter to grope our way at first, until experience had indicated the best 
solution of the problem. Thus was inaugurated the Engineer School 
of Application. 

At this time the roster of officers on duty with the companies was 
the following: Battalion Adjutant. 1st Lieut. A. Nisbet Lee; Bat¬ 
talion Quartermaster, 1st Lieut. D. P. Heap; Company A, at West 


6 


Point, Capt. W. H. H. Benyaurd, 1st Lieut. W. A. Jones and 1st 
Lieut. H. M. Adams; Company B, at Willets Point, Capt. C. W. 
Howell and 1st Lieut. L.C.Overman; Company C, at Willets Point, 
Capt. A. H. Holgate and 1st. Lieut. W. R. Livermore; Company D, 
at Willets Point, Capt. F. Harwood, 1st Lieut. C. B. Phillips and 
1st Lieut. W. H. Chase; Company E, at Jefferson Barracks, 1st 
Lieut. W. Ludlow, 1st Lieut. J. C. Post and 2d Lieut. E. A. 
Woodruff. Many changes, however, soon occurred. 

These officers had all graduated at the Military Academy during the 
progress of the war, and had had no experience in the civil duties of 
the Corps. Furthermore the Battalion organization had not been 
recognized by Congress, and had been improvised to meet the needs 
of an active field service. Graduates on reporting had usually been 
assigned to a Company, making the Battalion a sort of headquarters 
when the army was stationary, but when a movement came the de¬ 
mand for engineers with divisions and brigades caused so many tem¬ 
porary detachments that the Battalion often marched under the com¬ 
mand of the acting sergeant major. Indeed Lieutenants Lee and 
Heap, appointed by me on October 3, 1866, to take rank from the date 
of the Act (July 28, 1866), were the first legal incumbents of the offices 
of Adjutant and Quartermaster. On assuming command I had found 
the officer of the day receiving dress parades, 1st sergeants command¬ 
ing the companies. Under such conditions the summer of 1866 was 
naturally devoted to establishing the usual routine of duty at a mili¬ 
tary post, and to carrying out Colonel Harwood’s drill orders cover¬ 
ing infantry, pontoneering and the construction of three field batter¬ 
ies. One of the latter, however, was tranformed into a typical mortar 
battery to illustrate the system developed in the siege of Petersburg.- 
This pattern it was found could never be silenced, by reason of over¬ 
head splinter proof shelters placed between the mortar platforms and 
the traverse magazines, under which the cannoneers could find instant 
shelter against shells exploding over the battery. The construction 
at Willets Point was intended as a permanent type, but was removed 
many years after to give place to new officers’ quarters. 

The instruction order for the summer of 1867, when systematic 
work really began, prescribed the completion of this battery, the 
fabrication of materials gathered in the vicinity or received from 
West Point into gabions, facines, etc., and the construction upon a 
scale of r 2 of Vauban’s 1st front, Noizet’s front, and the German front 
used at Fort Alexander at Coblenz. One of the fronts was assigned 































7 


to each Company, the working drawings to be prepared by the Com¬ 
pany officers. One of Brialmont’s fronts was added at a later day. 
The scarps and counterscarps, at first of marsh sod, were subsequently 
replaced with concrete; and the models proved to be useful in the 
verbal instruction of the non-commissioned officers, and interest¬ 
ing to officers visiting the Post. The utility of the practice even 
for the officers themselves was illustrated when I found a recent 
graduate attempting to construct his front on the ground with 
chain and transit, his theoretical instruction having failed to make 
him appreciate the use of drawings for that purpose. The course 
in pontoneering covered all details, including rowing, bridge build¬ 
ing with wooden and canvas pontons, loading and unloading the 
wagons, etc. In infantry it covered company, battalion, and 
skeleton drills in the school of the brigade; bayonet exercise, and 
Heth’s target practice. The latter, although required by existing 
War Department orders, was often ignored at military Posts; and, 
as will appear below, this early attention to the duty brought great 
credit to the Battalion when a few years later marksmanship became 
so conspicuously the recognized test of soldierly merit. 

To trace from year to year the gradual development in summer in¬ 
struction at the Posts occupied by the Battalion would exceed the 
limits of this paper. It may be found in the annual orders printed on 
the Battalion press by enlisted men at Willets Point. This instruc¬ 
tion covered verbal questioning of the soldiers by their officers at the 
model batteries; the practical driving of mining galleries, the explo¬ 
sion of gunpowder and dynamite mines, the formation by small 
charges of cavities for camouflets in countermining; the construction 
and breaking of improvised bridges over dry ravines; the making of 
military maps by officers, non-commissioned officers, and selected pri¬ 
vates upon the system defined by Battalion order in June, 1868, which 
had been adopted after large experience in the Civil War; the rapid 
multiplication of military maps by various photographic processes; 
no little practice in carpentry and masonry in the construction of the 
new Post buildings, a work which continued actively until 1875; 
regular drilling in a large circular building, 110 feet in diameter, 
floored with moulding sand,where the construction of batteries,paral¬ 
lels, saps and other works of siege on a scale of k could be executed 
with great advantage, as I had seen practiced by the Royal Engineers 
at Chatham in 1873; and finally elaborate instruction in submarine 
mining, as will appear below. 


8 


For the enlisted men, the winter instruction order for 1867-68 pre¬ 
scribed the usual daily recitations of the non-commissioned officers in 
field fortification, ponton manual, and Infantry tactics, together with 
Company drills in the bayonet exercise and such other exercises as 
were suited to the season. The school for soldiers ordered by Act of 
Congress of July 28, 1866, was opened under the following regula¬ 
tions. Attendance to be voluntary. Those desiring to attend to 
meet and elect three of their number to constitute a School Commit¬ 
tee for the season, whose first duty would be to prepare a classified list 
of the studies desired. The necessary room, with fire, light, black¬ 
boards, tables, etc., to be provided without expense to the scholars; 
ultimately the Post fund assisted in the purchase of books. This 
school proved highly successful, the Battalion containing many men 
desirous to improve themselves by study. Three departments, mathe¬ 
matics, languages and English branches were formed,including arith¬ 
metic, algebra, geometry, English grammer, French, Spanish, history, 
international law, geography and penmanship. Four officers were de¬ 
tailed in each department, one to be present on three nights for three 
consecutive weeks from 6.30 to 8 P. M., to hear and mark the recita¬ 
tions. This school was continued annually during my entire tour of 
duty, the instruction finally devolving upon the Adjutant and Quar¬ 
termaster, as the other duties of the Company officers became more 
onerous. Theoretical instruction in the submarine mining service 
was also given later to the enlisted man, as will appear below. 

THE ESSAYONS CLUB. 

The problem how to make the winter season of 1867-68 pass pleas¬ 
antly and profitably to the officers during the suspension of drills was 
not a simple one. The ordinary routine of garrison duty after years 
spent in active field service could hardly fail to become wearisome to 
men of mental ability. We had no funds or outfit of any kind. Gen¬ 
eral Duane and I discussed various plans, and finally decided upon the 
following, suggested by the success of a similar voluntary organiza¬ 
tion formed among the officers at West Point to discuss the cam¬ 
paigns of Napoleon at regular meetings, some member in turn hav¬ 
ing previously secured the needful maps and reviewed the important 
facts by aid of the Library of the Academy. As our officers at Willets 
Point had just served with distinction in a great war, and had had no 
experience in the civil duties of the Corps, it seemed to be more use¬ 
ful for them to turn their attention to the latter, which could be done 















































• I 








































































9 


by individual reading and the preparation of papers for discussion. 
The idea at once proved popular, and thus was originated the Essayons 
Club of the Corps of Engineers, which became the germ of the School 
of Application. 

I he active membership was composed of all officers on duty at Wil- 
lets Point who desired to join, and they all did, and such other per¬ 
sons as should be unanimously elected; among them will be pleas' 
antly remembered Mr. Oxholm, the Asst. Engineer at the Fort. 
I he honorary membership included all other officers of the Corps of 
Engineers, and such others as should be unanimously elected. Origi¬ 
nal communications upon professional subjects were solicited from 
the latter, which if voted by the Club might be printed on the Bat- 
tal ion press, making its proceedings the means of disseminating valu¬ 
able information. Subjects for discussion to be confined to scientific 
topics. Meetings to be held on Monday of each week during the 
season. At each meeting some member to read a paper upon a sub¬ 
ject announced by himself at the previous meeting, either an essay 
or a compilation from authorities at his disposal. The order of 
papers to be determined by lot at the first meeting, and as often there¬ 
after as necessary. After the reading a discussion to follow on that or on 
some other subject announced by the president at the previous meeting. 

This plan proved highly successful. General Duane, on the occa¬ 
sion of the first meeting, held on January 28, 1868, read a paper on 
the experiments conducted at West Point to develop the best pattern 
of bridge train for the Army. This was followed by others, and gen¬ 
eral interest in professional subjects was soon awakened. Many of 
the papers, fifty in all, were printed from time to time on the Battal¬ 
ion press, some of them contributed by officers of high rank not 
stationed at Willets Point. As the technical work of the School in¬ 
creased meetings were held at longer intervals, and finally the Club 
died a natural death in 1882. The printed papers covered a wide 
range of topics pertaining to physics and engineering, and they form 
a worthy supplement to the Professional Papers of the Corps. They 
were followed by another series entitled Professional Papers of the 
Engineer School of Application of which two volumes were printed 
during my tour of duty. They were largely but not exclusively re¬ 
stricted to translations of such current literature as seemed appropri¬ 
ate to the objects of the School, both military and civil. 

To attempt to follow year by year the gradual development of the 
School of Application would extend this paper beyond reasonable 


10 


limits. The fundamental idea was the following. The study of 
natural phenomena with a view to a specific application of the infor¬ 
mation acquired constitutes so important a part of the current duties 
of the Corps that the time of the young officer could not be more 
profitably spent than by making him familiar with the methods com¬ 
mon to such investigations. Reading can be done anywhere, re¬ 
search demands tools and skill in using them, and these are not to 
be had at ordinary stations of the Corps. It should be the function 
of the School to supply them. 

METEOROLOGY IN CONNECTION WITH HYPSOMETRY. 

The beginning was made with meteorology, for which alone the 
needful instruments could then be obtained. The Corps had made 
important contributions to hypsometry in conducting the explorations 
for the Pacific Railroad, and few instruments require more delicate 
handling or furnish better tests of the accuracy of the observations 
than does the barometer. In July, 1868, the eleven officers on duty 
with the Battalion, and Asst. Surgeon Calvin De Witt as a volunteer, 
each made hourly observations with extreme care for twenty-four con¬ 
secutive hours, of the barometric pressure, the temperature, and the 
humidity. The usual reductions were applied and the results were 
published in Battalion orders, giving five mean horary curves. 

These observations were continued regularly from year to year, the 
observers being the officers and selected non-commissioned officers at 
the three Engineer Posts; and the results were published in annual 
orders in the form of mean horary curves. These observations, and 
their reduction by the method prescribed in Colonel Williamson’s 
Corps Paper, made the officers familiar with the latest developments 
in hypsometry, and the few hours devoted to them were well spent. 

MILITARY RECONNAISSANCES AND SURVEYS. 

The details of military reconnaissance next received attention. On 
June 30, 1868, was published a Battalion Order prescribing the method 
developed during the War for such work on foot and on horseback, 
and for its compilation into military maps. This practice was con¬ 
tinued annually not only by the officers and non-commissioned officers 
but also by selected privates. Indeed, for many years small detach¬ 
ments served in the Western Departments and on the Wheeler Survey, 
and the Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for 1876 records 
the fact that during three years these enlisted men reconnoitred and 









11 


mapped 24,044 miles, for the benefit of the Army. In the summer 
of 1872 reconnaissances near Willets Point were combined in a way 
to make a connected map of the district, and during the following 
winter the instruction order described: "Each commissioned officer 
of the Battalion, stationed at Willets Point, will prepare, in lieu of 
essays, ’ ’ (which had been required in the previous year) "a detailed pro¬ 
ject for a line of field worksextending from Willets Point to Jamaica 
Bay, designed for the defense of Brooklyn against an anticipated sud¬ 
den invasion by a well equipped army of 100,000 men, landing on 
the east end of Long Island. The project will include a plan (on 
the Battalion photographic map), sections, estimates of time and 
materials, with a full memoir showing the theory of defence. Our 
working forces may be assumed at 30,000 militia infantry, and three 
full companies of the Battalion of Engineers; our artillerv to consist 
of 50 rifled siege guns and 50 eight-inch siege mortars, served by a full 
regiment of artillery, and of 30 six-guns batteries of field artillery, 
one-third being rifled. In addition to the needful quartermaster trans¬ 
portation, including forage, 1,000 horses will be available, and all re¬ 
quisite tools; of which, however, a list should be given." These 
projects were forwarded to the Chief of Engineers. At a later date, 
each officer was required to carefully survey and contour one square 
mile of territory,using the ordinary surveying instruments. Finally,as 
the distance from the Post increased outlying camps were formed for 
this purpose. One object of this practice was to impress the officers 
with the fact that while absolute accuracy is unattainable, no matter 
how perfect the instruments, a very close approximation ought to be 
secured even with rough methods, if skillfully applied. 

FIELD ASTRONOMY. 

Field astronomy was the next subject to receive attention. As the 
demarkation of all our International and many of our State bounda¬ 
ries has been confided to the Corps of Engineers, together with the 
Survey of the Great Lakes, and the exploration of the new and little 
known portions of our territory, every young officer should be an ex¬ 
pert in practical field astronomy. Prof. Bartlett, who took a warm 
interest in the new School, kindly offered in February, 1867, to loan 
us the early astronomical outfit of the Military Academy. In the 
summer following he sent an astronomical transit, a zenith telescope, 
a telescope for occultations mounted equatorially, sextants, chrono¬ 
meters, etc. To properly make use of these instruments a field 


12 


observatory was necessary, and funds were so hard to obtain in those 
days that it was only early in 1869 that regular observations could be¬ 
gin. All officers on duty with the Pattalion were put on the roster, 
and weather permitting the hours from sunset to midnight were devoted 
to the work. Each officer was supplied with the printed blank forms 
used by the Corps for recording the notes and making the computa¬ 
tions; and as these after approval became his personal property they 
could hardly fail to be convenient at a later day if suddenly detailed 
on astronomical duty. As the latitude and longitude of the observa¬ 
tory would soon be accurately known, the former by many zenith tele¬ 
scope observations and the latter by time signals from Washington, 
the individual results of each officer were tabulated and announced an¬ 
nually in Battalion Orders, which thus became useful for reference 
in estimating the probable absolute errors to which simular observa¬ 
tions and methods in the field are liable. This annual publication, 
which continued during my entire tour of duty, ultimately resulted in 
connecting our little observatory with the discovery of a new oscillat¬ 
ing motion of the axis of the earth, as will appear below. 

During the first twelve years fifty officers of the Corps had the 
benefit of practice, in this old observatory. The building was small 
and the instruments were of ancient patterns, but they were replaced 
in the spring of 1879 by a new outfit entirely satisfactory in these 
respects. The building was constructed almost wholly by Engineer 
soldiers. A lithograph showing its dimensions and arrangements was 
appended to Battalion Order No. 3, of 1881 (reprinted in Annual 
Report of Chief of Engineers for 1881), which also contained a full 
description of the instruments, about a dozen in number and includ¬ 
ing the latest types. Prof. T. H. Safford after visiting it remarked to 
me that in his opinion it was t,he best observatory in the United States 
for teaching practical astronomy. The regular course included deter¬ 
mination of latitude by different types of zenith telescope and by the 
sextant; the determination of longitude by moon culminations, by oc- 
culations by the dark limb of the moon, by eclipses of Jupiter’s satel¬ 
lites, and (for practice in using the sextant in oblique planes) by 
lunar distances. Any unusual astronomical event was of course ob¬ 
served and reported, as for example the transit of Mercury on May 6, 
1878, in connection with which the longitude of the observatory was 
determined by time signals sent for ten days from the Naval observa¬ 
tory at Washington; and the transit of Venus on December 6, 1882, 
of which the results were reported in full in Paper V of the Engineer 








































13 


School of Application. At the same time special observations were 
made to determine the correction for the right ascension of Venus as 
given in the American Ephemeris. which was determined to be plus 
0.48 seconds; similar observations made with the Transit Circle of 
the Naval Observatory at Washington indicated a correction of plus 
0.47 seconds. But the most interesting contribution to the science 
of astronomy for which credit was accorded to our little observatory 
came about by accident. It was well understood that a good deter¬ 
mination of latitude by the zenith telescope method should not be in 
error more than one-tenth of a second of arc, or say about ten feet. 
But a study of all the observations made at the new observatory, as 
reported in the Annual Battalion Orders, indicated a slight but pro¬ 
gressive change, as appears from the following figures quoted from the 
Battalion Order of February 15, 1886. 

In 1880 (326 observations on 84 pairs) latitude 40° 47' 21".59 

In 1881 (591 observations on 104 pairs) latitude 40 47 21 .47 

In 1882 (235 observations on 60 pairs) latitude 40 47 21 .37 

In 1883 (497 observations on 118 pairs) latitude 40 47 21 .15 

In 1884 (523 observations on 89 pairs) latitude 40 47 20 .75 

In 1885 (564 observations on 85 pairs) latitude 40 47 21 .49 

Grand mean of 2,736 observations latitude 40 47 21 .29 

This result seemed to me so surprising that I communicated the 
figures to some of my astronomical friends, and it so happened that 
one of them, Prof. Seth C. Chandler, was then engaged in studying 
some similar results reported from Europe. Full details of our rec¬ 
ords were given him at his request, and in his well known analysis of 
the problem he accorded gratifying recognition to the good work of 
our little observatory. 

The frequency of auroral displays being well known to be connected 
with the occurrence of certain astronomical phenomena, advantage 
was taken of the unusual facilities at Willets Point to secure an ac¬ 
curate record of their number. The public property was guarded by 
three watchmen, especially selected for trustworthy character, who oc¬ 
cupied three widely separated posts during the entire night. They were 
each ordered to report on the following morning whether any auroras 
had appeared, and if not whether the condition of the sky would have 
permitted any to be seen. The following is a summary (quoted from 
the Battalion Order of February 15, 1886), of these records for sixteen 
years, which is interesting in connection with the epochs of maxi¬ 
mum and minimum solar spots as given by Prof. Fritz of Zurich, viz: 


14 


maximum, anno domini 1870.6; minimum, anno domini 1878.9; 
maximum, anno domini 1882.4. The average number of sun spots 
for the last nine of these years, as reported by Prof. D. P. Todd of 
the Lawrence Observatory in the monthly weather reports of the Sig¬ 
nal Service is added to the table. The "probable” auroras were esti¬ 
mated by assuming the same ratio on the cloudy nights as was noted 
on the clear nights. For 1870 only the last eleven months were in¬ 
cluded in the table, all the other years being complete. 

Summary for auroral records for sixteen years. 


Years. 

Clear sky. 

Cloudy sky. 

Total for 
year. 

Average 
number of 
sun spots. 

Remarks. 

Nights. 

Observed 

auroras. 

Nights. 

Probable 

auroras. 

1870 

184 

50 

150 

41 

99 


11 months 

1871 

211 

60 

154 

44 

104 



1872 

234 

60 

132 

34 

94 



1873 

214 

54 

151 

38 

92 



1874 

190 

18 

175 

17 

35 



1875 

189 

14 

176 

13 

27 



1876 

195 

9 

171 

8 

17 



1877 

191 

7 

174 

6 

13 

2.6 

Sun soot 

1878 

185 

2 

180 

2 

4 

2.2 

record be- 

1879 

204 

9 

161 

7 

16 

2.0 

gun June, 

1880 

216 

13 

150 

9 

22 

14.3 

1877. 

1881 

191 

23 

174 

21 

44 

26.7 


1882 

201 

55 

164 

44 

99 

28.3 


1883 

215 

24 

150 

17 

41 

27.4 


1884 

180 

12 

186 

12 

24 

38.0 


1885 

208 

11 

157 

8 

19 

50.8 



It will be noted, although there seems to be no correspondence be¬ 
tween the above number of auroras and the number of sun spots as 
reported by Prof. Todd, that there is a remarkable correspondence be¬ 
tween the auroras as observed at Willets Point and the epochs of 
maximum and minimum sun spots as reported by Prof. Fritz. It is 
certain that the heavens were carefully watched by our soldiers; 
indeed one of the watchmen, private Thomas Murphy of Company 
B, discovered and reported a new comet at 2h 20m A. M., on June 22, 
1881, which was in advance of any other of the numerous claims 
reported by the newspapers. 

TIDAL AND CURRENT MEASUREMENTS. 

In 1871 a systematic course of practice in tidal current measure¬ 
ments with double floats, electric current meters, and a self-register¬ 
ing tide gauge to determine the hourly water level, was begun and 
continued annually under direction of the Battalion Adjutant or 
Quartermaster. Full records were kept and discussed by the observers. 





















































15 


MILITARY PHOTOGRAPHY. 

The discovery that maps could be readily multiplied by photography 
was made shortly before the beginning of the Civil War, and the 
process was largely applied by officers of Engineers in the field, making 
use of civilian experts. Manifestly this work would pertain in future 
to the engineer troops, and the study was taken up in March, 1873, 
in an old building and with limited means. At first it was placed in 
charge of the Battalion Adjutant, Lieut. Mercur, and the instruction 
was confined to three non-commissioned officers from each of the three 
companies. In 1875 the building had beeen sufficiently enlarged to 
extend its benefits to the commissioned officers, and they were re¬ 
quired to fit themselves for instructing their soldiers. Lieut. Quinn, 
Battalion Quartermaster, was in charge of the laboratory from Decem¬ 
ber 1876, to April 1881, when it devolved on Lieut. Griffin as Bat¬ 
talion Quartermaster. Both of these officers did excellent service in 
developing this new branch of Engineer duty; the former contributed 
a paper on the subject to the Essayons Club series, and the latter to 
the Professional Papers of the School of Application. In this con¬ 
nection the long and excellent service of Sergeant Charles E. von 
Sothen of Company C should be remembered. Detailed as assistant 
to the officer in charge, about the time when the work began, and 
then having little or no knowledge of the subject, he devoted himself 
so enthusiastically to the study as ultimately to become an expert of 
no mean attainments. A paper written by him forms one of the 
School of Application Series. 

Finally, after long waiting, funds were secured and a really fine pho¬ 
tographic laboratory was completed, and opened in November. 1882 
After that date nothing more could be desired, either for the instruc¬ 
tion of officers or the practical training of enough selected men in each 
Company to meet any probable demands of the service. As this sub¬ 
ject was not included in the West Point course, officers were required 
to prepare and submit notes and to pass examinations in order to en¬ 
sure their proficiency. 

THE ENGINEER DEPOT. 

The large collection of Engineer materiel at Willets Point was 
stored, guarded, and issued by the Battalion. The old buildings 
were all made of wood and were in close proximity to each other, as 
indeed was the case with the barracks and officers’ quarters. The 
danger of fire was ever present. A large supply of water buckets, and 


16 


copies of a map showing the location of all sources of water supply, were 
early prepared and distributed; fire drills were frequently had; an old 
hand engine formerly famous as "Tweed’s Tiger’ ’ in the days of the vol¬ 
unteer fire organization of New York City was purchased in March, 
1867, and the soldiers were exercised regularly in its use; finally the 
plan of special watchmen acting with more freedom than ordinary 
sentinels was established for posts distant from the Guard House. An 
event which happened on the occasion of the funeral of General 
George H. Thomas in April, 1870, illustrated the good judgment of 
one of the young officers, Lieut. Powell, Battalion Quartermaster. 
The troops were ordered to Troy to form part of the escort, and I left 
him in command of the Post, with only a few men to guard the prop¬ 
erty. Reflecting that the usual fire measures could not be carried out 
from want of men, the first thing he did was to have all available 
buckets filled with water, and to arrange a signal for all hands to as¬ 
semble on the run. A few moments after these arrangements were 
perfected the cry of fire came from a building occupied as the Adju¬ 
tant’s office, situated on the line of officers’ quarters. The stove pipe 
where it passed through the roof had ignited it. The signal was 
given; the men assembled, laughing at the supposed drill alarm; and 
the Post was saved from destruction, for the wind was strong and once 
started nothing could have stopped the flames. 

In 1868-69 the Battalion did much experimental work for an Engi¬ 
neer Board appointed to prepare, in the form of a Ponton Manual, a 
revised system of bridge equipage and drill, which should embody the 
practical experience of the War. After its adoption, the manual 
work of remodeling many of the old wagons to make them conform 
to the adopted pattern was continued for several years by skilled car¬ 
penters from the Companies. 

In 1870 the functions of the Depot were extended to include the 
inspection, repairs, and issue on approved requisitions of the instru¬ 
ments held in reserve for the use of the Corps. For their safe storage 
a fireproof brick building was finally erected. Some of them soon 
began to suffer from the condensation of moisture in the damp air of 
the seacoast, and an experiment on a large scale was made with cal¬ 
cium chloride (not chloride of lime) to artificially dry the room 
where the most delicate of them were stored. It had 37,000 cubic 
feet of air space. The crystals were exposed on gratings which al¬ 
lowed the fluid caused by the absorption of water to drip into reser¬ 
voirs. This fluid was subsequently evaporated by boiling, and the 














































17 


salt was thus recovered, to be used again. By noting the weight be* 
fore and after boiling, the volume of water taken from the air of the 
room could easily be determined. During the year 1880-81 by six 
boilings each six hours long 74.7 gallons were thus removed: in 
1881-82 seven boilings yielded 85 gallons; and in 1884-85 the volume 
was 107 gallons. 4 he result was a decided success, and suggests how 
some damp powder magazines may be rendered dry at little expense. 

THE SUBMARINE MINING SERVICE. 

But the most important researches conducted at Willets Point dur¬ 
ing my tour of duty there were those connected with submarine min¬ 
ing. In May, 1869, General Humphreys, with the sanction of the 
Secretary of War, devolved upon the Battalion of Engineers the duty 
of developing a torpedo system, as an accessory to the permanent sea- 
coast defences of the Country. The work was to be done under the 
direction of the Board of Engineers, of which the commanding offi¬ 
cer was made a member when this subject was under consideration. 
The problem involved experimental researches with all known kinds 
of modern high explosives to determine their relative intensity of ac¬ 
tion, and the laws governing the transmission of the shock of explo¬ 
sion through water; the best form of cases, modes of anchorage, and 
typical grouping of mines to insure the blocking of a channel of ap¬ 
proach ; the best mode of operating the mines so that while innocuous 
to our own fleet they should be deadly to an enemy; in a word, an 
elaborate experimental study of a new and little known element of 
modern warfare. Work was immediately begun and continued with¬ 
out interruption during my entire tour of duty with the Battalion, 
resulting in developing a complete system which received the appro¬ 
val of the Government. 

To determine the relative intensity of action of different explo¬ 
sives, and the laws of its transmission through water, use was made 
of wrought iron rings having interior diameters ranging from 3 feet 
to 8 feet, and carrying six pressure gauges disposed around a central 
charge to be tested. The method heretofore in use for forming the 
scales for these gauges by static compression proved to be inapplicable 
when they were subjected to the sudden blow given by a high explo¬ 
sive, and a new method by impact was devised which solved the diffi¬ 
culty. The rings were supported vertically at any desired depth by 
cylindrical buoys floating vertically, with pointed bottoms reducing 
the shock to the minimum. The whole apparatus was often thrown 


18 


bodily into the air with the jet. It was manipulated from a raft made 
by connecting two pontons, and provided with a windlass for raising 
and lowering the ring. To extend the measurements to longer ranges, 
a large wrought iron crate, fifty feet by ten feet by ten feet, was con¬ 
structed. The stresses were reduced to the minimum by making it 
of half-inch plates from 5 to 11 inches in width, the planes of which 
passed through the central point to be occupied by the explosive. 
Each of the nine cross frames carried four pressure gauges. The 
whole was supported, either horizontally or inclined at any desired 
angle or depth, by two cylindrical buoys with wire rope slings at¬ 
tached to cross frames diagonally braced. This apparatus was maneu¬ 
vered by a sixty-ton schooner towed to the firing station by a small 
steam launch. Here the crate was abandoned to its buoys; the charge 
was fired by electricity; the schooner returned; the crate was raised; 
and the pressure gauges were recovered. Many large charges of differ¬ 
ent high explosives were fired in this manner, the last one, 100 pounds 
of dynamite No. 1, fired in 1878, disrupted the crate, but the gauges 
were recovered. An analysis of these ring and crate records revealed 
the algebraic law governing the transmission of intensity of action 
through the fluid, together with the relative efficiency of about a 
dozen explosives, of which two, the safety compound and dualin, 
proved to be too dangerous for service. In 1879 dynamite No. 1 was 
definitely adopted as the best known explosive for our submarine 
mines. This conclusion was not reached without a long series of ex¬ 
periments upon sympathetic explosions, which demonstrated that 
their range was too short for one explosion to endanger neighboring 
mines as planted for service; and also that, if not compacted into 
cartridges, the dynamite when thoroughly frozen was certain to be 
detonated by our adopted fuze. 

During the progress of the above experiments investigations had 
also been conducted to determine the intensity required to disrupt the 
bottom of a modern ship of war. A target representing the latter in 
interior construction, 20 feet by 20 feet by 3 feet in dimensions, was 
placed in position and held firmly down by several 1,000 pound anchors 
and chain cables crossed over it. Various charges of dynamite No.1,rang¬ 
ing up to 200 pounds, were supported under it at different depths and ex¬ 
ploded by electricity. These researches made known the proper charges 
and their dangerous ranges, whether floating or resting on the bottom. 

The formulae resulting from these researches were tested during the 
exceptionally cold winter of 1878-79 by many explosions under thick 



































19 

ice. The intensity at the edge of the circular crater produced by the 
explosion of a dynamite cartridge inserted through a small hole, was 
compared with those resulting from much larger charges at greater 
depths. The formulae uniformly indicated like intensities at these 
points, thus confirming their trustworthy character. 

In 1878 the old schooner that had been used to maneuver the crate 
was blown up, to illustrate the nature of the strains of a sub-aqueous 
explosion upon a vessel. Six cameras were employed to record the 
result. Their exposures were regulated by the explosion of electrical 
fuzes fired from a key board, the same circuit recording the exact time 
on a chronograph. The first view, taken at the instant when the mine 
exploded,shows the vessel lifted high amidships,with bow and stern de¬ 
pressed. This phase passed so rapidly that the eye failed to distin¬ 
guish it. The maximum height of the water jet (180 feet) was 
reached in 2.3 seconds, showing the air full of fragments. In 4.3 
seconds only a cloud of mist and smoke remained over the wreck. 
At this date the dry plate process had not been introduced and these 
highly successful pictures taken by the wet plate process reflect great 
credit on the photographic detail. Another sample of good photo¬ 
graphic work was secured about this same date. A condemned mule 
was k id led by exploding a cartridge of dynamite behind his ears. 
The exposure of the plate was caused by the explosion of a second fuze 
in the same electrical circuit. The picture showed the animal still 
standing, with his front legs slightly bent but with his head detached 
and hanging by a strip of skin against his breast. 

The best kind of electrical fuzes for igniting the mines was deter¬ 
mined by a long series of experimental investigations involving novel 
apparatus. Both high tension and low tension varieties were included. 

The kind and shapes of torpedo cases and anchors received like at¬ 
tention, including resistance to blows from the largest class of steam¬ 
ers navigating Long Island Sound, moving at full speed, and actual 
submergence through a full period of five years. A knowledge of 
the degree of buoyancy necessary to prevent too much depression by 
strong currents was obtained at Hell Gate, in 1874, by a series of 
elaborate measurements, over 400 in number. A large scow was an¬ 
chored bow and stern in 50 feet of water. Torpedoes of different 
shapes were held down by their anchors nearby. Graduated lines sup¬ 
ported by fishing poles rose from their top rings, allowing the exact de¬ 
pression from the vertical to be noted at any instant. The velocity 
of the current, ranging at different stages of the tide from zero to five 


20 


miles per hour, was measured by three independent methods and the 
corresponding depressions were read on the graduated lines. These 
data made known the constants of the desired depression formula. 
Such were the investigations which determined our adopted patterns 
of submarine mines. 

At a later date a device was perfected by which either buoyant or • 
ground mines, while quite safe to handle, would automatically become 
dangerous a few moments after submergence. 

After trials of various experimental devices, the final patterns of 
circuit closers, batteries, testing apparatus, operating boxes, etc., were 
perfected, and a definite system for disposing the mines in grand 
groups or skirmish lines was adopted in 1874. The operating boxes, 
included an arrangement by which the fire of guns previously pointed 
to sweep the lines of mines would be provoked at any locality by an 
attempt there at countermining. At this date 600 miles of torpedo 
cable and 300 mines had been procured; a new Torpedo Laboratory 
for officers and a building for the instruction of the enlisted men had 
been completed; a preliminary Manual had been issued in the form 
of a Battalion Order dated December 10, 1873; and the Board of En¬ 
gineers had taken up the study of detailed projects for the defence of 
the harbors of the United States. In a word submarine mining passed 
at about this date from the field of investigation to that of practical 
application, in this country. 

But it must by no means be inferred that researches in this direc¬ 
tion were not actively continued. The Smith movable torpedo driven 
by ammoniacal gas and steered from the shore by electricity had early 
been the subject of practical trials at Willets Point. It was succeeded 
by the Sims fish torpedo, driven and steered by electricity from the 
shore, with which many elaborate trials were made involving accurate 
tracking by triangulation at intervals of a few seconds, and complete 
records of the power developed at the dynamo and expended at each 
point of the run. These trials called for the cooperation of nearly 
every officer at the Post, and of many of the enlisted men. Sufficient 
success was had to cause the purchase of a few of the torpedoes to 
place in store. At this date the electrical transmission of power was 
in its infancy, and few experiments in this country antedate these 
researches at Willets Point. 

It is pleasant to remember that during these investigations the most 
cordial relations existed between ourselves and the Naval Torpedo 
School at Newport, then in charge of Commander E. O. Mathews. 


wum 





















21 

Visits were often exchanged, and any new ideas were mutually com¬ 
municated. 

Experiments to develop the utility of electric light projectors for 
protecting mine-fields against countermining were conducted in the 
early days at Willets Point, when the use of this kind of light was so 
new as. to attract many spectators. The first projector was a silvered 
parabolic reflector, served by from 50 to 200 Grove cells. Later an 
Alliance magneto-electric machine was used, and then a more modern 
dynamo, with a glass lens of the form used by the Light House Board 
but computed for the electric light. 4 he conclusion was reached, 
in 1874, that this accessory in the defence of mine-fields is very use¬ 
ful in clear dark nights, of comparatively little value in bright moon¬ 
light nights, and of no value in fogs. Also that the observer must be 
at a considerable distance from the lens. 

The proof edition of the Submarine Mining Manual was completed 
and printed on the Battalion press in 1877. This, after testing by 
practical use, was replaced by a new edition formally adopted by the 
Department, to which I put the last touches after being relieved from 
duty at Willets Point in 1886. 

As the defence of the seacoast by submarine mines, assigned to the 
Corps of Engineers by Congress, involved study in several branches 
which hardly formed part of the curriculum at West Point, a new 
question was early presented as to the best mode of certainly making 
the young officers proficient in this duty. At first they were put upon 
a roster and detailed weekly by twos for such assistance as might be 
required, and to spend at least six hours daily in the laboratory, mak¬ 
ing use of the library and instruments for personal study of electricity, 
modern explosives, etc. No recitations or examinations were re¬ 
quired. Finding from the examinations for promotion that in a few 
cases this plan was not entirely successful, a change was announced in 
the Instruction Order of November 9, 1882. The three Captains 
were constituted,under the Commanding officer,a Board of Instruction. 
They were individually to take military charge, for one week in turn, 
of the buildings and details of officers and enlisted men, and to direct 
the courses of reading, experiments and drills. The student officers 
were divided into two classes according to their periods of service 
with the troops. Semi-annual examinations before this Board (four 
for each officer) were prescribed; and a regular programme for each of 
them was laid down. This plan worked well, and it is believed was 
equally effective and less onerous for the officers than would have 


22 


been recitations and marks. As this important Battalion Order, and 
indeed the entire series subsequent to July, 1879, are to be found in 
print in the Annual Reports of the Chief of Engineers, no further de¬ 
tails are needed here. 

It is a little singular, but is nevertheless a fact, that the establish¬ 
ment was officially recognized as a Torpedo School prior to its recog¬ 
nition as an Engineer School of Application. General Sherman, who 
often visited Willets Point and took great interest in the researches 
in submarine mining, issued the following order through the Adju¬ 
tant General’s Office on August 30, 1880. 

"When the number of subaltern officers absent from any of the ar¬ 
tillery regiments does not exceed eleven, the commanding officer of 
such regiment is authorized, with the approval of the department 
commander, to order one subaltern to Willets Point, New York, Jan¬ 
uary 1st of each year, to serve six full months, to receive instruction 
in torpedo service." 

Under this order a class of, Artillery officers annually took the course 
in submarine mining under the conditions prescribed in Battalion 
Order of January 3, 1881, which gave them in all respects the same 
advantages as the Engineers. During my tour of duty these officers 
were: 

Class of 1881—1st Lieut. E. L. Zalinski, 5th Artillery; 1st Lieut. 
J. E. Eastman, 2d Artillery; 1st Lieut. A. H. Merrill, 1st Artillery. 

Class of 1882—1st Lieut. W. P. Edgerton, 2d Artillery; 2d Lieut. 
J. C. Bush, 5th Artillery. 

Class of 1883—2d Lieut. J. L. Chamberlain, 1st Artillery; 2d 
Lieut. H. A. Schroeder, 4th Artillery; 2d Lieut. M. C. Richards, 2d 
Artillery. 

Class of 1884—1st Lieut. I. T. Webster, 1st Artillery; 2d Lieut. 
W. P. Newcomb, 5th Artillery; 2d Lieut. O. M. Lissak, 4th Artil¬ 
lery; 2d Lieut. J. T. Thompson, 2d Artillery. 

Class of 1885—1st Lieut. H. H. Ludlow, 3rd Artfl 1 ery; 2d Lieut. 
C. P. Townsley, 4th Artillery; 2d Lieut. H. C. Carbaugh, 5th Artil¬ 
lery; 2d Lieut. S. Rodman, Jr., 1st Artillery. 

Class of 1886—1st Lieut. Allyn Capron, 1st Artillery; 2d Lieut. 
C. G. Treat, 5th Artillery; 2d Lieut. I. N. Lewis, 2d Artillery. 

Upon the completion of the course a report was made to the Com¬ 
manding General of the Army, giving for each Artillery officer the 
opinion of the Board of Instructors as to his absolute fitness for 
detail in case of war, indicated under one of four grades, viz: 


23 


competent to plant and operate, competent to operate, competent as an 
assistant, or deficient. No classification as to relative proficiency was 
made in these reports. 

For the instruction of the enlisted men in submarine mining, a sys¬ 
tematic course was early inaugurated. At first an old carpenters’ 
shop, subsequently replaced by a fine new building, was used as a lab¬ 
oratory for instruction in loading torpedoes, charging junction boxes, 
making joints in electric cables, operating the dial telegraph, and 
many other details of the service. During the summer season the 
soldiers were practiced in planting and raising mines; in firing them; 
in the boat service generally, making use for the latter of pontons, pon¬ 
ton rafts, a small steam launch, and finally of a fine new steamboat 
(for description see page 51, Annual Report of Chief of Engineers 
for 1886), designed specially for the purpose and named the David 
Bushnell, in memory of the pioneer in the use of sub-aqueous explo¬ 
sions for the destruction of shipping, who was a Captain of Engineers 
in the army of the Revolution. Instruction in this branch of the 
school was directed by the officers of the weekly torpedo detail, aided 
by sergeants who had become experts in the duty. Officers of that 
day will remember in this connection Sergt. Conklin, Sergt. Nolty, 
Sergt. Kelly, Sergt. Warner and Sergt. Brown. 

SPECIAL RESEARCHES AT WILLETS POINT. 

The first work of this kind was done in August, 1867. The intro¬ 
duction of armor and heavy guns on ships of war had raised many new 
questions as to the planning of works for coast defence. General 
Totten had always favored low sites, to secure the maximum advan¬ 
tages of ricochet fire. The new conditions suggested higher posi¬ 
tions for the batteries, to be armed with 15-inch guns, and the prob¬ 
lem arose to determine to what extent this involved a reduced length 
of ricochet trajectory dangerous to shipping. Observations to settle 
the question began on the Potomac in the summer of 1865, and were 
terminated by the officers of the Battalion in August, 1867, the firing 
being done for us by the artillery garrison at Fort Schuyler. The 
results in detail are given on pages 57-84 of No. 14, Professional 
Papers of the Corps of Engineers. 

At the time when experiments with explosives was begun at Willets 
Point the use of low tension fuzes was not common in economic 
blasting in this country. The market was stocked with high tension 
varieties, ignited by a spark given by a class of machines of which that 


24 


known by the name of the inventor, Mr. H. Julius Smith, was most 
common. The spark passing between terminals bedded in fulminat¬ 
ing copper determined the explosion. The extreme sensitiveness, and 
hence the dangerous character of these fuzes, will be understood when 
it is stated that they could be ignited by passing an ebonite comb a 
few times through the hair of a child standing on an insulating stool, 
and holding one end of a leading wire the other end of which was at¬ 
tached to one terminal of the fuze, the other terminal being in the air. 
Accidents were common, and the matter demanded attention. An ex¬ 
tremely delicate form of electrometer was devised by which sparks of 
known and regularly increasing quantity could be successively sent 
through the fuzeuntil its detonation indicated the minimum necessary. 
By the aid of this machine and the cooperation of Mr. Browne, a 
fuze manufacturer, a reasonably safe priming, known later as Browne 
No.4,was discovered and used fora time in our experiments. He put it 
upon the market, and supplied large numbers to the Hoosac Tunnel, 
where it probably saved many lives. These researches are reported in 
detail in No. XLVII of the Essayons Club series. At this same time 
General Newton was conducting the preliminary operations for the 
great blast at Hallets Point, and narrowly escaping a terrible acci¬ 
dent with one of the dangerous varieties, he took great interest in 
our researches at Willets Point, supplying me with samples of all his 
fuzes for test. This continued even after we had both of us adopted 
the low tension platinum wire fuze; and I was thus naturally led to 
study his special problem for the great blast, which demanded the fir¬ 
ing simultaneously and with absolute certainty an immense number 
of fuzes. A paper giving the results of my analysis was read before 
the National Academy of Sciences on April 18, 1876, and it forms No. 
XXXIX of the Essayons Club series. General Newton used the formulae 
# in arranging his circuits for the great blast of September 24, 1876 
(3680 fuzes), and again in that of Flood Rock in 1885 (591 fuzes), 
and with a success that left nothing to be desired. A conspicuous fail¬ 
ure at a large private blast near Albany, a few months after the former, 
illustrated the importance of mathematical treatment in such problems. 

General Humphreys, who always took interest in scientific investi¬ 
gations, appreciated the opportunity afforded by the explosion of 
about 50,000 pounds of dynamite at Hallets Point; and as General 
Newton had no facilities for measuring the velocity of transmission 
of the earth wave, assigned the duty to the Engineer Battalion. Deli¬ 
cate mercury seismometers were improvised at Willets Point, the 















25 


cooperation of the Western Union Telegraph Company was secured, 
and the velocity was measured over a range of about 13 miles. Full de¬ 
tails were read before the National Academy of Sciences on October 
18, 1876, and may be found in No. XL of the Esasyons Club Papers. 

The velocity of transmission proved to be about one mile per sec¬ 
ond, which so much exceeded that found many years before by Mr. 
Mallet from small gunpowder explosions in England that the investi¬ 
gation was continued at Willets Point, by taking advantage of the 
frequent firing of torpedoes ranging from 70 pounds of gunpowder to 
400 pounds of dynamite. The results were published in the Ameri¬ 
can Journal of Science for March, 1878. They suggested the follow¬ 
ing conclusions: "(1) A high magnifying power of telescope is 
essential with mercury seismometers. (2) The more violent the 
initial shock the higher is the velocity of transmission. (3) This 
velocity diminishes as the wave advances. (4) The movements of 
the earth’s crust are complex, consisting of many short waves, first 
increasing and then diminishing in amplitude; and, with a detonating 
explosive the interval between the first wave and the maximum wave 
at any station is shorter than with a slow burning explosive.” 

At the much larger explosion at Flood Rock, on October 10, 1885, 
the Battalion was charged with observations covering a wider range. 
The exploding charge consisted of 240,399 pounds of rackarock, hav¬ 
ing an intensity not inferior to that of dynamite No. 1, and of 48,537 
pounds of the latter added to insure the full detonation of the former, 
and to reduce by sympathetic explosion the number of fuzes to be sim¬ 
ultaneously fired. General Newton in his report states; "The speci¬ 
fications required that the rackarock should have a strength only of 90 
per cent that of No. 1 dynamite when fired under water and meas¬ 
ured by the method in use at the Engineer School of Application at 
Willets Point. But such care was taken by the contractors in select¬ 
ing their materials and such benefits derived from the careful deter¬ 
mination made at Willets Point experimentally, and from the analysis 
of the exact proportions of oil and chlorate to be used, as well as the 
thoroughness of the mixing of these ingredients, that the 71 samples 
tested showed an average strength of 109 per cent that of dynamite 
No. 1, no sample falling below 99 per cent.” 

At the explosion the whole Battalion was on duty. Captain Bailey 
was charged with determining the exact instant of explosion, in /5 
meridian time, to render available time records of volunteer observers. 
Captain Knight experimented with three novel types of seismographs 


26 


set up at Astoria. Lieut. Lusk directed the taking of photographs at 
the firing point to determine whether the explosion was simultane¬ 
ous in all the galleries. Three parties stationed along the telegraph 
line on Long Island and one at West Point received on their chrono¬ 
graphs each tick of the standard break circuit chronometer at the 
firing station, and also when the mine was fired a signal made by the 
same motion of the firing key that caused the explosion. The local 
records of arrival and du r ation of the earth wave were also recorded 
on the same chronograph sheet. Thus the instant of explosion and the 
instants of arriving and ending of earth movements at each station 
were registered in the time of one standard chronometer. This plan 
was an improvement on that used at the Hallets Point explosion, by 
which only the interval of time between the igniting of the charge 
and the arrival and ending of the tremor at each station was registered 
on the chronographs. By adding the ticks of the standard chrono¬ 
meter provision was made for referring everything to the same abso¬ 
lute time, permitting comparison to be made with the records at 
several outlying stations, off the line of the telegraph, but where the 
true time was known from local astronomical observations. Such 
stations were Willets Point, Goat Island, and the observatories of 
Harvard College and Hamilton College, the latter extending the range 
of observation to a distance of about 175 miles from Flood Rock. 
At Willets Point not only was a mercury seismograph used but also as 
a check a Thompson reflecting galvanometer so adjusted as to be 
specially sensitive to local tremors. 

My report to General Newton (page 691 of the Annual Report of 
the Chief of Engineers for 1886) fully covers the details of these in¬ 
vestigations not only for the two great explosions but also for the 
similar special observations at Willets Point. It is therefore enough 
to state here that the earth wave at the Flood Rock explosion moved 
northward through rock at a velocity of nearly four miles per second, 
and eastward through the drift formation of Long Island at a more 
variable rate but nowhere exceeding about three miles per second. 
The Flood Rock charge was about six times as great, and the rate of 
transmission about three times as great, as those noted at the Hallets 
Point explosion. 

MILITARY PEACE RECORD OF THE BATTALION. 

On December 3, 1869, the Battalion was ordered with other troops 
to Brooklyn to support the Collector in suppressing some illicit 
distilleries near the Navy Yard. This duty was performed in a way to 


27 


receive the official thanks of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
communicated through the Department Commander. 

Again, on November 3, 1870, the Battalion was ordered to Brook¬ 
lyn on like duty. 

In the same year the Battalion was ordered to New York City and, 
with other troops from the forts, was held in reserve to suppress anti¬ 
cipated election disturbances, which, however, did not occur. 

In the great Railroad Riots of 1877 the Battalion took an active 
part*, with all available regular troops. It proceeded to Baltimore on 
the night of July 1st, and while en route to relieve one of the regi¬ 
ments of the National Guard ai its armory had a soldier in ranks 
knocked senseless by a brick thrown by a rioter. The incident had 
a ludicrous ending. The Battalion was marching in column of Com¬ 
panies, and Captain Livermore seeing his men likely to trample on 
the fallen soldier commanded "Halt” in so loud a tone that the en¬ 
tire Battalion obeyed the order. Marching at a right shoulder the 
men naturally came to a carry, and did it so perfectly in unison that 
the mob which crowded the street mistook it for the first movement 
of firing. A wild panic instantly occurred. Men rushed in every 
direction, one plunging head first through a window into a neighbor¬ 
ing house. The street was effectually cleared, and we had no further 
annoyance in reaching the armory. On July 26th the Battalion was 
transferred to Philadelphia, and on August 2d to Easton, Pennsyl¬ 
vania, where it remained in camp until August 17tn, when it was or¬ 
dered back to Willets Point. General Hancock officially commended its 
services in the following letter, signed by his A. A. Adjutant General: 

"I am directed by the Major General Commanding the Division to 
say, that, orders having been issued relieving you from duty in the 
field, he takes the occasion to tender to you, and the officers and sol¬ 
diers of your Battalion,his thanks for the soldierly manner in which all 
have preformed the arduous and delicate duties assigned them during 
the recent disorders. He further instructs me to say that the bearing 
and discipline of tne Battalion have been admirable throughout, and 
that the services rendered by it deserve the highest commendation.” 

Such commendation from a soldier of General Hancock s record 
can hardly be appreciated too highly. 

At the explosions at Hallets Point and Flood Rock the Battalion 
was called upon to preserve order and guard the public property, and 
it received the thanks of General Newton for the ''prompt and effi¬ 
cient” manner in which it was done. 


28 


The Battalion formed part of the escort of regular troops at the 
funerals of General Thomas and of Admiral Farragut, and held the 
right of the line at that of General Meade, its old Commander whose 
Headquarters it had so often followed in the Civil War. 

The Battalion took a prominent position in the regular service when 
the establishment of the rifle range at Creedmoor, in 1873, at¬ 
tracted general attention to this important element of military effi¬ 
ciency. The order of the War Department prescribing the system of 
instruction in markmanship laid down in Heth’s Target Practice, 
and carried into effect by Battalion Order of March 23, 1867, had 
been scrupulously obeyed, and the men were already experts in shoot¬ 
ing the rifle. The results of this practice, with the names and strings 
of the Company and Battalion prizemen, had been annually announced 
in orders since 1867. Indeed in 1869 the annual Army target prize, 
a large silver medal, had been awarded, it is believed for the first time, 
to private J. W. Miller of Company E. This prize had been open for 
competition to the entire army since 1862. 

Individual and team practice at Creedmoor by our officers and men 
began soon after the opening of the range in 1873. In the first thirteen 
years, at the regular Spring and Fall Meetings, 117 individual prizes 
were won by them, using the Springfield rifle often in competition 
with sporting arms. Many team matches were also shot during this 
period, of which the following are the most noteworthy. 

The Short Range Military Team Match .—Open to teams of five men 
duly certified to be members of the Company they represent in any 
organization of the National Guard of any State, or of the Regular 
Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. Distance 200 yards; position, stand¬ 
ing; rounds, seven. 1 he prize was a handsome embroidered flag, to 
be held by the winner for one year, and to become a permanent trophy 
after being won three times by the same organization. This was 
sharply contested for eight years, by about a dozen competitors. Dur¬ 
ing this period it ornamented the barracks of Company B twice, of 
Company C twice, and in 1883 it became the permanent trophy of the 
latter. 

The Army and Navy Journal Match .—Open to teams of twelve from 
all regularly organized military organizations in the United States. 
Their own uniform to be worn, and their own rifle to be used. Dis¬ 
tance 500 yards; rounds, seven. I his prize, too, was to be won three 
times before becoming the property of the winning organization. It 
was shot for ten times, and was sharply contested often by nearly 




















29 


twenty teams. It was won in 1878 and again in 1881 by the Battal¬ 
ion,but was finally lost, in 1883, to the 7th Regiment of New Jersey 
National Ouard, which had about 900 men to draw upon for its team 
while the Battalion had only about 150. 

Ihe Company Match . Open to the National Guard and Regular 
Army. Teams of five men; distance 200 yards; match shot June 3, 
1879; 8 competiting teams. Company C of the Battalion took 1st 
prize; Company B, 2d prize; and Company A, 3rd prize. 

The Military Team Match. Open to the National Guard and Regu¬ 
lar Army. Teams of four men; distance 500 yards; match shot on 
same day as last; 6 competiting teams; two from the Battalion won 
1st and 2d prizes. 

The Skirmishers' Match .—This novel match was shot at the Fall 
Meeting in 1881. It was open to members of the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and to the National Guard, Volunteers, or Militia of 
any country. Each competitor to advance from the 600 to the 200 
yard range and return, making five halts in each passage. Twenty 
rounds were allowed to each man, and elaborate rules were prescribed 
for their use. Many soldiers competed, and the prize was won by 
private John Cavanagh of Company C. In transmitting it Major 
General Hancock, as President of the National Rifle Association, 
wrote to me: 

"I send you herewith the 'Traver’s Badge,’ the first prize in the 
skirmishing match at Creedmoor—which was won by private John 
Cavanagh of your command. 

"This match is one in which I take a special interest, as intro¬ 
ducing a new departure in rifle matches. ;; It was my desire 

to show my appreciation of this match by presenting personally this 
badge at the close of the contest, hut I regret I was unable to do so. 

"I, therefore, transmit the badge to you with the request that you 
will present it to private Cavanagh, its winner, in front of his bat¬ 
talion, and in so doing convey to him and to his officers and comrades 
my congratulations upon his success, as well as the pleasure I feel in 
seeing that the Army is able to show that it can hold its own in prac¬ 
tical military rifle shooting.” 

Under the competitions for the Nevada Trophy, prescribed in Gen¬ 
eral Order No. 45 from the Headquarters of the Army, dated May 
11, 1881, Company C of the Battalion took second place in 1881 and 
third place in 1882, the firing being open to all companies and bat- 
eries of the entire Army. 


30 


Under the provisions of General Order No. 53 Headquarters of 
the Army, series of 1882, establishing competitions for Department, 
Division and Army prizes for markmanship, the Battalion of Engi¬ 
neers had the distinguished honor of sending a marksman and alter¬ 
nate to report to the Commanding General of the Department of the 
Missouri to form part of the Army team of twelve soldiers selected by 
competition for the competition at Fort Leavenworth, in 1882. 
Sergt. Charles Barrett of Company B was selected to represent the 
Battalion,with Corporal Doyle of Company A as alternate, after care¬ 
ful competition at Willets Point. The match, at ranges of 200, 300 
and 600 yards, was shot on October 25, 26, 27, 1882, and Sergt. 
Barrett won the first prize, a large gold medal, which he received from 
the hands of General Sherman. Thus did the Battalion a second time 
win the prize for markmanship open for competition to the entire army. 

Sergt. Barrett was sent again in October, 1884 to compete at the bi¬ 
annual Fort Leavenworth match for the Army prize. There were 
twelve competitors and he won the fourth of the six prizes, a large 
silver medal presented in person by General Sherman. Shortly after, at a 
special prize match offered by the citizens of St. Louis to the six win¬ 
ners of the Army prizes, Sergt. Barrett won the first prize. 

The foregoing military peace record of the Battalion makes it evi¬ 
dent that, although much time and attention are given to matters form¬ 
ing no part of the training of other troops, the military efficiency of the 
soldiers is by no means impaired thereby. Neither officers nor enlisted 
men have ever failed when brought to this test. 

END OF TENTATIVE DEVELOPMENT. 

It will be appreciated from what has gone before that the develop¬ 
ment of the Engineer School of Application was a very gradual pro¬ 
cess. To furnish the officers with every possible facility for perfect¬ 
ing themselves in a knowledge of the practical duties of the Corps, 
had been kept steadily in view, and an advance had been made as rap¬ 
idly as the means at hand would permit. A fairly good library had at 
last been secured; and a valuable collection of models illustrating 
bridges, ponton trains, military mining, river improvements, harbor 
improvements, and other engineering works had been accumulated, 
partly by utilizing the labor of skilled artisans in the Battalion, and 
partly by soliciting contributions in kind from officers of the Corps 
directing important public works. General Wright who had suc¬ 
ceeded General Humphreys as Chief of Engineers, and whowas per¬ 
fectly familiar with the conditions at Willets Point,considered at length 


31 


that the time had come for a more formal recognition of the establ¬ 
ishment, and early in 1884 he called upon me for a succinct state¬ 
ment of the conditions existing at the School of Application. The 
following letter was written in reply. 

Battalion of Engineers, 
Willets Point, Whitestone P. O., 
Queens County, New York, 

February 6 , 1884. 

General H. G. Wright, 

Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. 

GENERAL: In reply to your instructions of the 28th ult., I have the 
honor to submit the following statement of the course of practical and 
theoretical instruction adopted and now carried out at Willets Point, for 
graduates of the U. S. Military Academy assigned to the Corps of Engi¬ 
neers. 

It is proper to premise that the School of Application, during the past 
17 years, has gradually developed from an ordinary military Post to its 
present organization, and that progress has by no means ceased. 

At the end of the War the Battalion of Engineers was ordered here 
from the held, to garrison and construct a new Post, and establish a depot 
for the bridge equipage and stores of Engineer material on hand. No 
permanent barracks or storehouses existed, and use was first made of the 
temporary buildings erected for the Grant General Hospital. The com¬ 
pany officers of all grades bad been graduated during the war and conse¬ 
quently had no experience in any of the civil duties of their Corps. At 
the outset every one was fully occupied in remodeling the buildings, in 
storing the material, and so far as time would permit in Engineer and 
Infantry drills. In a word, Willets Point differed in no essential particu¬ 
lar from the other military Posts of the Army. 

Shortly after his appointment as Chief of Engineers in 1866, General 
Humphreys inspected the establishment. He seemed to be impressed 
with three ideas: (1) That to command and properly instruct the com¬ 
panies a considerable detail of officers of the Corps would be permanently 
needed. (2) That this service should be apportioned among all the offi¬ 
cers in turn, thus giving them that practical experience with troops which 
the war had convinced every one was desirable. And (3) that, for the 
young officers, the duty should be combined with facilities for supple¬ 
menting theory, which time alone permits at West Point, with the prac¬ 
tice needful to make the knowledge available in the actual works 
intrusted to the Corps of Engineers. For various reasons he did not 


32 


consider it advisable to publish any general order on the subject; but in 
a personal conversation he instructed me under my own authority as Bat¬ 
talion Commander to require such professional exercises both civil and 
military as the facilities at hand would permit, informing me that, as a 
rule, the tour of duty for Captains and Battalion Staff officers would be 
about four years, and that immediately after graduation at the Military 
Academy the young officers would all be sent here for about two and a 
half years before assignment to other duty. 

The general system thus inaugurated in 1866 has been carried out as 
closely as circumstances would permit up to the present time. Very little 
money has been available; but the steady support of the Chief of Engi¬ 
neers, and the interest and cooperation of the officers of the Battalion, 
have rendered it possible to overcome many difficulties; and, in my judg¬ 
ment, the School of Application now supplies a need of which every 
officer of the Corps was sensible before the war. 

I shall not attempt to trace the gradual advance, which is sufficiently 
indicated by the file of Battalion Orders and by my annual reports. The 
following is the present status of the School. 

The three Captains, in addition to the military command of their com¬ 
panies, are each charged with special branches of instruction, and, together 
with the Battalion Commander, constitute a permanent Board of In¬ 
structors. The Battalion Staff officers (usually 1st Lieutenants of several 
years’ experience) also act as instructors in certain branches, in addition 
to their regular military duties. The recent graduates are attached to the 
companies, and beside the ordinary routine of a military Post, which is 
strictly enforced, enjoy many advantages for becoming familiar with var¬ 
ious branches of civil and military engineering. The enlisted men are 
instructed both theoretically and practically bv their Company officers. 

The course is divided into two parts, winter extending from December 
1st to April 30th, and summer covering the rest of the year. The first 
is chiefly in laboratories, and is somewhat theoretical in character; the last 
includes, also, exercises and practice out of doors. 

By persistent effort the School has finally become well provided with 
apparatus. We now have a fine electrical and torpedo laboratory; a very 
convenient photographic laboratory; the best field astronomical observa¬ 
tory I have ever seen; a museum containing valuable models both military 
and civil; a new modeling room (now under construction to replace the 
old one) for moulding in sand on a scale of i every kind of field fortifi¬ 
cation, including parallels and saps; a good range for target practice, with 
a room for gallery practice in the winter; an ample supply of surveying 


33 


instruments, a self-registering tide gauge, current meters, Sz c.; and finally 
the nucleus of a professional library. So soon as practicable a small build¬ 
ing will be erected for magnetic and meteorological observatories (the 
present one is not suitable), and a shed for practice with base measuring 
apparatus. 

Perhaps the best way to explain the system of instruction is to indicate 
the duties of a young graduate from the time he joins the Battalion from 
West Point, until he has completed his first tour. (Most officers of the 
Corps return again as Captains and sometimes as Staff officers). 

The new officers usually report from West Point early in October. 
The first two months are spent in becoming familiar with routine military 
duties, including practice with the sextant for regulating the Post time 
when officer of the day. These military duties of course continue during 
the whole period of service with the troops. 

The first winter course (five months) includes 14 weeks of study in 
the Torpedo Laboratory, with two examinations before the Board of In¬ 
structors (January 31st and April 30); these examinations continue about 
five hours and cover the whole of the Torpedo Manual, in prescribed 
portions; 8 weeks of study and practical work in the Photographic Labo¬ 
ratory ; two consecutive days of hourly meteorological observations, with 
the study of Colonel Williamson’s report upon barometric hypsometry 
and the reduction of a part of the whole series (60 days’ observations) 
made by the officers and non-commissioned officers; and lastly the con¬ 
ducting of some of the recitations of the non-commissioned officers of his 
Company, under the direction of the Captain. 

7Te first summer course (7 months) includes frequent weekly details 
(fixed by number of officers for duty) for torpedo practice on the water 
and in the Labaratory, and for aiding the Battalion Commander in the 
investigations in submarine mining in progress; systematic instruction in 
practical astronomy, covering the use of the astronomical transit and 
zenith telescope, the sextant upon stars for time and latitude, and the per¬ 
sonal equation machine—the extent of this work may be inferred from 
the fact that the observatory is in use on every pleasant night from May 
1st to December 1st; the survey of one square mile of "round, including 
transit and stadia work and contours with the spirit level; the making of 
foot reconnaissances with pocket compass and hand level; and, under the 
direction of the Captain, the instruction of the enlisted men in Infantry 
drill, target practice, military reconnaissance, the use of the railroad 
transit, field fortification in the moulding room, ponton drill on land and 
on the water, and sometimes in military mining on land. The reduced 


/ 


34 


force of the Battalion renders some of these drills unsatisfactory at pres¬ 
ent, and deprives the officers at well as the men of much valuable 
experience. 

The second winter course includes 7 weeks in the Torpedo Laboratory, 
with two examinations before the Board of Instructors (January 30th and 
and April 29th); these examinations are each about five hours long, an 1 
cover the investigations in submarine mining made here during the past 
15 years, and a study of all foreign systems and experiments so far as 
known ; 8 weeks of study and practical work in the Photographic Lab¬ 
oratory, thus completing the course, which covers making negatives with 
gelatine emulsion plates, silver printing, map printing including glass and 
paper negatives, the blue process, etc., photo-lithography, heliotype pro¬ 
cess, &c.; two consecutive days of hourly meteorological observations and 
reductions, as before; and lastly aiding in conducting the Company reci¬ 
tations, as before. 

The second summer course includes the frequent weekly details for 
torpedo practice, as before; instruction in practical astronomy completed, 
including the use of the latest patterns of combined transit and zenith 
telescope instruments, and of the 5.5 inch equatorial telescope; tertiary 
triangulation and hydrographic work, with current measurements and the 
use of the self-registering tide gauge; and the instruction of the enlisted 
men in their various drills and exercises, as before. So soon as the neces¬ 
sary buildings can be prepared, practice in field magnetic observations and 
in the use of the Repsold base apparatus will be included in this summer’s 
work. 

The third winter course includes 7 weeks in the Torpedo Laboratory, 
devoted to such reviews and investigations as the officer may select for 
himself, and in daily lectures and instruction to the enlisted men, under 
the Captain in charge—no examination is required; the meteorological 
observations as before; the preparation of drawings and a memoir upon 
some prescribed problem in permanent fortification or in the operations 
of an army in the field, which after revision and discussion by the Board 
of Instructors in the presence of the officer is transmitted to the Chief of 
Engineers; and finally the aiding in the Company recitations, as before. 

I he tour of the officer at Willets Point is supposed to terminate about 
May 1st, when the opening of the season creates a demand for assistants 
on the several works. 

It may be added that in the fortifications at Fort Schuyler and Willets 
Point a fine opportunity is afforded to study in detail the development at 
all marked epochs during the past fifty years. 







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35 


In conclusion, I would invite attention to three points, which in my 
judgment are of no little importance to the success of the School of Ap¬ 
plication. (1) The young officers should always complete their regular 
tours. (2) The Captains and Battalion Staff officers should be relieved 
by their successors before quitting the Post. They all occupy responsible 
positions which cannot be left vacant without more or less confusion. 
(3) The number of our enlisted men, as now authorized, is not only 
wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the Country should it become 
necessary to defend the coasts with torpedoes, or to put an army into the 
field, but is also insufficient for the preparatory instruction of both offi¬ 
cers and men in their special military duties. The whole three Companies, 
recruited as they now are to only one-third of the organization fixed by 
law, cannot perform the ordinary guard and police duties of a Post 
like this and at the same time furnish enough men to properly con¬ 
struct a military bridge, to make a land mine or field fortification in any 
reasonable time, or even to permit of a satisfactory battalion drill. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

HENRY L. ABBOT, 

Lieut. Col. of Engineers, Bvt. Brig. Gen., U. S. A. 

General Wright was retired from active service in March, 1884, 
before taking further action in regard to the School of Application. 
The Secretary of War, Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, visited the Post in 
July, 1884, in company with General Newton who had succeeded 
General Wright, and he was so much impressed with what he saw 
that he immediately authorized an increase of 250 men in the garrison, 
thus raising the effective strength of the Engineer Battalion from 200 
men to 450 men. General Newton was also authorized to call upon 
the Board of Engineers for a report looking to a formal recognition 
of the School of Application by the War Department. The follow¬ 
ing document makes known the result. 

Office of the Chief of Engineers, 
United States Army, Washington, D. C., 

February 20 , 1885 . 

Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, 

Secretary of War. 

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the Board of 
Engineers for Fortifications, &c., upon the reorganization of the Engineer 
School of Application at Willets Point, made in compliance with instruc¬ 
tions based upon your authority as granted in indorsement upon my letter 
of August 18, 1884. 


36 


In submitting this report I have to say that the first condition neces¬ 
sary to make the school at Wdiets Point efficient as a practical school of 
instruction for Engineer Officers is to insure its permanency, 

BOARD OF VISITORS.. 

The Board of Engineers for Fortifications, &c., in New York, together 
with such other officers of the Corps of Engineers above the rank of 
Major as shall be stationed in New York City, should constitute a Board 
of Visitors, which should visit the school at. least twice in each year and 
make a thorough and detailed inspection of everything connected with it, 
submitting a report thereof to the Secretary of War, through the Chief of 
Engineers, with such recommendations in reference to the school as may 
be deemed necessary, 

ACADEMIC STAFF, 

The Academic Staff of the School should consist of the Commanding 
Officer, at least one other field officer, and the Captains commanding the 
companies; the Adjutant of the Battalion of Engineers should be the 
secretary, 

TOURS OF DUTY. 

The tours of duty of the Commanding Officer and of the Field Offi¬ 
cers detailed for the school should be as long as possible, subject to the 
exigencies of the service. 

The regular tour of the Captains should not be less than three years, 
and only one of them should be relieved in any single year. 

As the duty of instruction in some branches of the profession will 
probably devolve upon the Adjutant and Quartermaster* who should be 
First Lieutenants of high rank, the tour of each should be not less than 
three years, and only one of them should be relieved in any one year. 

GRADUATES ASSIGNED TO THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 

All graduates of the Military Academy who may be assigned to the 
Corps of Engineers, at the expiration of their graduating leave, should, as 
far as circumstances will permit, be ordered to the School of Application 
at Willets Point, and their tour of service should not be less than two 
and a half years. 

LIBRARY. 

Provision should be made from the appropriation for incidental ex¬ 
penses of the Engineer Depot at Willets Point for the annual purchase 
of a few new standard books for the library of the school. 


INSTRUCTION OF ENLISTED MEN. 


"The enlisted men of the Battalion of Engineers should be instructed 
not only in their duties as soldiers of the line of the Army, but also in 
sapping,, mining, pontoneering, the duties of a Torpedo Corps, Sec. 

The non-commissioned officers of the Battalion should receive theo¬ 
retical as well as practical instruction. 

REORGANIZATION OF THE ENGINEER SCHOOL OF APPLICATION. 

The following plan of reorganization of the school, mainly a repetition 
of the ideas submitted in the report of the Board of Engineers, is recom¬ 
mended for approval. 

The Establishment shall be designated The Engineer School of Applica¬ 
tion of the Army of the United States. It shall be divided into five 
departments, as follows: 

Submarine Mining .—Including electricity, our own and foreign sys¬ 
tems of defensive torpedo warfare, and modern high explosives. 

Military'Engineering ,—Including the operations of armies in the field, 
seacoast defence, modern siege operations, and modern ordnance. 

Military Photography .—Including all methods of map multiplication 
in the field and the use of the camera. 

Practical Astronomy .—Including the best methods and the use of in¬ 
struments employed upon the more important boundary surveys. 

Civil Engineering .—Including practical surveying, river and harbor 
improvements, and barometric hypsometry. 

OBJECT OF ESTABLISHMENT. 

The object of the establishment should be to conduct researches in the 
branches of science applicable to the duties of the Corps of Engineers, to 
instruct newly assigned officers in the profession, and to train the enlisted 
men of the Battalion of Engineers to the highest possible degree of 
efficiency. 

COMMAND. 

The establishment, under the Chief of Engineers, should be under the 
military command of the officer of Engineers assigned to the command of 
the Post of Willets Point, N. Y. 

ACADEMIC STAFF. 

The Academic Staff should consist of the Commandant, of the other 
field officers of the school, and of the Captains commanding the Engi¬ 
neer companies stationed at Willets Point. 


38 


Any other officer charged with a department of instruction should be a 
member when his branch is under consideration. The Adjutant of the 
Battalion of Engineers should be secretary of the Academic Staff. 

STUDENTS. 

The students should consist of the subaltern officers serving with com¬ 
panies, of such other officers as may be authorized to study the course in 
whole or in part, and of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the 
Battalion of Engineers stationed at Willets Point. 

EXAMINATIONS. 

There should be two semi-annual examinations of the officers under 
instruction during the first and second years, and one during the last half 
year of their service with the Battalion. These examinations should be 
conducted by the Academic Staff in the presence of one or more members 
of the Board of Visitors. Careful records should be kept, which should 
be duly reported to the Chief of Engineers by the Commanding Officer 
of the Post. 

These semi-annual examinations should take place on or about the end 
of January and on or about the end of April. 

Their scope, subject to the approval of the Chief of Engineers, should 
be designated by the Commandant on the recommendation of the Aca¬ 
demic Staff. 

Officers of other arms of service attached to the school should be ex¬ 
amined by the Academic Staff at such times as may be ordered by the 
Commandant, on the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and the results 
of such examinations should be reported, through the Chief of Engineers, 
to the General Commanding the Army when such officers are relieved 
from duty, or sooner if deemed expedient by the Academic Staff. 

RESEARCHES. 

The- researches to be conducted at Willets Point shall be such as may be 
approved by the Chief of Engineers. 

COURSE OF INSTRUCTION. 

I he annual course of instruction should be divided into two parts, 
winter and summer. The former, which will be chiefly library and 
laboratory work, should extend from about the first of December to about 
the end of April. The latter should include the rest of the year, and will 
be chiefly practical. So far as the season permits, theory and practice 
should at all times be combined. 























39 


During the summer season each member of the Academic Staff should 
be assigned by the Commandant to the charge of one of the departments 
of instruction, and so far as practicable this detail should be changed each 
year. In making such assignments, however, no Captain should be re¬ 
lieved of responsibilities which properly pertain to his military command. 

During the winter season the supervision of the course should be 
divided among the Academic Staff. 

I he following should be the general programme of instruction, the 
details being ordered by the Commandant, upon the approval of the 
Chief of Engineers, upon the recommendation of the Academic Staff, 
which shall designate the necessary text books. 


COURSE FOR OFFICERS 


The young officers should be required to assist in the various researches 
in military science conducted at Willets Point, with a view to familiariz¬ 
ing them with the methods employed in such work. 

Their technical course of study should be arranged as far as practicable 
upon the following basis; details should be arranged by the Academic 
Staff : 

1st winter. 2d winter. 3d winter. 


Submarine mining__ 14 weeks. 7 weeks. 

Chemistry and Military Photography - 4 weeks. 4 weeks. 

Military Engineering_ _ 7 weeks. 

Civil Engineering_ _ _ 


6 weeks. 


3 weeks. 
11 weeks. 


During the summer much time will be occupied by the regular com¬ 
pany duties, and it is not deemed possible to arrange the course as defi¬ 
nitely as for winter. The following schedule indicates the general 
disposition of time: 

1st summer. 2d summer. 

Submarine mining_ 7 weeks. 6 weeks. 

Practical Astronomy_ 5 weeks. 6 weeks. 

Military Engineering_Sapping, mining, and pontoniering drills, infantry 

drills and target practice, with their companies. 
Civil Engineering_ 4 weeks. 7 weeks. 


COURSE FOR ENLISTED MEN. 

The course of instruction for the enlisted men of Engineers should 
be determined by the Academic Staff, and should be repeated annually, 
more care and time being devoted to recruits than to instructed soldiers. 

In submarine mining recruits should receive three months and instructed 
soldiers one month of drilling, covering seven hours daily. These drills 









40 


should include all the duties of the loading room, boat service, and the 
handling and firing of modern high explosives. Grand groups of mines 
should frequently be planted and raised, and the entire familiarity with 
the service which practice alone can give should be insisted upon. 

In field fortification and sapping each company should have one 
months’ regular practice in the moulding room, and such outside work 
as may be found practicable. 

In pontoniering each company should have two months’ regular prac¬ 
tice, arranged to include every part of the authorized manual. In mili¬ 
tary mining on land each company should have one months’ practice, 
including the construction and firing of mines charged with gunpowder 
and modern high explosives. In Infantry drill and target practice each 
company should be exercised enough to maintain the reputation already 
acquired by the Battalion in this necessary part of its duty. 

In foot reconnaissance and military map making all the non-commis¬ 
sioned officers and many selected privates should be thoroughly instructed. 
In military photography and the multiplication of maps in the field all 
the non-commissioned officers should receive regular instruction, which 
for men of special aptitude should be sufficiently extended to provide each 
company with skilled artisans to perform this work in war. 

The practice in simple reconnoitering and surveying, and in the use of 
the barometer already carried out should be continued not only for its 
own utility, but also to train the men in intelligence and in manual dex¬ 
terity in the use of instruments which their field duties often demand. 

As the object of this organization is to obtain a complete system of 
instruction, it is suggested that if the foregoing meet with approval, that 
such approval be given with the understanding that changes may be made 
from time to time by the Chief of Engineers, with the approval of the 
Secretary of War. 

I have also the honor to recommend that there be prepared at Willets 
Point, under the direction of the Board of Engineers, a torpedo manual, 
which will present the practical method of loading and anchoring tor¬ 
pedoes, making all electrical connections, and firing both single mines and 
groups; this manual should give concise description of all boats and 
machinery for planting torpedoes with expedition, and the whole subject 
of the torpedo system should be condensed in a course of instruction 
similar in scope to the drill for pontoniers. 

T he object of this manual is, without betraying anything which in the 
judgment of the Chief of Engineers it is important to keep secret, that 
officers and even intelligent non-commissioned officers who have been 






























41 


through the school of instruction, maybe enabled to plant torpedoes both 
singly and in groups, and to manipulate them efficiently and skillfully. 

In connection with the researches at Willets Point, the Commandant 
should from time to time inform the Board of Engineers for Fortifica¬ 
tions, through the Chief of Engineers, of every new discovery or inven¬ 
tion of this character, in order that the Board may be able to use such 
information in preparing the system of defence for various harbors through¬ 
out the E T nited States. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

JOHN NEWTON, 

Chief of Engineers, Brig, and Bvt. Mai. Gen., U. S. A. 

1st Indorsement, War Department, February 28, 1885. 

Approved: ROBERT T. LINCOLN, 

' Secretary of JVar. 

It seems fitting that this record of the early days of the Engineer 
School of Application should be brought to a close at the date of its 
formal recognition by the War Department. I remained in command 
about a year longer, but as will be seen by comparing the approved 
document with my letter above there was no radical change in the 
establishment. There were no recitations and no published marks, 
or standings. The school had attained its growth naturally, seeking 
to assist and not to drive officers in preparing for their life work. 
Such had been the basis of General Humphreys’ original plan and 
instructions. 

It only remains to name the Captains and Battalion staff officers 
who, as the instructors at Willets Point, had one and all most cor¬ 
dially and efficiently assisted in the work. They were in order of 
assignment: Captains Harwood, Howell, Holgate, Burnham, Mans¬ 
field, Ernst, Mackenzie, King, Raymond, Twining, Livermore, 
Cuyler, Mercur, Miller, Handbury, Gregory, Mallery, Ruffner, Price, 
Palfrey, Mahan, Bailey and Knight. Battalion Adjutants; Lieut- 
ants A. N. Lee, Maguire, Hinman, Heuer, Mercur, Bass, Leach, 
Greene, Quinn, Mallery, Fisk, Griffin, Willard, Bixby, Millis, 
Hodges, Warren, Crosby and Roessler. Battalion Quartermasters; 
Lieutenants Heap, Chase, Powell, Davis, Payson, Greene, Taber, 
Quinn, Griffin and Lusk. My association with these officers, and 
with the nearly fifty young students who have since so worthily main¬ 
tained the reputation of the Corps, will always form one of my most 
pleasant memories. 


















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